

Niccolò Machiavelli

DISCOURSES ON LIVY

Translated by

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
& NATHAN TARCOV

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ABBREVIATIONS

AW Machiavelli, *The Art of War*
D Machiavelli, *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*
FH Machiavelli, *Florentine Histories*
Livy Titus Livy, *Ab urbe condita*
NM Niccolò Machiavelli
P Machiavelli, *The Prince*

INTRODUCTION

In this introduction we offer a quick tour through Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*. We shall mark the four-star attractions that tourists will want to visit repeatedly and wish to remember. The great Machiavellian themes of politics, morality, fortune, necessity, and religion will be set forth, together with the controversies they have touched off. For Machiavelli, to say the least, did not write in such a mode as to prevent dispute about what he said. We consider the fact that Machiavelli wrote at the same time two very different books on the whole of politics, *The Prince* and the *Discourses*. We provide a brief appraisal of the latter's scholarly reputation today as the first source of classical republicanism, as the recollection of ancient liberty that calls us to venture from the settled and secure realm of property and self-interest. And we present Machiavelli himself, not a disengaged philosopher but the instigator in the schemes he advised, an actor in his own enterprise of bringing "new modes and orders . . . for [the] common benefit of everyone" (*D* I pr.1). As befits an introduction, we try to speak with both modesty and authority.

MACHIAVELLI AND THE RENAISSANCE

Machiavelli lived in the Renaissance, and the Renaissance lived in Machiavelli; the communion between the man and the time seems complete. Jacob Burckhardt, the nineteenth-century historian who established our idea of "the Renaissance" and who despite new discoveries still reigns over it, gave Machiavelli the greatest prominence in that period and allowed him to define its politics in the section of his famous book *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* titled "The State as a Work of Art."

The Renaissance is a rebirth, *the* rebirth of the classical times of ancient Greece and Rome. These times had already been reborn, one could say, with the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth century and his adoption by the Christian church, after initial rejections, through the immense achievements and good offices of Thomas Aquinas. It is not customary to consider the work of the scholastics as a renaissance, however, because the distinction between human reason and divine law, required for the adoption of the pagan Aristotle into Christian learning, did not liberate human beings

from the tutelage of the church. Even more wayward souls such as Dante or Marsilius of Padua in the early fourteenth century did not take this step; they remained within the broad ambit of scholasticism and stayed true to Aristotle. In Italy later in the fourteenth century Petrarch led a change in the direction of greater freedom from the church, which now seemed to require greater freedom from Aristotle. Petrarch criticized those who thought every problem could be solved by pronouncing the five syllables in Aristotle's name (so it is in Latin) and declared himself an admirer of Cicero.[1] Cicero became, as it has been said, the principal figure of the Renaissance. Cicero's rhetoric, as well as his philosophy, came to receive the attention of the learned, and the goal of Renaissance rhetoric became the promotion of a morality of Roman manliness (*virtus*) that Cicero had glowingly described.

This movement, led by Petrarch in Italy and including such illustrious names as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Marsilio Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola, was pronounced to be *the* Renaissance. Part of it is also known as humanism because it concentrated on humane studies, or the "humanities," rather than physics, metaphysics, and theology, and it was the immediate intellectual inheritance for anyone born in Machiavelli's time. But Machiavelli refused it almost totally and made his own way against his time. In the *Discourses* he refers to only three modern authors—Dante, Lorenzo de' Medici, and Flavio Biondo—in contrast to nineteen ancient ones. Although the notion of rebirth implies in itself dissatisfaction with current ways, Machiavelli was profoundly dissatisfied with the Renaissance he saw underway. At the beginning of the *Discourses* he complains that those of his time are content to honor antiquity by buying fragments of ancient statues for their homes and having them imitated rather than by imitating the "ancient virtue" in politics, of which no sign remains (*D* I pr.). To remedy their political ills, he continues, they go to the ancient jurists, not to the *examples* set by ancient princes, republics, and captains.

Thus Machiavelli accepts the necessity of returning to the ancients because they were superior to the moderns, but, waving aside the marvelous works of art created in his own lifetime and even in his own city of Florence under his very eyes, he calls for imitating the *deeds* of the ancients. He shares in the new esteem for Rome but carries it to the point of preferring Rome to Greece and adopting the imperial Roman republic, and not the Greek polis, as his model. Together with his six references to "ancient virtue" in the *Discourses* are four to *Roman* virtue but none to Greek. Ancient virtue is to be found mainly with the Romans, and especially in the

Roman historian Titus Livy, who narrates the deeds of the republican Romans. Because deeds take precedence over words, Rome has primacy over Greece and the historians over the philosophers. Machiavelli's complaint against the Renaissance can be seen in his low opinion of Cicero, not a hero for him. Cicero used rhetoric to advance the cause of philosophy, a Greek discovery, in a Rome suspicious of the influence of Greek softness. Machiavelli accuses both rhetoric and philosophy of attempting to rule deeds with words, and he shows sympathy for Cato's desire to rid Rome of foreign philosophy that corrupts the virtue of doers (*D* III 1.3; *FH* V 1). He too objects to softness, the idleness or leisure (*ozio*) of contemplators, both philosophic and religious, who look down on doers.

Despite its literal meaning as the "rebirth" of something old, the Renaissance is better known as the beginning of something new that has come to be called modernity. It is doubtful that the Renaissance would have that meaning were it not for Machiavelli. For modernity is not merely something new but also a new idea that favors innovation in principle and constantly promotes new ideas and institutions, a change that wants to be receptive to further change. Whatever is modern does not stay the same but keeps becoming more modern. Such are Machiavelli's "new modes and orders" in the *Discourses* and his new prince in *The Prince*. Nothing like Machiavelli's encouragement of innovation as such, topped off with the proud advertisement of his own originality, can be found in other writers of his time or before. If they were original, they disguised it by claiming merely to return to the true origins of an institution or an idea in the past before the present rot set in—as, for example, Marsilius of Padua claimed to be restoring original Christianity in his criticism of the church.

Machiavelli's claim of ancient virtue appears to have this character only at first glance. He praises ancient virtue in order to improve on it. He wants to free it from inhibitions placed on it by writers such as those who inconsiderately blamed Hannibal's cruelty when in fact it was one of his infinite virtues (*P* 18; *D* III 21.4, 40.1). This is what he means when in the first preface to the *Discourses* he speaks of the "true knowledge of the histories" that is lacking in his time and is responsible for the failure of moderns to have recourse to ancient examples (*D* I pr.2). Ancient virtue, it turns out, needs a Machiavellian interpretation to ensure that it is reported correctly. Even Livy, who is not the type to enthuse and philosophize about ancient virtue, and who is treated with such reverence by Machiavelli, needs at least occasionally, and perhaps generally, to be set right. Among other things, Livy did not properly appreciate the need for innovation; he did not

see that the ancient virtue of actual Romans brought opportunity to new men to enter upon new enterprises and make new conquests. When examined, ancient virtue turns out to show little respect for things ancient. Those with virtue, like Machiavelli himself, characteristically act without any respect (*sanza alcuno rispetto*, one of his favorite phrases).

The Machiavellian interpretation transforms ancient virtue into virtue proper, Machiavellian virtue. At the same time it changes the Renaissance from a rebirth of the ancient into the dawn of the new, the modern. When Machiavelli speaks of the "moderns," it is always with disrespect, as of the weak. He does not openly claim that the moderns can be stronger than the ancients, as Francis Bacon was to do. But he offers remedies for modern weakness that will have the effect of making the moderns stronger than the ancients. "Modernity" is the opinion that the moderns are, or can become, stronger than the ancients—that the moderns can benefit from an irreversible progress in their favor. Because of Machiavelli's contribution to the transformation of the Renaissance into modernity, one can say with faithfulness to both him and his time that he did as much for the Renaissance as it did for him.

THE *DISCOURSES ON LIVY* AND *THE PRINCE*

When we begin to examine Machiavelli's remedies for modern weakness, we come upon an obvious difficulty that has been much discussed. Machiavelli is most famous today as the author of *The Prince*, a witty and attractive, proudly original, short and apparently easy, but wicked and dangerous book that advises princes on how to "seize absolute authority" (*P* 9) and to learn how not to be good to their subjects and friends—in short, to be criminally wicked tyrants. But Machiavelli has also been famous among devotees of republics as the author of the *Discourses*, which by contrast is a long, forbidding, apparently nostalgic, obviously difficult, but decent and useful book that advises citizens, leaders, reformers, and founders of republics on how to order them to preserve their liberty and avoid corruption. The relation between the two books is notoriously obscure. How could two such books be written by the same man, apparently at more or less the same time?

The Prince appears from its first two chapters to be a dispassionate analysis of all kinds of principalities that does not include reasoning on republics only because its author has reasoned on them at length another time—that is, in the *Discourses*. But the reader soon perceives that its

author recommends the imitation especially of what he calls "new princes," private individuals who become princes of new states that they found. He emphasizes the most excellent and glorious examples of founders, such as Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, but he does not seem to distinguish them much from ordinary tyrants, such as Hiero of Syracuse, or even from infamous and criminal tyrants, such as Agathocles of Syracuse. Accordingly, he advises their imitators to come to power and rule by force and fraud.

In contrast, the *Discourses* not only includes reasoning about republics but recommends them over principalities. Machiavelli writes a chapter entitled "The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince" in which he proclaims that peoples are more stable and have better judgment than princes, that their governments are better, and that the people are superior in goodness and glory (*D* I 58.3). He adds that republics keep their word better than princes and therefore can be trusted more than princes (*D* I 59). He also argues that the common good is observed only in republics, whereas usually what suits a prince hurts the city and what suits the city hurts him (*D* II 2.1). So he concludes that "a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality" (*D* III 9.2). The *Discourses* praises republican founders and their peoples for their goodness and virtue and their love of liberty, the fatherland, and the common good (*D* I 9.2, 58.3–4; II 2).

In perhaps the most famous passage in *The Prince*, with professed timidity but transparent pride, Machiavelli proclaims the work's radical originality as he promises to go to the effectual truth and ignore imaginary states. He attacks "the writers" whose inconsistent moralism allows them to admire great deeds but not the cruel acts necessary to accomplish them. He rejects the republics and principalities of the writers as imaginary because they recommend a kind of goodness and virtue that leads to ruin and they condemn virtues necessary for preservation, such as stinginess, cruelty, and faithlessness. Based on his acceptance of the "very natural and ordinary desire to acquire" as a "necessity," and the consequent "natural and ordinary necessity" to offend those whom or from whom one acquires (*P* 3), Machiavelli in *The Prince* abandons the moral teachings of the classical and biblical traditions for a new conception of virtue as the willingness and ability to do whatever it takes to acquire and maintain what one has acquired.

Again, in contrast to the spirit of self-conscious innovation in *The Prince*, the *Discourses* is a sort of commentary on the first decade, or 10 books, of Livy's history of Rome (of which most of the other 132 books are lost and

available to us only in summary form). Machiavelli says at the beginning that he writes only what he judges to be necessary for readers' greater understanding, as if he were merely an auxiliary to Livy and his book merely a supplement to Livy's (*D* I pr.2). In a spirit of apparently nostalgic antiquarianism, Machiavelli seems at first deferential toward ancient writers and content with trying to stimulate love and imitation of "the most virtuous works the histories show us, which have been done by ancient kingdoms and republics" (*D* I pr.2), so that the spirits of youths who may read his writings can flee their times and prepare themselves to imitate the times of the ancient Romans (*D* II pr.3).

The common opinion that *The Prince* is an innovative but wicked and tyrannical book, whereas the *Discourses* is an antiquarian and virtuous republican book, leaves us shocked and puzzled as to why Machiavelli should have written two such opposite books. Nonetheless, the view that the two books are opposed to each other, although based on obvious features of each of them, represents only part and not the whole of Machiavelli's intention. Neither book is as opposed to the other as first appears.

The Prince is not simply about princes or tyrants, and it does not endorse principalities or tyrannies over republics in the way that the *Discourses* recommends republics over principalities or tyrannies. Indeed, republican political philosophers such as Spinoza and Rousseau understood *The Prince* to be a secretly republican book.[2] What basis is there for such a judgment? Although Machiavelli says early in *The Prince* that he will not discuss republics, he soon puts forward, and later confirms, the Roman republic as the model for wise princes (*P* 2–5). Romulus, the founder and first king of Rome, is cited among the most excellent and glorious of new princes (*P* 6), but although a king, he is praised in the *Discourses* for laws establishing a free and civil way of life—for being the founder of a republic or protorepublic (*D* I 9.2, 18.5, 49.1; II 2.1; III 1.2). Moreover, since the new prince will want to maintain his state and his glory for a long life and even after his death, he will find that founding a republic is the best way to do so. He might first think of establishing a hereditary principality, in which he would be succeeded by others of his bloodline. But enemies may eliminate not only him but also his bloodline, precisely so that they will not be menaced by the memory of his name. Republics do the same thing, and for good measure they also wipe out all hereditary nobility as hostile to the republic. But they revere their own founders. "In republics there is greater life, greater hatred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest" (*P* 5). Therefore, to avoid the

pitfalls clearly brought into view, *The Prince* implicitly advises princes to found republics to perpetuate their states and their glory.

Just as *The Prince* is more republican than it first appears and than it is reputed to be according to the common opinion that the two books are opposed, so the *Discourses* is more princely or even tyrannical than it first appears and is reputed to be.

First of all, we should note that the *Discourses* is not addressed to peoples. It is addressed "above all" (that is to say, not only) to Machiavelli's friends Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai; and Machiavelli's dedicatory letter to the *Discourses* contrasts this choice of addressee with "the common usage of those who write, who are accustomed [the first word of the dedicatory letter to *The Prince*] always to address their works to some prince" and to flatter him. So as not to run into this error, Machiavelli chooses to address "not those who are princes but those who for their infinite good parts deserve to be." Thus Machiavelli seems in the dedicatory letter to the *Discourses* to attack *The Prince*, or at least the dedicatory letter to *The Prince* addressed to Lorenzo de' Medici, or at least the view that *The Prince* is simply dedicated or addressed to Lorenzo. Speaking to "those who know," he seems in the mode of the classical political philosophers to prefer knowers to rulers and to regard those knowers as deserving to be rulers. But contrary to the classical mode, he addresses not merely knowers who deserve to be princes but knowers who may actually rise like Hiero to become princes and replace such incompetent rulers as Perseus or possibly Lorenzo. And Hiero, we should recall, is placed by Machiavelli in *The Prince* with the greatest examples of the founders Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus (*P* 6).

One of the early discourses is entitled "That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient Orders" (*D* I 9). By "being alone" Machiavelli means that it is necessary for any ordering to depend on a single mind. In consequence he excuses the extraordinary actions of a founder or reformer, such as Romulus's murder of his brother, as necessary to achieve sole authority. Thus Machiavelli insists that precisely so as to order a republic, it is necessary to have recourse to violent, one-man rule; too bad if others call it tyranny. He indeed warns that such a founder should take care not to leave his sole authority as an inheritance to another, to whom it might be a bad example. His republic will last long only "if it remains in the care of many and its maintenance stays with many" (*D* I 9.2). Thus even and precisely one who is concerned with his own ambition should seek to perpetuate his

state and his glory not through inheritance by single heirs who rule alone as he does but through a republic entrusted to the care of the many: one to order, many to maintain. Republics need to be founded by something like tyrants to be well ordered; tyrants need to found something like republics to maintain their states and names.

The need of republics for something like tyranny is clarified later in book I when Machiavelli makes clear that his special interest is not in founding a new people but in liberating and keeping free a corrupt people. Such is the task relevant to his own historical situation, in which a new prince must remake, rather than make, everything anew. Part of the problem of perpetuating republics is that they have as partisan enemies those who benefit from tyranny but they do not have partisan friends (*D* I 16.3). The reasons are, first, that free republics give honors and rewards for merit, but those who receive what they deserve feel no obligation to those who reward them. And, second, the benefits of free life do not give rise to any sense of obligation: "For no one ever confesses that he has an obligation to one who does not offend him." Neither those eager for rewards nor those desiring to be left alone will be partisan friends of a republic.

The problem with republics, in short, is that they are just. People do not appreciate being treated justly because that is something they think they deserve. The solution—and there is a solution—is for republics to behave less justly, more tyrannically, so that the benefits they confer and the security they provide will be more appreciated and better defended. In particular, to maintain its freedom, a newly free people must "kill the sons of Brutus"—that is, engage in acts of violence that make examples out of the enemies of freedom. Ensuring that the violence sets an example is more important than doing it legally. Indeed, illegal violence is all the more impressive. Machiavelli informs us of the tyrannical character of this solution in the digression immediately following, in which he gives similar advice to "princes who have become tyrants of their fatherlands" (*D* I 16.5).

Machiavelli knows that readers like ourselves who believe in justice will find this advice difficult to accept. He sometimes prepares us to accept the ordinarily unacceptable means he recommends by saying that a desired goal is impossible, then that it is very difficult, and finally that this is the means to achieve it. So he says, "One should presuppose as a thing very true that a corrupt city that lives under a prince, can never be turned into a free one, even if that prince is eliminated along with all his line" (*D* I 17.1). Almost immediately he adds, "unless indeed the goodness of one individual, together with virtue, keeps it free," only apparently to retract that offer by

warning that such freedom will last only as long as the life of that individual. It would be impossible to have "one man of such long life as to have enough time to inure to good a city that has been inured to bad for a long time." Yet Machiavelli again opens up a way to the cure of corruption arising from inequality. That is to create equality by using "the greatest extraordinary means, which few know how or wish to use."

Finally, in the next chapter, Machiavelli explains that it is very difficult to maintain a free state in corrupt cities and "almost impossible to give a rule for it" (*D* I 18.1). Even Rome eventually succumbed to corruption because once the Romans had subdued their enemies, the Roman people no longer had regard for virtue. To have maintained Rome free it would have been necessary to change not only its laws but its orders—that is, its fundamental institutions or constitution. Such fundamental reordering, Machiavelli says, is "almost impossible." It must be done "little by little" by "someone prudent" before the problem is recognized by everyone, in which case he will never be able to persuade anyone else of what he understands. Or it must be done "at a stroke," when the problem is easily recognized but difficult to correct. For to do this, Machiavelli argues, it is not enough to use ordinary or legal means, "since the ordinary modes are bad; but it is necessary to go to the extraordinary, such as violence and arms, and before everything else become prince of that city, able to dispose it in one's own mode" (*D* I 18.4). This is difficult or impossible, and Machiavelli tells us why with wonderful clarity:

> Because the reordering of a city for a political way of life presupposes a good man, and becoming prince of a republic by violence presupposes a bad man, one will find that it very rarely happens that someone good wishes to become prince by bad ways, even though his end be good, and that someone wicked, having become prince, wishes to work well, and that it will ever occur to his mind to use well the authority that he has acquired badly.

No one could put better the moral contradiction at the heart of Machiavelli's marriage of tyranny and republicanism. Nonetheless, he concludes that to create or maintain a republic in a corrupt city, it is necessary to turn it more toward a kingly state than toward a popular one.

The discussion in the *Discourses* of ordering and maintaining liberty in a corrupt city (*D* I 16–18) makes clear the dependence of republican ends on tyrannical means. It also reveals Machiavelli's apparent indifference to whether these good ends achieved through bad means result from good men willing to use bad means or from bad men willing to seek good ends, as if there were no effectual difference between them. It indicates that the need for such means and for such men arises not only once at the founding or

beginning but repeatedly for maintaining, reforming, or refounding. Machiavelli takes the point further when he argues that in Rome new causes cropped up *every day* for which it had to make new orders or new provisions to maintain freedom (*D* I 49.1; III 49.1).

In a famous chapter, he says that if a republic is to be maintained, it must often be led back toward its beginnings (*D* III 1). Leading it back toward the beginnings, Machiavelli explains, means restoring esteem for virtue through some terrifying external danger, through the virtue of a citizen who carries out "excessive and notable" executions that remind men of punishment and renew fear in their spirits, or alternatively through "the simple virtue of one man" who acts outside the law. Nor is it only at the beginning that one man may need to be alone; recall that Machiavelli earlier declared that it is necessary to be alone if one wants either "to order a republic anew or to reform it altogether outside its ancient orders" (*D* I 9 T). For one citizen to be alone it is necessary first to eliminate the envy of those who might get in his way (*D* III 30). This can be done either through some "strong and difficult accident" that makes everyone run voluntarily to cooperate—that is, obey—or through the deaths of the envious. The one citizen may be so lucky as to have the envious die naturally, or he may have to think of a way of removing them. And Machiavelli adds that whoever reads the Bible judiciously will see that Moses took the latter option: he "was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, were opposed to his plans" (*D* III 30.1). The need for continual refounding involves republics in a continual dependence on princely or tyrannical men and princely or tyrannical means.

Machiavelli's mixture of republicanism and tyranny in the *Discourses* refutes the decent, republican opinion that the *Discourses* is a decent, republican book as opposed to the wicked, tyrannical *Prince*. On the contrary, Machiavelli's critique of classical and biblical morality and religion appears in the *Discourses* as well as in *The Prince*, and it is meant to liberate not only the rulers of principalities but also republics or their leaders, whom Machiavelli frequently and disconcertingly refers to as princes.

Even Machiavelli's endorsement of republics over principalities in the *Discourses* reveals the princely or tyrannical elements in his republicanism. While he declares that two virtuous princes in succession are sufficient to acquire the world, he adds that a republic should do more, since it has through election not only two but infinite virtuous princes who succeed one another (*D* I 20). The advantage of a republic is not that it takes government

out of the hands of princes but precisely that election provides "infinite most virtuous princes." And in the place where Machiavelli says that a republic has greater life and more lasting good fortune than a principality, he claims that this is because republics can accommodate themselves to the times by choosing which of those citizens they employ as princely leaders (*D* II 9). Where he says that "a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince," he also refers to republics as "cities where peoples are princes" and ends up repeating the formula of one to order, many to maintain (*D* I 58.3). In the chapter in which he explains the affection of peoples for the free or republican way of life, he relies on the fact that "it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom" (*D* II 2.1). And the argument there that the "common good is not observed if not in republics" depends on the view that the common good is the good of the many, which may "turn out to harm this or that private individual" and go "against the disposition of the few crushed by it." The common good of republics is not the "common benefit to everyone" (*D* I pr.1) to which Machiavelli himself claims to be devoted. In the same discourse we learn that an important part of the reason why people love republics more than principalities is that all those who dwell in them can believe that their children can grow up to be princes through their virtue.

In sum, just as *The Prince* is more republican than it seems, so the *Discourses* is more princely, and through its mixture of tyranny and republicanism it is also more critical of classical and biblical morality and thereby more original than it seems.

Republicanism Ancient and Modern

The tyranny in Machiavelli's republicanism gives it an original character and new features that catch the eye of every reader. The change in character comes out in a comparison with the classical republicanism of the ancient philosophers, of whom we may choose Aristotle as a representative. Aristotle was the dominant figure—in either the foreground or the background—of the political science of Machiavelli's time. His notions are behind the humanist republicanism of Machiavelli's predecessors in the office of Florentine secretary, Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni, whose works set the republican norm for the Italian Renaissance. But the contrast will be more clear if we look at Aristotle himself.

Aristotle's republic is the *politeia*, a word that can also be translated "constitution" or "regime." The regime is the rule of the whole city (*polis*) by a part, and it can be by one, few, or many (though rule by one is hardly a fixed regime). Thus there are several regimes but typically two that are always in competition: those of the few and of the many. These parts rule or want to rule on the basis of claims they advance or professions they avow about contributions they make to the whole—for example, the outstanding competence of the few versus the freedom and collective judgment of the many. Aristotle as political scientist judges these claims and finds them only partially true, hence partisan. He sets up a discussion between the parties (especially in books III and IV of his *Politics*), of which the intended or hoped for result is a mixed regime that combines the partisan virtues and persuades each party to recognize that it gains from the other. Although the argument refers to power and self-interest, it consists essentially in persuading political men to act their best. Hence Aristotle's mixed regime is very unlikely or impossible; it exists so as to be realized only in part or by degrees and to serve as a model for the end and manner of reform or progress in politics. Since the truly nonpartisan mixed regime does not exist and cannot be brought into being, every actual regime remains partisan and retains a measure of tyranny.

In Aristotle, the tyrannical element in a republic stands for its lapses from perfection, but in Machiavelli, tyranny is used precisely to the contrary—to make a republic perfect. Machiavelli praises the Roman republic for being among those republics that, although not perfectly ordered at the beginning, had a good enough beginning so that through the occurrence of accidents they might become "perfect" (*D* I 2.1). These eventually perfect republics—numerous enough that the Roman appears to be only one example—are contrasted with others, such as the Spartan, whose laws and orders are given all at once, "at a stroke," by one alone. Machiavelli speaks freely of perfection not so much, perhaps, to make it seem common as to make it seem attainable. And in giving preference to Rome's accidental perfection because it is more flexible than that of Sparta's one-time classical legislator Lycurgus, he shows again that tyranny—the rule of *uno solo*—works well, or best, in the context of a republic.

Machiavelli, like Aristotle, begins from the few and the many, but he treats them very differently. For him they are not two parties making characteristically contrasting claims to rule (oligarchy versus democracy) but "two diverse humors," also called "desires," that are not sufficiently rational to be called claims or opinions (*D* I 4–5). The great or the nobles

have a "great desire to dominate," and the people or the ignoble have "only desire not to be dominated" (*D* I 5.2). In reinterpreting the popular claim to rule as the desire not to be dominated, Machiavelli prepares the way for democracy and even republicanism to become liberal. "Don't tread on me!" is the theme of popular feeling that he underscores. From this description we see that for Machiavelli, contrary to Aristotle, only one side wants to rule. Each side sees only its own necessity—to rule or not to be ruled—and does not understand, respectively, those who do not care to rule or those whose natures insist on it. Those who want glory despise those who want security, and the latter fear and hate the former.

Because of their fundamental difference of desire and inevitable mutual misunderstanding, conflict between the two humors cannot be mediated by words. The clash between them is "tumult," a word Machiavelli uses repeatedly to underscore the irrational noisiness of politics (*D* I 4–6). The first of the new features of Machiavelli's political science is his rejection of the traditional condemnation of the tumults between the nobles and the plebs in Rome (a tradition that included Livy, Machiavelli's supposed mentor in things Roman). Those who condemn that disunion blame the very thing that was the first cause of keeping Rome free (*D* I 4.1). Machiavelli was the first political philosopher to endorse party conflict as useful and good, even if partisan tactics are often not respectable. In doing so he accepts both the "tyrannical" desire to dominate and the "republican" desire not to be dominated and shows how they can be made to cooperate.

Machiavelli approves of the Roman law on "accusation," another novelty of his political science (*D* I 7–8). That law permitted any citizen to accuse another of ambition and the accused to defend himself, with both accusation and defense to be made before the people. The advantage of such a law, or "order," is in allowing the people to vent the ill humor it harbors toward the whole government or toward the class of nobles against one individual, whose punishment satisfies the people and excuses everyone else. Machiavelli does not worry about the possible injustice of the procedure, as did Aristotle in his qualified defense of ostracism, the democratic practice in his day of exiling outstanding, and possibly dangerous, individuals from the city. Machiavelli will cheerfully sacrifice one of the princely types in order to save the rest. He does not waste time deploring the personal abuse characteristic of popular government at its worst; he turns it to account. The business of republics is not so much positive legislation to benefit the people as the negative exchange of accusations that entertains the people. While making use of ambitious

princes, republics must take care to appease the popular fear and dislike of ambition.

A principal use of princely types by republics is as dictators in emergencies (*D* I 33.1). So Machiavelli approves of the Roman practice of giving power to one man to act in such situations without consultation and without appeal. His endorsement contrasts sharply with the discomfort of ancient writers, who regard it as an embarrassment to the Roman republic and who play it down (Livy), assimilate it to kingship (Cicero), denounce it as deceit of the Senate against the poor (Dionysius of Halicarnassus), or pass it over in silence (Polybius).[3] Machiavelli thus begins the willing acceptance of dictatorship that is shared by later modern philosophers such as Jean Bodin and Karl Marx, not to mention the republican Rousseau. He does not oppose the dictators to the democracies, as was done in democratic rhetoric during the Second World War, but regards them as compatible and mutually useful, provided that the dictatorship is limited in tenure (*D* I 34). The dictator answers to the defects in whatever is customary or "ordinary" in useful republican procedures; he serves as a reminder of both the danger and the necessity of "extraordinary modes." When unforeseen accidents occur, republics need a regular way to act irregularly. The dictatorship allows the republic to benefit from "this kingly power" without having a king. Or is the dictator a tyrant? Machiavelli struggles to sustain the difference between dictator and tyrant, but it is not clear that he succeeds or even wants to succeed (*D* I 34).

The need for tyranny in republics brings Machiavelli to question the value and viability of constitutions. Constitutions give visible order to political arrangements so as to make clear what is done in public as distinct from private activities. For a prince who dominates his state, public and private are virtually the same; but for a republic, the distinction is crucial. If the people are to govern or at least control the government, they must be able to see, through formal and regular institutions, what the government is doing in their name. So, as Machiavelli indicates, founding a republic centers on its *ordering* (*D* I 2, 9). But he also stresses that political orders are not enough and do not last. Orders must be accompanied by "modes" of political activity that give effect to the orders, interpret them, manipulate them. The *Discourses* is full of examples to illustrate how institutions (as we may speak of Machiavelli's "orders") are actually made use of; one of the best is the story of Pacuvius's manipulation of the people (*D* I 47.2). The book is far from a treatise on the constitutional structure of republics, since such a work would easily acquire a normative character and would come to

resemble a study of an imaginary republic (*P* 15). Machiavelli promises to bring "new modes and orders" in the plural (*D* I pr.1), not a single new "constitution." Although he occasionally uses the word *costituzione*, his use is not in a comprehensive sense; in the *Discourses* he does not use the word *regime*, which would call to mind *politeia*, the Greek word for "constitution" that was extensively defined by Aristotle.

Here again Machiavelli is hostile to Aristotle's republicanism, and he also seems to offer a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, to the regime of modern liberty as opposed to ancient virtue, with which we live today. In his complex presentation he says that the regular orders of a republic, which give rise to "ordinary modes" of behavior, need to be distinguished from "extraordinary modes" that go beyond ordinary bounds, lest the republic succumb to a tyrant. Yet at the same time, because of unforeseen accidents or the motion of human things (*D* I 6.4), as we have seen, the orders need to be revived by extraordinary modes—above all, by sensational executions. What is ordinary is defined against the extraordinary and yet depends on it. And this is simply to restate the paradox, for Machiavelli, that a republic must be both opposed and receptive to tyranny. To preserve its liberty it must stand by its laws and its constitution; to survive, it must be willing to forego them. Thus the distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary, public and private, republic and tyranny, must be simultaneously defended and surrendered.

The chief of the extraordinary modes is, as noted, the sensational execution. The law must be visibly, and therefore impressively, executed. An impressive execution is not necessarily a legal one. In fact, an execution draws more attention if it is illegal, and illegality also shows more spirit in the one who executes. For Machiavelli specifies that executions should be seen to be done by one individual, as opposed to Aristotle's preference for a committee that would dissipate the responsibility.[4] Machiavelli's emphasis on execution—in the double sense of "carrying out" and "punishing capitally"—could be said to make him the author of modern executive power. A strong executive is a vital feature of modern republics today, distinguishing them from ancient republics in which such a power would have been considered too monarchical. The toleration for so much one-man rule in regimes so proud to be democracies may owe something to Machiavelli's argument in the *Discourses*, however far it may seem from us.

Another new element in Machiavelli's political science is his recommendation of fraud and conspiracy. His chapter on conspiracy (*D* III 6), by far the longest in the *Discourses* and a veritable book within the book,

is a definite four-star attraction. For the first time in the history of political philosophy, one finds a discussion not of the *justice* of conspiracy but of the *ways and means*. Instead of disputing whether it is just to conspire against a tyrant, Machiavelli shows how to conduct a conspiracy against either a republic or a tyranny; and, as if this were not enough, he shows governments how to conspire against peoples. Conspiracy, of course, requires fraud, and Machiavelli is not embarrassed to praise those who excel in fraud and to promote them as models for republics as well as princes (*D* II 13; III 41). The necessity of fraud, one can see, is contained in Machiavelli's description of the two humors in all states, one desiring to dominate and the other not to be dominated. Since government is domination, those who do not desire it must necessarily be fooled into accepting it—which is fraud. Election is one principal method: while the people are choosing who is to govern them, they forget their desire not to be governed at all; for injuries one chooses for oneself hurt less than those imposed by someone else (*D* I 34.4).

The last item deserving notice in our survey of Machiavelli's republicanism is the discussion of corruption that runs through the *Discourses*. He seems to praise traditional republican virtue by noting that when public spirit is absent, republics become corrupt and fall victim to tyrants. That conclusion would imply a connection between moral virtue and political success. It would suggest that republican peoples will be rewarded for their self-sacrifice by the survival and prosperity of their republics (*D* I 55) and that the most efficacious means to success is education in virtue. But in fact, when examined closely, Machiavelli's discussion of corruption proves to be another novelty of his political science, and not in accord with the fond hope of moral people that morality brings success.

A quick look at what Machiavelli has to say about Julius Caesar, the tyrant who put an end to the Roman republic, will make the point. It will also illustrate the turns of Machiavelli's rhetoric and the necessity of finding his opinion by comparing all his statements rather than accepting just one or following only one tendency of his argument. We first encounter Caesar in a chapter that contrasts the founders of a republic or kingdom, who are praiseworthy, with the blameworthy founders of a tyranny (*D* I 10). In that contrast there is said to be a "choice between the two qualities of men": the detestable Caesar, who desired to possess a corrupt city in order to spoil it, and Romulus, who founded or reordered it. Then Machiavelli establishes that the Rome of the early republic, even of the Tarquins, was not corrupt,

although it was very corrupt under Caesar (*D* I 17.1). But in a discussion of ingratitude in a republic, he says that Caesar "took for himself by force what ingratitude denied him," implying that Caesar's services deserved to be rewarded by tyranny and that the Roman people in their corruption denied it to him (*D* I 29.3)! Caesar is pronounced to be the "first tyrant in Rome" (*D* I 37.2), and in the chapter on conspiracies he is cited as one who conspired against his fatherland (*D* III 6.18–19). At last, however, in a chapter on how Rome made itself a slave by prolonging military commands, Caesar is presented as a beneficiary of a chain of necessary consequences (*D* III 24). As Rome expanded, its armies went further afield and its captains needed a longer tenure of command, which gave them the opportunity of gaining the army over to themselves. Such an opportunity is bound to be seized, sooner or later, by an ambitious prince. And we have already learned that the Roman republic had no choice but to expand, because the motion of human things requires that a state either expand or decline (*D* I 6.4). A Caesar waits in the future of every successful republic.

Thus, corruption is not a moral failing but, in a people, the necessary consequence of republican virtue and, in a prince, the necessity of his nature. Machiavelli reiterates that one must judge in politics and morals "according to the times." He inaugurates what is today called "situational ethics," a mode of moral judgment more convenient than his high-minded speech of "corruption" first promises. If this quick study of Caesar is not the whole view of Machiavelli on corruption, it is at least a part often unremarked, and the reverse of what one expects from a republican partisan. It is surely not a whole view of Machiavelli's Caesar, the man who both furthered Rome and brought it to an end.

Machiavelli's treatment of corruption is of a piece with the other disturbing novelties of his republicanism—the praise and promotion of tumult, imperialism, dictatorship, fear, fraud, and conspiracy. His talk of "corruption" is more an excuse for tyranny than an accusation against it, and it signifies rather a surrender to necessity than moral resistance to its apparent dictates. Machiavelli does not abandon moral language; he speaks confidently of both "virtue" and "corruption." Characteristically, he does not depart from the common speech of political actors; he does not try to teach us new terms—such as "power," "legitimacy," and "decision making"—with a scientifically neutral, amoral content. To this extent he stays with the method of Aristotle and with the ancient philosophers of ancient virtue. But he interprets common speech in a new way and uses the good old words in disconcerting and thought-provoking ways of his own. He

tries to show that to understand political situations correctly, one must not listen to the intent of the words people use but rather look at the necessities they face. The prince must adjust his words to his deeds, not the other way around. Most people do not or cannot accept that necessity—a failing that is *their* necessity. They will continue in their moralizing habits because they are too weak to face a world in which necessity decides. Machiavelli's use of "corruption" reflects both the permanence of the moral attitude he rejects and his way of getting around it.

Machiavelli's Criticism of Christianity

What moved Machiavelli to take the grave step of recommending the mutual accommodation of tyranny and republics, thus changing both republican morality and republican politics? The answer is in Machiavelli's view of his own time: the moderns are weak, the ancients were strong. The moderns are so called by Machiavelli because they are formed by Christianity—just the opposite of our usage, for which modernity is a departure from, or at least a secular modification of, Christianity. But Machiavelli is not ready to praise modernity until it is ready to follow him. At the beginning of the *Discourses* he criticizes "the weakness into which the present religion has led the world" and the evil that "ambitious idleness" has done to Christian countries (*D* I pr.2). Somehow the Christian church and religion stand in the way of the recovery of ancient virtue and ancient republicanism, but it is unclear why their presence compels the comprehensive innovations we have noted in the *Discourses*, as opposed to a mere reassertion of the ancient ways in the manner of the humanists, a sincere Renaissance. What precisely are the evils of Christianity, and what is Machiavelli's remedy?

The amazingly bold criticisms of Christianity in three of the *Discourses* (*D* I 12; II 2.2; III 1.4) surely count among the sites in this work not to be missed by the conscientious tourist. The criticisms do not seem to be made from a single point of view, however, and despite their boldness they are as difficult to interpret as the more hidden treasures of the *Discourses*. At first it appears that Machiavelli's objection is only to the church, because it has kept Italy weak and disunited (*D* I 12). The church is not strong enough by itself to unify Italy, but it is too strong to let any other power do so (see also *FH* I 9). If one combines this passage with Machiavelli's ferocious suggestion to kill the pope and "all the cardinals" (*D* I 27), he seems to be an anticlerical critic aiming at a kind of Protestant reform, or possibly even

a partisan of original Christianity. His objection applies in Italy, not in France or Spain, where unified states have been attained despite the church.

The picture changes when we encounter a direct attack on Christianity, not just on corruption in the church. "Our religion" is said to esteem less the honor of the world than does the religion of the Gentiles; it glorifies humble and contemplative men more than active ones, an attitude that has made the world "effeminate" and "disarmed" heaven (*D* II 2). Returning to the possibility of reform, Machiavelli concludes by saying that the present religion needs to be interpreted according to virtue, not idleness, but the preceding discussion has made clear that Machiavelli's preferred kinds of worldly glory and virtue were incompatible with Christianity, however interpreted.

In the third passage on Christianity, Machiavelli considers it as a "sect," a collectivity made by human beings that needs to be renewed periodically by being drawn back toward its beginning, as was done by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick (*D* III 1.4). Here original Christianity is apparently accepted by Machiavelli as the true Christianity but still found wanting because it becomes corrupt in time and needs renewal. Elsewhere Machiavelli, speaking explicitly of the "Christian sect," gives it a variable life span of between 1666 and 3000 years and attributes to it a human rather than a heavenly origin; and he adopts the opinion of the philosophers, opposed by the Bible, that the world is eternal (*D* II 5.1). But to understand Christianity as a sect like any other sect is to deny its divinity, together with that of the other sects, so here Machiavelli comes out an atheist. If one looks also at his discourses on the religion of the Romans, Machiavelli shows an appreciation for the political utility, if not the truth, of the pagan religion. He allows that the orderers of religions are praised above founders of states (*D* I 9.1, 10.1, 11.2), and he says that after Romulus founded Rome, the heavens inspired Numa Pompilius to make it religious (*D* I 12.1). Religion enabled the Senate to manipulate the people in carrying out its enterprises, a function implying that the nobles or princes who manipulate religion do not believe, unlike the people who are manipulated (*D* I 14). Nor does Machiavelli express a consistent opinion on the importance of religion. After praising Numa's religion as "altogether necessary" for keeping Rome quiet and civilized (*D* I 11.1), he soon after drastically demotes both Numa and religion, saying that Numa himself was "quiet and religious" while lacking in virtue, dependent on that of his predecessor Romulus (*D* I 19.1).

However all this adds up, we should note that Machiavelli's view of Christianity is not so negative as the boldness of his criticism suggests. After all, the supposedly strong ancients were spiritually overcome by the supposedly weak moderns. He certainly says, despite his apparent atheism, that Christianity shows "the truth and the true way" (*D* II 2.2). But Christianity might *show* the truth without being itself that truth. By imitating the life of Christ, Christian priests gain credit with the people and, says Machiavelli in memorable words, "give them to understand that it is evil to say evil of evil" (*D* III 1.4). So priests do evil and "do not fear the punishment that they do not see and do not believe." But there seems to be admiration in this denunciation. Machiavelli, who does not blink at Romulus's act of killing his brother in order to be alone, can hardly be objecting to the rule of priests as the rule of evil. Precisely if Machiavelli, like the priests, does not fear punishment in the afterlife, he must have been interested in the modes of manipulating those who do fear it, or who believe they do. It is no accident that the mode of renewing republics by the sensational execution (*D* III 1.3) bears a strange resemblance to the central mystery of the "Christian sect."

And this is perhaps not the only mode of political maneuver that Machiavelli learned from the priests and the church as exemplars of spiritual warfare. Machiavelli quotes the Bible only once in the *Discourses* (*D* I 26), and when he does, he makes a manifest blunder (see *D* III 48), attributing to David an action of God's (thus also mistaking a very familiar passage from the New Testament for one from the Old). It was God, not David, "who filled the poor with good things and sent the rich away empty" (Luke 1:53), the action of a new prince who makes everything anew in his state. It is God, then, who in this instance serves as Machiavelli's model of a new prince, or of what authors call a "tyrant" (*D* I 25), who may also be the founder of a tyrannical republic, or the bringer of the new modes and orders that make such republics possible. Just when Machiavelli by implication calls the Christian God a tyrant, he also indicates that he is paying his greatest compliment. His blasphemy discloses his appreciation, for it amounts to an appropriation of Christianity to the benefit of mankind.

To answer the question of why Machiavelli felt it necessary to change ancient virtue, we return to the criticism of Christianity in which he blames it for creating "ambitious idleness" (*D* I pr.2) and for being interpreted according to leisure and not virtue (*D* II 2.2). Idleness, or leisure (as *ozio* can also be translated), is the contrary of virtue in Machiavelli's view. For Aristotle, leisure (*schole*) was the very condition of the virtuous.

Machiavelli directs his venomous criticism of idleness against not only the priests but also the gentlemen (*D* I 55.4), who were the bearers of worldly honor according to the ancients. Thus, it is not enough to recover the honor of this world against Christian humility if honor is still to be found in high-minded leisure. Leisure makes republics either effeminate or divided, or both (*D* I 6.4; II 20, 25.1); the idle or the leisurely are included among the enemies of the human race (*D* I 10.1). Machiavelli puts *necessity* over leisure as the concern of the legislator (*D* I 1.4–5). He wants men to seek that worldly honor—or, better to say, glory—that is consistent with vigorous devotion to answering one's necessities. However much ancient virtue and Christian virtue are divided over worldly honor, they are together in their high-minded rejection of motives arising from necessity and, in general, of the acquisitive life. Both find the highest type—philosopher or saint—in one who puts the contemplative life over politics and who thus could not be described as a "new prince," Machiavelli's highest type.

To conclude the point: in order to oppose Christian weakness, Machiavelli felt he had to transform ancient virtue. His studious concentration on necessity compelled him to turn his back on classical nobility because it was involved with, and perhaps inevitably gave way to, its apparent opposite, Christian humility. After human excellence has been elevated to divine perfection, honoring the best is easily translated into humbling oneself before the divine. From his rejection of nobility follow both the democratic and the manipulative policies Machiavelli recommends to republics. Since he opposes both nobles and noble scruples, he can indulge popular resentment against gentlemen, and he can do so with fraudulent strategems.

MACHIAVELLI THE PHILOSOPHER?

Machiavelli does not appear to be a philosopher, and there are some scholars bold enough to assure us that he was not. His books are devoted to "worldly things"—that is, human things—and they do not sustain philosophic themes, if "philosophic" is understood to mean supraworldly interests. Machiavelli speaks explicitly of philosophers only three times in the *Discourses* (*D* I 56; II 5.1; III 12.1), and he mentions Plato and Aristotle only once each (*D* III 6.16, 26.2). Among philosophers he prefers the more political. He speaks much more often of "writers" and "historians," and in the *Discourses*, next to Livy, he mentions Xenophon the most often. At the beginning of the *Discourses* he blames the weakness of the modern world

not on bad philosophy but on "not having a true knowledge of histories" (*D* I pr.2).

Nonetheless—to borrow Machiavelli's frequent expression for turning back on his argument—philosophy lurks everywhere in his work behind the scenes in which politics plays out its lessons. Although Machiavelli may look like a disorderly essayist, he gained the attention of the greatest modern philosophers from Bacon on. They recognized that a philosopher cannot reflect on the highest themes without thinking about the conditions of his thought, which are, broadly speaking, political. So it is not unphilosophical for a philosopher to take note of the politics of his time and therewith the politics of any time, the *nature* of politics. Political philosophy is a necessary, not an accidental, interest of the philosopher. At times of grave emergency, his interest in politics might have to become a preoccupation. In such circumstances he might have to narrow his focus from the nonhuman to the human, particularly if the emergency consists in too much concern for the superhuman. Philosophy, in this picture of Machiavelli's view, might then with reason cease to be the theme of the philosopher. For Machiavelli, the philosophy of his time—whether it was lingering medieval Aristotelianism or Renaissance Platonism—was on more or less friendly terms with Christianity, and it was so involved in compromise with a difficult partner that it could not keep the distance necessary for attack or for reform.

Yet if philosophers are preoccupied with politics, they must also of course be concerned with what is beyond politics. This is all the more true with a thinker such as Machiavelli, who expects such great results from the "remedies" he proposes. In the same place at the beginning of the *Discourses* where he criticizes the lack of true knowledge of histories, he says that people judge it impossible to imitate the ancients, as if heaven, the sun, the elements, and men themselves had changed from what they were in antiquity (*D* I pr.2). But according to the Bible, human beings and their relation to heaven *were* changed by the coming of God into the world. The natural world is subject to supernatural supervision and intervention: such was the dominant opinion in Machiavelli's time, which he had to confront. The authority of Christianity stood in the way of his political project of reviving ancient virtue. So, like every philosopher, but in his own way and with fierce determination, he found it necessary to reassert the integrity of nature against those who provide authoritative opinions reassuring to the people and convenient for their own domination. "It is good to reason about

everything," Machiavelli says inconspicuously in a dependent clause (*D* I 18.1). But reasoning about everything is the mark of a philosopher.

For Machiavelli, the assertion of nature required the defense of this world against the claims of the next world. His defense in turn required a rediscovery of nature, a reformulation of the classical view. Despite his concentration on politics, he was led after all into the themes of nature, fortune, and necessity for which he is famous. These are the nonpolitical considerations necessary to his politics because they concern the limits of what politics can attain. They also represent the humanly or politically relevant aspect of what is nonhuman in appearance or origin. Machiavelli is not so much interested in nature itself as in how "nature" appears to most people; similarly, he cares little for God but much for religion, the human view of God. The reason for his politicized treatment is not difficult to find. Machiavelli attempts to show that human beings can control what previous philosophers thought uncontrollable and what religion leaves in the hands of God.

The question of the limits of politics comes up in the very first chapter, in which Machiavelli debates how much a legislator can choose and how much is determined by necessity. The answer proves to be that the legislator can expand his choice by choosing what he will sooner or later find to be necessary; he must *anticipate* necessity. Any other policy leaves him dependent on good fortune, which he cannot count on. Then Machiavelli turns to the cycle of regimes, a theme of classical but not of modern political science (*D* I 2.2–4). Here is another much-visited site in the *Discourses*. According to the classical cycle of regimes, they do not develop progressively (as is assumed in what we call "political development") but rather revolve in a circle in which bad regimes succeed good, and good succeed bad. The cycle implies that politics cannot achieve any permanent or irreversible benefit; human nature, subject to corruption, will sooner or later corrupt even the best regime and bring it down.

Machiavelli repeats the account of the cycle given by the Roman historian Polybius, although without mentioning his name and with significant differences. Above all, the changes in regimes that Polybius attributes to nature Machiavelli accords to chance. Machiavelli does not accept or reject the classical analysis, but at the end he brusquely remarks that a state undergoing these changes would fall victim to a stronger neighbor before it could have time to complete the cycle. The classical cycle unrealistically presupposes that a state runs its course of domestic change undisturbed by changes imposed from abroad. Machiavelli challenges the

classical presupposition indirectly, for he goes on to praise expansionist Rome, the very kind of regime that could take advantage of other republics devoted to domestic justice and insufficiently prepared to expand. He leaves the cycle of regimes, never again to return, since its presupposition is not his. His appropriation of the classical notion proves to be temporary and provisional, apparently serving a tactical purpose: it enables him to discuss the beginning of Rome without admitting any role for divinity, whether pagan or Christian. Thus he can focus on human necessity as the original motive of politics, while putting aside human piety. When he does come to discuss religion (*D* I 9), it is as an aid to a regime already established on grounds of necessity.

Machiavelli does discuss later the cycle of civilizations, different from that of regimes (*D* II 5). This is the motion by which not merely regimes in one province but entire civilizations—or, to use his term, "sects"—are initiated and destroyed by heavenly or human causes. In considering the causes that come from heaven—plague, famine, and flood—Machiavelli remarks that a flood survivor with knowledge of the preceding sect might be able to pervert it in his own mode and leave to posterity what he alone wished. Here is a dream of glory, for someone not in Machiavelli's situation, which raises the possibility of human control to an unprecedented degree. It is one thing for a philosopher to contemplate changes of sect; it is another to go about changing one. Machiavelli presents the possibility without having recourse to Bacon's modern idea of the conquest of nature; he remains tied to a simplified Aristotelian belief that nature is a living body purging itself in a way that humans—or one individual human—can take advantage of.

Machiavelli's portrayal of Fortune as a willing being with control over humans is consistent with this politicized Aristotelianism. Aristotle himself distinguishes nature from chance, the order and regularity of things from irregular, unforeseeable accidents. He notes that the realm of chance is identical to the realm of human choice, since what happens by chance could have been intended.[5] Machiavelli, always politicizing, looks at the matter from the standpoint of ordinary people who worry about what will happen to themselves. They postulate a providential God who will take care of them. But while adopting the human concern for providence, Machiavelli does not endorse the belief that God will take care of us, and he sets aside the goodness or perfection of God except insofar as it touches human necessity. The good people may believe that their goodness guarantees success, or at least protection; but "goodness is not enough" (*D* III 30.1).

Instead of relying on providence, he postulates a deity called Fortune, who is said to watch over our actions and sometimes to intervene on our behalf, but also to have its own plans (*D* II 29). Or, rather than Fortune, it may be that there are intelligences in the air with compassion for human beings (*D* I 56). But in either case the lesson Machiavelli draws is that human beings should never abandon themselves, or yield to the superior power of the superhuman (*D* II 29.3).

Although fortune can never be conquered, human beings can learn to go along with it, picking up experience and making its plans their own, thus finally reducing its influence over human affairs. Fortune personified is a half-way station between a truly pious conception of providence mysterious to human beings and a scientific or atheist view of fortune as mere chance. Machiavelli's personification yields something to wishful thinking—to human weakness—but in such a way as to encourage human virtue and reject passive piety. It is doubtful that Machiavelli would have wanted to conquer fortune even if he could, because of his concern for virtue: virtue is overcoming risk and so depends on risk; and risk requires chance so that we do not know what is going to happen. Machiavelli has to hope that the anticipation of fortune that he counsels will never finally succeed in making human life predictable.

Machiavelli initiates the modern campaign to conquer nature that Bacon was to proclaim and carry further. Nature and chance are made less distinct by Machiavelli than they were for Aristotle. In a comment on Pope Julius II parallel to one in *The Prince*, Machiavelli says that he succeeded in the adventures of his pontificate because his impetuosity was suited to stormy times, but in quiet times he would have failed because he could not adapt to them (*D* III 9.3; *P* 25). Why not? Because "we are unable to oppose that to which nature inclines us," and because success in acting one way becomes a habit from which you cannot be dissuaded. But Machiavelli shows how to get around the two difficulties, which may indeed be reduced to one. Earlier he said that nature "forces you"; then he says that it merely inclines us; then he suggests that it may only be a stupid habit. In the only chapter of the *Discourses* whose title includes the word, "nature" is similarly equated with custom (*D* III 43). Machiavelli makes it clear that opposite qualities, such as the harshness of Manlius and the kindness of Valerius (*D* III 22), are useful in different times. Virtue in general is, and must be practiced, "according to the times," and republics are superior to principalities because they are capable of calling upon diverse abilities to find the right man for the time (*D* III 9.2).

Machiavelli's stance toward nature is complicated. In the first place he insists on the fixity of nature in order to repel the Christian claim that nature is subordinate to God. Thus he can conclude that, in view of the sameness of things, nothing prevents the moderns from imitating the ancients. But when it develops that it is not enough to imitate the ancients —one must improve upon them—Machiavelli changes his tune, and the fixity of nature yields to the flexibility of human virtue and the need for human mastery. Politically, he knows that most princes have diverse natures or habits (it matters little which), and princes and peoples have different humors. These cannot be changed, but they can be manipulated so that a state does not depend on nature's provision for its good fortune. Machiavelli's republic, unlike Plato's, is not a coincidence of wisdom and power, based on the good luck that rulers with the best natures will happen to gain power. One can see that Machiavelli, a prince above the princes he advises, has a certain freedom from nature's limitations that they lack (*P* ded. let.). But he, too, has a "natural desire" to work for the benefit of everyone (*D* I pr.1).

Machiavelli's Perpetual Republic

Although Machiavelli discourages the image or dream of perfection in our lives, he does speak, as we have seen, of a perfect republic. He prefers Rome, the republic that eventually became perfect by innovating through "accidents," to Sparta, which was perfectly ordered all at once at its beginning but proved unable, despite this seeming advantage, to answer the necessities imposed from without in foreign affairs (*D* 1 2.6–7, 6.4). By looking to its actual working, Machiavelli rejects a classical model of perfection in favor of his own idea of accidental perfection not planned from the beginning. Accidental perfection has to be shown not in a philosopher's model but in an actual example, and Machiavelli's example is Rome. Clearly his Rome is neither the historical Rome nor Livy's Rome. For all his deference to Livy, he announces his definite disagreement on an important point and substitutes his own authority (*D* I 58.1). In a sense, Machiavelli's Rome is planned from the beginning, but it depends on being unpredictably completed by others, by the princes he is instructing (*D* I pr.1). His constant use of examples does not signify an unphilosophical inability to formulate universal propositions or to think systematically. He refuses to cater to the human weakness that craves universal rules and the assurance that success results from conforming to them. In fact, he provides

many universals but qualifies or contradicts them, partly with other universals and especially with examples. His universals must always be read and revised in light of his examples. He too has a system, but the system includes his examples. To make philosophy pay more regard to things as they are, he wants to teach it to speak through examples, just as political rulers govern through examples and not only through laws (*D* III 1.3).

Machiavelli's seeming lack of system derives from his political intent and can be seen as deliberate. More hostile to Christianity than the humanists, he sought to replace its authority either with a new interpretation "according to virtue" (*D* II 2.2) or with a new sect based on reason and necessity. To this end he presents Rome in the *Discourses* as an alternative exemplar of human virtue to the "Rome" of the Christian church. His Rome comes to us from the books of Titus Livy, an authority comparable, as it were, to the authoritative book of the church, the Bible. If one looks carefully, Machiavelli's attitude to Livy can be seen to move from reverence to acceptance to departure to disagreement to rejection—in sum, his attitude is in fact an appropriation to his purpose. For the *Discourses* is not really a commentary but an original work, as indeed it is commonly treated. Yet its originality is both trumpeted to the world (its "new modes and orders") and concealed behind the example—that is, the authority—of Rome. Machiavelli's appropriation of Livy's Rome may also suggest to us his appropriation of Christian Rome, insofar as the two Romes are parallel as well as opposed. As we have noted, Machiavelli is not simply hostile to Christianity; on the contrary, he has great respect for its political acumen, for the ability of the church to rule the world without seeming to. Perhaps he has in mind the appropriation of Christian techniques of rule to the pagan end of worldly honor.

Yet Machiavelli promises a perfect republic far beyond the ambition of pagans and the sober reflections of the ancient philosophers. He dangles before us the dazzling idea of a "perpetual republic," once denying its possibility, once affirming it (*D* III 17, 22.3). A perpetual republic would have a remedy for every danger and would represent a perfect conquest of the fortune that sooner or later brings down every human institution except one: the church. Machiavelli claims for his revised Rome the success for which the church has to depend on God's providence. No doubt any particular republic, such as Florence or Italy, will come to grief; in this sense a perpetual republic is impossible. But the whole civilization or sect—the republic in the sense of the "Christian republic" comprising all Christian states, now transformed into Machiavellian principalities and republics—

will survive the ups and downs in particular provinces. To effect this irreversible change may be Machiavelli's amazing ambition.

Composition and Structure of the *Discourses*

Nothing is known directly from Machiavelli about the composition of the *Discourses*, so those who want to know about it have been reduced to making inferences. We know that he was expelled from his office as Florentine secretary in 1512 by the Medici and that in his famous letter of 13 December 1513 he remarks with becoming but unbelievable modesty that he has completed a "little work," a "whimsy," on principalities. And in *The Prince* we find a reference to a lengthier "reasoning on republics" that must be the *Discourses* (*P* 2). But the *Discourses* cannot have been finished by 1513 because we find in it reference to events that occurred as late as 1517. One of the two young friends to whom Machiavelli dedicated the work, Cosimo Rucellai, was apparently dead by 1519.

We are left, then, with the period 1513–17, or perhaps 1513–19, as the time of composition, though of course he might have begun the work while in office, and the scholars who have studied this matter have been unable to establish anything more precise. The *Discourses* was not published until 1531, four years after Machiavelli's death on 21 June 1527. As far as we know, he could have changed anything in the manuscript until his death; and if he did not, it was perhaps by choice. Any attempt to connect the time of writing with the content of his thought is complicated by the fact that he seems to have had the opportunity, not open to those who publish in their lifetimes, to leave his thought as he wanted it up to his last gasp. And in what respects did Machiavelli's thought change or develop? We have already dealt with the question of the consistency of the *Discourses* and *The Prince*, and despite first appearances, we did not find any notable discrepancy. As one discovers references to *The Prince* in the *Discourses* (*D* II 1.3; III 42), making their recognition mutual, it seems safest to regard them as a pair of works, not much different—if at all—in time of composition, each said by Machiavelli to contain everything he knows, and offered separately by intent and not by the accident of an author's development.

Coming to the structure of the *Discourses*, we have much less aid from the Machiavelli scholars who have shown so much interest in the time of the composition. We do have more aid from Machiavelli himself, who tells us the plan of the work. But his statements seem both inaccurate and

inadequate. To begin with his full title, *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy*, one discovers that Machiavelli does not confine himself to Livy's first ten books but comments on many more. In addition to the dedicatory letter there are two prefaces: one to the first book, another to the second, but none to the third. The two prefaces differ markedly. In the first Machiavelli urges his contemporaries to imitate the ancients, as the Renaissance calls for, but in all things and therefore in politics, as the Renaissance has neglected to do. In the second preface, however, he says that men often praise ancient times unreasonably. Readers are expected to have made progress in their thinking from imitating to improving on the ancients. The need to make progress derives from the resistance that readers, like human beings in general, feel toward one who finds "new modes and orders" or who makes himself the head in advising some new enterprise (*D* I pr.1; III 35.1). Machiavelli's two prefaces, which actually address the reason for prefaces, alert us to the movement of the *Discourses*, to the stages of argument and the presence of rhetoric. Rather than speaking abstractly, Machiavelli is trying to persuade an audience (which may, of course, have diverse parts more and less attracted to what is said).

At the end of the first chapter Machiavelli describes his plan in the *Discourses*. He distinguishes things done by Rome through either public or private counsel and either inside or outside the city, and he begins the first book with things occurring inside by public counsel. This is our preparation for the chapters on the regime contrasting Rome and Sparta, as we have noted. With the ninth chapter on founding, Machiavelli begins a series of groups of chapters devoted alternately to the two "humors" among human beings, princes and peoples. The nature of princes can be seen in how they govern, but the nature of peoples has to be seen in how they *are* governed, since peoples are incapable of governing without a head (*D* I 44). Princes and peoples both have a universal character irrespective of, and more important than, particular regimes. But Rome in particular excelled above all other republics because it allowed discord between princes and peoples and thus encouraged each party to reveal its character without attempting a false harmony. In considering princes, Machiavelli discusses founding and "being alone" (*D* I 9–10), corruption and how to overcome it (*D* I 16–18), the new prince (*D* I 25–27), and dictatorship and extraordinary remedies (*D* I 33–45). To explain peoples, he considers the use of religion (*D* I 11–15), overcoming weakness (*D* I 19–24), gratitude shown to princes (*D* I 28–32), and the relationship between fear and glory (*D* I 46–59).

Machiavelli tells us that the second book is about how Rome became an empire (*D* II pr.3)—in other words, foreign policy by public counsel, according to the earlier announcement. This includes a study of the military in Rome and a comparison of ancient and modern warfare. In book II Rome comes in for more criticism than before: at the start, Rome is said to have owed its empire to virtue rather than to fortune, but near the end of the book the judgment is reversed (*D* II I, 29.1–2). And in precisely the chapter in which republics are praised for their domestic policy—the "common good is not observed if not in republics"—the foreign policy of the Roman republic is said to have imposed servitude on neighboring republics.

From these discrepancies it appears that "public counsel" is not enough, and Machiavelli must turn to private counsel to coordinate domestic and foreign policy. So book III addresses individual actions in both of these areas instead of separating them on the model of the first two books. Book I showed that the public counsel of the Roman republic was in fact a hidden government making use of private motives (above all, the desire to be alone), and book II did the same for public counsel on "things outside" Rome. The stage is set for hidden government by a private individual—the founder-captain, or the captain who has the double glory of instructing his army before leading it (*D* III 13.3). Such a captain will have to be very capable in management by fraud (*D* II 13, 41) and skilled in conspiracy (*D* III 6). The problem he must face is how to overcome the classical cycle of good regimes and bad, by which virtue in the good leads eventually, but inevitably, to corruption in the bad. And he must contrive to extend his influence beyond his own time to successors who have been made complacent by his very virtue. It is a problem worthy of Machiavelli himself.

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A Note on the Translation

Our purpose has been to translate Machiavelli's text as literally and consistently as is compatible with readable English. By "readable" we mean what can readily be understood now, not necessarily the phrases and idioms we might use now. We believe that giving currency to Machiavelli requires us to convey as much as we can of his words, his terms, and his phrasing, because we wish to be sure that we are not putting our words in his mouth, thus putting our ideas in his head.

We aspire to the ideal that, despite the difficulties, it is possible to understand Machiavelli's thought as he understood it. Thus, perhaps naively, we consider our translation to be not an interpretation but the basis for a variety of responsible interpretations aiming at the ideal. We conceive the office of translator to be strictly confined by the duties of modesty, caution, and fidelity and not to require, or permit, the freedom of self-expression. We have added notes to explain allusions or difficulties in the text, not to advance any interpretation. In the notes we make Machiavelli's sources available to readers, insofar as we have been able to identify them, and we note discrepancies between the original and Machiavelli's quotation. We also provide brief descriptions of modern events referred to by Machiavelli for which he needed no textual source.

Precise cross-references are provided to clarify Machiavelli's own references to previous or later discussions in the *Discourses* or to his other works. We have not tried to compile lists of mutually relevant passages for this wonderfully involved or intricate book. These would amount to a subject index. To provide such a thing would give false security because passages that need to be compared with one another are many more than appear at first. We leave the task of putting things together to the discernment and interpretation of the reader.

We do offer a glossary enabling the reader to trace Machiavelli's use of important words and to see how we have translated them, and enabling us to vary the equivalents we use while still informing the reader of Machiavelli's terms. To discover what Machiavelli means by "corruption" in the *Discourses*, for example, it is necessary to make a survey of his usage of the word, which the glossary facilitates. Machiavelli does not define his terms otherwise than by his usage. Only by experience, indeed, does one learn

what his "terms" are. That fact gives special emphasis to the general duty imposed on translators to translate consistently, an obligation that cannot fully be met even when it is keenly felt because words in these two—or any two—languages do not have the same extent of meaning. For example, *ordine* does not always mean "order." But since it is important to understand the meaning of "order" in the work of a writer who says he is bringing "new modes and orders," we try to translate *ordine* as "order" as consistently as we can. (We had much less success translating *modo* consistently as "mode," since Machiavelli frequently uses it in phrases that must be rendered "so that" rather than "in a mode that" to be readable English.) We try to induce the reader to move toward Machiavelli rather than pulling Machiavelli toward the reader. This is certainly our choice; if it is also an interpretation, so be it. The inevitable imperfection of translation reminds one of life, except that a remedy exists: learn Italian and do your own translation so as not to depend on the arms of others.

Other difficulties of Machiavelli's prose should be mentioned. His pronouns often do not have a clear referent, and we have tried, at some cost to clarity in English, not to resolve his ambiguity by repeating the noun and thus making a choice he left open. Where gender clarifies the reference in Italian more than an English pronoun would, we have occasionally repeated the noun in brackets. Machiavelli also switches easily from singular to plural or the reverse, sometimes within the same sentence (making it clear that collective entities, such as "people," "nobility," "plebs," and "army" operate sometimes as wholes and sometimes as individuals); and occasionally he changes from the third person to the second, addressing the reader in the familiar as "you." We have kept the change of person but not always the change of number when it is too confusing. *Uno* standing by itself, which occurs frequently, we translate as "one individual" so as to distinguish it from the many uses of "one" necessary in idiomatic English. *Uno prudente* or *uno buono* is "someone prudent" or "someone good." *Uno solo* is "one alone."

In accord with the usage of his time Machiavelli says *università* and *universale* in cases in which we would expect "general," since apparently not everyone is included; so we translate them as "generality" or "collectivity." *Università* is derived from the medieval Latin *universitas*, which means both a legal body or corporation and (sometimes) the community on which such bodies depend. But Machiavelli's usage lacks the legalism of medieval usage. Machiavelli does not use one word for "power," such as *potere* in modern Italian; rather, he uses two words, *potestà* and *potenza*. In this he

follows the Latin usage of Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius, as well as the Italian of Dante. In their writings, *potestà* and *potestas* appear to mean a power (sometimes legal) that *may* be exercised, as opposed to *potenza* and *potentia* for a power that *must* be exercised. We have used notes to identify the less frequent *potestà* in that case in which it cannot be distinguished through the glossary.

Machiavelli calls the ancient Etruscans and Gauls "Tuscans" and "French," and we have not altered this anachronism (for an explanation, see *D* III 43). We have followed Machiavelli's use of "infinite" (for example, "infinite other examples") rather than correct it to "countless." But he uses "offend" with such a wide range of meanings that we have been compelled to use a variety of English terms ("attack," "hurt," "offend," "take the offensive"). We have preserved every reference to Machiavelli's writing ("the examples written above"), whether apparently casual or emphatically self-conscious. His use of *cosa* and *cose* cannot be captured by the English "thing/s," so we have sometimes had recourse to "affair/s" or omitted the term altogether. Machiavelli's busy families of words for bad, evil, and wicked and for advantage, convenience, usefulness, and utility defied any consistent translation; see the glossary. We have rendered *servo* as "servile" when it refers to a political community rather than an individual slave: "enslaved" would be too strong, "subordinate" too weak. The Italian *disarmato* means both "unarmed" and "disarmed," as if everyone were naturally armed; we have been compelled to choose by the context. Machiavelli uses "matter" to mean both the subject matter he discusses and the people as that on which an ambitious man can "impress the form of his ambition" (*D* III 8.2); he also uses "subject" in this latter sense. We have not attempted to streamline or vary his striking duplications and repetitions ("to order orders" or "reputed for a reputation"). While we have altered the sentence structure and word order of the Italian to render it English, we have attempted to be faithful to its surprising shifts of direction and changes of tone. In short, we have tried to let his readers taste the charm of Machiavelli's style:

> presenting the most serious matters in a boisterous *allegrissimo*, perhaps not without a malicious artistic sense of the contrast he risks—long, difficult, hard dangerous thoughts and the *tempo* of the gallop and the very best, most capricious humor.[1]

For the Italian text we have followed the Casella edition, adopting variants where they seem appropriate and noting them where they affect the meaning. We have profited from the scholarship of Walker's translation and

of Italian editions by Bertelli, Puppo, Inglese, and Vivanti. Allan Gilbert's translation has also been useful. We have numbered the paragraphs for ease of reference but make no claim they originate with Machiavelli.

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Ancient Italy
ALPS
Adria
ADRIATIC SEA
LIGURIA
APENNINES
Fiesole
UMBRIA
Arno
Florence
ETRURIA
Arretium
Volterra
Clusium
CIMINIAN FOREST
SABINES
SAMNIUM
Falerii
AEQUI
HERNICI
Alba
Rome
Sora
LATINUM
VOLSCI
SIDICINUM
CAUDINE FORKS
Cannae
Fidenae
Tibur
Capenae
Veii
Praeneste
Anio
Alba
Rome
L. Albanus
Ardea
Velitrae
Antium
Circeii
TYRRHENIAN SEA
Privernum
Minturnae
Capua
Nola
Lucera
Aquilonia
Tarentum
CAMPANIA
LUCANIA
LIPARI ISLANDS
Messina
Rhegium
SICILY
Syracuse
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
0 50 100 150 200 kms
0 50 100 150 miles

ALPS
Arbedo
Brescia
Novara
Milan
Verona
Venice
Agnadello
LOMBARDY
Po
Ferrara
Bologna
Genoa
Ravenna
TUSCANY
Castiglione
Urbino
Pisa
Florence
Arezzo
Volterra
Siena
Perugia
Popolonia
Piombino
UMBRIA
MARCHES
Tiber
Rome
LIGUREAN SEA
TYRRHENIAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
Ravenna
Faenza
Forlì
Bersighella
Ragusa
Cirignuola
Naples
CALABRIA
SICILY
Pistoia
Casaglia
Lucca
Mugello
Prato
Fiesole
Pisa
Arno
Florence
Cascina
San Regolo
Italy in Machiavelli's Time
0 50 100 150 200 kms
0 50 100 150 miles

Niccolò Machiavelli to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai,[1] Greetings:

I *send you a present that, if it does not correspond to the obligations I have to you, is without doubt the greatest Niccolò Machiavelli has been able to send you. For in it I have expressed as much as I know and have learned through a long practice and a continual reading in worldly things. And since neither you nor others can desire more of me, you cannot complain if I have not given you more. You can well regret the poverty of my talent, if these narrations of mine are poor; and the fallaciousness of my judgment, if in many parts I deceive myself while discoursing. That being so, I do not know which of us has to be less obligated to the other: whether I to you, who have forced me to write what I would never have written for myself; or you to me, if in writing I have not satisfied you. So take this in the mode*[2] *that all things from friends are taken, where one always considers the intention of the sender more than the qualities of the thing sent. And believe that in this my only satisfaction is that I think that even if I have deceived myself in many of its circumstances, in this one only I know that I have not made an error, in choosing you above all others to address these discourses to: whether because in doing this it appears to me I have shown some gratitude for benefits received, or because it appears to me I have gone outside the common usage of those who write, who are accustomed always to address their works to some prince and, blinded by ambition and avarice, praise him for all virtuous qualities when they should blame him for every part worthy of reproach. Hence, so as not to incur this error, I have chosen not those who are princes but those who for their infinite good parts deserve to be; not those who could load me with ranks, honors, and riches but those who, though unable, would wish to do so. For men wishing to judge rightly have to esteem those who are liberal, not those who can be; and likewise those who know, not those who can govern a kingdom without knowing. Writers praise Hiero the Syracusan*[3] *when he was a private individual more than Perseus the Macedonian*[4] *when he was king, for Hiero lacked nothing other than the principality to be a prince while the other had no part of a king other than the kingdom. Enjoy, therefore, the good or the ill that you yourselves have wished for; and if you persist in the error that these opinions of mine*

gratify you, I shall not fail to follow with the rest of the history, as I promised you in the beginning. Farewell.

First Book

Preface

[1] Although the envious nature of men has always made it no less dangerous to find new modes and orders than to seek unknown waters and lands,[1] because men are more ready to blame than to praise the actions of others, nonetheless, driven by that natural desire that has always been in me to work, without any respect, for those things I believe will bring common benefit to everyone, I have decided to take a path as yet untrodden by anyone, and if it brings me trouble and difficulty, it could also bring me reward through those who consider humanely the end of these labors of mine. If poor talent, little experience of present things, and weak knowledge of ancient things make this attempt of mine defective and not of much utility, it will at least show the path to someone who with more virtue, more discourse and judgment, will be able to fulfill this intention of mine, which, if it will not bring me praise, ought not to incur blame.[2]

[2] Considering thus how much honor is awarded to antiquity, and how many times—letting pass infinite other examples—a fragment of an ancient statue has been bought at a high price because someone wants to have it near oneself, to honor his house with it, and to be able to have it imitated by those who delight in that art, and how the latter then strive with all industry to represent it in all their works; and seeing, on the other hand, that the most virtuous works the histories show us, which have been done[3] by ancient kingdoms and republics, by kings, captains, citizens, legislators,[4] and others who have labored for their fatherland, are rather admired than imitated—indeed they are so much shunned by everyone in every least thing that no sign of that ancient virtue remains with us—I can do no other than marvel and grieve. And so much the more when I see that in the differences that arise between citizens in civil affairs or in the sicknesses that men incur, they always have recourse to those judgments or those remedies that were judged or ordered by the ancients. For the civil laws are nothing other than verdicts given by ancient jurists, which, reduced to order, teach our present jurists to judge. Nor is medicine other than the experiments performed by ancient physicians, on which present physicians found their judgments. Nonetheless, in ordering republics, maintaining states, governing kingdoms, ordering the military and administering war, judging subjects, and increasing empire, neither prince nor republic[5] may be found

that has recourse to the examples of the ancients. This arises, I believe, not so much from the weakness into which the present religion[6] has led the world, or from the evil that an ambitious idleness has done to many Christian provinces and cities, as from not having a true knowledge of histories, through not getting from reading them that sense nor tasting that flavor that they have in themselves. From this it arises that the infinite number who read them take pleasure in hearing of the variety of accidents[7] contained in them without thinking of imitating them, judging that imitation is not only difficult but impossible—as if heaven, sun, elements, men had varied in motion, order, and power from what they were in antiquity. Wishing, therefore, to turn men from this error, I have judged it necessary to write on all those books of Titus Livy that have not been intercepted by the malignity of the times[8] whatever I shall judge necessary for their greater understanding, according to knowledge of ancient and modern things, so that those who read these statements of mine can more easily draw from them that utility for which one should seek knowledge of histories. Although this enterprise may be difficult, nonetheless, aided by those who have encouraged me to accept this burden, I believe I can carry it far enough so that a short road will remain for another to bring it to the destined place.

1

What Have Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and What Was That of Rome

[1] Those who read what the beginning was of the city of Rome and by what legislators[1] and how it was ordered will not marvel that so much virtue was maintained for many centuries in that city, and that afterward the empire that the republic attained arose there. Wishing first to discourse of its birth, I say that all cities are built either by men native to the place where they are built or by foreigners. The first case[2] occurs when it does not appear, to inhabitants dispersed in many small parts, that they live securely, since each part by itself, both because of the site and because of the small number, cannot resist the thrust of whoever assaults it; and when the enemy comes, they do not have time to unite for their defense. Or if they did, they would be required to leave many of their strongholds abandoned; and so they would come at once to be the prey of their enemies. So to flee these dangers, moved either by themselves or by someone among them of greater authority, they are restrained to inhabit together a place elected by them, more advantageous to live in and easier to defend.

[2] Of these, among many others, were Athens and Venice. The first was built for like causes by the dispersed inhabitants under the authority of Theseus.[3] The other consisted of many peoples reduced to certain small islands at the tip of the Adriatic Sea, who began among themselves, without any other particular prince who might order them, to live under the laws that appeared to them most apt to maintain them, so as to flee the wars that arose every day in Italy because of the coming of new barbarians after the decline of the Roman Empire.[4] It turned out happily for them because of the long idleness that the site gave them, since the sea had no exit and the peoples who were afflicting Italy had no ships to be able to plague them: so any small beginning would have enabled them to come to the greatness they have.

[3] The second case is that of a city built by foreign races, whether free men or those depending on others, who are sent out as colonies either by a republic or by a prince so as to relieve their lands of inhabitants or for the defense of a country newly acquired that they wish to maintain securely and without expense. Of such cities the Roman people built very many throughout its empire. Or truly they are built by a prince, not to inhabit but for his glory, like the city of Alexandria by Alexander. Because these cities do not have a free origin, it rarely occurs that they make great strides and can be numbered among the capitals[5] of kingdoms. The building of Florence was like these, because—whether built by soldiers of Sulla or perchance by inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesole, who, trusting in the long peace that was born in the world under Octavian, came down to inhabit the plain by the Arno—it was built under the Roman Empire. Nor, in its beginnings, could it make any gains other than those conceded to it by courtesy of the prince.[6]

[4] The builders of cities are free when peoples, either under a prince or by themselves, are constrained by disease, hunger, or war to abandon the ancestral country and to seek for themselves a new seat. Such peoples either inhabit the cities they find in the countries they acquire, as did Moses, or they build anew in them, as did Aeneas. In this case one can recognize the virtue of the builder and the fortune of what is built, which is more or less marvelous as the one who was the beginning of it was more or less virtuous. His virtue can be recognized in two modes: the first is in the choice of site, the other in the ordering of laws. Because men work either by necessity or by choice, and because there is greater virtue to be seen where choice has less authority, it should be considered whether it is better to choose sterile places for the building of cities so that men, constrained to be industrious and less seized by idleness, live more united, having less cause for discord, because of the poverty of the site, as happened in Ragusa[7] and in many other cities built in similar places. This choice would without doubt be wiser and more useful if men were content to live off their own and did not wish to seek to command others. Therefore, since men cannot secure themselves except with power, it is necessary to avoid this sterility in a country and to settle in the most fertile places, where, since [the city] can expand because of the abundance of the site, it can both defend itself from whoever might assault it and crush anyone who might oppose its greatness. As to the idleness that the site might bring, the laws should be ordered to constrain it by imposing such necessities as the site does not provide. Those

should be imitated who have inhabited very agreeable and very fertile countries, apt to produce men who are idle and unfit for any virtuous exercise, and who have had the wisdom to prevent the harms that the agreeableness of the country would have caused through idleness by imposing a necessity to exercise on those who had to be soldiers, so that through such an order they became better soldiers there than in countries that have naturally been harsh and sterile. Among them was the kingdom of the Egyptians, in which the necessity ordered by the laws was able to do so much that most excellent men arose there, notwithstanding that the country is very agreeable. If their names had not been eliminated by antiquity, they would be seen to merit more praise than Alexander the Great and many others whose memory is still fresh. Whoever had considered the kingdom of the sultan, and the order of the Marnelukes and of their military before they were eliminated by Selim the Grand Turk,[8] would have seen many exercises concerning soldiers in it, and would in fact have recognized how much they feared the idleness to which the kindness of the country could lead them if they had not been prevented with very strong laws.

[5] I say, thus, that it is a more prudent choice to settle in a fertile place, if that fertility is restrained within proper limits by laws. When Alexander the Great wished to build a city for his glory, Deinocrates the architect came and showed him that he could build it on top of Mount Athos, which place, besides being strong, could be adapted to give that city a human form, which would be a marvelous and rare thing, worthy of his greatness. When Alexander asked him what the inhabitants would live on, he replied he had not thought of that. At this the former laughed and, setting aside that mountain, built Alexandria, where the inhabitants would have to stay willingly because of the fatness of the country and the advantages of the sea and the Nile.[9] So if whoever examines the building of Rome takes Aeneas for its first progenitor,[10] it will be of those cities built by foreigners, while if he takes Romulus[11] it will be of those built by men native to the place; and in whichever mode, he will see that it had a free beginning, without depending on anyone. He will also see, as will be said below, how many necessities the laws made by Romulus, Numa,[12] and the others imposed, so that the fertility of the site, the advantages of the sea, the frequent victories, and the greatness of its empire could not corrupt it for many centuries, and that they maintained it full of as much virtue as has ever adorned any other city or republic.

[6] Because the things worked by it, which are celebrated by Titus Livy, ensued either through public or through private counsel, and either inside or outside the city, I shall begin to discourse of things occurring inside and by public counsel that I shall judge worthy of greater notice, adding to them everything that might depend on them, to which discourses this first book, or in truth this first part, will be limited.

2

Of How Many Species Are Republics, and Which Was the Roman Republic

[1] I wish to put aside reasoning on cities that have had their beginning subject to another; and I shall speak of those that had a beginning far from all external servitude and were at once governed by their own will, either as a republic or as a principality. These have had diverse laws and orders, as they have had diverse beginnings. For some were given laws by one alone and at a stroke, either in their beginning or after not much time, like those that were given by Lycurgus to the Spartans;[1] some had them by chance and at many different times, and according to accidents, as had Rome. So that republic can be called happy whose lot is to get one man so prudent that he gives it laws ordered so that it can live securely under them without needing to correct them. One sees that Sparta observed them for more than eight hundred years without corrupting them or without any dangerous tumult.[2] On the contrary, that city has some degree of unhappiness that, by not having fallen upon one prudent orderer, is forced of necessity to reorder itself. Of these still more unhappy is that which is the farthest from order, and that one is farthest from it that by its orders is altogether off the right road that might lead it to the perfect and true end. It is almost impossible for those in this degree to repair themselves by any accident whatever; the others that, if they do not have perfect order, have taken a beginning that is good and capable of becoming better, can by the occurrence of accidents become perfect. But it is indeed true that they will never order themselves without danger, because enough men never agree to a new law that looks to a new order in a city unless they are shown by a necessity that they need to do it. Since this necessity cannot come without danger, it is an easy thing for the republic to be ruined before it can be led to a perfection of order. This is vouched for fully by the republic of Florence, which was reordered by the accident in Arezzo in ’02 and disordered by the one in Prato in ’12.[3]

[2] Wishing thus to discourse of what were the orders of the city of Rome and what accidents led it to its perfection,[4] I say that some who have

written on republics say that in them is one of three states[5]—called by them principality, aristocrats, and popular—and that those who order a city should turn to one of these according as it appears to them more to the purpose. Some others, wiser according to the opinion of many, have the opinion that there are six types of government, of which three are the worst; that three others are good in themselves but so easily corrupted that they too come to be pernicious.[6] Those that are good are the three written above; those that are bad are three others that depend on these three; and each one of them is similar to the one next to it so that they easily leap from one to the other. For the principality easily becomes tyrannical; the aristocrats with ease become a state of the few; the popular is without difficulty converted into the licentious. So if an orderer of a republic orders one of those three states in a city, he orders it there for a short time; for no remedy can be applied there to prevent it from slipping into its contrary because of the likeness that the virtue and the vice have in this case.

[3] These variations of governments arise by chance among men. For since the inhabitants were sparse in the beginning of the world, they lived dispersed for a time like beasts; then, as generations multiplied, they gathered together, and to be able to defend themselves better, they began to look to whoever among them was more robust and of greater heart, and they made him a head, as it were, and obeyed him. From this arose the knowledge of things honest and good, differing from the pernicious and bad. For, seeing that if one individual hurt his benefactor, hatred and compassion among men came from it, and as they blamed the ungrateful and honored those who were grateful, and thought too that those same injuries could be done to them, to escape like evil they were reduced to making laws and ordering punishments for whoever acted against them: hence came the knowledge of justice. That thing made them go after not the most hardy but the one who would be more prudent and more just when they next had to choose a prince. But then as the prince began to be made by succession, and not by choice, at once the heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors; and leaving aside virtuous works, they thought that princes have nothing else to do but surpass others in sumptuousness and lasciviousness and every other kind of license. So as the prince began to be hated and, because of such hatred, began to fear, and as he soon passed from fear to offenses, from it a tyranny quickly arose. From this arose next the beginnings of ruin and of plots and conspiracies[7] against princes, done not by those who were either timid or weak but by those who were in

advance of others in generosity, greatness of spirit,[8] riches, and nobility; who were unable to endure the dishonest life of that prince. The multitude, thus following the authority of the powerful, armed itself against the prince and obeyed them as its liberators when he was eliminated. And holding in hatred the name of a sole head, they constituted a government of themselves; and in the beginning, with respect to the past tyranny, they governed themselves according to the laws ordered by them, placing the common utility before their own advantage; and they governed and preserved both private and public things with the highest diligence. This administration came next to their sons, who, not knowing the variation of fortune, never having encountered evil, and unwilling to rest content with civil equality, but turning to avarice, to ambition, to usurpation of women, made a government of aristocrats become a government of few, without respect for any civility. So in a short time the same thing happened to them as to the tyrant; for disgusted by their government, the multitude made for itself a minister of whoever might plan in any mode to offend those governors; and so someone quickly rose up who, with the aid of the multitude, eliminated them. Since the memory of the prince and of the injuries received from him was still fresh, and since they had unmade the state of the few and did not wish to remake that of the prince, they turned to the popular state. They ordered it so that neither the powerful few nor one prince might have any authority in it. Because all states have some reverence in the beginning, this popular state was maintained for a little while, but not much, especially once the generation that had ordered it was eliminated; for it came at once to license, where neither private men nor public were in fear, and each living in his own mode, a thousand injuries were done every day. So, constrained by necessity, or by the suggestion of some good man, or to escape such license, they returned anew to the principality; and from that, degree by degree, they came back toward license, in the modes and for the causes said.

[4] It is while revolving in this cycle that all republics are governed and govern themselves. But rarely do they return to the same governments, for almost no republic can have so long a life as to be able to pass many times through these changes and remain on its feet. But indeed it happens that in its travails, a republic always lacking in counsel and forces becomes subject to a neighboring state that is ordered better than it; assuming that this were not so, however, a republic would be capable of revolving for an infinite time in these governments.

[5] I say thus that all the said modes are pestiferous because of the brevity of life in the three good ones and because of the malignity in the three bad. So those who prudently order laws having recognized this defect, avoiding each of these modes by itself, chose one that shared in all, judging it firmer and more stable; for the one guards the other, since in one and the same city there are the principality, the aristocrats, and the popular government.

[6] Among those who have deserved most praise for such constitutions is Lycurgus, who in Sparta ordered his laws so as to give their roles to the kings, the aristocrats, and the people and made a state that lasted more than eight hundred years, achieving the highest praise for himself and quiet in that city.[9] The contrary happened to Solon, who ordered the laws in Athens: by ordering only the popular state there, he made it of such short life that before he died he saw the tyranny of Pisistratus born there.[10] His heirs were expelled after forty years and Athens returned to freedom, yet because it took up the popular state again, according to the orders of Solon, it lasted no more than a hundred years. To maintain it, [Athens] made many constitutions that had not been considered by Solon, by which the insolence of the great and the license of the collectivity[11] were repressed. Nonetheless, because it did not mix them with the power of the principality and with that of the aristocrats, Athens lived a very short time in respect to Sparta.

[7] But let us come to Rome. Notwithstanding that it did not have a Lycurgus to order it in the beginning in a mode that would enable it to live free a long time, nonetheless so many accidents arose in it through the disunion between the plebs and the Senate that what an orderer had not done, chance did. For if the first fortune did not fall to Rome, the second fell to it; for if its first orders were defective, nonetheless they did not deviate from the right way that could lead them to perfection. For Romulus and all the other kings made many and good laws conforming also to a free way of life; but because their end was to found a kingdom and not a republic, when that city was left free, many things that were necessary to order in favor of freedom were lacking, not having been ordered by those kings. Even though its kings lost their empire by the causes and modes discoursed of, nonetheless those who expelled them expelled from Rome the name and not the kingly power, having at once ordered two consuls there who stood in the place of the kings; so, since there were the consuls and the Senate in that republic, it came to be mixed only of two qualities out of the three written of above—that is, the principality and the

aristocrats. It remained only to give a place to the popular government; hence, when the Roman nobility became insolent for the causes that will be told below, the people rose up against it; so as not to lose the whole, it was constrained to yield to the people its part, and on the other side the Senate and the consuls remained with so much authority that they could keep their rank in that republic. Thus arose the creation of the tribunes of the plebs, after which the state of that republic came to be more stabilized, since all three kinds of government there had their part. Fortune was so favorable to it that although it passed from the government of kings and of aristocrats to that of the people, by the same degrees and for the same causes that have been discoursed of above, nonetheless it never took away all authority from kingly qualities so as to give authority to the aristocrats, nor did it diminish the authority of the aristocrats altogether so as to give it to the people. But, remaining mixed, it made a perfect republic, to which perfection it came through the disunion of the plebs and the Senate, as will be demonstrated at length in the next two chapters.

3

What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be Created in Rome, Which Made the Republic More Perfect

[1] As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it. When any malignity remains hidden for a time, this proceeds from a hidden cause, which is not recognized because no contrary experience has been seen. But time, which they say is the father of every truth, exposes it later.

[2] It appeared that in Rome there was a very great union between the plebs and the Senate after the Tarquins were expelled,[1] and that the nobles had put away that pride of theirs, had taken on a popular spirit, and were tolerable to anyone, however mean.[2] This deception remained concealed, nor did one see the cause of it while the Tarquins lived. Fearing them, and having fear that if the plebs were treated badly it would not take their side, the nobility behaved humanely toward them; but as soon as the Tarquins were dead and fear fled from the nobles, they began to spit out that poison against the plebs that they had held in their breasts, and they offended it in all the modes they could.[3] Such a thing is testimony to what I said above, that men never work any good unless through necessity, but where choice abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of confusion and disorder. Therefore it is said that hunger and poverty make men industrious, and the laws make them good. Where a thing works well on its own without the law, the law is not necessary; but when some good custom is lacking, at once the law is necessary. Therefore when the Tarquins, who had kept the nobility in check with fear of themselves, were missing, it was fitting to think of a new order that would have the same effect as the Tarquins had had when they were alive. Therefore, after many

confusions, noises, and dangers of scandals that arose between the plebs and the nobility, they arrived at the creation of the tribunes for the security of the plebs.[4] They ordered them with so much eminence and reputation that they could ever after be intermediaries between the plebs and the Senate and prevent the insolence of the nobles.

4

That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That Republic Free and Powerful

[1] I do not wish to fail to discourse of the tumults in Rome from the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes,[1] and then upon some things contrary to the opinion of many who say that Rome was a tumultuous republic and full of such confusion that if good fortune and military virtue had not made up for its defects, it would have been inferior to every other republic.[2] I cannot deny that fortune and the military were causes of the Roman Empire; but it quite appears to me they are not aware that where the military is good, there must be good order; and too, it rarely occurs that good fortune will not be there. But let us come to other details of that city. I say that to me it appears that those who damn the tumults between the nobles and the plebs blame those things that were the first cause of keeping Rome free, and that they consider the noises and the cries that would arise in such tumults more than the good effects that they engendered. They do not consider that in every republic are two diverse humors,[3] that of the people and that of the great, and that all the laws that are made in favor of freedom arise from their disunion, as can easily be seen to have occurred in Rome. For from the Tarquins to the Gracchi, which was more than three hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely engendered exile and very rarely blood. Neither can these tumults, therefore, be judged harmful nor a republic divided that in so much time sent no more than eight or ten citizens into exile because of its differences, and killed very few of them, and condemned not many more to fines of money. Nor can one in any mode, with reason, call a republic disordered where there are so many examples of virtue; for good examples arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those tumults that many inconsiderately damn. For whoever examines their end well will find that they have engendered not any exile or violence unfavorable to the common

good but laws and orders in benefit of public freedom. If anyone said the modes were extraordinary and almost wild, to see the people together crying out against the Senate, the Senate against the people, running tumultuously through the streets, closing shops, the whole plebs leaving Rome—all of which things frighten whoever does no other than read of them—I say that every city ought to have its modes with which the people can vent its ambition, and especially those cities that wish to avail themselves of the people in important things. Among these the city of Rome had this mode: that when the people wished to obtain a law, either they did one of the things said above or they refused to enroll their names to go to war, so that to placate them there was need to satisfy them in some part. The desires of free peoples are rarely pernicious to freedom because they arise either from being oppressed or from suspicion that they may be oppressed. If these opinions are false, there is for them the remedy of assemblies, where some good man[4] gets up who in orating demonstrates to them how they deceive themselves; and though peoples, as Tully says, are ignorant, they are capable of truth and easily yield when the truth is told them by a man worthy of faith.[5]

[2] Thus one should blame the Roman government more sparingly and consider that so many good effects would not have emerged from that republic if not caused by the best causes. And if the tumults were the cause of the creation of the tribunes, they deserve highest praise; for besides giving popular administration its part, they were constituted as a guard of Roman freedom, as will be shown in the following chapter.

5

Where the Guard of Freedom May Be Settled More Securely, in the People or in the Great; and Which Has Greater Cause for Tumult, He Who Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain

[1] For those who have prudently constituted a republic, among the most necessary things ordered by them has been to constitute a guard for freedom, and according as this is well placed, that free way of life lasts more or less. Because in every republic there are great and popular men, it has been doubted in which hands it is better to place the said guard. With the Lacedemonians, and in our times with the Venetians, it has been put in the hands of the nobles; but with the Romans it was put in the hands of the plebs.

[2] Therefore it is necessary to examine which of these republics made the better choice. If one goes back to the reasons, there is something to say on every side; but if one examines their end, one takes the side of the nobles because the freedom of Sparta and Venice had a longer life than that of Rome. Coming to reasons, taking first the side of the Romans, I say that one should put on guard over a thing those who have less appetite for usurping it. Without doubt, if one considers the end of the nobles and of the ignobles, one will see great desire to dominate in the former, and in the latter only desire not to be dominated; and, in consequence, a greater will to live free, being less able to hope to usurp it than are the great. So when those who are popular are posted as the guard of freedom, it is reasonable that they have more care for it, and since they are not able to seize it, they do not permit others to seize it. On the other side, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian order says that those who put the guard in the hands of the powerful do two good works: one is that they satisfy their ambition more, and, having more part in the republic through having this stick in hand, they

have cause to be more content; the other is that they take away a quality of authority from the restless spirits of the plebs that is the cause of infinite dissensions and scandals in a republic and is apt to reduce the nobility to a certain desperation that with time produces bad effects. They give as an example of this the same Rome, where because the tribunes of the plebs had this authority in their hands it was not enough for them to have one plebeian consul, but they wished to have both. From this, they wished for the censorship, the praetor, and all the other ranks of command of the city; nor was this enough for them, since, taken by the same fury, they later began to adore those men who they saw were apt to beat down the nobility, from which came the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.[1] And truly, he who discourses well on the one thing and the other could remain doubtful as to which should be chosen by him as guard of such freedom, not knowing which humor of men is more hurtful in a republic, that which desires to maintain honor already acquired or that which desires to acquire what it does not have.

[3] In the end, he who subtly examines the whole will draw this conclusion from it: you are reasoning either about a republic that wishes to make an empire, such as Rome, or about one for whom it is enough to maintain itself. In the first case, it is necessary for it to do everything as did Rome; in the second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for the causes that will be told in the following chapter.

[4] But, so as to return to discoursing on which men in a republic are more hurtful, those who desire to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius was created dictator and Marcus Fulvius master of the horse, both of them plebeians, so as to look into certain conspiracies that had been made in Capua against Rome, authority was also given to them by the people to be able to look into whoever in Rome, through ambition and extraordinary modes, might be contriving to come to the consulate and to the other honors of the city. As it appeared to the nobility that such authority was given to the dictator against them, they spread it through Rome that the nobles were not the ones seeking honors through ambition and extraordinary modes but rather that the ignobles, who, not trusting in their blood and virtue, were seeking by extraordinary paths to come to those ranks; and they accused the dictator particularly. So powerful was the accusation that after holding an assembly and complaining of the calumnies put on him by the nobles, Menenius laid down the dictatorship and submitted himself to the judgment that might be

made of him by the people; and then, after his case had been aired, he was absolved.[2] There it was much disputed which is the more ambitious, he who wishes to maintain or he who wishes to acquire; for either one appetite or the other can be the cause of very great tumults. Yet nonetheless they are most often caused by him who possesses, because the fear of losing generates in him the same wishes that are in those who desire to acquire; for it does not appear to men that they possess securely what a man has unless he acquires something else new. There is this besides: that since they possess much, they are able to make an alteration with greater power and greater motion. And there is still this besides: that their incorrect and ambitious behavior inflames in the breasts of whoever does not possess the wish to possess so as to avenge themselves against them by despoiling them or to be able also themselves to enter into those riches and those honors that they see being used badly by others.

6

Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered in Rome That Would Have Taken Away the Enmities between the People and the Senate

[1] We have discoursed above on the effects produced by the controversies between the people and the Senate. Now since they continued until the time of the Gracchi,[1] when they were the cause of the ruin of a free way of life, one might desire that Rome had produced the great effects that it produced without having such enmities in it. So it has appeared to me a thing worthy of consideration to see whether a state could have been ordered in Rome that would have removed the aforesaid controversies. For him who wishes to examine this it is necessary to have recourse to those republics that have been free for a long while without such enmities and tumults and to see what state they had and whether it could be introduced in Rome. For an example among the ancients there is Sparta, among the moderns Venice, named by me above.[2] Sparta made a king, with a small Senate, who governed it; Venice did not divide the government by names, but under one appellation all those who can hold administration are called gentlemen. This mode was given it by chance more than by the prudence of him who gave them laws; for since many inhabitants retired onto the shores where that city is now, for the causes said above,[3] and as they grew to such a number that if they wished to live together they needed to make laws, they ordered a form of government.[4] And as they joined together often in councils to decide about the city, when it appeared to them that there were as many as would be sufficient for a political way of life, they closed to all others who might come newly to inhabit there the way enabling them to join in the government. In time, when enough inhabitants found themselves in that place outside the government so as to give reputation to those who governed, they called [the latter] gentlemen and the others the populace.

This mode could arise and be maintained without tumult because when it arose whoever then inhabited Venice was put in the government, so that nobody could complain; those who came later to inhabit it, finding the state steady and closed off, had neither cause nor occasion to make a tumult. The cause was not there because nothing had been taken from them; the occasion was not there because whoever ruled held them in check and did not put them to work in things in which they could seize authority. Besides this, those who came later to inhabit Venice were not many, nor of such number that there was a disproportion between whoever governed them and those who were governed; for the number of gentlemen is either equal or superior to them. So for these causes Venice could order that state and maintain it united.

[2] Sparta, as I said, was governed by a king and by a narrow Senate. It could maintain itself for so long a time because they could live united a long time: there were few inhabitants in Sparta, for they blocked the way to those who might come to inhabit it, and the laws of Lycurgus were held in repute. (Since they were observed, they removed all causes of tumult). For Lycurgus with his laws made more equality of belongings[5] in Sparta and less equality of rank; for there was an equal poverty and the plebeians were less ambitious because the ranks of the city were spread among few citizens and were kept at a distance from the plebs; nor did the nobles, by treating them badly, ever give them the desire to hold rank. This was because the Spartan kings, placed in that principality and set down in the middle of the nobility, had no greater remedy for upholding their dignity than to keep the plebs defended from every injury, which made the plebs not fear and not desire rule.[6] Since the plebs neither had nor feared rule, the rivalry that it could have had with the nobility was taken away, as well as the cause of tumults; and they could live united a long time. But two principal things caused this union: one, that there were few inhabitants in Sparta, and because of this they could be governed by few; the other, that since they did not accept foreigners in their republic they had opportunity neither to be corrupted nor to grow so much that it was unendurable by the few who governed it.[7]

[3] Considering thus all these things, one sees that it was necessary for the legislators of Rome to do one of two things if they wished Rome to stay quiet like the above-mentioned republics: either not employ the plebs in war, as did the Venetians, or not open the way to foreigners, as did the Spartans. They did both, which gave the plebs strength and increase and infinite opportunities for tumult. But if the Roman state had come to be

quieter, this inconvenience would have followed: that it would also have been weaker because it cut off the way by which it could come to the greatness it achieved, so that if Rome wished to remove the causes of tumults, it removed too the causes of expansion. In all human things he who examines well sees this: that one inconvenience can never be suppressed without another's cropping up. Therefore, if you wish to make a people numerous and armed so as to be able to make a great empire, you make it of such a quality that you cannot then manage it in your mode; if you maintain it either small or unarmed so as to be able to manage it, then if you acquire dominion you cannot hold it or it becomes so cowardly that you are the prey of whoever assaults you. And so, in every decision of ours, we should consider where are the fewer inconveniences and take that for the best policy, because nothing entirely clean and entirely without suspicion is ever found. So Rome in similarity to Sparta could have made a prince for life and made a small Senate; but it could not, like Sparta, refuse to increase the number of its citizens if it wished to make a great empire; that would have made the king for life and the small number of the Senate serve for little as far as union was concerned.

[4] If someone wished, therefore, to order a republic anew, he would have to examine whether he wished it to expand like Rome in dominion and in power or truly to remain within narrow limits. In the first case it is necessary to order it like Rome and make a place for tumults and universal dissensions, as best one can; for without a great number of men, and well armed, a republic can never grow, or, if it grows, maintain itself. In the second case, you can order it like Sparta and like Venice, but because expansion is poison for such republics, he who orders them should, in all the modes he can, prohibit them from acquiring, because such acquisitions, founded on a weak republic, are its ruin altogether. So it happened to Sparta and to Venice. The first of these, after it had subjected almost all Greece to itself, showed its weak foundation upon one slightest accident; for when other cities rebelled, following the rebellion of Thebes, caused by Pelipodas, that republic was altogether ruined.[8] Similarly, having seized a great part of Italy—and the greater part not with war but with money and astuteness—when it had to put its forces to the proof, Venice lost everything in one day.[9] I would well believe that to make a republic that would last a long time, the mode would be to order it within like Sparta or like Venice; to settle it in a strong place of such power that nobody would believe he could crush it at once. On the other hand, it would not be so great as to be

formidable to its neighbors; and so it could enjoy its state at length. For war is made on a republic for two causes: one, to become master of it; the other, for fear lest it seize you. These two causes the mode said above takes away almost altogether; for if it is difficult to capture it, as I presuppose, since it is well ordered for defense, it will happen rarely, or never, that one[10] can make a plan to acquire it. If it stays within its limits, and it is seen by experience that there is no ambition in it, it will never occur that one[11] will make war for fear of it; and so much the more would this be if there were in it a constitution and laws to prohibit it from expanding. Without doubt I believe that if the thing could be held balanced in this mode, it would be the true political way of life and the true quiet of a city. But since all things of men are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall;[12] and to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you. So when a republic that has been ordered so as to be capable of maintaining itself does not expand, and necessity leads it to expand, this would come to take away its foundations and make it come to ruin sooner. So, on the other hand, if heaven were so kind that it did not have to make war, from that would arise the idleness to make it either effeminate or divided; these two things together, or each by itself, would be the cause of its ruin. Therefore, since one cannot, as I believe, balance this thing, nor maintain this middle way exactly, in ordering a republic there is need to think of the more honorable part and to order it so that if indeed necessity brings it to expand, it can conserve what it has seized. To return to the first reasoning, I believe that it is necessary to follow the Roman order and not that of the other republics—for I do not believe one can find a mode between the one and the other—and to tolerate the enmities that arise between the people and the Senate, taking them as an inconvenience necessary to arrive at Roman greatness. For besides the other reasons cited, in which the tribunate authority was demonstrated to have been necessary for the guard of freedom, the benefit produced in republics by the authority to accuse, which was among others committed to the tribunes, can easily be appreciated, as will be discoursed of in the following chapter.

7

How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in a Republic to Maintain It in Freedom

[1] To those who are posted in a city as guard of its freedom one cannot give a more useful and necessary authority than that of being able to accuse citizens to the people, or to some magistrate or council, when they sin in anything against the free state. This order produces two very useful effects for a republic. The first is that for fear of being accused citizens do not attempt things against the state; and when attempting them, they are crushed instantly and without respect. The other is that an outlet is given by which to vent, in some mode against some citizen, those humors that grow up in cities; and when these humors do not have an outlet by which they may be vented ordinarily, they have recourse to extraordinary modes that bring a whole republic to ruin. So there is nothing that makes a republic so stable and steady as to order it in a mode so that those alternating humors that agitate it can be vented in a way ordered by the laws. This can be demonstrated by many examples, and especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livy brings up.[1] There he says that the Roman nobility had become angered against the plebs because the plebs appeared to it to have too much authority through the creation of the tribunes, who defended it. Meanwhile Rome, as it happened, had come into a great scarcity of provisions and the Senate had sent for grain in Sicily. Coriolanus, enemy of the popular faction, counseled that the time had come when, by keeping it famished and not distributing the grain, they could punish the plebs and take from it the authority that it had taken to the prejudice of the nobility. When that judgment came to the ears of the people, it aroused such indignation against Coriolanus that as he emerged from the Senate they would have killed him in a tumult, had the tribunes not summoned him to appear to defend his cause. On this incident one notes what is said above, how far it may be useful and necessary that republics give an outlet with their laws to vent the anger that the collectivity conceives against one citizen; for when

these ordinary modes are not there, one has recourse to extraordinary ones, and without doubt these produce much worse effects than the former.

[2] For if a citizen is crushed ordinarily, there follows little or no disorder in the republic, even though he has been done a wrong. For the execution is done without private forces and without foreign forces, which are the ones that ruin a free way of life; but it is done with public forces and orders, which have their particular limits and do not lead beyond[2] to something that may ruin the republic. As to corroborating this opinion, I wish this example of Coriolanus to suffice among the ancient ones, concerning which everyone may consider how much ill would have resulted to the Roman republic if he had been killed in a tumult; for from that arises offense by private individuals against private individuals, which offense generates fear; fear seeks for defense; for defense they procure partisans; from partisans arise the parties in cities; from parties their ruin. But since the affair was governed through whoever had authority for it, all those ills came to be taken away that could have arisen if it were governed with private authority.

[3] We have seen in our times what innovation has done to the republic of Florence because the multitude was unable to vent its animus ordinarily against one of its citizens, as happened in the times when Francesco Valori was like a prince of the city. He was judged by many to be ambitious and a man who with his audacity and spiritedness wished to pass beyond[3] a civil way of life; and there being no way in the republic to resist him except with a sect contrary to his, it came about that since he had no fear except of extraordinary modes, he began to get supporters to defend him. On the other side, since those who opposed him had no ordinary way to repress him, they thought of extraordinary ways until they came to arms. If one had been able to oppose him ordinarily, his authority would have been eliminated with harm to him alone; but since he had to be eliminated extraordinarily, there followed harm not only to him but to many other noble citizens.

[4] One could also cite in support of the conclusion written above the incident that also occurred in Florence regarding Piero Soderini, which occurred entirely because in that republic there was no mode of accusation against the ambition of powerful citizens.[4] For to accuse one powerful individual before eight judges[5] in a republic is not enough; the judges need to be very many because the few always behave in the mode of the few. So if such modes had been there, either the citizens would have accused him,

if he were living badly, and by such means they would have vented their animus without having the Spanish army come; or, if he were not living badly, they would not have dared to work against him for fear of being accused themselves. And so from each side the appetite that was the cause of the scandal would have ceased.

[5] So one can conclude this: Whenever one sees that alien forces are called in by a party of men living in a city, one can believe it arises from its bad orders, because inside that wall[6] there is no order able, without extraordinary modes, to vent the malignant humors that arise in men—for which one fully provides by ordering accusations there before very many judges and giving reputation to them. These modes were so well ordered in Rome that in so many dissensions of the plebs and the Senate, never did the Senate or the plebs or any particular citizen plan to avail themselves of external forces; for having the remedy at home, they were not compelled of necessity to go outside for it. Although the examples written above are very sufficient to prove it, nonetheless I wish to bring up another, recited by Titus Livy in his history. He refers to how in Chiusi, a very noble city in Tuscany in those times, a sister of Arruns was violated by one Lucumo, and since Arruns could not avenge himself because of the power of the violator, he went to the French, who were then reigning in that place today called Lombardy. He urged them to come with arms in hand to Chiusi, showing them that they could avenge the injury received usefully to themselves.[7] If Arruns had seen that he could avenge himself with the modes of the city, he would not have sought out barbarian forces. But as these accusations are useful in a republic, so calumnies are useless and harmful, as we shall discourse of in the following chapter.

8

As Much As Accusations Are Useful to Republics, So Much Are Calumnies Pernicious

[1] Notwithstanding that the virtue of Furius Camillus, after he had freed Rome from the oppression of the French, had made all Roman citizens yield to him without its appearing to them that reputation or rank were taken away from them,[1] nonetheless Manlius Capitolinus could not endure having so much honor and so much glory attributed to him, since it appeared to Manlius that he had done as much for the safety[2] of Rome; for having saved the Capitol he deserved as much as Camillus and as for other martial praise he was not inferior. So, loaded with envy, since he could not remain quiet because of the other's glory and saw that he could not sow discord among the Fathers, he turned to the plebs, sowing various sinister opinions within it. Among other things he said was that the treasure gathered together to give to the French and then not given to them had been usurped by private citizens; and if it were taken back it could be converted to public utility, relieving the plebs of taxes or of some private debt. These words were able to do very much among the plebs; so it began to make a crowd and to make many tumults to its own purpose in the city. Since this thing displeased the Senate, and appeared to it momentous and dangerous, it created a dictator to inquire into the case and to check the impetuosity of Manlius. Then the dictator at once had him summoned, and the two came out in public confronting fronting each other, the dictator in the midst of the nobles and Manlius in the midst of the plebs. Manlius was asked to say who held this treasure he told of, because the Senate was as desirous of learning it as the plebs. To this Manlius did not respond specifically but kept evading, and said it was not necessary to tell them what they knew; so the dictator had him put in prison.[3]

[2] It is to be noted by this text how detestable calumnies are in free cities and in every other mode of life, and that to repress them one should not

spare any order that may suit the purpose. Nor can there be a better order for taking them away than to open up very many places for accusations; for as much as accusations help republics, so much do calumnies hurt. Between one side and the other there is the difference that calumnies have need neither of witnesses nor of any other specific corroboration to prove them, so that everyone can be calumniated by everyone; but everyone cannot of course be accused, since accusations have need of true corroborations and of circumstances that show the truth of the accusation. Men are accused to magistrates, to peoples, to councils; they are calumniated in piazzas and in loggias. Calumny is used more where accusation is used less and where cities are less ordered to receive them. So an orderer of a republic should order that every citizen in it can accuse without any fear or without any respect; and having done this and observed it well, he should punish calumniators harshly. They cannot complain if they are punished since they have places open for hearing the accusations of him whom one has calumniated in the loggias. Where this part is not well ordered, great disorders always follow; for calumnies anger and do not punish citizens, and those angered think of getting even, hating rather than fearing the things said against them.

[3] This part, as was said, was well ordered in Rome; and it has always been badly ordered in our city of Florence. As in Rome this order did much good, in Florence this disorder did much evil. Whoever reads the histories of this city will see how many calumnies were given out in every time against citizens who have been put to work in important affairs for it. Of one individual they said that he had stolen money from the common; of another, that he had not won a campaign because he had been corrupted; and that this other had done something so inconvenient because of his ambition. From this it arose that on every side hatred surged; whence they went to division; from division to sects; from sects to ruin. If there had been an order in Florence for accusing citizens and punishing calumniators, the infinite scandals that occurred would not have occurred. For those citizens, whether they were condemned or absolved, would not have been able to hurt the city, and very many fewer would have been accused than were calumniated, since one could not, as I said, accuse as one could calumniate everyone. Among other things a citizen could avail himself of to arrive at greatness have been these calumnies. They do very much for him against powerful citizens who are opposed to his appetite; for taking the side of the people, and confirming it in the bad opinion it has of them, he makes it a

friend. Although one could bring up very many examples, I wish to be content with only one. The Florentine army was in the field at Lucca, commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, its commissioner. Either his bad governance or his bad fortune willed for the capture of that city not to occur; yet, however the case stood, Messer Giovanni was faulted, as it was said he had been corrupted by the Lucchese. When that calumny was favored by his enemies, it brought Messer Giovanni almost to ultimate despair. Although to justify himself he wished to be put in the hands of the captain,[4] nonetheless he could never justify himself because there were no modes in that republic to enable him to do it. On account of this there was great indignation among Messer Giovanni's friends, who were the larger part of the great men, and among those who desired to bring innovation to Florence.[5] For this and other like causes, this affair grew so much that the ruin of the republic followed from it.

[4] Thus Manlius Capitolinus was a calumniator, and not an accuser; and the Romans showed precisely in this case how calumniators should be punished. For one should make them become accusers, and when the accusation is corroborated as true, either reward them or not punish them; but when it is not corroborated as true, punish them as Manlius was punished.

9

That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient Orders

[1] It will perhaps appear to someone that I have run too far into Roman history without having made any mention of the orderers of that republic or of the orders that concern religion or the military. So, not wishing to hold longer in suspense the minds of those who wish to understand some things regarding this part, I say that many will perhaps judge it a bad example that a founder of a civil way of life, as was Romulus, should first have killed his brother,[1] then consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine,[2] chosen by him as partner in the kingdom—judging because of this that its citizens might, with the authority of their prince, through ambition and desire to command, be able to offend those who might be opposed to their authority. That opinion would be true if one did not consider what end had induced him to commit such a homicide.

[2] This should be taken as a general rule: that it never or rarely happens that 2 any republic or kingdom is ordered well from the beginning or reformed altogether anew outside its old orders unless it is ordered by one individual. Indeed it is necessary that one alone give the mode and that any such ordering depend on his mind. So a prudent orderer of a republic, who has the intent to wish to help not himself but the common good, not for his own succession but for the common fatherland, should contrive to have authority alone; nor will a wise understanding[3] ever reprove anyone for any extraordinary action that he uses to order a kingdom or constitute a republic. It is very suitable that when the deed accuses him, the effect excuses him; and when the effect is good, as was that of Romulus, it will always excuse the deed; for he who is violent to spoil, not he who is violent to mend, should be reproved. He should indeed be so prudent and virtuous

that he does not leave the authority he took as an inheritance to another; for since men are more prone to evil than to good, his successor could use ambitiously that which had been used virtuously by him. Besides this, if one individual is capable of ordering, the thing itself is ordered to last long not if it remains on the shoulders of one individual but rather if it remains in the care of many and its maintenance stays with many. For as many are not capable of ordering a thing because they do not know its good, which is because of the diverse opinions among them, so when they have come to know it, they do not agree to abandon it. That Romulus was of those, that he deserves excuse in the deaths of his brother and of his partner, and that what he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition, is demonstrated by his having at once ordered a Senate with which he took counsel and by whose opinion he decided.[4] He who considers well the authority that Romulus reserved for himself will see that none other was reserved except that of commanding the armies when war was decided on and that of convoking the Senate. That may be seen later, when Rome became free through the expulsion of the Tarquins; then no ancient order was innovated by the Romans, except that in place of a perpetual king there were two annual consuls.[5] This testifies that all the first orders of that city were more conformable to a civil and free way of life than to an absolute and tyrannical one.

[3] One could give infinite examples to sustain the things written above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and republics who were able to form laws for the purpose of the common good because they had one authority attributed to them; but I wish to omit them as a thing known.

[4] I shall bring up only one of them, not so celebrated, but to be considered by those who desire to be orderers of good laws. When Agis, king of Sparta, desired to return the Spartans to the limits within which the laws of Lycurgus had enclosed them, it appeared to him that, because it had in some part deviated, his city had lost very much of its ancient virtue, and, in consequence, its strength and empire. He was killed in his first beginnings by the Spartan ephors as a man who wished to seize the tyranny.[6] When Cleomenes succeeded to the kingdom, the same desire arose in him because of the records and writings he had found of Agis, in which his mind and intention were seen. But he knew that he could not do this good for his fatherland unless he alone were in authority since it appeared to him that because of the ambition of men, he could not do something useful to many

against the wish of the few. He took a convenient opportunity, had all the ephors and anyone else who might be able to stand against him killed, and then renewed altogether the laws of Lycurgus. That decision was apt for making Sparta rise again and for giving to Cleomenes the reputation that Lycurgus had, if it had not been for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek republics. For after such an order, when he was assaulted by the Macedonians, found himself alone and inferior in strength, and had no one with whom to seek refuge, he was conquered; and his plan, however just and praiseworthy, remained imperfect.[7]

[5] Thus having considered all these things, I conclude that to order a republic it is necessary to be alone; and for the death of Remus and Titus Tatius, Romulus deserves excuse and not blame.

10

As Much As the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a Tyranny Are Worthy of Reproach

[1] Among all men praised, the most praised are those who have been heads and orderers of religions. Next, then, are those who have founded either republics or kingdoms. After them are celebrated those who, placed over armies, have expanded either their kingdom or that of the fatherland. To these literary men are added; and because these are of many types, they are each of them celebrated according to his rank. To any other man, the number of which is infinite, some share of praise is attributed that his art or occupation brings him. On the contrary, men are infamous and detestable who are destroyers of religions, squanderers of kingdoms and republics, and enemies of the virtues, of letters, and of every other art that brings utility and honor to the human race, as are the impious, the violent, the ignorant, the worthless, the idle, the cowardly. And no one will ever be so crazy or so wise, so wicked or so good, who will not praise what is to be praised and blame what is to be blamed, when the choice between the two qualities of men is placed before him. Nonetheless, afterward, deceived by a false good and a false glory, almost all let themselves go, either voluntarily or ignorantly, into the ranks of those who deserve more blame than praise; and though, to their perpetual honor, they are able to make a republic or a kingdom, they turn to tyranny. Nor do they perceive how much fame, how much glory, how much honor, security, quiet, with satisfaction of mind, they flee from by this policy; and how much infamy, reproach, blame, danger, and disquiet they run into.

[2] It is impossible for those who live in a private state in a republic or who either by fortune or by virtue become princes of it, if they read the histories and make capital of the memories of ancient things, not to wish to live in their fatherlands rather as Scipios than Caesars if they are private persons

and rather as Agesilauses, Timoleons, and Dions than Nabises, Phalarises, and Dionysiuses if they are princes. For they would see that the latter are reproached to the utmost and the former exceedingly praised. They would also see that Timoleon and the others did not have less authority in their fatherlands than Dionysius and Phalaris, but they would see they had more security by far.

[3] Nor should anyone deceive himself because of the glory of Caesar, hearing him especially celebrated by the writers; for those who praise him are corrupted by his fortune and awed by the duration of the empire that, ruling under that name, did not permit writers to speak freely of him.[1] But whoever wishes to know what the writers would say of him if they were free should see what they say of Catiline.[2] Caesar is so much more detestable[3] as he who has done an evil is more to blame than he who has wished to do one. He should also see with how much praise they celebrate Brutus,[4] as though, unable to blame Caesar because of his power, they celebrate his enemy.

[4] He who has become a prince in a republic should also consider, when Rome became an empire, how much more praise those emperors deserved who lived under the laws and as good princes than those who lived to the contrary. He will see that praetorian soldiers were not necessary to Titus, Nervus, Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius, and Marcus, nor the multitude of legions to defend them, because their customs, the benevolence of the people, and the love of the Senate defended them. He will see also that the eastern and western armies were not enough to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and so many other criminal emperors from the enemies whom their wicked customs and their malevolent life had generated for them. If their history were well considered, it would be very much a lesson for any prince, to show him the way of glory or of blame and of his own security or fear. For of the twenty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus, sixteen were killed, ten died ordinarily.[5] If any of those who were killed were good, such as Galba and Pertinax, he was killed by the corruption that his predecessor had left in the soldiers. And if there was any criminal among those who died ordinarily, such as Severus, it arose from his very great fortune and virtue, two things that accompany few men. He will also see by the reading of this history how a good kingdom can be ordered; for all the emperors who succeeded to the empire by inheritance, except Titus, were bad. Those who succeeded by adoption were all good, as were the five from Nerva to Marcus; and as the empire fell to heirs, it returned to its ruin.

[5] Thus, let a prince put before himself the times from Nerva to Marcus, and compare them with those that came before and that came later; and then let him choose in which he would wish to be born or over which he would wish to be placed. For in those governed by the good he will see a secure prince in the midst of his secure citizens, and the world full of peace and justice; he will see the Senate with its authority, the magistrates with their honors, the rich citizens enjoying their riches, nobility and virtue exalted; he will see all quiet and all good, and, on the other side, all rancor, all license, corruption, and ambition eliminated. He will see golden times when each can hold and defend the opinion he wishes. He will see, in sum, the world in triumph, the prince full of reverence and glory, the peoples full of love and security. If he then considers minutely the times of the other emperors, he will see them atrocious because of wars, discordant because of seditions, cruel in peace and in war; so many princes killed with steel, so many civil wars, so many external ones; Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes, its cities ruined and sacked. He will see Rome burning, the Capitol taken down by its own citizens, the ancient temples desolate, ceremonies corrupt, the cities full of adulterers. He will see the sea full of exiles, the shores full of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties follow in Rome, and nobility, riches, past honors, and, above all, virtue imputed as capital sins. He will see calumniators rewarded, slaves corrupted against their master, freedmen against their patron, and those who lacked enemies oppressed by friends.[6] And he will then know very well how many obligations Rome, Italy, and the world owe to Caesar.

[6] Without doubt, if he is born of man, he will be terrified away from every imitation of wicked times and will be inflamed with an immense desire to follow the good. And truly, if a prince seeks the glory of the world, he ought to desire to possess a corrupt city—not to spoil it entirely as did Caesar but to reorder it as did Romulus. And truly the heavens cannot give to men a greater opportunity for glory, nor can men desire any greater. If one who wishes to order a city well had of necessity to lay down the principate,[7] he would deserve some excuse if he did not order it so as not to fall from that rank; but if he is able to hold the principate and order it, he does not merit any excuse. In sum, those to whom the heavens give such an opportunity may consider that two ways have been placed before them: one that makes them live secure and after death renders them glorious; the other that makes them live in continual anxieties and after death leaves them a sempiternal infamy.

11

Of the Religion of the Romans

[1] Although Rome had Romulus as its first orderer and has to acknowledge, as daughter, its birth and education as from him,[1] nonetheless, since the heavens judged that the orders of Romulus would not suffice for such an empire, they inspired in the breast of the Roman Senate the choosing of Numa Pompilius as successor to Romulus so that those things omitted by him might be ordered by Numa. As he found a very ferocious people and wished to reduce it to civil obedience with the arts of peace, he turned to religion as a thing altogether necessary if he wished to maintain a civilization; and he constituted it so that for many centuries there was never so much fear of God as in that republic, which made easier whatever enterprise the Senate or the great men of Rome might plan to make.[2] Whoever reviews[3] infinite actions, both of the people of Rome all together and of many Romans by themselves, will see that the citizens feared to break an oath much more than the laws, like those who esteemed the power of God more than that of men, as is seen manifestly by the examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus.[4] For after the defeat that Hannibal had given to the Romans at Cannae, many citizens gathered together and, terrified for their fatherland, agreed to abandon Italy and move to Sicily. Hearing this, Scipio went to meet them and with naked steel in hand constrained them to swear they would not abandon the fatherland.[5] Lucius Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called Torquatus, had been accused by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the plebs; before the day of the judgment came, Titus went to meet Marcus, and, threatening to kill him if he did not swear to drop the accusation against his father, he constrained him to take the oath; and Marcus, having sworn through fear, dropped the accusation. So those citizens whom the love of fatherland and its laws did not keep in Italy were kept there by an oath that they were forced to take; and the tribune put aside the hatred he had for the father, the injury that the son had done him, and his own honor to obey the oath he had taken.[6] This

arose from nothing other than that religion Numa had introduced in that city.

[2] Whoever considers well the Roman histories sees how much religion served to command armies, to animate the plebs, to keep men good, to bring shame to the wicked. So if one had to dispute over which prince Rome was more obligated to, Romulus or Numa, I believe rather that Numa would obtain the first rank; for where there is religion, arms can easily be introduced, and where there are arms and not religion, the latter can be introduced only with difficulty. One sees that for Romulus to order the Senate and to make other civil and military orders, the authority of God was not necessary;[7] but it was quite necessary to Numa, who pretended to be intimate with a nymph who counseled him on what he had to counsel the people.[8] It all arose because he wished to put new and unaccustomed orders in the city and doubted that his authority would suffice.

[3] And truly there was never any orderer of extraordinary laws for a people who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise they would not have been accepted. For a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others. Thus wise men who wish to take away this difficulty have recourse to God. So did Lycurgus;[9] so did Solon;[10] so did many others who have had the same end as they. Marveling, thus, at his goodness and prudence, the Roman people yielded to his every decision. Indeed it is true that since those times were full of religion and the men with whom he had to labor were crude, they made much easier the carrying out of his plans, since he could easily impress any new form whatever on them. Without doubt, whoever wished to make a republic in the present times would find it easier among mountain men, where there is no civilization, than among those who are used to living in cities, where civilization is corrupt; and a sculptor will get a beautiful statue more easily from coarse marble than from one badly blocked out by another.

[4] Everything considered, thus, I conclude that the religion introduced by Numa was among the first causes of the happiness of that city. For it caused good orders; good orders make good fortune; and from good fortune arose the happy successes of enterprises. As the observance of the divine cult is the cause of the greatness of republics, so disdain for it is the cause of their ruin. For where the fear of God fails, it must be either that the kingdom comes to ruin or that it is sustained by the fear of a prince, which supplies

the defects of religion. Because princes are of short life, it must be that the kingdom will fail soon, as his virtue fails. Hence it arises that kingdoms that depend solely on the virtue of one man are hardly durable, because that virtue fails with the life of that one; and it rarely happens that it is restored by succession, as Dante prudently says:

> Rarely does human probity descend by the branches;
> and this He wills who gives it,
> that it be called for from him.[11]

[5] Thus it is the safety of a republic or a kingdom to have not one prince who governs prudently while he lives, but one individual who orders it so that it is also maintained when he dies. Although coarse men may be more easily persuaded to a new order or opinion, this does make it impossible also to persuade to it civilized men who presume they are not coarse. To the people of Florence it does not appear that they are either ignorant or coarse; nonetheless, they were persuaded by Friar Girolamo Savonarola that he spoke with God.[12] I do not wish to judge whether it is true or not, because one should speak with reverence of such a man; but I do say that an infinite number believed him without having seen anything extraordinary to make them believe him. For his life, learning, and the subject he took up were sufficient to make them lend faith. No one, therefore, should be terrified that he cannot carry out what has been carried out by others, for as was said in our preface, men are born, live, and die always in one and the same order.

12

Of How Much Importance It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How Italy, for Lacking It by Means of the Roman Church, Has Been Ruined

[1] Those princes or those republics that wish to maintain themselves uncorrupt have above everything else to maintain the ceremonies of their religion uncorrupt and hold them always in veneration; for one can have no greater indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine cult disdained. This is easy to understand once it is known what the religion where a man is born is founded on, for every religion has the foundation of its life on some principal order of its own. The life of the Gentile religion was founded on the responses of the oracles and on the sect of the diviners and augurs. All their other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on them; for they easily believed that that god who could predict your future good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you. From these arose the temples, from these the sacrifices, from these the supplications and every other ceremony to venerate them; through these the oracle of Delos, the temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated oracles who filled the world with admiration and devotion. As these later began to speak in the mode of the powerful, and as that falsity was exposed among peoples, men became incredulous and apt to disturb every good order. Thus, princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united. All things that arise in favor of that religion they should favor and magnify, even though they judge them false; and they should do it so much the more as they are more prudent and more knowing of natural things. Because this mode has been observed by wise men, the belief[1] has arisen in miracles, which are celebrated even in false religions; for the prudent enlarge upon them from whatever beginning they arise, and their authority then gives

them credit[2] with anyone whatever. There were very many of these miracles at Rome; among them was that when Roman soldiers were sacking the city of the Veientes, some of them entered the temple of Juno and, drawing near her image, said to it, "Do you want to come to Rome?"[3] It appeared to someone that he saw her nod and to someone else that she said yes. For, being men full of religion (which Titus Livy demonstrates, for in entering the temple they entered without tumult, all devoted and full of reverence), it appeared to them they heard the response to their question that they had perhaps presupposed. That opinion and credulity were altogether favored and magnified by Camillus and by the other princes of the city. If such religion had been maintained by the princes of the Christian republic as was ordered by its giver, the Christian states and republics would be more united, much happier than they are. Nor can one make any better conjecture as to its decline than to see that those peoples who are closest to the Roman church, the head of our religion, have less religion. Whoever might consider its foundations and see how much present usage is different from them might judge, without doubt, that either its ruin or its scourging is near.

[2] Because many are of the opinion that the well-being of the cities of Italy arises from the Roman church, I wish to discourse of those reasons that occur to me against it. I will cite two very powerful reasons that, according to me, are incontrovertible. The first is that because of the wicked examples of that court, this province has lost all devotion and all religion—which brings with it infinite inconveniences and infinite disorders; for as where there is religion one presupposes every good, so where it is missing one presupposes the contrary. Thus we Italians have this first obligation to the church and to the priests that we have become without religion and wicked; but we have yet a greater one to them that is the second cause of our ruin. This is that the church has kept and keeps this province divided. And truly no province has ever been united or happy unless it has all come under obedience to one republic or to one prince, as happened to France and to Spain. The cause that Italy is not in the same condition and does not also have one republic or one prince to govern it is solely the church. For although it has inhabited and held a temporal empire there, it has not been so powerful nor of such virtue as to be able to seize the tyranny of Italy[4] and make itself prince of it. On the other hand, it has not been so weak that it has been unable to call in a power to defend it against one that had become too powerful in Italy, for fear of losing dominion over its temporal things.

This has been seen formerly in very many experiences: when, by means of Charlemagne, it expelled the Longobards, who were then almost king of all Italy,[5] and when in our times it took away power from the Venetians with the aid of France,[6] then expelled the French with the aid of the Swiss.[7] Thus, since the church has not been powerful enough to be able to seize Italy, nor permitted another to seize it, it has been the cause that [Italy] has not been able to come under one head but has been under many princes and lords, from whom so much disunion and so much weakness have arisen that it has been led to be the prey not only of barbarian powers but of whoever assaults it. For this we other Italians have an obligation to the church and not to others. Whoever wished to see the truth more readily by certain experience would need to be of such power as to send the Roman court, with all the authority it has in Italy, to inhabit the towns of the Swiss. They are today the only peoples who live according to the ancients as regards both religion and military orders; and one would see that in little time the bad customs of that court would make more disorder in that province than any other accident that could arise there at any time.

13

How the Romans Made Religion Serve to Reorder the City and to Carry Out Their Enterprises and to Stop Tumults

[1] It does not appear to me beside the point to bring up some example when the Romans made religion serve to reorder the city and to carry out their enterprises; and although there are many in Titus Livy, nonetheless I wish to be content with these. After the Roman people had created tribunes with consular power and they were all plebeians except for one, and when plague and famine occurred that year and certain prodigies came, the nobles used the opportunity in the next[1] creation of tribunes to say that the gods were angry because Rome had used the majesty of its empire badly, and that there was no remedy for placating the gods other than to return the election of tribunes to its place. From this it arose that the plebs, terrified by this religion, created as tribunes all nobles.[2] One also sees in the capture of the city of the Veientes how the captains of armies availed themselves of religion to keep them disposed to an enterprise. For when Lake Albanus rose wonderfully that year and the Roman soldiers were annoyed because of the long siege and wished to return to Rome, the Romans found that Apollo and certain other responses said that the city of the Veientes would be captured the year that Lake Albanus overflowed. This thing made the soldiers endure the vexations of the siege, held by this hope of capturing the town; and they stayed, content to carry out the enterprise, so that Camillus, having been made dictator, captured that city after ten years during which it had been besieged.[3] So, used well, religion helped both for the capture of that city and for the restitution of the tribunate to the nobility; for without the said means, both one and the other would have been conducted with difficulty.

[2] I do not wish to fail to bring up another example to this purpose. Very many tumults had arisen in Rome caused by the tribune Terentillus when he wished to propose a certain law, for the causes that will be told of below in

its place.[4] Among the first remedies that the nobility used against him was religion, which they made serve in two modes. In the first, they had the Sybilline books seen and made to respond that through civil sedition, dangers of losing its freedom hung over the city that year—a thing that, though exposed by the tribunes, nonetheless put such terror in the breasts of the plebs that it was cooled off in following them.[5] The other mode was when one Appius Erdonius, with a multitude of exiles and slaves to a number of four thousand men, seized the Capitol by night, so that one could fear that if the Aequi and the Volsci, perpetual enemies to the Roman name, had come to Rome, they would have captured it.[6] The tribunes did not because of this cease their persistence in proposing the Terentillan law, saying that the onslaught was pretended and not true; one Publius Ruberius,[7] a citizen grave and of authority, came outside the Senate with words, part loving, part threatening, showing the dangers to the city and the untimeliness of their demand. So he constrained the plebs to swear it would not depart from the wish of the consul, so that the plebs, obeying, recovered the Capitol by force. But as Publius Valerius the consul was killed in the capture, at once Titus Quintius was remade consul.[8] So as not to let the plebs rest or give it room to think about the Terentillan law, he commanded it to go out of Rome to go against the Volsci, saying that because of the oath it had made not to abandon the consul, it was obligated to follow him—which the tribunes opposed, saying that that oath had been given to the dead consul, not to him. Nonetheless, Titus Livy shows that for fear of religion the plebs wished rather to obey the consul than to believe the tribunes, saying these words in favor of the ancient religion: “This negligence of the gods that now possesses the age had not yet come, nor did each make oath and laws suitable by interpreting for himself.”[9] The tribunes, fearing because of this thing lest they lose all their dignity, agreed with the consul that they would remain in obedience to him and that for one year they would not discuss[10] the Terentillan law and the consuls could not, for a year, take the plebs out to war. So religion made the Senate overcome the difficulties that would never have been overcome without it.

14

The Romans Interpreted the Auspices according to Necessity, and with Prudence Made a Show of Observing Religion When Forced Not to Observe It; and If Anyone Rashly Disdained It, They Punished Him

[1] Not only were the auguries the foundation, in good part, of the ancient religion of the Gentiles, as was discoursed of above, but also they were the cause of the well-being of the Roman republic. Hence the Romans took more care of them than of any other order in it and used them in consular assemblies, in beginning enterprises, in leading out armies, in making battles, and in every important action of theirs, civil or military; nor would they ever go on an expedition unless they had persuaded the soldiers that the gods promised them victory. Among the other auspices, they had in their armies certain orders of augurs whom they called chicken-men; and whenever they were ordered to do battle with the enemy, they wished the chicken-men to take their auspices. If the chickens ate, they engaged in combat with a good augury; if they did not eat, they abstained from the fight. Nonetheless, when reason showed them a thing they ought to do—notwithstanding that the auspices had been adverse—they did it in any mode. But they turned it around with means and modes so aptly that it did not appear that they had done it with disdain for religion.

[2] One such means was used by the consul Papirius in a most important fight he had with the Samnites, after which they remained weak and afflicted in everything. For when Papirius was in his camp in front of the Samnites and wished to do battle because it appeared to him that victory in the fight was certain, he commanded the chicken-men to take their auspices. But when the chickens did not eat, the prince of the chicken-men, seeing the army's great disposition to engage in combat and the opinion in the captain and in all the soldiers that they would win, related to the consul

that the auspices went well, so as not to deprive the army of the opportunity of working well. So while Papirius was ordering the squadrons, some of the chicken-men said to certain soldiers that the chickens had not eaten; they told it to Spurius Papirius, nephew of the consul. When he related it to the consul, the latter responded at once that he should try to do his duty well; that as for him and the army, the auspices were good; and if the chicken-man had told lies, they would return to his prejudice. So that the effect would correspond to the prognostication, he commanded the legates to place the chicken-men in the front of the fight. Then it happened that when going against the enemy, a javelin thrown by a Roman soldier by chance killed the prince of the chicken-men. When the consul heard this, he said that everything was going well and with the favor of the gods, for by the death of that liar the army had been purged of every fault and of all the anger that they had assumed against it. And so, by knowing well how to accommodate his plans to the auspices, he took up the policy of fighting without the army's perceiving that he had neglected in any part the orders of their religion.[1]

[3] Appius Pulcher[2] did the contrary in Sicily during the first Punic War. For when he wished to fight with the Carthaginian army, he had the chicken-men take the auspices; and when they related that the chickens had not eaten, he said, "Let's see if they wish to drink!"—and had them thrown in the ocean. Then, fighting, he lost the battle. For this he was condemned at Rome and Papirius honored, not so much because one had won and the other lost as because one had acted against the auspices prudently and the other rashly.[3] Nor did this mode of taking auspices tend toward any end other than to make the soldiers go confidently into the fight, from which confidence victory almost always arose. This was used not only by the Romans but also by foreigners, of which it appears to me I ought to bring up an example in the following chapter.

15

The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting Them, Had Recourse to Religion

[1] After the Samnites had had many defeats from the Romans and had been destroyed in Tuscany by the last one, with their armies and captains killed, and after their partners, like the Tuscans, the French, and the Umbrians, had been conquered, “they could no longer stand either by their own or by external forces; nonetheless they did not abstain from war, so far they were from tiring even of freedom they had unsuccessfully defended; and they would rather be conquered than not attempt victory.”[1] Hence they decided to make the last try. Because they knew that if they wished to win it was necessary to induce obstinacy in the spirits of the soldiers, and that to induce it there was no better means than religion, they thought of repeating an ancient sacrifice of theirs through Ovius Paccius, their priest.[2] He ordered it in this form: when the solemn sacrifice had been made, and, among the dead victims and the flaming altars, the heads of the army had all been made to swear never to abandon the fight, they called up the soldiers one by one; and among the altars, in the midst of many centurions with naked swords in hand, they made them swear, first, that they would never retell anything they had seen or heard. Then, with words of execration and verses full of fright, they made them promise to the gods to be quick to go where the commanders sent them, and never to flee from the fight, and to kill anyone they saw fleeing. If one did not observe this, it would return upon the head of his family and his line. When some of them, terrified, did not wish to swear, they were at once killed by their centurions, so that all the others who came after them swore, made fearful by the ferocity of the spectacle. To make their assemblage more magnificent, there being forty thousand men, they dressed half in white with crests and feathers on top of their helmets; and, so ordered, they were posted near Aquilonia. Against them came Papirius, who to encourage his soldiers said, “Crests do not

make wounds, and the Roman javelin goes through painted and gilded shields."[3] To weaken the opinion his soldiers had of the enemy, he said the oath [the Samnites] had taken represented their fear and not their strength, for they had to have fear of citizens, gods, and enemies at the same time. When they came to conflict, the Samnites were overcome, because Roman virtue and the fear conceived out of past defeats overcame whatever obstinacy they were able to assume by virtue of religion and of the oath they had taken.[4] Nonetheless, one sees that to them it did not appear they could have any other refuge, nor try any other remedy from which they could take hope of recovering lost virtue. This testifies in full how much confidence can be had through religion well used. Although this part might perhaps require to be placed rather among foreign[5] things, since it nonetheless depends on one of the most important orders of the republic of Rome, it appeared to me [good] to connect it in this place, so as not to divide this matter and to have to return to it several times.

16

A People Used to Living under a Prince Maintains Its Freedom with Difficulty, If by Some Accident It Becomes Free

[1] Infinite examples read in the remembrances of ancient histories demonstrate how much difficulty there is for a people used to living under a prince to preserve its freedom afterward, if by some accident it acquires it, as Rome acquired it after the expulsion of the Tarquins. Such difficulty is reasonable; for that people is nothing other than a brute animal that, although of a ferocious and feral nature, has always been nourished in prison and in servitude. Then, if it is left free in a field to its fate, it becomes the prey of the first one who seeks to rechain it, not being used to feed itself and not knowing places where it may have to take refuge.

[2] The same happens to a people: since it is used to living under the government of others, not knowing how to reason about either public defense or public offense, neither knowing princes nor known by them, it quickly returns beneath a yoke that is most often heavier than the one it had removed from its neck a little before. It finds itself in these difficulties whenever the matter is corrupt. For a people into which corruption has entered in everything cannot live free, not for a short time or at all, as will be discoursed of below. So our reasonings are about those peoples among whom corruption has not expanded very much and there is more of the good than of the spoiled.

[3] To that written above another difficulty is joined, which is that the state that becomes free makes partisan enemies and not partisan friends. All those become its partisan enemies who were prevailing under the tyrannical state, feeding off the riches of the prince; and when the ability to prevail is taken away from them, they cannot live content and are forced, each one, to attempt to take up the tyranny again so as to return to their authority. One does not acquire partisan friends, as I said, because a free way of life proffers honors and rewards through certain honest and determinate causes,

and outside these it neither rewards nor honors anyone; and when one has those honors and those useful things that it appears to him he merits, he does not confess that he has an obligation to those who reward him. Besides this, the common utility that is drawn from a free way of life is not recognized by anyone while it is possessed: this is being able to enjoy one's things freely, without any suspicion, not fearing for the honor of wives and that of children, not to be afraid for oneself. For no one ever confesses that he has an obligation to one who does not offend him.

[4] So, as is said above, a state that is free and that newly emerges comes to have partisan enemies and not partisan friends. If one wishes to remedy these inconveniences and the disorders that the difficulties written above might bring with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, more secure, and more necessary, than to kill the sons of Brutus. As the history shows, they were induced to conspire with other young Romans against the fatherland because of nothing other than that they could not take advantage extraordinarily under the consuls as under the king, so that the freedom of that people appeared to have become their servitude.[1] Whoever takes up the governing of a multitude, either by the way of freedom or by the way of principality, and does not secure himself against those who are enemies to that new order makes a state of short life. It is true that I judge unhappy those princes who have to hold to extraordinary ways to secure their states, since they have the multitude as enemies. For the one who has the few as enemies secures himself easily and without many scandals, but he who has the collectivity as enemy never secures himself; and the more cruelty he uses, the weaker his principality becomes. So the greatest remedy he has is to seek to make the people friendly to himself.

[5] Although this discourse does not conform to the heading,[2] since it speaks here of a prince and there of a republic, nonetheless, so as not to have to return to this matter, I wish to speak of it briefly. Therefore, if a prince wishes to win over a people that has been an enemy to him—speaking of those princes who have become tyrants over their fatherlands—I say that he should examine first what the people desires; and he will always find that it desires two things: one, to be avenged against those who are the cause that it is servile; the other, to recover its freedom. The first desire the prince can satisfy entirely, the second in part. As to the first, there is an example to the point. When Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile, it happened that in the course of a controversy that came up between the people and the aristocrats of Heraclea, the aristocrats, seeing they were

inferior, turned to favoring Clearchus and, having conspired with him, brought him to Heraclea against the popular disposition; and they took freedom away from the people.[3] So, finding himself between the insolence of the aristocrats, whom he could not in any mode either make content or correct, and the rage of the people,[4] who could not endure having lost their freedom, Clearchus decided to free himself at one stroke from the vexation of the great and to win over the people to himself. Having taken a convenient opportunity for this, he cut to pieces all the aristocrats, to the extreme satisfaction of the people.[5] So in this way he satisfied one of the wishes that peoples have—that is, to be avenged. But as to the other popular desire, to recover freedom, since the prince cannot satisfy it, he should examine what causes are those that make [peoples] desire to be free. He will find that a small part of them desires to be free so as to command, but all the others, who are infinite, desire freedom so as to live secure. For in all republics, ordered in whatever mode, never do even forty or fifty citizens reach the ranks of command; and because this is a small number, it is an easy thing to secure oneself against them, either by getting rid of them or by having them share in so many honors, according to their situations, that they have to be in good part content. The others, to whom it is enough to live secure, are easily satisfied by making orders and laws in which universal security is included, together with one's own power. If a prince does this, and the people see that he does not break such laws because of any accident, in a short time he will begin to live secure and content. As an example there is the kingdom of France, which lives secure because of nothing other than that the kings are obligated by infinite laws in which the security of all its peoples is included. And he who ordered that state wished those kings to act in their own mode as to arms and money, but in every other thing they should not be able to dispose except as the laws order. That prince, then, or that republic that does not secure itself at the beginning of its state must secure itself at the first opportunity, as did the Romans. Whoever lets that pass repents later for not having done what he should have done.

[6] Since, therefore, the Roman people was not yet corrupt when it recovered its freedom—the sons of Brutus having been killed and the Tarquins eliminated—it could maintain it with all those modes and orders that have been discoursed of another time. But if that people had been corrupt, neither in Rome nor elsewhere does one find sound remedies for maintaining it, as will be shown in the following chapter.

17

Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt People Can with the Greatest Difficulty Maintain Itself Free

[1] I judge that it was necessary either that the kings be extinguished in Rome or that Rome in a very short time become weak and of no value. For considering how much corruption those kings had come to, if two or three such had followed in succession, and the corruption that was in them had begun to spread through the members, as soon as the members had been corrupted it would have been impossible ever to reform it. But since they lost the head when the trunk was sound, they could easily be brought to live free and ordered. One should presuppose as a thing very true that a corrupt city that lives under a prince can never be turned into a free one, even if that prince is eliminated along with all his line. On the contrary, one prince must eliminate the other; and without the creation of a new lord it never settles down, unless indeed the goodness of one individual, together with virtue, keeps it free. But such freedom will last as long as the life of that one, as happened in Syracuse with Dion and Timoleon, whose virtue in diverse times kept that city free while each lived; when they were dead, it returned to its former tyranny. But one sees no stronger example than that of Rome. When the Tarquins were expelled, Rome could at once take and maintain its freedom, but after Caesar died, after Gaius Caligula died, after Nero died, when the whole line of Caesar was eliminated, not only could it never maintain but it could not even give a beginning to freedom. So great a difference of results in one and the same city arose from nothing other than that in the times of the Tarquins the Roman people was not yet corrupt, and in these last times it was very corrupt. For then to maintain it steadfast and disposed to avoid kings it was enough only to make it swear that it would never consent that someone should reign in Rome, but in other times the authority and severity of Brutus,[1] together with all the eastern legions, were not enough to hold it so disposed as to wish to maintain that freedom that

he, in likeness to the first Brutus,[2] had restored to it. This arose from the corruption that the Marian parties had put in the people; Caesar, as their head, could so blind the multitude that it did not recognize the yoke that it was putting on its own neck.

[2] Although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example whatever, nonetheless I wish to bring up peoples known in our times. Therefore I say that no accident, even though grave and violent, could ever make Milan or Naples free because their members are all corrupt. This one may see after the death of Filippo Visconti, for although Milan wished to turn to freedom, it could not and did not know how to maintain it.[3] So it was to Rome's great happiness that those kings became corrupt quickly, so that they were driven out before their corruption passed into the bowels of that city. This lack of corruption—men having a good end—was the cause that the infinite tumults in Rome did not hurt and indeed helped the republic.

[3] One can draw this conclusion: that where the matter is not corrupt, tumults and other scandals do not hurt; where it is corrupt, well-ordered laws do not help unless indeed they have been put in motion by one individual who with an extreme force ensures their observance so that the matter becomes good. I do not know whether this has ever occurred or whether it is possible; for it is seen, as I said a little above, that if a city that has fallen into decline through corruption of matter ever happens to rise, it happens through the virtue of one man who is alive then, not through the virtue of the collectivity that sustains good orders. As soon as such a one is dead, it returns to its early habit, as occurred in Thebes, which could hold the forms of a republic and its empire through the virtue of Epaminondas while he lived, but returned to its first disorders when he was dead.[4] The cause is that there cannot be one man of such long life as to have enough time to inure to good a city that has been inured to bad for a long time. If one individual of very long life or two virtuous ones continued in succession do not arrange it, when they are lacking—as was said above—it is ruined, unless indeed he makes it be reborn with many dangers and much blood. For such corruption and slight aptitude for free life arise from an inequality that is in that city; and if one wishes to make it equal, it is necessary to use the greatest extraordinary means, which few know how or wish to use, as will be told in another place more particularly.[5]

18

In What Mode a Free State, If There Is One, Can Be Maintained in Corrupt Cities; or, If There Is Not, in What Mode to Order It

[1] I believe it is not beyond the purpose of nor does it fail to conform to the discourse written above to consider whether in a corrupt city one can maintain a free state, if there is one, or, if it has not been there, whether one can order it. On this thing I say that it is very difficult to do either the one or the other; and although it is almost impossible to give a rule for it, because it would be necessary to proceed according to the degrees of corruption, nonetheless, since it is good to reason about everything, I do not wish to omit this. I shall presuppose a very corrupt city, by which I shall the more increase such a difficulty, for neither laws nor orders can be found that are enough to check a universal corruption. For as good customs have need of laws to maintain themselves, so laws have need of good customs so as to be observed. Besides this, orders and laws made in a republic at its birth, when men were good, are no longer to the purpose later, when they have become wicked. If laws vary according to the accidents in a city, its orders never vary, or rarely; this makes new laws insufficient because the orders, which remain fixed, corrupt them.

[2] To make this part better understood, I say that in Rome there was the order of the government, or truly of the state, and afterward the laws, which together with the magistrates checked the citizens. The order of the state was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the tribunes, of the consuls; the mode of soliciting and creating the magistrates; and the mode of making the laws. These orders varied hardly or not at all in accidents. The laws that checked the citizens varied—such as the law on adulteries,[1] the sumptuary [law],[2] that on ambition,[3] and many others—as the citizens little by little became corrupt. But by holding steady the orders of the state,

which in corruption were no longer good, the laws that were renewed were no longer enough to keep men good; but they would indeed have helped if the orders had been changed together with the innovation in laws.

[3] That it is true that such orders in the corrupt city were not good one sees plainly under two principal heads: creating the magistrates and the laws. The Roman people did not give the consulate and the other first ranks of the city except to those who asked for it. This order was good in the beginning because only those citizens who judged themselves worthy asked for them, and to suffer rejection was ignominious; so, to be judged worthy, each one worked well. This mode later became very pernicious in the corrupt city because not those who had more virtue but those who had more power asked for the magistracies, and the impotent, even though virtuous, abstained from asking for them out of fear. They came to this inconvenience not at a stroke but by degrees, as happens with all other inconveniences; for after the Romans had subdued Africa and Asia and had reduced almost all Greece to obedience, they became secure in their freedom, as it did not appear to them that they had any more enemies who ought to give them fear. This security and this weakness of their enemies made the Roman people no longer regard virtue but favor in bestowing the consulate, lifting to that rank those who knew better how to entertain men rather than those who knew better how to conquer enemies. Afterward, from those who had more favor, they descended to giving it to those who had more power; so, through the defect in such an order, the good remained altogether excluded. A tribune, or any other citizen whatever, could propose a law to the people, on which every citizen was able to speak, either in favor or against, before it was decided. This was a good order when the citizens were good, because it was always good that each one who intended a good for the public could propose it; and it is good that each can speak his opinion on it so that the people can then choose the best after each one has been heard. But when the citizens have become bad, such an order becomes the worst, for only the powerful propose laws, not for the common freedom but for their own power; and for fear of them nobody can speak against them. So the people came to be either deceived or forced to decide its own ruin.

[4] If Rome wished to maintain itself free in corruption, therefore, it was necessary that it should have made new orders, as in the course of its life it had made new laws. For one should order different orders and modes of life in a bad subject and in a good one; nor can there be a similar form in a

matter altogether contrary. But because these orders have to be renewed either all at a stroke, when they are discovered to be no longer good, or little by little, before they are recognized by everyone, I say that both of these two things are almost impossible. For if one wishes to renew them little by little, the cause of it must be someone prudent who sees this inconvenience from very far away and when it arises. It is a very easy thing for not one of these [men] ever to emerge in a city, and if indeed one does emerge, that he never be able to persuade anyone else of what he himself understands. For men used to living in one mode do not wish to vary it, and so much the more when they do not look the evil in its face but have to have it shown to them by conjecture. As to innovating these orders at a stroke, when everyone knows that they are not good, I say that the uselessness, which is easily recognized, is difficult to correct. For to do this, it is not enough to use ordinary terms, since the ordinary modes are bad; but it is necessary to go to the extraordinary, such as violence and arms, and before everything else become prince of that city, able to dispose it in one's own mode. Because the reordering of a city for a political way of life presupposes a good man, and becoming prince of a republic by violence presupposes a bad man, one will find that it very rarely happens that someone good wishes to become prince by bad ways, even though his end be good, and that someone wicked, having become prince, wishes to work well, and that it will ever occur to his mind to use well the authority that he has acquired badly.

[5] From all the things written above arises the difficulty, or the impossibility, of maintaining a republic in corrupt cities or of creating it anew. If indeed one had to create or maintain one there, it would be necessary to turn it more toward a kingly state than toward a popular state, so that the men who cannot be corrected by the laws because of their insolence should be checked in some mode by an almost kingly power. To wish to make them become good by other ways would be either a very cruel enterprise or altogether impossible, such as I said above that Cleomenes did.[4] If he killed the ephors so as to be alone, and if Romulus for the same causes killed his brother and Titus Tatius the Sabine and then used their authority well, nonetheless one should take note that neither one of them had a subject stained with the corruption that we have been reasoning about in this chapter, and so they were able to wish, and, in wishing, to give color to their plan.

19

After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince Can Maintain Himself, but after a Weak One No Kingdom Can Be Maintained by Another Weak One

[1] Having considered the virtue and the mode of proceeding of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus, the first three Roman kings, one sees that Rome chanced upon very great fortune when it had the first king very fierce and bellicose, the next quiet and religious, the third similar in ferocity to Romulus and more a lover of war than of peace. For in Rome it was necessary that in its first beginnings an orderer of a civil way of life emerge, but it was indeed then necessary that the other kings take up again the virtue of Romulus; otherwise that city would have become effeminate and the prey of its neighbors. Hence one can note that a successor of not so much virtue as the first can maintain a state through the virtue of him who set it straight and can enjoy the labors of the first. But if it happens either that he has a long life or that after him another does not emerge to resume the virtue of the first, the kingdom of necessity comes to ruin. So, on the contrary, if two, one after the other, are of great virtue, one often sees that they do very great things and that with fame they rise up to heaven.

[2] David was without doubt a man very excellent in arms, in learning, in judgment; and so much was his virtue that when he had conquered and beaten all his neighbors, he left to his son Solomon a peaceful kingdom, which he was able to preserve with the art of peace and not with war; and he was able to enjoy happily the virtue of his father. But indeed he could not leave it to his son Rehoboam, who had to labor to be heir to a sixth part of the kingdom, since he was not like his grandfather in virtue nor like his father in fortune.[1] As he was more a lover of peace than of war, Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, was able to enjoy the labors of his father Mahomet, who, having like David beaten his neighbors, left him a steady kingdom and

one that he could easily preserve with the art of peace. If his son Selim, the present lord, had been like his father and not his grandfather, that kingdom would be ruined; but one sees that he is about to surpass the glory of his grandfather. I say, therefore, with these examples that after an excellent prince, a weak prince can maintain himself; but after a weak one, no kingdom can be maintained with another weak one, unless indeed it is like that of France, which its ancient orders maintain. Those princes are weak who do not rely on war.

[3] I conclude, therefore, with this discourse: that the virtue of Romulus was so much that it could give space to Numa Pompilius to enable him to rule Rome for many years with the art of peace. But after him succeeded Tullus,[2] who by his ferocity regained the reputation of Romulus, and after whom came Ancus,[3] gifted by nature in a mode that enabled him to use peace and endure war. First he set out wanting to hold to the way of peace, but at once he recognized that his neighbors esteemed him little, judging him effeminate. So he thought that if he wished to maintain Rome, he needed to turn to war and be like Romulus, not Numa.

[4] From this all princes who hold a state may find an example. For he who is like Numa will hold it or not hold it as the times or fortune turn under him, but he who is like Romulus, and like him comes armed with prudence and with arms, will hold it in every mode unless it is taken from him by an obstinate and excessive force. And surely one can estimate that if Rome had chanced upon a man for its third king who did not know how to give it back its reputation with arms, it would never, or only with the greatest difficulty, have been able to stand on its feet later or to produce the effects it produced. So while it lived under the kings, it bore the dangers of being ruined under a king either weak or malevolent.

20

Two Virtuous Princes in Succession Produce Great Effects; and That Well-Ordered Republics Have of Necessity Virtuous Successions, and So Their Acquisitions and Increases Are Great

[1] After Rome had expelled the kings,[1] it lacked those dangers that, as was said above,[2] it must endure if either a weak or a bad king should succeed. For the highest command[3] was brought to the consuls, who came to that command not by inheritance or by deception or by violent ambition but by free votes, and were always most excellent men. Since Rome enjoyed their virtue and their fortune in one time and another, it could come to its ultimate greatness in as many years as it was under the kings. For it is seen that two virtuous princes in succession are sufficient to acquire the world, as were Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. A republic should do so much more, as through the mode of electing it has not only two in succession but infinite most virtuous princes who are successors to one another. This virtuous succession will always exist in every well-ordered republic.

21

How Much Blame That Prince and That Republic Merit That Lack Their Own Arms

[1] Present princes and modern republics that lack their own soldiers for defense and offense ought to be ashamed of themselves and to think as in the example of Tullus,[1] that such a defect is not through a lack of men apt for the military but through their own fault, that they have not known how to make their men military. For when he succeeded to the kingdom, Tullus did not find a man who had ever been in war, since Rome had been at peace for forty years; nonetheless, when he planned to make war, he did not think to avail himself of either the Samnites or the Tuscans or others who were accustomed to being in arms. But as a very prudent man, he decided to avail himself of his own. So much was his virtue that in a stroke, under his government, he was able to make very excellent soldiers. It is more true than any other truth that if where there are men there are no soldiers, it arises through a defect of the prince and not through any other defect, either of the site or of nature.

[2] Of this there is a very fresh example. For everyone knows that in the most recent times the king of England assaulted the kingdom of France, nor did he take soldiers other than his own people; and because that kingdom had gone more than thirty years without making war, he had neither soldiers nor captain who had ever served in the military.[2] Nonetheless he did not hesitate to assault with these a kingdom full of captains and good armies that had been continually under arms in the wars in Italy. It all arose from that king's being a prudent man and that kingdom well ordered, which did not interrupt the orders of war in time of peace.

[3] After the Thebans Pelopidas and Epaminondas had freed Thebes and had brought it out of the servitude of the Spartan empire, though they found themselves in a city used to serving and in the midst of effeminate peoples, they did not hesitate—so much was their virtue—to put them under arms,

and to go with them to meet the Spartan armies in the field, and to conquer them. He who writes of it[3] says that in a short time these two showed that men of war are born not only in Lacedemon but in every other place where men are born, provided that there may be found one who knows how to direct them to the military, as one sees that Tullus knew how to direct the Romans. Virgil could not have expressed this opinion better, nor shown with other words that he took its side, than when he says:

> And Tullus will move indolent men to arms.[4]

22

What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the Three Alban Curiatii

[1] Tullus, king of Rome, and Mettius, king of Alba, agreed that that people would be the lord over the other whose three men, written above, should win. All the Alban Curiatii were killed, one of the Roman Horatii was left alive; and because of this Mettius, the Alban king, with his people, was left subject to the Romans. When that Horatius was returning the victor to Rome, he met a sister of his who had been betrothed to one of the three dead Curiatii, and as she wept for the death of her betrothed, he killed her. Hence that Horatius was put under judgment for the fault and after many disputes was freed, more because of his father's prayers than for his own merits.[1] Three things are to be noted here: one, that one should never risk all one's fortune with part of one's forces; the next, that in a well-ordered city, faults are never paid for with merits; third, that policies are never wise if one should or can doubt their observance. For being servile is so important to a city that one ought never to believe that any of those kings or those peoples would be content that three of their citizens had put them into subjection, as may be seen in what Mettius wished to do. Although he at once confessed himself conquered after the victory of the Romans and promised obedience to Tullus, nonetheless in the first expedition that they had to gather against the Veientes, it may be seen how he sought to deceive him, as one who had become aware late of the rashness of the policy he had taken up.[2] Because enough has been spoken about this third notable thing, we shall speak only of the other two in the following two chapters.

23

That One Should Not Put All One's Fortune in Danger, and Not All One's Forces; and Because of This, the Guarding of Passes Is Often Harmful

[1] It has never been judged a wise policy to put all your fortune in danger and not all your forces. This is done in many modes. One is doing as Tullus and Mettius did when they committed all the fortune of their fatherland and the virtue of as many men as both of them had in their armies to the virtue and fortune of three of their citizens, who amounted to a minimal part of the forces of each of them. Nor were they aware that by this policy all the labor that their predecessors had endured in ordering the republic, to make it live free for a long while and to make its citizens defenders of their freedom, was almost as if in vain, since it was in the power of so few to lose it. This affair could not have been worse considered by those kings.

[2] This inconvenience is also brought on almost always through those who, when they see the enemy, plan to hold difficult places and to guard passes. For almost always this decision will be harmful unless indeed you can conveniently keep all your forces in that difficult place. In this case such a policy is to be taken, but if the place is harsh and one cannot keep all the forces there, the policy is harmful. This makes me judge thus the example of those who, having been assaulted by a powerful enemy, and having their country surrounded by mountains and mountainous places, have never attempted to fight the enemy in the passes and in the mountains but have gone to meet it on the other side; or, when they have not wished to do this, they have waited on the inner side of the mountains in benign, not mountainous, places. The cause has been the one cited before: one cannot lead many men to the guarding of mountainous places, whether because they cannot live there a long time or because the places are so narrow and have capacity for so few that it is not possible to withstand an enemy who comes in a mass to strike you. It is easy for the enemy to come in a mass

because his intention is to pass through and not to stop; and it is impossible for him who waits to wait for it in a mass since one has to encamp for a long time, not knowing when the enemy wishes to pass through places that are, as I said, narrow and barren. Thus when you lose the pass that you had presupposed you would hold, and in which your people and your army trusted, most often such terror enters into the people and the remainder of your troops that you are left a loser without being able to try out their virtue. So you have come to lose all your fortune with part of your forces.

[3] Everyone knows with how much difficulty Hannibal crossed the mountains that divide Lombardy from France[1] and with how much difficulty he crossed those that divide Lombardy from Tuscany;[2] nonetheless, the Romans waited for him first on the Ticino[3] and then on the plain of Arezzo.[4] They preferred that their army be eaten up by the enemy in places where it was able to win rather than leading it into the mountains to be destroyed by the malignity of the site.

[4] He who reads all the histories judiciously will find very few virtuous captains who have tried to hold such passes, both for the reasons given and because they cannot all be closed, since the mountains are like the countryside and have not only customary and frequented ways but many others that, if they are not known to foreigners, are known to the peasants with whose aid you will always be led to any place whatever against the wish of whoever opposes you. One can bring up a very fresh example of this in 1515. When Francis, king of France, planned to come into Italy for the recovery of the state of Lombardy, the greatest foundation that those who were contrary to his enterprise relied on was that the Swiss would hold him at the passes on the mountains. As was seen later by experience, that foundation of theirs was in vain; for leaving aside two or three places guarded by them, the king came over by another, unknown way and was in Italy and upon them before they had a presentiment of him. So they retired, terrified, into Milan, and all the peoples of Lombardy took the side of the French troops, having been disappointed in the opinion they had that the French were to be held back in the mountains.[5]

24

Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards and Punishments for Their Citizens and Never Counterbalance One with the Other

[1] The merits of Horatius were very great, since with his virtue he had conquered the Curiatii; his fault was atrocious, since he had killed his sister. Nonetheless, such a homicide so greatly displeased the Romans that they brought him to trial[1] for his life, notwithstanding that his merits were so great and so fresh. To whoever considers it superficially, such a thing would appear an example of popular ingratitude; nonetheless, whoever examines it better and inquires with better consideration what the orders of republics should be will blame that people rather for having absolved him than for having wished to condemn him. The reason is this: that no well-ordered republic ever cancels the demerits with the merits of its citizens; but, having ordered rewards for a good work and punishments for a bad one, and having rewarded one for having worked well, if that same one later works badly, it punishes him without any regard for his good works. When these orders are well observed, a city lives free for a long time; otherwise it will always come to ruin soon. For if a citizen has done some outstanding work for the city, and on top of the reputation that this thing brings him, he has an audacity and confidence that he can do some work that is not good without fearing punishment, in a short time he will become so insolent that any civility will be dissolved.

[2] If one wishes the punishment for malevolent works to be kept up, it is indeed 2 necessary to observe the giving of rewards for good ones, as it was seen Rome did. Although a republic may be poor and able to give little, it should not abstain from that little; for every small gift given to anyone, in recompense for a good however great, will always be esteemed by him who receives it as honorable and very great. The history of Horatius Coclus is very well known,[2] and that of Mucius Scaevola:[3] as the one held back the enemy at the bridge until it was cut, the other burned his own hand that had

erred when it tried to kill Porsenna, king of the Tuscans. For these two such outstanding works, two *staiora* of land were given by the public to each of them.[4] The history of Manlius Capitolinus is also known. For having saved the Capitol from the French who were encamped there, he was given a small measure of flour by those who were besieged inside with him.[5] That reward was great, according to the fortune then current in Rome, and of such quality that when Manlius was moved later by his envy or by his wicked nature to arouse sedition in Rome, and sought to gain the people for himself, he was without any respect for his merits thrown headlong from the Capitol that before, with so much glory for himself, he had saved.[6]

25

He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated State in a Free City May Retain at Least the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes

[1] If someone who desires or who wishes to reform a state in a city wishes it to be accepted and capable of being maintained to the satisfaction of everyone, he is under the necessity of retaining at least the shadow of its ancient modes so that it may not appear to the peoples to have changed its order even if in fact the new orders are altogether alien to the past ones. For the generality of men feed on what appears as much as on what is; indeed, many times they are moved more by things that appear than by things that are. For this cause, recognizing this necessity at the beginning of their free way of life and having created two consuls in exchange for one king, the Romans did not wish to have more than twelve lictors, so as not to surpass the number of those who ministered to the kings.[1] Besides this, since an annual sacrifice was offered in Rome that could not be done except by the king in person, and since the Romans wished the people not to have to desire anything ancient because of the absence of the kings, they created a head of said sacrifice, whom they called the sacrificing king, and subordinated him to the highest priest, so that by this way the people came to be satisfied with the sacrifice and never to have cause, for lack of it, to desire the return of the kings.[2] This should be observed by all those who wish to suppress an ancient way of life in a city and to turn it to a new and free way of life, for since the new things alter the minds of men, you should contrive that those alterations retain as much of the ancient as possible. If the magistrates vary from the ancient ones in number and authority and time, they should at least retain the name. This, as I said, he should observe who wishes to order a political way of life by the way either of republic or of kingdom; but he who wishes to make an absolute power, which is called tyranny by the authors,[3] should renew everything, as will be told in the following chapter.

26

A New Prince Should Make Everything New in a City or Province Taken by Him

[1] The best remedy whoever becomes prince of either a city or a state has for holding that principality is to make everything in that state anew, since he is a new prince, and so much the more when his foundations are weak and he may not turn to civil life by way either of kingdom or of republic: that is, to make in cities new governments with new names, new authorities, new men; to make the rich poor, the poor rich, as did David when he became king—"who filled the hungry with good things and sent the rich away empty";[1] besides this, to build new cities, to take down those built, to exchange the inhabitants from one place to another; and, in sum, not to leave anything untouched in that province, so that there is no rank, no order, no state, no wealth there that he who holds it does not know it as from you; and to take as one's model Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander, who from a small king became prince of Greece with these modes. He who writes of him says that he transferred men from province to province as herdsmen transfer their herds.[2] These modes are very cruel, and enemies to every way of life, not only Christian but human; and any man whatever should flee them and wish to live in private rather than as king with so much ruin to men. Nonetheless, he who does not wish to take this first way of the good must enter into this evil one if he wishes to maintain himself. But men take certain middle ways that are very harmful, for they do not know how to be either altogether wicked or altogether good, as will be shown by example in the following chapter.

27

Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be Altogether Wicked or Altogether Good

[1] When Pope Julius II went to Bologna in 1505 to expel from that state the house of Bentivogli, which had held the principate[1] of the city for a hundred years, he also wished—as one who had taken an oath[2] against all the tyrants who seized towns of the church—to remove Giovampagolo Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. Having arrived near Perugia, with this intent and decision known to everyone, he did not wait to enter that city with his army, which was guarding him, but entered it unarmed, notwithstanding that Giovampagolo was inside with many troops that he had gathered for defense of himself. So, carried along by that fury with which he governed all things, he put himself with a single guard in the hands of his enemy, whom he then led away with him, leaving a governor in the city who would render justice[3] for the church. The rashness of the pope and the cowardice of Giovampagolo were noted by the prudent men who were with the pope,[4] and they were unable to guess whence it came that he did not, to his perpetual fame, crush his enemy at a stroke and enrich himself with booty, since with the pope were all the cardinals with all their delights. Nor could one believe that he had abstained either through goodness or through conscience that held him back; for into the breast of a villainous man, who was taking his sister for himself, who had killed his cousins and nephews so as to reign, no pious respect could descend. But it was concluded that it arose from men's not knowing how to be honorably wicked or perfectly good; and when malice has greatness in itself or is generous in some part, they do not know how to enter into it.

[2] So Giovampagolo, who did not mind being incestuous and a public parricide, did not know how—or, to say better, did not dare, when he had just the opportunity for it—to engage in an enterprise in which everyone would have admired his spirit and that would have left an eternal memory of himself as being the first who had demonstrated to the prelates how little is to be esteemed whoever lives and reigns as they do; and he would have

done a thing whose greatness would have surpassed all infamy, every danger, that could have proceeded from it.

28

For What Cause the Romans Were Less Ungrateful toward Their Citizens Than the Athenians

[1] Whoever reads of the things done by republics will find in all of them some species of ingratitude toward their citizens; but he will find less of it in Rome than in Athens, and perhaps than in any other republic.[1] Searching for the cause of this, speaking of Rome and Athens, I believe it happened because the Romans had less cause than the Athenians for suspecting their citizens. For in Rome, as one reasons about it from the expulsion of the kings until Sulla and Marius, freedom was never taken away by any of its citizens, so that there was no great cause for suspecting them and, in consequence, for offending them inconsiderately. The very contrary happened in Athens when freedom had been taken away from it by Pisistratus in its most flourishing time and under a deception of goodness, for as soon as it became free and recalled the injuries received and its past servitude, it became a very prompt avenger not only of the errors but of the shadow of errors in its citizens. Hence arose the exiles and the deaths of so many excellent men; hence the order of ostracism and every other violence that was done against its aristocrats in various times by that city. What these writers on civility say is very true: that peoples bite more fiercely after they have recovered their freedom than after they have saved it.[2] Whoever considers, then, how much has been said will neither blame Athens in this nor praise Rome, but will accuse only necessity because of the diversity of accidents that arose in these cities. For whoever considers things subtly will see for himself that if freedom had been taken away in Rome as in Athens, Rome would not have been more merciful toward its citizens than the latter was. One can make a very true conjecture about this because of what happened to Collatinus[3] and Publius Valerius[4] after the expulsion of the kings. The first of them was sent into exile for no cause other than that he bore the name of the Tarquins, even though he had been found to have freed

Rome; the other was also on the point of being made an exile only for having given suspicion of himself by building a house on the Caelian Hill. So, seeing how far Rome was suspicious and severe with these two, one can reckon that it would have made use of ingratitude as had Athens if, like the latter, it had been injured by its citizens in early times and before its increase. So as not to have to return to this matter of ingratitude, I shall say what will be needed about it in the following chapter.

29

Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince

[1] It appears to me, with regard to the matter written about above, that one should discourse on which practices this ingratitude in greater examples, a people or a prince. To dispute the case better, I say that this vice of ingratitude arises either from avarice or from suspicion.[1] For when either a people or a prince has sent out one of its captains on an important expedition, from which that captain will have acquired very much glory if he should win, that prince or that people is held to the bargain of rewarding him. If, instead of rewards, he either dishonors or offends him, moved by avarice and not wishing to satisfy him since he is held back by this greed, he makes an error that has no excuse but rather brings with it an eternal infamy. Yet one finds many princes who sin in this way. And Cornelius Tacitus tells the cause in this sentence: "One is more inclined to make return for an injury than for a benefit, because gratitude is held to be a burden and revenge a gain."[2] But when he does not reward him—or, to say better, offends him—moved not by avarice but by suspicion, then he merits —both the people and the prince—some excuse. Of these acts of ingratitude, used for such a cause, one reads very much: for the captain who has virtuously acquired an empire for his lord, overcoming enemies and filling himself with glory and his soldiers with riches, of necessity acquires such reputation with his soldiers, with enemies, and with the subjects belonging to that prince that the victory cannot taste good to the lord who has sent him. Because the nature of men is ambitious and suspicious and does not know how to set a limit[3] to any fortune it may have, it is impossible for the suspicion suddenly arising in the prince after the victory of his captain not to be increased by that same one because of some mode or term of his used insolently. So the prince cannot but think of securing himself against him; and to do this, he thinks either of having him killed or of taking away the reputation that he has gained for himself in his army or in his peoples, and with all industry shows that the victory arose not through

the virtue of that one but through fortune, or through the cowardice of the enemies, or through the prudence of the other heads that had been with him in such a struggle.

[2] After Vespasian, then in Judea, was declared emperor by his army, Antonius Primus, who was in Illyria with another army, took his part and came into Italy against Vitellius, who was reigning in Rome, and most virtuously destroyed two armies of Vitellius and seized Rome. So Mucianus, sent by Vespasian, found that through the virtue of Antonius, all had been acquired and every difficulty conquered. The reward that Antonius received for it was that Mucianus at once took away the obedience of the army and little by little reduced him to being without any authority in Rome. So Antonius went to meet Vespasian, still in Asia, by whom he was so received that in a brief time, reduced to no rank, he died almost in despair.[4] Histories are full of these examples. In our times, everyone who lives at present knows with how much industry and virtue Gonsalvo Ferrante, serving in the military against the French in the kingdom of Naples for Ferdinand, king of Aragon, conquered and overcame that kingdom; and how, as a reward for victory, what he got was that Ferdinand left Aragon and, having come to Naples, first deprived him of the obedience of the men-at-arms, then took the fortresses away from him, and next brought him back with him to Spain, where he died, dishonored, a short time later.[5] Thus, so natural is this suspicion in princes that they cannot defend themselves against it; and it is impossible that they use gratitude to those who have made great acquisitions through victory under their banners.

[3] It is not a miracle, nor a thing worthy of the greatest memory, if a people does not defend itself from what a prince does not defend himself. For since a city that lives free has two ends—one to acquire, the other to maintain itself free—it must be that in one thing or the other it errs through too much love. As to errors in acquiring, they will be told in their place.[6] As to errors in maintaining itself free, there are these among others: to offend those citizens whom it ought to reward; to have suspicion of those in whom it ought to have confidence. Although these modes are the cause of great evils in a republic that has come into corruption, and often it comes all the sooner to tyranny—as happened to the Rome of Caesar,[7] who took for himself by force what ingratitude denied him—nonetheless in a republic that is not corrupt they are the cause of great goods and make it live free, since men are kept better and less ambitious longer through fear of punishment. It is true that among all the peoples that ever had empire, for

the causes discoursed of above,[8] Rome was the least ungrateful. For one can say of its ingratitude that there was no example other than that of Scipio,[9] because Coriolanus[10] and Camillus[11] were made exiles for the injuries that both had done to the plebs. The one was not pardoned because he had always reserved a hostile spirit against the people; the other was not only recalled but at all times of his life adored as a prince. But the ingratitude used to Scipio arose from a suspicion that the citizens were beginning to have of him that had not been held of the others, which arose from the greatness of the enemy that Scipio had overcome,[12] from the reputation that victory in so long and dangerous a war had given him, from its rapidity, and from the favor that his youth, prudence, and other memorable virtues acquired for him. These things were so great that none other than the magistrates of Rome feared his authority, a thing that displeased wise men as something unaccustomed in Rome. His way of life appeared so extraordinary that Cato Priscus, reputed holy, was the first to act against him and to say that a city could not call itself free where there was a citizen who was feared by the magistrates. So if the people of Rome followed the opinion of Cato in this case, it merits the excuse that, as I said above, those peoples and those princes merit who are ungrateful through suspicion. Thus concluding this discourse, I say that since this vice of ingratitude is used through avarice or through suspicion, one will see that peoples never make use of it through avarice, and very much less through suspicion than princes, having less cause to suspect, as will be said below.

30

Which Modes a Prince or a Republic Should Use So As to Avoid the Vice of Ingratitude; and Which a Captain or a Citizen Should Use So As Not to Be Crushed by It

[1] So as to avoid the necessity either of having to live with suspicion, or of being ungrateful, a prince should go personally on expeditions, as the Roman emperors did in the beginning, as the Turk does in our times, and as those who are virtuous have done and do. For if they win, the glory and the acquisition are all theirs; and when they are not present, since the glory is someone else's, it does not appear to them that they can make use of the acquisition unless they eliminate in someone else the glory that they have not known how to gain for themselves. They become ungrateful and unjust, and without doubt their loss is greater than the gain. But when through either negligence or lack of prudence they remain idly at home and send a captain, I have no precept to give them other than the one they know for themselves. But I do say to that captain, since I judge that he cannot avoid the bites of ingratitude, that he may do one of two things: either leave the army at once after the victory and put himself in the hands of his prince, guarding himself against every insolent or ambitious act, so that the latter, deprived of every suspicion, may have cause either to reward him or not to offend him; or, when this does not appear to him proper to do, he may spiritedly take the contrary part and hold to all those modes through which he believes that that acquisition may be his own and not his prince's, making the soldiers and the subjects well disposed to him. He may make new friendships with neighbors, seize fortresses with his men, corrupt the princes of his army, and secure himself against those he cannot corrupt; and through these modes seek to punish his lord for the ingratitude that he would have used to him. There are no other ways, but, as was said above,

men do not know how to be either altogether bad or altogether good.[1] It always happens that they do not wish to leave the army at once after victory, that they are unable to behave modestly, that they do not know how to use violent measures that have something honorable in them. So, remaining ambiguous, they are crushed between their delay and ambiguity.

[2] To a republic wishing to avoid this vice of the ungrateful, one cannot give the same remedy as to the prince—that is, to go and not send someone else on his expeditions—since it is under a necessity to send one of its citizens. It is fitting, therefore, that I propose as remedy that it follow the same modes the Roman republic followed so as to be less ungrateful than the others. This arose from the modes of its government. For since the whole city—both the nobles and the ignobles—was put to work in war, so many virtuous men emerged in every age, decorated from various victories, that the people did not have cause to fear any one of them, since they were very many and guarded one another. They kept themselves so upright, and so hesitant to cast a shadow of any ambition or give cause to the people to offend them for being ambitious, that when one came to the dictatorship he carried away from it the greater glory the sooner he laid it down. And so, since modes such as these could not generate suspicion, they did not generate ingratitude. So a republic that does not wish to have cause to be ungrateful should govern itself as did Rome; and a citizen who wishes to avoid its bites should observe the limits observed by Roman citizens.

31

That the Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for an Error Committed; nor Were They Ever Punished When Harm Resulted to the Republic through Their Ignorance or through Bad Policies Adopted by Them

[1] The Romans, as we have discoursed of above, not only were less ungrateful than other republics but also were more merciful and more hesitant in the punishment of the captains of their armies than any other.[1] For if his error had been made through malice, they punished him humanely; if it was through ignorance, not only did they not punish him, they rewarded and honored him. This mode of proceeding was well considered by them; for they judged that it was of such importance to those who governed their armies that they have a free and ready spirit, without other extrinsic hesitations in making policies, that they did not wish to add new difficulties and dangers to a thing in itself difficult and dangerous, since they thought that if they added them, no one could ever work virtuously. They might be, for instance, sending an army into Greece against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against Hannibal, or against those peoples whom they had conquered before. The captain who had been put in charge of such an expedition was worried by all the cares that go along with these affairs, which are grave and most important. Now if to such cares had been added many Roman examples of having crucified or otherwise killed those who had lost battles, it would have been impossible for the captain to be able to decide strenuously among so many suspicions.[2] Therefore, since they judged that for such ones the ignominy of having lost was penalty enough, they did not wish to terrify them with another, greater penalty.

[2] As to an error committed not through ignorance, here is one example. Sergius and Virginius were in the field at Veii, each one in charge of one part of the army.[3] Of the two, Sergius was facing where the Tuscans could come, Virginius on the other side. It happened that when Sergius was assaulted by the Faliscians and by other peoples, he endured being defeated and put to flight before sending to Virginius for aid. On the other side, expecting him to be humiliated, Virginius preferred to see the dishonor of his fatherland and the ruin of the army than to help him—a case truly malevolent and worthy of being noted, and from which to draw not a good conjecture concerning the Roman republic if both had not been punished. It is true that whereas another republic would have punished them with the capital penalty, this one punished them with fines of money. This came about not because their sins did not merit greater punishment but because, for the reasons already given, the Romans in this case wished to maintain their ancient customs. As to errors through ignorance, there is no example more beautiful than that of Varro.[4] Because of his rashness the Romans were defeated at Cannae by Hannibal, and that republic was in danger of losing its freedom; nonetheless, because it was ignorance and not malice, not only did they not punish him but they honored him, and at his return to Rome the whole senatorial order went to meet him. Since they could not thank him for the fight, they thanked him because he returned to Rome and had not despaired of Roman affairs. When Papirius Cursor wished to have Fabius killed for having engaged in combat with the Samnites contrary to his command, among other reasons that were advanced by the father of Fabius against the obstinacy of the dictator was that the Roman people had never done in any loss by its captains what Papirius wished to do in their victories.[5]

32

A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer Benefiting Men in Their Necessities

[1] The Romans did succeed happily in being liberal to the people as danger came up when Porsenna came to assault Rome so as to restore the Tarquins. Then, fearing that the plebs would rather accept kings than sustain the war, the Senate relieved it of the salt tax and of every imposition so as to secure itself with it, saying that the poor worked well enough for the public benefit if they raised their children, and for this benefit the people exposed itself to enduring siege, hunger, and war.[1] Yet no one, trusting in this example, should defer winning over the people until times of danger, for what succeeded for the Romans will never succeed for him. For the collectivity will judge that it has that good not from you but from your adversaries; and since it ought to fear that when the necessity has passed, you will take back from them what you had been forced to give them, it will not have any obligation to you. The cause why this policy turned out well for the Romans was that the state was new and not yet solid; and that people had seen that laws had been made for its benefit, such as the one on appealing to the plebs, so that it could be persuaded that the good that was done was caused not so much by the coming of enemies as by the disposition of the Senate to benefit them. Besides this, the memory of the kings, by whom they had been vilified and injured in many modes, was fresh. Because like causes happen rarely, it will also occur rarely that like remedies help. So whoever holds a state, whether republic or prince, should consider beforehand what times can come up against him, and which men he can have need of in adverse times; and then live with them in the mode that he judges to be necessary to live, should any case whatever come up. The one who governs himself otherwise—whether prince or republic, and especially a prince—and then believes in the fact that, when danger comes up, he can regain men with benefits, deceives himself; for not only does he not secure himself with them but he hastens his own ruin.

33

When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either in a State or against a State, the More Salutary Policy Is to Temporize with It Rather Than to Strike at It

[1] As the Roman republic was growing in reputation, strength, and empire, its neighbors, who at first had not thought of how much harm that new republic could bring them, began—but late—to recognize their error; and wishing to remedy what they had not remedied at first, a good forty peoples conspired against Rome. Hence, among the other usual remedies they made for themselves in urgent dangers, the Romans turned to creating the dictator—that is, to giving power to one man who could decide without any consultation and execute his decisions without any appeal.[1] As that remedy was useful then and was the cause that they overcame the impending dangers, so it was always most useful in all those accidents that arose at any time against the republic in the increasing of the empire.

[2] First to be discussed in regard to that accident is that when an inconvenience that arises either in a republic or against a republic, caused by an intrinsic or extrinsic cause, has become so great that it begins to bring fear to everyone, it is a much more secure policy to temporize with it than to attempt to extinguish it. For almost always those who attempt to allay it make its strength greater and accelerate the evil that they suspected from it for themselves. And accidents such as these arise in a republic more often through an intrinsic than an extrinsic cause. Many times a citizen is allowed to gather more strength than is reasonable, or one begins to corrupt a law that is the nerve and the life of a free way of life; and the error is allowed to run on so far that it is a more harmful policy to wish to remedy it than to allow it to continue. It is so much the more difficult to recognize these inconveniences when they arise as it appears more natural to men always to favor the beginnings of things; and more than for anything else, such favor

can be for works that appear to have some virtue in them and have been done[2] by youths. For if in a republic one sees a noble youth arise who has an extraordinary virtue in him, all eyes of the citizens begin to turn toward him and agree in honoring him without any hesitation, so that if there is a bit of ambition in him, mixed with the favor that nature gives him and with this accident, he comes at once to a place where the citizens, when they become aware of their error, have few remedies to avoid it. If they try to work as many as they have, they do nothing but accelerate his power.

[3] One could bring up very many examples of this, but I wish to give only one of them from our city. Cosimo de' Medici, from whom the house of Medici had the beginning of its greatness in our city, came to such reputation with the favor that his prudence and the ignorance of the other citizens gave him that he began to bring fear to the state, so that the other citizens judged it dangerous to offend him and very dangerous to allow him to remain thus. But living in those times was Niccolò da Uzzano, a man held to be very expert in civil affairs, who had made the first error of not recognizing the dangers that could arise from the reputation of Cosimo. While he lived, he did not ever permit the second to be made—that is, of attempting to eliminate him—since he judged that such an attempt would be the entire ruin of their state, as one sees it was after his death. For as the citizens who were left did not observe his counsel, they made themselves strong against Cosimo and expelled him from Florence. Hence it came about that his party, resentful because of this injury, recalled him soon after and made him prince of the republic, to which rank he would never have been able to climb without that manifest opposition.[3]

[4] The same happened in Rome with Caesar; for although that virtue of his was favored by Pompey and by others, the favor soon after was converted to fear. Cicero bears witness to this in saying that Pompey had begun to fear Caesar late.[4] That fear made them think about remedies; and the remedies they made accelerated the ruin of their republic.

[5] I say, thus, that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when they arise – the difficulty being caused by the fact that things are apt to deceive you in the beginning—it is a wiser policy to temporize with them after they are recognized than to oppose them; for if one temporizes with them, either they are eliminated by themselves or at least the evil is deferred for a longer time. In all things, princes who plan to cancel them or oppose their strength and thrust should open their eyes, so as not to give them increase instead of

decrease, believing that they are pushing a thing back while pulling it along, or indeed that they are drowning a plant by watering it. But they should consider well the strength of the malady, and if you see you have enough to cure it, set yourself at it without hesitation; otherwise let it be and do not attempt it in any mode. For, as was discoursed of above, it will happen as it happened to Rome's neighbors, for whom, since Rome had grown to so much power, it was more salutary to seek to appease it and to hold it back with the modes of peace than to make them think about new orders and new defenses with the modes of war. For that conspiracy of theirs did nothing but make [the Romans] more united, more vigorous, and make them think about new modes, through which they expanded their power in a briefer time. Among them was the creation of the dictator, a new order through which they not only overcame impending dangers but that was the cause of avoiding infinite evils that the republic would have incurred without that remedy.

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The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and That the Authorities Citizens Take for Themselves, Not Those Given Them by Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life

[1] The Romans who invented in that city the mode of creating the dictator[1] have been condemned by some writer[2] for a thing that was the cause, in time, of the tyranny of Rome. He cites the fact that the first tyrant[3] in that city commanded it under the dictatorial title; he says that if it had not been for this, Caesar would not have been able to put an honest face on his tyranny under any public title. This thing was not well examined by the one who holds the opinion, and it was believed against all reason. For it was neither the name nor the rank of dictator that made Rome servile, but it was the authority taken by citizens because of the length of command. If the dictatorial name had been lacking in Rome, they would have taken another; for it is forces that easily acquire names, not names forces. One sees that while the dictator was appointed according to public orders, and not by his own authority, he always did good to the city. For magistrates that are made and authorities that are given through extraordinary ways, not those that come through ordinary ways, hurt republics; so one sees that in Rome the result was that in so much course of time no dictator ever did anything but good to the republic.

[2] There are very evident reasons for this. First, if a citizen wishes to be able to offend and to seize extraordinary authority for himself, he must have many qualities that in a noncorrupt republic he can never have. For he needs to be very rich and to have very many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have where the laws are observed; and even if he had them, men like these are so formidable that free votes do not concur in them. Besides this, the dictator was appointed for a time, and not perpetually, and so as to

obviate only the cause by means of which he was created; and his authority extended to being able to decide by himself regarding remedies for that urgent danger, and to do everything without consultation, and to punish everyone without appeal.[4] But he could not do anything that might diminish the state, as taking away authority from the Senate or from the people, undoing the old orders of the city and making new ones, would have been. So, when the brief time of his dictatorship, the limited authorities he had, and the noncorrupt Roman people are added up, it was impossible for him to escape his limits and to hurt the city; and one sees by experience that he always helped.

[3] And truly, among the other Roman orders, this is one that deserves to be considered and numbered among those that were the cause of the greatness of so great an empire, for without such an order cities escape from extraordinary accidents with difficulty. Because the customary orders in republics have a slow motion (since no council and no magistrate can work anything by itself, but in many things one has need of another, and because it takes time to add these wills together), their remedies are very dangerous when they have to remedy a thing that time does not wait for. So republics should have a like mode among their orders; and the Venetian republic, which is excellent among modern republics, has reserved authority to a few citizens who in urgent needs can decide, all in accord, without further consultation.[5] For when a like mode is lacking in a republic, it is necessary either that it be ruined by observing the orders or that it break them so as not to be ruined. In a republic, one would not wish anything ever to happen that has to be governed with extraordinary modes. For although the extraordinary mode may do good then, nonetheless the example does ill; for if one sets up a habit of breaking the orders for the sake of good, then later, under that coloring, they are broken for ill. So a republic will never be perfect unless it has provided for everything with its laws and has established a remedy for every accident and given the mode to govern it. So, concluding, I say that those republics that in urgent dangers do not take refuge either in the dictator or in similar authorities will always come to ruin in grave accidents.

[4] In this new order the mode of electing is to be noted, as it was wisely provided by the Romans. For since the creation of the dictator brought some shame for the consuls, who as heads of the city had to come under obedience like others, and since they supposed that disdain among the citizens had to arise from this, they wished the authority of electing him to

be in the consuls. They thought that if an accident came in which Rome might have need of this kingly power, they would have to make him voluntarily; and in making him themselves, it would pain them less. For wounds and every other ill that a man does to himself spontaneously and by choice hurt much less than those that are done to you by someone else. Indeed, in the last times the Romans used to give such authority to the consul instead of to the dictator with these words: “Let the consul see that the republic comes to no harm.”[6] To return to our matter, I conclude that by seeking to crush them, Rome’s neighbors made them order themselves not only to be able to defend themselves but able to attack them with more force, more counsel, and more authority.

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The Cause Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome Was Hurtful to the Freedom of That Republic, Notwithstanding That It Was Created by Public and Free Votes

[1] The election of the ten citizens created by the Roman people to make the laws in Rome[1] appears contrary to what was discoursed of above, that the authority that is seized by violence, not that given by votes, harms republics.[2] In time they became tyrants of Rome and without any hesitation seized its freedom. Hence one should consider the modes of giving authority and the time for which it is given. If a free authority is given for a long time —calling a long time one year or more—it will always be dangerous and will have either good or bad effects according as those to whom it is given are bad or good. If one considers the authority that the Ten had, and that which the dictators used to have, one will see that that of the Ten was greater beyond comparison. For when the dictator was created, the tribunes, consuls, and Senate remained with their authority; nor was the dictator able to take it away from them. If he had been able to deprive one of them of the consulate, one of the Senate, he could not annul the senatorial order and make new laws. So the Senate, the consuls, the tribunes, remaining in their authority, came to be like a guard on him to make him not depart from the right way. But in the creation of the Ten it happened all the contrary; for they annulled the consuls and the tribunes; they gave them authority to make laws and do any other thing, like the Roman people. So finding themselves alone, without consuls, without tribunes, without appeal to the people, and because of this not having anyone to observe them, they were able to become insolent in the second year, moved by the ambition of Appius. Because of this, one should note that when it is said that an authority given by free votes never hurts[3] any republic, one presupposes that a people is

never led to give it except in the proper circumstances and for the proper times. But if—either because it was deceived or for some other cause that blinded it—it is led to give it imprudently, and in the mode that the Roman people gave it to the Ten, it always happens as it did. One easily proves this by considering what causes kept the dictators good and what made the Ten wicked, and also by considering how those republics have fared that have been kept well ordered in giving authority for a long time, as the Spartans gave to their kings and the Venetians to their dukes. For one will see that in both modes guards were posted who made them unable to use their authority badly. Nor does it help, in this case, that the matter be incorrupt; for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time and makes friends and partisans for itself. Nor is it hurt either by being poor or by not having relatives; for riches and every other favor run after it at once, as we shall discourse of in detail concerning the creation of the said Ten.

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Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors Should Not Disdain Lesser Ones

[1] The Romans had made Marcus Fabius and G. Manilius consuls and had won a very glorious battle against the Veientes and the Etruscans in which Quintus Fabius, the consul's brother, who had been consul the year before, was killed.[1] Here one should consider how the orders of that city were suited to making it great; and how much other republics that are distant from its modes deceive themselves. For although the Romans were great lovers of glory, nonetheless they did not esteem it a dishonorable thing to obey now one whom they had commanded at another time, and to find themselves serving in the army of which they had been princes. Such a custom is contrary to the opinion, orders, and modes of citizens in our times. In Venice there is still the error that a citizen who has had a great rank is ashamed to accept a lesser one; and the city consents to his being able to keep his distance from it. Though such a thing may be honorable for the private individual, it is altogether useless for the public. For a republic should have more hope and should trust more in a citizen who descends from a great rank to govern in a lesser one than in one who rises from a lesser to govern in a greater. For one cannot reasonably believe in the latter unless one sees men around him who are of so much reverence or so much virtue that his newness can be moderated with their counsel and authority. And if in Rome there had been such a custom as is in Venice and in other modern republics and kingdoms—that he who had been consul once would never again wish to go in the armies unless he were consul—infinite things unfavorable to a free way of life would have arisen, both through the errors the new men would have made and through the ambition they would have been able to use better if they had had men around them in the sight of whom they feared to err. So they would have come to be more unshackled, which would have turned out wholly to the public detriment.

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What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave Birth to in Rome; and That to Make a Law in a Republic That Looks Very Far Back and Is against an Ancient Custom of the City Is Most Scandalous

[1] It is the verdict of the ancient writers that men are wont to worry in evil and to become bored with good, and that from both of these two passions the same effects arise.[1] For whenever engaging in combat through necessity is taken from men they engage in combat through ambition, which is so powerful in human breasts that it never abandons them at whatever rank they rise to. The cause is that nature has created men so that they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain everything. So, since the desire is always greater than the power of acquiring, the result is discontent with what one possesses and a lack of satisfaction with it. From this arises the variability of their fortune; for since some men desire to have more, and some fear to lose what has been acquired, they come to enmities and to war, from which arise the ruin of one province and the exaltation of another. I have made this discourse because it was not enough for the Roman plebs to secure itself against the nobles by the creation of the tribunes, to which desire it was constrained by necessity; for having obtained that, it began at once to engage in combat through ambition, and to wish to share honors and belongings[2] with the nobility as the thing esteemed most by men. From this arose the disease that gave birth to contention over the Agrarian law,[3] which in the end was the cause of the destruction of the republic. Because well-ordered republics have to keep the public rich and their citizens poor, it must be that in the city of Rome there was a defect in this law. Either it was not made at the beginning so that it did not have to be treated again every day; or they delayed so much in making it because looking back might be scandalous;[4] or if it was well ordered at first, it had been corrupted later

by use. So in whatever mode it might have been, one never spoke of this law in Rome without turning the city upside down.[5]

[2] This law had two principal heads. In the one it set forth that no citizen could possess more than so many *jugera* of land;[6] in the other, that fields taken from enemies should be divided among the Roman people.[7] It therefore brought on offenses of two sorts to the nobles: for those who possessed more goods than the law permitted (who were the greater part of the nobles) had to be deprived of them, and dividing the goods of enemies among the plebs took away from them the way to get rich. So since these offenses came to bear against powerful men who, as it appeared to them, were defending the public in opposing it, whenever one was reminded of it, as was said, the whole city was turned upside down. With patience and industry the nobles temporized with it, either by leading an army out, or by having the tribune who proposed it opposed by another tribune, or by sometimes yielding to a part of it, or indeed by sending a colony to the place that had to be distributed. This happened in the countryside around Anzio: when the dispute over the law resurged, a colony drawn from Rome, to which the said countryside was assigned, was sent to the place. Here Titus Livy uses a notable phrase, saying that only with difficulty was anyone found in Rome to give his name to go to that colony,[8] so much was the plebs more willing to desire things in Rome than to possess them in Anzio.[9] The temper[10] of this law went operating on thus for a time until the Romans began to take their arms to the farthest parts of Italy or outside Italy, after which it appears that it ceased. This came about because the fields the enemies of Rome possessed, being distant from the eyes of the plebs and in places where it was not easy to cultivate them, came to be less desired by them; and also the Romans were less punitive to their enemies in a like mode, and when they despoiled any town of its countryside, they distributed colonies there. So for such causes this law lay as though asleep until the Gracchi; when it was aroused by them, it altogether ruined Roman freedom.[11] For it found the power of its adversaries redoubled, and because of this it inflamed so much hatred between the plebs and the Senate that they came to arms and to bloodshed, beyond every civil mode and custom. So, since the public magistrates could not remedy it, and none of the factions could put hope in them, they had recourse to private remedies, and each one of the parties was thinking of how to make itself a head to defend it. In this scandal and disorder the plebs came first and gave reputation to

Marius, so that it made him consul four times; and he continued in his consulate, with a few intervals, so long that he was able to make himself consul three other times. As the nobility had no remedy against such a plague, it turned to favoring Sulla; and when he had been made head of its party, they came to civil wars. After much bloodshed and changing of fortune, the nobility was left on top.[12] Later these humors were revived at the time of Caesar and Pompey; for after Caesar had made himself head of Marius's party, and Pompey that of Sulla, in coming to grips Caesar was left on top. He was the first tyrant in Rome, such that never again was that city free.[13]

[3] Such, thus, were the beginning and the end of the Agrarian law. And although we have shown elsewhere that the enmities in Rome between the Senate and the plebs kept Rome free by giving rise to laws in favor of freedom,[14] and although the end of this Agrarian law appears not to conform to such a conclusion, I say that I do not, because of this, abandon such an opinion. For so great is the ambition of the great that it soon brings that city to its ruin if it is not beaten down in a city by various ways and various modes. So, if the contention over the Agrarian law took three hundred years to make Rome servile, it would perhaps have been led into servitude much sooner if the plebs had not always checked the ambition of the nobles, both with this law and with its other appetites. One also sees through this how much more men esteem property than honors. For the Roman nobility always yielded honors to the plebs without extraordinary scandals, but when it came to property, so great was its obstinacy in defending it that the plebs had recourse to the extraordinary [means] that were discoursed of above to vent its appetite.[15] The motors of this disorder were the Gracchi, whose intention one should praise more than their prudence. For to try to take away a disorder that has grown in a republic, and because of this to make a law that looks very far back, is an ill-considered policy. As was discoursed of above at length,[16] one does nothing but accelerate the evil to which the disorder is leading you; but by temporizing with it, either the evil comes later or it eliminates itself on its own with time, before it reaches its end.

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Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and Do Not Know How to Decide; and If They Ever Take Up Any Policy, It Arises More from Necessity Than from Choice

[1] Since in Rome there was a very grave pestilence, and because of this it appeared to the Volsci and the Aequi that the time had come when they could crush Rome, these two peoples, having made a very large army, assaulted the Latins and the Hernici.[1] And as their countries were being despoiled, the Latins and the Hernici were constrained to make it understood in Rome and to beg that they be defended by the Romans. Since the Romans were burdened by disease, they replied to them that they should take up the policy of defending themselves on their own and with their arms, because they could not defend them. Here one recognizes the generosity and prudence of the Senate and how in every fortune it always wished to be the one that was prince over the decisions that its subjects[2] would have to make. Nor was it ever ashamed to decide a thing that was contrary to its mode of life or to other decisions it had made when necessity commanded them to.

[2] I say this because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said peoples to arm and defend themselves,[3] so that to a Senate less prudent than this one it would have appeared to be falling from its rank to concede such defense to them. But this one always judged things as they should be judged, and always took the less bad policy for the better.[4] For not being able to defend its subjects tasted bad to it, and that they should arm themselves without them tasted bad, for the said reasons and for many others that are understood. Nonetheless, recognizing that they would arm themselves by necessity in any mode, since the enemy was upon them, it took the honorable part and willed that what they had to do they would do with license from it, so that having disobeyed by necessity, they should not

become inured to disobeying by choice. Although this may appear to be the policy that should be adopted by every republic, nonetheless weak and badly counseled republics do not know how to take it up, nor do they know how to honor themselves in like necessities. Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and had made Bologna bow to his terms.[5] Then, wishing to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent his man to Florence to ask passage for himself and his army. In Florence they consulted one another as to how one might have to govern this affair, and it was never counseled by anyone to concede it to him. In this, one did not follow the Roman mode, for since the duke was very well armed and the Florentines so unarmed that they could not prevent him from passing through, it was much more to their honor that he should appear to pass by their will rather than by force, because, while it was altogether their reproach, it would have been less so in part if they had conducted it otherwise. But the worst part that weak republics take is to be irresolute, so that all the policies they take up are taken up by force; and if any good comes to be done by them, they do it forced and not by their prudence.

[3] I wish to give two other examples of this that occurred in our times in the state of our city. In 1500, when King Louis XII of France had retaken Milan, he was desirous of turning over Pisa to Florence so as to have the fifty thousand ducats that had been promised to him by the Florentines after the restitution. He sent his armies toward Pisa, captained by Monsieur de Beaumont, who, though French, was nonetheless a man whom the Florentines trusted very much. This army and this captain took themselves between Cascina and Pisa so as to go into combat against the walls. As they waited there for some days so as to order themselves for the storming, Pisan spokesmen came to Beaumont and offered to give the city to the French army with this pact: that he promise by the faith of the king not to put it in the hands of the Florentines before the end of four months. This policy was altogether rejected by the Florentines, with the result that they took the field and left it in shame. Nor was the policy rejected for any other cause than that they distrusted the faith of the king, as those who through the weakness of their counsel had put themselves by force into his hands. On the other hand, they did not trust him, nor did they see how much better it was for the king to be able to turn Pisa over to them when he was inside it—and, if he did not turn it over, to uncover his intent—than for him to be able to promise it to them when he did not have it, and for them to be forced to buy those promises. So they would have acted much more profitably if they

had consented that Beaumont take it under any promise whatever—as experience showed later, in 1502, when Monsieur Imbault was sent by the king of France with French troops to aid the Florentines after Arezzo had rebelled.[6] When he arrived near Arezzo, after a short time he began to negotiate an accord with the Aretines, who wished to give over the town under a certain pledge,[7] as had the Pisans. The policy was rejected in Florence; seeing this, Monsieur Imbault began to hold negotiations for an accord by himself, without the participation of the commissioners, since it was apparent to him that the Florentines understood little of this. So he concluded it in his own mode and under it entered Arezzo with his troops, giving the Florentines to understand that they were mad and did not understand worldly things; for if they wished for Arezzo, they should have made it understood to the king, who could give it to them much better if he had his troops inside the city than outside. In Florence they did not stop tearing up and blaming the said Imbault; nor did they ever stop until at last it was recognized that if Beaumont had been like Imbault, they would have had Pisa as well as Arezzo.

[4] So, to return to our point, irresolute republics never take up good policies unless by force, because their weakness never allows them to decide where there is any doubt; and if that doubt is not suppressed by violence that drives them on, they always remain in suspense.

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In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be Seen

[1] Whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the same humors, and there always have been. So it is an easy thing for whoever examines past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take the remedies for them that were used by the ancients, or, if they do not find any that were used, to think up new ones through the similarity of accidents. But because these considerations are neglected or not understood by whoever reads, or, if they are understood, they are not known to whoever governs, it follows that there are always the same scandals in every time.

[2] After ’94, when the city of Florence had lost part of its empire, such as Pisa and other towns, it was compelled of necessity to make war on those who had seized them.[1] And because he who seized them was powerful, it followed that [the Florentines] spent very much in the war, fruitlessly; from very much spending came very heavy taxes; from the taxes, infinite quarrels among the people. And because this war was administered by a magistracy of ten citizens, who were called the Ten of War, the collectivity began to bear spite against them, as the cause both of the war and of its expenses; and it began to persuade itself that if the said magistracy were taken away, the war would be taken away. So when it had to be remade, replacements were not made for it; it was allowed to expire and its functions transferred to the Signoria. That decision was so pernicious that not only did it not remove the war, as the collectivity had persuaded itself, but, since those men who were administering it with prudence were taken away, such disorder followed that, besides Pisa, Arezzo and many other places were lost, so that when the people saw better its error, and that the cause of the ill was the fever and not the physician, it remade the magistracy of the Ten. This same humor was raised in Rome against the name of the consuls. For when the people saw one war after another arise, and that they could never rest, whereas they should have thought that it arose from the ambition of

neighbors who wished to crush them, they thought it arose from the ambition of the nobles, who, since they were unable to punish the plebs when defended by the tribunate power[2] inside Rome, wished to lead it outside Rome under the consuls so as to crush it where it did not have any aid. They thought, because of this, that it might be necessary either to remove the consuls or to regulate their power[3] so that they did not have authority over the people either outside or at home. The first who attempted this law was one Terentillus, a tribune, who proposed that five men ought to be created to consider the power of the consuls and to limit it.[4] This very much upset the nobility, since the majesty of the empire appeared to it to have altogether declined, so that there no longer remained any rank for the nobility in that republic. The obstinacy of the tribunes was nonetheless so great that the consular name was eliminated;[5] and in the end they were content, after some other ordering, to create tribunes with consular power[6] rather than consuls—so much more was the name held in hatred than their authority.[7] So they continued a long time until their error was recognized, and as the Florentines returned to the Ten, so they recreated consuls.

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The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and What Is to Be Noted in It; Where It Is Considered, among Many Other Things, How through Such an Accident One Can Either Save or Crush a Republic

[1] Since I wish to discourse in detail of the accidents that arose in Rome through the creation of the Decemvirate, it does not appear to me superfluous first to narrate all that followed from that creation and then to dispute those parts that are notable in their actions. These are many and of great importance, as well for those who wish to maintain a free republic as for those who plan to subject it. For in such a discourse one will see many errors made by the Senate and by the plebs unfavorable to freedom, and many errors made by Appius, head of the Decemvirate, unfavorable to the tyranny that he had supposed he would stabilize in Rome.

[2] After many disputes and contentions that continued between the people and the nobility, so as to confirm new laws in Rome through which the freedom of that state would be more stabilized, by agreement they sent Spurius Postumius with two other citizens to Athens for examples of the laws that Solon gave to that city so that they could found the Roman laws on them. When these had gone and returned, they came to the creation of men who would have to examine and confirm the said laws, and they created ten citizens for a year, among whom was Appius Claudius, a sagacious and restless man. And so that they could create such laws without any hesitation, they removed all the other magistrates from Rome, and in particular the tribunes and the consuls, and removed the appeal to the people, so that that magistracy came to be altogether prince of Rome. All the authority of his partners was turned over to Appius because of the favor that he had with the plebs, for with demonstrations he had made himself so popular that it appeared marvelous that he had taken on a new nature and a new genius so

quickly, since before this time he had been held a cruel persecutor of the plebs.[1]

[3] These Ten conducted themselves very civilly, keeping not more than twelve lictors, who went before the one who was put ahead among them.[2] Although they had absolute authority, nonetheless, when they had to punish a Roman citizen for homicide, they summoned him into the presence of the people and had him judged by it. They wrote their laws on ten tables, and before they confirmed them, they put them out in public so that everyone could read them and dispute them, so that it might be known if there was any defect in them so as to be able to amend them before their confirmation. In this regard Appius had a rumor raised throughout Rome that if to these ten tables two others were added, they would be brought to their perfection; so this opinion gave opportunity to the people to remake the Ten for another year, to which the people agreed willingly, both so as not to remake the consuls and because it appeared to them they could do without tribunes, since they were judges of cases, as was said above. Thus, since the policy of remaking them had been adopted, the whole nobility moved to seek these honors, and among the first was Appius. He used so much humanity toward the plebs in asking for [the honor] that it began to be suspect to his partners, "for they hardly believed that in such great arrogance friendship would be spontaneous."[3] Hesitating to oppose him openly, they decided to do it with art; and although he was the most junior in age of all, they gave him authority to propose the future Ten to the people, believing that he would observe the limits of others in not proposing himself, since that was an uncustomary and ignominious thing in Rome. "He indeed seized on this obstacle as an opportunity"[4] and named himself among the first, to the astonishment and displeasure of all the nobles; then he named nine others to his purpose. That new creation, made for another year, began to show its error to the people and the nobility. For at once "Appius put an end to playing an alien persona,"[5] began to show his inborn pride, and in a few days permeated his partners with his customs. To terrify the people and the Senate, they made one hundred twenty lictors instead of twelve.

[4] The fear remained equal for some days; but then they began to entertain the Senate and to beat down the plebs. If someone who was beaten by one appealed to another, he was treated worse in the appeal than in the first sentence. So, when the plebs had recognized its error, it began, full of

affliction, to look the nobles in the face "and to try to breathe in the air of freedom where, by fearing servitude, they had brought the republic to its present state."[6] To the nobility their affliction was gratifying, "as they themselves, disgusted with the present, desired consuls."[7] The days that ended the year came: two tables of laws were produced but not made public. From this the Ten took the opportunity to continue in the magistracy; and they began to hold the state with violence and to make satellites for themselves of the noble youths, to whom they gave the goods of those they condemned. "The youths were corrupted by these goods, and they preferred their own license to the freedom of all."[8] In this time it came to pass that the Sabines and the Volsci[9] started a war against the Romans, in fear of which the Ten began to see the weakness of their state, because without the Senate they could not order for the war, and if the Senate met, it appeared to them they would lose the state. Yet, compelled by necessity, they adopted this last policy; and when the senators met together, many of the senators spoke against the pride of the Ten, and in particular Valerius and Horatius. Their authority would have been entirely eliminated if the Senate through envy of the plebs had not been unwilling to show its authority, thinking that if the Ten laid down the magistracy voluntarily, the tribunes of the plebs might not be remade. Thus they decided on war and they went out with two armies led in part by the said Ten; Appius remained to govern the city. Hence it arose that he fell in love with Virginia and that, since he wished to take her by force, her father Virginius killed her to free her. Hence followed tumults in Rome and in the armies, which, retiring together with the rest of the Roman plebs, went off to the Sacred Mount, where they stayed until the Ten laid down the magistracy. Tribunes and consuls were created, and Rome was brought back to the form of its ancient freedom.[10]

[5] Thus through this text one notes, first, that in Rome the inconvenience of creating this tyranny arose for those same causes that the greater part of tyrannies in cities arises; and this is from too great a desire of the people to be free and from too great a desire of the nobles to command. When they do not agree to make a law in favor of freedom, but one of the parties jumps to favor one individual, then it is that tyranny emerges at once. The nobles and the people of Rome agreed to create the Ten, and to create them with so much authority because of the desire that each of the parties had—the one to eliminate the consular name, the other the tribunate. Once they were created, when it appeared to the plebs that Appius had become

popular and was beating down the nobility, the people turned to favoring him. When a people brings itself to make this error of giving reputation to one individual because he beats down those it holds in hatred, and if that individual is wise, it will always happen that he will become tyrant of the city. For he will wait to eliminate the nobility with the favor of the people; and he will never turn to the oppression of the people until he has eliminated them, at which time, when the people recognizes it is servile, it has nowhere to take refuge. All those who have founded tyrannies in republics have held to this mode. If Appius had held to this mode, his tyranny would have taken on more life and would not have failed so quickly; but he did quite the contrary, and he could not have conducted himself more imprudently. For to hold the tyranny he made himself the enemy of those who had given it to him and could maintain it for him, and the enemy[11] of those who had not concurred in giving it to him and would not have been able to maintain it for him; and he lost those who were friends to him and sought to have as friends those who could not be friends to him. For although nobles may desire to tyrannize, that part of the nobility that finds itself outside the tyranny is always an enemy to the tyrant; nor can he ever win over all of it, because of the great ambition and great avarice that are in it, since the tyrant cannot have either so much wealth or so many honors that he may satisfy all of it. And so, by leaving the people and taking the side of the nobles, Appius made a most evident error, both for the reasons given above and because, if one wishes to hold a thing with violence, whoever forces needs to be more powerful than whoever is forced.

[6] Hence it arises that those tyrants who have the collectivity as a friend and the great as an enemy are more secure, because their violence is sustained by greater force than that of those who have the people for an enemy and the nobility for a friend. For with the favor of the former, internal[12] forces are enough to preserve oneself, as they were enough for Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when all Greece and the Roman people assaulted him.[13] After he had secured himself against a few nobles, having the people as a friend, he defended himself with it, which he would not have been able to do if he had it as an enemy. In that other condition, because one has few friends inside, internal[14] forces are not enough and he must seek them outside. And [outside forces] have to be of three sorts: one, foreign satellites to guard your person; another, arm the countryside to do the duty that the plebs ought to have done; third, get close to neighboring powers to defend you. Whoever holds to these modes and observes them well could save

himself in some mode, even though he had the people for an enemy. But Appius could not accomplish the [mode] of gaining over the countryside to himself since the countryside and Rome were one and the same thing; and that which he could have done he did not know how to do, so that he was ruined in his first beginnings.

[7] The Senate and the people made very great errors in the creation of the Decemvirate; for even though it was said above, in the discourse that was made on the dictator,[15] that those magistrates who make themselves by themselves—not those whom the people makes—are hurtful to freedom, nonetheless when the people orders magistrates, it should make them so that they have to have some hesitation about becoming criminals. Whereas [the people] ought to post a guard for itself over [the magistrates] to keep them good, the Romans took it away, making [the Ten] the only magistracy in Rome and annulling all others because of the excessive wish (as we said above) that the Senate had to eliminate the tribunes and the plebs to eliminate the consuls. This blinded them in such a mode that they agreed to such disorder. For as King Ferdinand used to say, men often act like certain lesser birds of prey, in whom there is such desire to catch their prey, to which nature urges them, that they do not sense another larger bird that is above them so as to kill them.[16] Thus one may know through this discourse, as I put it at the beginning, the error of the Roman people if they wished to save their freedom, and the errors of Appius if he wished to seize a tyranny.

41

To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is Something Imprudent and Useless

[1] Among the other means badly used by Appius to maintain his tyranny, it was of no little moment to leap too quickly from one quality to another. For his astuteness in deceiving the plebs, pretending to be a man of the people, was well used; also well used were the means he adopted so that the Ten would have to be remade; also well used was the audacity of creating himself against the opinion of the nobility; creating partners to his purposes was well used. But it was not at all well used, when he had done this, as I say above, to change nature of a sudden and from a friend of the plebs show himself an enemy; from humane, proud; from agreeable, difficult;[1] and to do it so quickly that without any excuse every man had to know the falsity of his spirit. For whoever has appeared good for a time and wishes for his purposes to become wicked ought to do it by due degrees and to conduct himself with opportunities, so that before your different nature takes away old favor from you, it has given you so much new that you do not come to diminish your authority; otherwise, finding yourself uncovered and without friends, you are ruined.

42

How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted

[1] One also notes in the matter of the Decemvirate how easily men are corrupted and make themselves assume a contrary nature,[1] however good and well brought up, considering how much the youths that Appius had chosen around him began to be friendly to the tyranny for the little utility that came to them from it, and how Quintus Fabius, one in the number of the second Ten—though a very good man—blinded by a little ambition and persuaded by the malignity of Appius, changed his good customs to the worst and became like him.[2] If this is well examined, it will make legislators of republics and kingdoms more ready to check human appetites and to take away from them all hope of being able to err with impunity.

43

Those Who Engage in Combat for Their Own Glory Are Good and Faithful Soldiers

[1] One also considers, from the treatment written above, how much difference there is between an army that is content and engages in combat for its own glory and one that is ill disposed and engages in combat for the ambition of someone else. For whereas under the consuls Roman armies were always accustomed to be victorious, under the decemvirs they always lost.[1] From this example one can know in part the causes of the uselessness of mercenary soldiers, which do not have cause to hold them firm other than a little stipend that you give them. That cause is not and cannot be enough to make them faithful and so much your friends that they wish to die for you.[2] For in those armies in which there is no affection toward him for whom they engage in combat that makes them become his partisans, there can never be enough virtue to resist an enemy who is a little virtuous. Because neither this love nor this rivalry arises except from your subjects, it is necessary to arm one's subjects for oneself, if one wishes to hold a state—if one wishes to maintain a republic or a kingdom—as one sees those have done who have made great profit with armies. The Roman armies under the Ten had the same virtue; but because there was not the same disposition, they did not have the customary effects. But as soon as the magistracy of the Ten was eliminated, and they began to serve in the military as free persons, the same spirit returned to them, and, in consequence, their enterprises had the same happy end as by their former custom.[3]

44

A Multitude without a Head Is Useless; and That One Should Not First Threaten and Then Request Authority

[1] Because of the incident of Virginia, the Roman plebs had repaired, armed, to the Sacred Mount.[1] The Senate sent its ambassadors to ask with what authority they had abandoned their captains and repaired to the Mount. So much was the authority of the Senate esteemed that no one dared to respond, since the plebs had no heads among them. Titus Livy says that they did not lack matter to respond but they lacked one who would make the response. Such a thing demonstrates precisely the uselessness of a multitude without a head. The disorder was recognized by Virginius, and by his order twenty military tribunes were created to be their heads and to respond to and meet with the Senate. When they requested that Valerius and Horatius be sent to them, to whom they would say their wish, the two did not wish to go there if the Ten did not first lay down the magistracy. When they arrived on the Mount where the plebs was, they were asked by it to create tribunes of the plebs, and to have appeal to the people from every magistracy, and to give over all the Ten to them, because they wished to burn them alive.

[2] Valerius and Horatius praised their first demands; they blamed the last as impious, saying, “You damn cruelty, you rush into cruelty.”[2] They counseled them that they ought to omit making mention of the Ten and that they should wait until they had retaken their authority and their power; then they would not lack their mode of satisfying themselves. Here one knows openly how much stupidity and how little prudence there is to ask for a thing and to say first: I wish to do such and such evil with it. For one should not show one’s intent but try to seek to obtain one’s desire in any mode. For it is enough to ask someone[3] for his arms without saying, “I wish to kill you with them,” since you are able to satisfy your appetite after you have the arms in hand.

45

Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been Made, and Especially by Its Author, Is a Thing That Sets a Bad Example; and to Freshen New Injuries Every Day in a City Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It

[1] When the accord had been accomplished and Rome had been returned to its former form, Virginius summoned Appius before the people to defend his cause. The latter appeared accompanied by many nobles; Virginius commanded that he be put in prison. Appius began to cry out and to appeal to the people. Virginius said that he was not worthy of having the appeal that he had destroyed, and to have as defender the people that he had offended. Appius replied that they did not have to violate the appeal that with so much desire they had ordered. Thereupon he was incarcerated, and before the day of the judgment he killed himself.[1] Although the criminal life of Appius merited every punishment, nonetheless it was hardly a civil thing to violate the laws, and so much the more one that had been made then. For I do not believe there is a thing that sets a more wicked example in a republic than to make a law and not observe it, and so much the more as it is not observed by him who made it.

[2] Florence, after ’94, had been reordered in its state by the aid of Friar Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings show the learning, the prudence, and the virtue of his spirit.[2] Among the other institutions to secure the citizens, he had had a law made so that one could appeal to the people from sentences that the Eight and the Signoria gave in state cases. He urged this law for a long time and obtained it with the greatest difficulty. Soon after its confirmation, it happened that five citizens were condemned to death by the Signoria on the state’s account; and when they wished to appeal, they were not allowed to and the law was not observed.[3] That took away more

reputation from the friar than any other accident: for if the appeal was useful, it ought to have been observed; if it was not useful, he ought not to have had it passed. This accident was noted so much the more since, in so many sermons he made after the law was broken, the friar never either condemned[4] whoever had broken it or excused him, as one whom he did not wish to condemn, since it was a thing that was turned to his purpose and that he could not excuse. This exposure of his ambitious and partisan spirit took away reputation from him and brought him very much disapproval.

[3] A state also offends very much when it freshens new humors every day in the spirits of your citizens through new injuries that are done to this one and that, as happened in Rome after the Decemvirate. For all the Ten, and other citizens at different times, were accused and condemned so that there was a very great fright in all the nobility, since it judged that no end would ever be put to like condemnations until all the nobility had been destroyed. It would have generated great inconvenience in that city if Marcus Duellius, the tribune, had not provided against it. He made an edict that for one year it would not be permitted for anyone to summon or accuse any Roman citizen—which reassured all the nobility.[5] There one sees how much it is harmful to a republic or to a prince to hold the spirits of subjects in suspense and fearful with continual penalties and offenses. Without doubt one could not hold to a more pernicious order, because men who begin to suspect they have to suffer evil secure themselves by every mode in their dangers and become more audacious and less hesitant to try new things. Thus it is necessary either not to offend anyone ever or to do the offenses at a stroke, and then to reassure men and give them cause to quiet and steady their spirits.[6]

46

Men Ascend from One Ambition to Another; First One Seeks Not to Be Offended, and Then One Offends Others

[1] When the Roman people had recovered its freedom and returned to its former rank—and so much the greater since many new laws had been made in confirmation of its power—it appeared reasonable that Rome would quiet down for some time.[1] Nonetheless by experience one may see the contrary, for every day new tumults and new discords rose up there. Because Titus Livy very prudently supplies the reason why these arose, it does not appear to me inapposite to refer precisely to his words, where he says that either the people or the nobility always became proud when the other humbled itself.[2] When the plebs stayed quiet within its bounds, the young nobles began to injure it; and the tribunes could find few remedies for it because they too were violated. Though it appeared to the nobility on the other side, that its youth had been too ferocious, it preferred that if the bounds[3] had to be overstepped, its own should overstep and not the plebs. So the desire to defend freedom made each one try to prevail so much that he oppressed the other. The order of these accidents is that when men seek not to fear, they begin to make others fear; and the injury that they dispel from themselves they put upon another, as if it were necessary to offend or to be offended. One sees by this in what mode, among others, republics break down, and in what mode men ascend from one ambition to another, and how that Sallustian sentence, put in the mouth of Caesar, is very true: that "all bad examples have arisen from good beginnings."[4] Those citizens who live ambitiously in a republic, as was said above, seek as the first thing to be able not to be offended, not only by private individuals but also by the magistrates. They seek friendships so as to be able to do this; and they acquire them in ways honest in appearance, either by helping with money or by defending them from the powerful. Because this appears virtuous, it easily deceives everyone, and because of this they offer no remedies against

it, so that he, persevering without hindrance, becomes of such quality that private citizens have fear of him and the magistrates have respect for him. When he has ascended to this rank, and he has not already been prevented from greatness, he comes to be in a position where to try to strike him is most dangerous, for the reasons that I gave above[5] of the danger there is in striking at an inconvenience that has already gained much increase in a city. So the affair comes down to a point at which one needs either to seek to eliminate him with danger of sudden ruin or, by allowing him to act, to enter into a manifest servitude, unless death or some accident frees you from it. For having come to the positions written above, where the citizens and magistrates have fear of offending him and his friends, he does not have much trouble getting them to judge and to offend in his mode. Hence a republic must have among its orders this one, of watching out that its citizens cannot do evil under shadow of good, and that they have that reputation that helps and does not hurt freedom, as will be disputed by us in its place.[6]

47

However Deceived in Generalities, Men Are Not Deceived in Particulars

[1] When the Roman people, as was said above,[1] was disgusted with the consular name and wished for plebeian men to be able to be made consuls or for their authority to be diminished, the nobility, so as not to blemish the consular authority either with one thing or with the other, took a middle way and was content that four tribunes with consular power, who could be plebeians as well as nobles, be created.[2] The plebs was content with this, as it appeared to it to eliminate the consulate and to get its part in this highest rank. From this arose a notable case, for coming to the creation of these tribunes and being able to create all plebeians, the Roman people created all nobles. Hence Titus Livy says these words: "The outcome of these elections taught that there is one spirit in contention over freedom and honor, another after conflict has been put aside and when their judgment is uncorrupt."[3] Examining what this could proceed from, I believe it proceeds from men's being very much deceived in general things, not so much in particulars. It appeared generally to the Roman plebs that it deserved the consulate because it had more part in the city, because it carried more danger in wars, because it was that which with its arms[4] kept Rome free and made it powerful. Since to the plebs its desire appeared reasonable, as was said, it turned to obtaining this authority in any mode. But as it had to pass judgment on its men particularly, it recognized their weakness and judged that no one of them deserved that which the whole together appeared to it to deserve. So, ashamed of them, it had recourse to those who deserved it. Titus Livy, deservedly marveling at this decision, says these words: "This modesty, equity, and elevation of spirit—where will you now find in one what then was in the people universally?"[5]

[2] In confirmation of this, one can bring up another notable example that occurred in Capua after Hannibal defeated the Romans at Cannae.[6] Although all Italy was stirred up because of this defeat, Capua was still in

tumult because of the hatred there was between the people and the Senate. Pacuvius Calanus,[7] finding himself at that time in the supreme magistracy, and recognizing the danger that being in tumult was bringing to the city, planned through his rank to reconcile the plebs with the nobility. After he had this thought, he had the Senate convened and narrated to them the hatred the people had against them and the dangers they bore of being killed by it, and the city given to Hannibal, the Romans' affairs being in distress. Then he added that if they wished to let this affair be governed by him, he would do it so that they would unite together; but he wished to shut them inside the palace and, by giving the people the power to punish them, save them. The senators yielded to his opinion, and he called the people to a meeting, having closed up the senate in the palace. He said that the time had come that they could tame the pride of the nobility and avenge themselves for the injuries received from it, since he had closed them all in under his custody. But because he believed that they did not wish for their city to remain without government, if they wished to kill the old senators, it was necessary to create new ones. Therefore he had all the names of the senators put in a bag and would begin to draw them out in their presence, and he would have those drawn killed one by one as soon as they had found the successor. As he began to draw out one of them, a very great noise was raised at his name, calling him a proud, cruel, and arrogant man; and when Pacuvius requested them to make the exchange, the whole meeting was quiet. After a while one of the plebs was named, at whose name someone began to whistle, someone to laugh, someone to speak ill of him in one mode, and someone in another. So continuing one by one, all those who were named they judged unworthy of senatorial rank. So, taking this opportunity, Pacuvius said: "Since you judge that this city is badly off without the Senate and you do not agree on making exchanges for the old senators, I think it is good that you reconcile yourselves together; for the fear that the senators have been in will have made them so humble that the humanity that you are seeking elsewhere you will find in them."[8] When this was agreed to, the union of this order followed, and the deception they were under was exposed when they were constrained to come to particulars. Besides this, peoples are deceived generally in judging things and their accidents about which, after they know them particularly, they lack such deception.

[3] After 1494, when the princes of the city had been expelled from Florence and no ordered government was there,[9] but rather a certain

ambitious license, and public things were going from bad to worse, many popular men, seeing the ruin of their city and not understanding any other cause for it, accused the ambition of someone powerful who was nourishing the disorders so as to be able to make a state to his purpose and take freedom away from them. This sort stood around the loggias and piazzas speaking ill of many citizens, threatening that if they ever became signors, they would uncover their deception and would punish them. It often happened that persons like these ascended to the supreme magistracy, and as he had risen to that place and had seen things more closely, he recognized where the disorders arose from, and the dangers that impended, and the difficulty in remedying them. Since he saw that the times and not the men caused the disorder, he suddenly became of another mind and of another sort, because the knowledge of particular things took away from him the deception that had been presupposed in considering them generally. So those who had first heard him speak when he was a private individual and later seen him become quiet in the supreme magistracy believed that this arose not through a truer knowledge of things but because he had been got around and corrupted by the great. Since this befalls many men, and many times, a proverb arises among them that says: They have one mind in the piazza and another in the palazzo. Thus, considering all that has been discoursed of, one sees how, seeing that a generality deceives them, one can soon open the eyes of peoples by finding a mode by which they have to descend to particulars, as did Pacuvius in Capua and the Senate in Rome. I also believe that one may be able to conclude that a prudent man should never flee the popular judgment in particular things concerning distributions of ranks and dignities, for only in this does the people not deceive itself; and if it deceives itself at some time, it is so rare that a few men who have to make such distributions will deceive themselves more often. Nor does it appear to me superfluous to show, in the following chapter, the order that the Senate held to so as to deceive the people in its distributions.

48

He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be Given to Someone Vile or Someone Wicked Should Have It Asked for Either by Someone Too Vile and Too Wicked or by Someone Too Noble and Too Good

[1] When the Senate feared that tribunes with consular power would be made of plebeian men, it held to one of two modes: either it had [the position] asked for by the most reputed men in Rome; or truly, through due degrees, it corrupted some vile and very ignoble plebeian who, mixed with the plebeians of better quality who ordinarily asked for it, also asked them for it.[1] This last mode made the plebs ashamed to give it; the first made it ashamed to take it. All of this returns to the purpose of the preceding discourse, in which it is shown that the people does not deceive itself in particulars, even if it deceives itself in generalities.

49

If Those Cities That Have Had a Free Beginning, Such as Rome, Have Difficulty in Finding Laws That Will Maintain Them, Those That Have Had One Immediately Servile Have Almost an Impossibility

[1] The course of the Roman republic demonstrates extremely well how difficult it is, in ordering a republic, to provide for all the laws that maintain it free. Notwithstanding the many laws that were ordered there by Romulus first, then by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and last by the ten citizens created for like work, nonetheless new necessities in managing that city were always discovered, and it was necessary to create new orders, as happened when they created the censors,[1] which were one of those provisions that helped keep Rome free for the time that it lived in freedom. For when they had become arbiters of the customs of Rome, they were a very powerful cause why the Romans delayed more in corrupting themselves. They did indeed make an error in the beginning of the creation of such a magistracy, creating it for five years; but after not much time, it was corrected by the prudence of Mamercus the dictator, who by a new law reduced the said magistracy to eighteen months. This the censors who were on watch took so ill that they denied Mamercus [membership in] the Senate, which was very much blamed both by the plebs and by the Fathers. Because the history does not show that Mamercus was able to defend himself against it,[2] it must be either that the historian is defective or that the orders of Rome in this aspect are not good, for it is not good for a republic to be ordered so that one citizen, by promulgating a law conforming to a free way of life, can be offended for it without any remedy.

[2] But, returning to the beginning of this discourse, I say that the creation of this new magistracy should make one consider that if those cities that have had their beginning free and that have been corrected by themselves,

like Rome, have great difficulty in finding good laws for maintaining themselves free, it is not marvelous that the cities that have had their beginnings immediately servile have not difficulty but an impossibility in ever ordering themselves so that they may be able to live civilly and quietly. As one sees in what happened to the city of Florence: having had its beginning subordinate to the Roman Empire, and having always lived under the government of another, it remained abject for a time, without thinking about itself. Then, when the opportunity came for taking a breath, it began to make its own orders, which could not have been good, since they were mixed with the ancient that were bad. So it has gone on managing itself, for the two hundred years of true memory that it has without ever having had a state for which it could truly be called a republic. The difficulties that have been in it have always been in all those cities that have had similar beginnings. Although many times, through public and free votes, expansive authority has been given to a few citizens to enable them to reform it, they have not therefore ever ordered it for the common utility but always for the purpose of their party, which has made not order but greater disorder in that city.

[3] To come to some particular example, I say that among the other things that have to be considered by an orderer of a republic is to examine in which men's hands he puts the authority to shed blood against its own citizens. This was well ordered in Rome because one could appeal to the people ordinarily; and if indeed an important thing did occur in which it was dangerous to defer the execution during the appeal, they had the refuge of the dictator, who executed immediately—in which remedy they never took refuge unless for necessity. But Florence and the other cities born in its mode, being servile, had this authority invested in a foreigner, who, sent by the prince, filled such an office. When later they came into freedom, they maintained this authority in a foreigner whom they called the captain.[3] Because he could easily be corrupted by powerful citizens, this was a very pernicious thing. But later, changing this order for themselves because of the change of states, they created eight citizens who would fill the office of the captain.[4] Such an order went from bad to worst, for the reasons that have been said at other times: that the few were always ministers of the few and of the most powerful. The city of Venice, which had ten citizens who could punish any citizen without appeal, guarded itself from this.[5] Because they might not be enough to punish the powerful, although they had authority for it, they had constituted there the Forty; and more, they willed

that the Council of the Pregai, which is the largest council, be able to punish them so that if an accuser is not lacking, a judge is not lacking to hold powerful men in check. Thus, seeing that in Rome, ordered by itself and by so many prudent men, every day new causes emerged for which it had to make new orders in favor of a free way of life, it is not marvelous if in other cities that have a more disordered beginning so many difficulties emerge that they are never able to reorder themselves.

50

One Council or One Magistrate Should Not Be Able to Stop the Actions of Cities

[1] Titus Quintius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mentus were consuls in Rome who, since they were disunited, had stopped all the actions of that republic. The Senate, seeing this, urged them to create the dictator to do that which they were unable to do because of their discords. But the consuls, in discord in every other thing, were in accord only in not wishing to create the dictator. So, not having any other remedy, the Senate had recourse to the aid of the tribunes, who with the authority of the Senate forced the consuls to obey.[1] Here it has to be noted, first, the utility of the tribunate, which was useful in checking not only the ambition that the powerful used against the plebs, but that too that they used among themselves; the other, that it should never be ordered in a city that the few can hold up any of those decisions that ordinarily are necessary to maintain the republic. For instance, if you give an authority to a council to make a distribution of honors and of useful things, or to a magistrate to administer a business, one must either impose a necessity on him so that he has to act in any mode, or order that another can and should act if he does not wish to act. Otherwise this order would be defective and dangerous, as was seen in Rome had the authority of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of those consuls. In the Venetian republic the Great Council distributes the honors and profits. It used to happen sometimes that through indignation or some false persuasion, the collectivity did not create successors to the magistrates of the city and to those who administered the empire outside. That was a very great disorder, because in a stroke both the subject lands and the city itself lacked its own legitimate judges; nor could anything be obtained unless the collectivity of that council were either satisfied or undeceived. That inconvenience would have reduced the city to a bad condition if it had not been provided for by the prudent citizens, who, taking a convenient opportunity, made a law that all the magistracies that are or may be inside and outside of the city may never be vacated except

when substitutes and successors have been made. So the occasion for being able to stop public actions with danger to the republic was taken away from that council.

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A Republic or a Prince Should Make a Show of Doing through Liberality What Necessity Constrains Him to Do

[1] Prudent men gain favor for themselves out of affairs, always and in their every action even though necessity constrains them to do them in any case. This prudence was well used by the Roman Senate when it decided that a public wage should be given to men serving in the military, who were accustomed to serve in the military on their own. But since the Senate saw that it could not make war for long in that mode, and because of this it was unable either to besiege towns or to lead armies far away, and since it judged that it was necessary to do both the one and the other, it decided that the said stipends should be given out. But it did it so that it gained favor for itself out of what necessity constrained it to do. This present was so acceptable to the plebs that Rome went upside down with joy, as it appeared to them a great benefit that they never hoped to have and they would never have sought by themselves. Although the tribunes did their best to suppress this favor, showing that it was a thing that burdened—not relieved—the plebs, since it was necessary to lay taxes to pay for this wage, nonetheless they could not do so much that the plebs did not accept it. That was increased too by the Senate through the mode in which they distributed the taxes, for the heaviest and greatest were those they laid on the nobility, and they were the first that were paid.[1]

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To Repress the Insolence of One Individual Who Rises Up in a Powerful Republic, There Is No More Secure and Less Scandalous Mode Than to Anticipate the Ways by Which He Comes to That Power

[1] One sees by the discourse written above how much credit the nobility acquired with the plebs by the demonstrations read of, which were to its benefit both from the wage it had ordered and also from the mode of laying the taxes.[1] If the nobility had been maintained in this order, every tumult in that city would have been removed and the credit that the tribunes had with the plebs would have been taken from them and, by consequence, their authority. And truly, in a republic, and especially in those that are corrupt, the ambition of any citizen cannot be opposed with a better, less scandalous, and easier mode than to anticipate the ways that he is seen to tread to arrive at the rank that he plans. If that mode had been used against Cosimo de' Medici, it would have been a very much better policy for his adversaries than to drive him out of Florence. For if those citizens who vied with him had taken his style of favoring the people, they would have come without tumult and without violence to take out of his hands those arms of which he most availed himself.[2]

[2] Piero Soderini had made a reputation for himself in the city of Florence with this only: favoring the collectivity. That gave him a reputation in the collectivity as a lover of the freedom of the city. And truly, to the citizens who bore envy for his greatness, it was much easier, and was a thing much more honest, less dangerous, and less harmful for the republic, to anticipate him in the ways with which he made himself great than to wish to put themselves up against him so that all the rest of the republic was ruined with his ruin. For if they had removed from his hands the arms with which he made himself mighty (which they could easily have done), they would

have been able to oppose him without suspicion and without any hesitation in all councils and in all public decisions. If someone replied that if the citizens who hated Piero made an error by not anticipating him in the ways with which he gained reputation for himself among the people, Piero too came to make an error by not anticipating the ways by which those adversaries of his made him fear, for which Piero merits an excuse, whether because it was difficult for him to do so or because they were not honest to him, yet the ways with which he was hurt were the favoring of the Medici, with which favors they beat him down and in the end ruined him. Piero, therefore, could not honestly take this part because he could not with good fame destroy the freedom for which he had been posted guard. Then, since these favors could not be done in secret and at a stroke, they were very dangerous for Piero, for if he had been exposed as a friend to the Medici, he would have become suspect and hateful to the people. Hence his enemies would have had much more occasion for crushing him than they had at first.

[3] Therefore, in every policy men should consider its defects and dangers and not adopt it if there is more of the dangerous than the useful in it, notwithstanding that a judgment had been given of it that conforms to their decision. For when they do otherwise, it would happen to them in this case as it happened to Tully,[3] who in wishing to take away favor from Mark Antony increased it for him. For when Mark Antony had been judged an enemy of the Senate, and had gathered together that great army in good part from the soldiers who had followed the party of Caesar, Tully, so as to take those soldiers from him, urged the Senate to give reputation to Octavian and to send him with Hirtius and Pansa, the consuls, against Mark Antony, alleging that as soon as the soldiers who were following Mark Antony heard the name of Octavian, nephew of Caesar, and that he was calling himself Caesar, they would leave him and would take the side of the latter; so when Mark Antony was left stripped of favor, it would be easy to crush him. This affair came out all to the contrary, for Mark Antony gained Octavian to himself; and he, having left Tully and the Senate, sided with him. This affair was the destruction of the party of the aristocrats. That was easy to conjecture; nor should that of which Tully persuaded himself have been believed, but that name that with so much glory had eliminated its enemies and acquired for itself the principate in Rome should have always been taken into account; nor should it have been believed that, either from his heirs or from his agents, anything could ever be had that would conform to the name of freedom.[4]

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Many Times the People Desires Its Own Ruin, Deceived by a False Appearance[1] of Good; and That Great Hopes and Mighty Promises Easily Move It

[1] After the city of the Veientes was captured, an opinion entered into the Roman people that it would be a useful thing for the city of Rome that half the Romans go to inhabit Veii. It was argued that because that city was rich in its countryside, full of buildings, and close to Rome, half of the Roman citizens could be enriched and not disturb any civil action because of the nearness of the site. This thing appeared to the Senate and to the wisest Romans so useless and harmful that they freely said they would rather suffer death than consent to such a decision. So, as this thing came into dispute, the plebs was so much inflamed against the Senate that it would have come to arms and blood if the Senate had not made itself a shield of some old and esteemed citizens, reverence for whom checked the plebs, which did not proceed further with its insolence.[2] Here two things have to be noted. The first is that many times, deceived by a false image of good, the people desires its own ruin; and if it is not made aware that that is bad and what the good is, by someone in whom it has faith, infinite dangers and harms are brought into republics. When fate makes the people not have faith in someone, as happens at some time after it has been deceived in the past either by things or by men, it of necessity comes to ruin. Dante says to this purpose in the discourse he makes *On Monarchy* that many times the people cries: “Life!” to its death and “Death!” to its life.[3] From this lack of belief it arises that sometimes in republics good policies are not taken up, as was said above[4] of the Venetians when, assaulted by so many enemies, they were unable to adopt the policy of gaining someone to themselves with the restitution of the things they had taken from others (because of which the

war on them had been started and the league[5] of princes made against them) before ruin came.[6]

[2] Therefore, considering what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a people of, this distinction can be made: what you have to persuade represents first on its face either gain or loss, or truly it appears to be a spirited or cowardly policy. And when gain is seen in the things that are put before the people, even though there is loss concealed underneath, and when it appears spirited, even though there is the ruin of the republic concealed underneath, it will always be easy to persuade the multitude of it; and likewise it may always be difficult to persuade it of these policies if either cowardice or loss might appear, even though safety and gain might be concealed underneath. What I have said is confirmed by infinite examples, Roman and foreign, modern and ancient. For from this arose the malevolent opinion that emerged in Rome about Fabius Maximus, who was unable to persuade the Roman people that it would be useful to that republic to proceed slowly in that war and to sustain the thrust of Hannibal without fighting. For the people judged this policy cowardly and did not see inside it the utility that was there, nor did Fabius have reasons enough to demonstrate it to them. So much are peoples blinded in these mighty opinions that although the Roman people had made the error of giving authority to Fabius's master of the horse to enable it to fight, even though Fabius did not wish it, and although because of such authority the Roman camp was on the point of being defeated had Fabius not remedied it with his prudence,[7] this experience was not enough for it, because it later made Varro consul through no merits of his other than to have promised, in all the piazzas and all the public places in Rome, to break Hannibal whenever authority might be given to him.[8] From this arose the fight and the defeat at Cannae, and nearly the ruin of Rome.[9]

[3] I wish to bring up yet another Roman example for this purpose. Hannibal had been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled all this province with slaughter of Romans, when into the Senate came Marcus Centenius Penula, a very vile man (nonetheless he had held some rank in the military), who offered that if they gave him authority to enable him to make an army of voluntary men wherever he wished in Italy, he would in a very brief time give them Hannibal, taken or killed. To the Senate his request appeared rash; nonetheless, thinking that if it were denied to him and his asking later became known among the people, there might arise from it some tumult,

envy, and disfavor toward the senatorial order, they conceded it to him, wishing rather to put in danger all those who followed him than to make new indignation rise up in the people, since they knew how such a policy was on the point of being accepted and how difficult it would be to dissuade from it. Thus he went to meet Hannibal with a disordered and unseemly multitude, and no sooner did he reach the encounter than he was defeated and killed with all those who followed him.[10]

[4] In Greece, in the city of Athens, Nicias, a very grave and prudent man, was never able to persuade that people that it might not be good to go to assault Sicily; so when that decision was taken against the wish of the wise, the entire ruin of Athens followed from it.[11] When Scipio was made consul and desired the province of Africa, promising the entire ruin of Carthage—to which the Senate did not agree because of the judgment of Fabius Maximus—he threatened to propose it to the people, as one who knew very well how much such decisions please peoples.[12]

[5] Examples from our city could be given to this purpose: as it was when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio, governor of the Florentine troops, went together with Antonio Giacomini to camp at Pisa after they had defeated Bartolommeo d'Alviano at San Vincenzo. This enterprise was decided by the people on the mighty promises of Messer Ercole, even though many wise citizens blamed it; nonetheless, they did not have a remedy for it, as they were driven by the universal will that was founded upon the mighty promises of the governor.[13] I say, thus, that there is no easier way to make a republic where the people has authority come to ruin than to put it into mighty enterprises, for where the people is of any moment, they are always accepted; nor will there be any remedy for whoever is of another opinion. But if the ruin of the city arises from this, there arises also, and more often, the particular ruin of citizens who are posted to such enterprises, for since the people had presupposed victory, when loss comes it accuses neither fortune nor the impotence of whoever has governed but his malevolence and ignorance; and most often it kills or imprisons or confines him, as happened to infinite Carthaginian captains and to many Athenians. Nor does any victory that they have had in the past help them, because the present loss cancels everything, as happened to our Antonio Giacomini: not having captured Pisa as the people had presupposed for itself and he had promised, he came to such popular disgrace that notwithstanding his infinite past good works, he survived more by the humanity of those who had authority over him than by any other cause that would defend him among the people.

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How Much Authority a Grave Man May Have to Check an Excited Multitude

[1] The second notable point on the text cited in the above chapter is that nothing is so apt to check an excited multitude as is the reverence for some grave man of authority who puts himself against it. Nor does Virgil say without cause: “Then if they happen to look on some man grave with piety and merits, they are silent and stand by with open ears.”[1] Therefore he who is posted to an army or who finds himself in a city where tumult arises should represent himself before it with the greatest grace and as honorably as he can, putting around himself the ensigns of the rank he holds so as to make himself more reverend. A few years ago Florence was divided into two factions, Fratesca and Arrabbiata as they were called.[2] And coming to arms, the Frateschi were overcome, among whom was Pagolantonio Soderini, a very highly reputed citizen in those times. As the armed people in those tumults were going to him at his home to sack it, Messer Francesco, his brother, then bishop of Volterra and today cardinal, by fate found himself at home. Having heard the noise and seen the disturbance, he at once put on his most honorable clothes and over them the episcopal rochet, put himself against those who were armed, and with presence and with words stopped them. That affair was noted and celebrated through all the city for many days. I conclude, thus, that there is no more steady nor more necessary remedy for checking an excited multitude than the presence of one man who because of his presence appears and is reverend. Thus, to return to the text cited before, one sees with how much obstinacy the Roman plebs accepted the policy of going to Veii because it judged it useful; nor did it recognize the harm that was there underneath; and since very many tumults were arising from it, scandals would have arisen if the Senate with its grave men full of reverence had not checked their fury.[3]

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How Easily Things May Be Conducted in Those Cities in Which the Multitude Is Not Corrupt; and That Where There Is Equality, a Principality Cannot Be Made, and Where There Is Not, a Republic Cannot Be Made

[1] Though it has been very much discussed above[1] what is to be feared and hoped from corrupt cities, nonetheless it does not appear to me outside the purpose to consider a decision of the Senate regarding the vow that Camillus had made to give the tenth part of the booty of the Veientes to Apollo. Since that booty had come into the hands of the Roman plebs and they could not otherwise supervise the account of it, the Senate made an edict that each should present in public the tenth part of what he had taken as booty. Although that decision did not take place, since the Senate later took another mode, and by other ways satisfied Apollo to the satisfaction of the plebs,[2] nonetheless by such a decision one sees how much the Senate trusted in the goodness [of the plebs] and that it judged that no one would not present exactly all that had been commanded of him by such an edict. On the other side, one sees that the plebs thought not of defrauding the edict in any part by giving less than it owed, but of freeing itself from it by showing open indignation. This example, with many others that have been brought up above, shows how much goodness and how much religion were in that people, and how much good was to be hoped from it.

[2] And truly, where there is not this goodness, nothing good can be hoped for, as it cannot be hoped for in the provinces that in these times are seen to be corrupt, as is Italy above all others; and France and Spain also retain part of such corruption. If as many disorders as arise in Italy are not seen every day in those provinces, it derives not so much from the goodness of the

peoples, which is in good part lacking, as from having one king that maintains them united not only through his virtue but through the order of those kingdoms, which is not yet spoiled. In the province of Germany this goodness and this religion are still seen to be great in those peoples, which makes many republics there live free, and they observe their laws so that no one from outside or inside dares to seize them.[3] To show that it is true that a good part of that ancient goodness reigns in them, I wish to give an example such as that given above of the Senate and the Roman plebs. When it occurs to those republics that they need to spend some quantity of money for the public account, they are used to having those magistrates or councils that have authority for it assess on all the inhabitants of the city one percent or two of what each has of value. When such a decision has been made, each presents himself before the collectors of such a duty according to the order of the town; and having first taken an oath to pay the fitting amount, he throws into a chest so designated what according to his conscience it appears to him he ought to pay. Of this payment there is no witness except him who pays. Hence it can be conjectured how much goodness and how much religion are yet in those men. It should be reckoned that each pays the true amount, for if it were not paid, that impost would not bring in the quantity that they planned on according to the former ones that they had been accustomed to collect. When it was not brought in, the fraud would be recognized, and when recognized, another mode than this would have been taken. Such goodness is so much more to be admired in these times as it is rarer; indeed one sees it remaining only in that province.

[3] This arises from two things: one, not having had great intercourse[4] with neighbors, for neither have the latter gone to their home nor have they gone to someone else's home, because they have been content with those goods, to live by those foods, to dress with those woolens that the country provides. Hence the cause of every intercourse[5] and the beginning of every corruption has been taken away, for they have not been able to pick up either French or Spanish or Italian customs, which nations all together are the corruption of the world.[6] The other cause is that those republics in which a political and uncorrupt way of life is maintained do not endure that any citizen of theirs either be or live in the usage of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among themselves an even equality, and to the lords and gentlemen who are in that province they are very hostile. If by chance some fall into their hands, they kill them as the beginnings of corruption and the cause of every scandal.

[4] To clarify this name of gentlemen such as it may be, I say that those are called gentlemen who live idly in abundance from the returns of their possessions without having any care either for cultivation or for other necessary trouble in living. Such as these are pernicious in every republic and in every province, but more pernicious are those who, beyond the aforesaid fortunes, command from a castle and have subjects who obey them. Of these two species of men the kingdom of Naples, the town of Rome, the Romagna, and Lombardy are full. From this it arises that in these provinces no republic or political way of life has ever emerged, for such kinds of men are altogether hostile to every civilization. To wish to introduce a republic into provinces made in a like mode would not be possible; but if anyone were arbiter of them and wished to reorder them, there would be no other way than to make a kingdom there. The reason is this: that where there is so much corrupt matter that the laws are not enough to check it, together with them greater force is needed to give order there—a kingly hand that with absolute and excessive power puts a check on the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This reason is verified with the example of Tuscany, where one sees three republics—Florence, Siena, and Lucca—have long been in a small space of territory; and the other cities of that province are seen to be servile in such a mode that one sees that with spirit and with order they would maintain or would like to maintain their freedom. All has arisen because in that province there is no lord of a castle and no or very few gentlemen, but there is so much equality that a civil way of life would easily be introduced there by a prudent man having knowledge of the ancient civilizations. But its misfortune has been so great that up to these times it has not run into[7] any man who has been able or known how to do it.

[5] Thus this conclusion may be drawn from this discourse: that he who wishes to make a republic where there are very many gentlemen cannot do it unless he first eliminates all of them; and that he who is where there is very much equality and wishes to make a kingdom or a principality will never be able to make it unless he draws from that equality many of ambitious and unquiet spirit and makes them gentlemen in fact, and not in name, granting them castles and possessions and giving them favor in belongings and men.[8] So, placed in the midst of them, through them he maintains his power; and they, through him, maintain their ambition. The others are constrained to endure the yoke that force, and never anything else, can make them endure. Since there is proportion by this way from

whoever forces to whoever is forced, men stand firm, each in his orders. Because the making of a republic from a province suited to be a kingdom, and the making of a kingdom from one suited to be a republic, is matter for a man who is rare in brain and authority, there have been many who have wished to do it and few who have known how to conduct it. For the greatness of the thing partly terrifies men, partly impedes them so that they fail in the first beginnings.

[6] I believe that the experience of the Venetian republic, in which none can have any rank except those who are gentlemen, will appear contrary to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen a republic cannot be ordered. To which it may be replied that this example does not impugn it because in that republic they are gentlemen more in name than in fact. For they do not have great incomes from possessions, since their great riches are founded in trade and movable things; and besides, none of them holds a castle or has any jurisdiction over men. But that name of gentlemen among them is a name of dignity and reputation, without being founded upon any of those things that make them be called gentlemen in other cities. As the other republics have all their divisions under various names, so Venice is divided into the gentlemen and the people,[9] and they wish that the former have, or are able to have, all the honors; the others are altogether excluded from them. That does not produce disorder in that town for the reasons given another time.[10] Thus he constitutes a republic where a great equality exists or has been made, and on the contrary orders a principality where there is great inequality; otherwise he will produce a thing without proportion and hardly lasting.

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Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast Them, or Men Who Predict[1] Them

[1] Whence it arises I do not know, but one sees by ancient and by modern examples that no grave accident in a city or in a province ever comes unless it has been foretold either by diviners or by revelations or by prodigies or by other heavenly signs. So as not to go far from my home to prove this, everyone knows how much had been foretold by Friar Girolamo Savonarola before the coming of King Charles VIII of France into Italy,[2] and that, beyond this, it was said throughout Tuscany there were men-at-arms heard in the air and seen above Arezzo, who were fighting together.[3] Everyone knows, beyond this, that before the death of Lorenzo de' Medici the Elder, the cathedral was struck in its highest part by a heavenly dart, with very great destruction for that building.[4] Everyone knows too that soon before Piero Soderini, who had been made gonfalonier for life by the Florentine people, was expelled and deprived of his rank, the very palace itself was struck by a thunderbolt.[5] Beyond this, more examples could be brought up that to escape tedium I shall leave out. I shall narrate only what Titus Livy says before the coming of the French to Rome; that is, that one Marcus Cedicius, a plebeian, reported to the Senate that in the middle of the night as he was passing through the Via Nuova he had heard a voice greater than human that admonished him that he should report to the magistrates that the French were coming to Rome.[6] The cause of this I believe is to be discoursed of and interpreted by a man who has knowledge of things natural and supernatural, which we do not have. Yet it could be, as some philosopher would have it,[7] that since this air is full of intelligences that foresee future things by their natural virtues, and they have compassion for men, they warn them with like signs so that they can prepare themselves for defense. Yet however this may be, one sees it thus to be the truth, and that

always after such accidents extraordinary and new things supervene in provinces.

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The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself Weak

[1] When the ruin of their fatherland occurred because of the passage of the French, many Romans had gone to inhabit Veii against the institution and order of the Senate. So as to remedy their disorder, it commanded by its public edicts that everyone return to inhabit Rome by a certain time and under certain penalties. At first jokes were made of such edicts by those against whom they applied; then, when the time to obey drew near, all obeyed. Titus Livy says these words: “From being ferocious together, when isolated, each with his own fear, they became obedient.”[1] And truly, the nature of a multitude in this part cannot be shown better than is demonstrated in this text. For the multitude is often bold in speaking against the decisions of their prince; then, when they look the penalty in the face, not trusting one another, they run to obey. So one sees certainly that no great account should be taken of what a people says about its good or bad disposition if you are ordered so as to be able to maintain it if it is well disposed, and to provide that it should not hurt you if it is badly disposed. This is to be understood for those bad dispositions that peoples have, arising from some cause other than that either they have lost their freedom or their prince is loved by them and is still alive. For the bad dispositions that arise from these causes are formidable above everything and have need of great remedies to check them; [the people’s] other bad dispositions are easy if it does not have heads with whom to seek refuge. For on one side there is nothing more formidable than an unshackled multitude without a head, and, on the other side, there is nothing weaker; for even though it has arms in hand, it is easy to put it down provided that you have a stronghold that enables you to escape the first thrust. For when the spirits of men are cooled a little and each sees he has to return to his home, they begin to doubt themselves and to think of their safety, either by taking flight or by coming to accord. Therefore a multitude so excited, wishing to escape these dangers, has at once to make from among itself a head to correct it, to hold

it united, and to think about its defense, as did the Roman plebs when it left Rome after the death of Virginia and made twenty tribunes among them to save themselves.[2] If it does not do this, what Titus Livy says in the words written above always happens to them: that all together are mighty, and when each begins later to think of his own danger, he becomes cowardly and weak.

58

The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince

[1] That nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude so our Titus Livy, like all other historians, affirms.[1] For in narrating the actions of men, it often occurs that the multitude is seen to have condemned someone to death, and then has wept for the same and greatly desired him, as the Roman people is seen to have done for Manlius Capitolinus, whom it had condemned to death, then greatly desired. The words of the author are these: “After there was no danger from him, desire for him soon took hold of the people.”[2] Elsewhere, when he shows the incidents that arose in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero,[3] he says: “This is the nature of the multitude: either it serves humbly or it dominates proudly.”[4] I do not know if I shall take upon myself a hard task[5] full of so much difficulty that it may suit me either to abandon it with shame or continue it with disapproval, since I wish to defend a thing that, as I said, has been accused by all the writers. But however it may be, I do not judge nor shall I ever judge it to be a defect to defend any opinion with reasons, without wishing to use either authority or force for it.

[2] I say, thus, that all men particularly, and especially princes, can be accused of that defect of which the writers accuse the multitude; for everyone who is not regulated by laws would make the same errors as the unshackled multitude. This can easily be known, because there are and have been very many princes, and the good and wise among them have been few. I speak of princes who have been able to break the bridle that can correct them, among whom are not those kings who arose in Egypt when, in that most ancient antiquity, the province was governed with laws;[6] nor those who arose in Sparta; nor those who in our times arise in France, a kingdom that is moderated more by laws than any other kingdom of which knowledge is had in our times. These kings who arose under such constitutions are not to be put in that number of which the nature of every

man by himself has to be considered to see if he is like the multitude. For one should put in the comparison a multitude regulated by laws as they are; and the same goodness that we see to be in them will be found to be in it, and it will be seen neither to dominate proudly nor to serve humbly—as was the Roman people, which never served humbly nor dominated proudly while the republic lasted uncorrupt; indeed, with its orders and magistrates, it held its rank honorably. When it was necessary to move against someone powerful, it did so, as may be seen in Manlius, in the Ten, and in others who sought to crush it; and when it was necessary to obey the dictators and the consuls for the public safety, it did so. If the Roman people desired Manlius Capitolinus after he was dead, it is no marvel; for it desired his virtues, which had been such that the memory of them brought compassion to everyone. They would have had force to produce the same effect in a prince, because it is the verdict of all the writers that virtue is praised and admired also in one's enemies; and if Manlius had been resuscitated among so much desire, the people of Rome would have given the same judgment on him as it did when it condemned him to death soon after it had dragged him from prison.[7] Notwithstanding that, some princes may be seen who, held to be wise, have had some person killed and then very highly desired him, as Alexander did Clitus[8] and other friends of his and Herod did Marianne.[9] But what our historian says of the nature of the multitude he does not say of that which is regulated by laws, as was the Roman, but of the unshackled, as was the Syracusan, which made those errors that infuriated and unshackled men make, as Alexander the Great and Herod made in the given cases. Therefore the nature of the multitude is no more to be faulted than that of princes, because all err equally when all can err without respect. Beyond what I have said, there are very many examples of this, both among the Roman emperors and among the other tyrants and princes, where so much inconstancy and so much variation of life are seen as may ever be found in any multitude.

[3] I conclude, thus, against the common opinion that says that peoples, when they are princes, are varying, mutable, and ungrateful, as I affirm that these sins are not otherwise in them than in particular princes. Someone accusing peoples and princes together might be able to say the truth, but in excepting princes, he would be deceived; for a people that commands and is well ordered will be stable, prudent, and grateful no otherwise than a prince, or better than a prince, even one esteemed wise. On the other side, a prince unshackled from the laws will be more ungrateful, varying, and imprudent

than a people. The variation in their proceeding arises not from a diverse nature—because it is in one mode in all, and if there is advantage of good, it is in the people—but from having more or less respect for the laws within which both live. Whoever considers the Roman people will see it to have been hostile for four hundred years to the kingly name and a lover of the glory and common good of its fatherland; he will see so many examples of it that testify to both one thing and the other. If anyone cites to me the ingratitude that it used against Scipio, I answer with what was discoursed on this matter above at length,[10] where it was shown that peoples are less ungrateful than princes. But as to prudence and stability, I say that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince. Not without cause may the voice of a people be likened to that of God; for one sees a universal opinion produce marvelous effects in its forecasts, so that it appears to foresee its ill and its good by a hidden virtue. As to judging things, if a people hears two orators who incline to different sides, when they are of equal virtue, very few times does one see it not take up the better opinion, and not persuaded of the truth that it hears. If it errs in mighty things or those that appear useful, as is said above,[11] often a prince errs too in his own passions, which are many more than those of peoples. It is also seen in its choices of magistrates to make a better choice by far than a prince; nor will a people ever be persuaded that it is good to put up for dignities an infamous man of corrupt customs—of which a prince is persuaded easily and by a thousand ways. A people is seen to begin to hold a thing in horror and to stay with that opinion for many centuries, which is not seen in a prince. Of both these two things I wish the Roman people by its testimony to suffice for me; in so many hundreds of years, in so many choices of consuls and tribunes, it did not make four choices of which it might have to repent. As I said, it held the kingly name so much in hatred that no obligation to any of its citizens who might try for that name could enable him to escape the proper penalties. Beyond this, one sees that cities in which peoples are princes make exceeding increases in a very brief time, and much greater than those that have always been made under a prince, as did Rome after the expulsion of the kings and Athens after it was freed from Pisistratus. That cannot arise from anything other than that governments of peoples are better than those of princes. Nor do I wish my opinion to be opposed by all that our historian says of it in the text cited before and in any other whatever; for if all the disorders of peoples are reviewed,[12] all the disorders of princes, all the glories of peoples, and all those of princes, the

people will be seen to be by far superior in goodness and in glory. If princes are superior to peoples in ordering laws, forming civil lives, and ordering new statutes and orders, peoples are so much superior in maintaining things ordered that without doubt they attain the glory of those who order them.

[4] In sum, to conclude this matter, I say that the states of princes have lasted very long, the states of republics have lasted very long, and both have had need of being regulated by the laws. For a prince who can do what he wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it wishes is not wise. If, thus, one is reasoning about a prince obligated to the laws and about a people fettered by them, more virtue will always be seen in the people than in the prince; if one reasons about both as unshackled, fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies. For a licentious and tumultuous people can be spoken to by a good man, and it can easily be returned to the good way; there is no one who can speak to a wicked prince, nor is there any remedy other than steel. From that can be made a conjecture of the importance of the illness of the one and the other: that if to cure the illness of the people words are enough, and for the prince's steel is needed, there will never be anyone who will not judge that where a greater cure is needed there are greater errors. When a people is quite unshackled, the craziness it does is not feared, nor is present evil feared, but what can arise from it, since in the midst of such confusion a tyrant can arise. But with wicked princes the contrary happens: the present evil is feared and the future is hoped for, since men persuade themselves that his wicked life can make freedom emerge. So you[13] see the difference between the one and the other, which is as much as between things that are and things that have to be. The cruelties of the multitude are against whoever they fear will seize the common good; those of a prince are against whoever he fears will seize his own good. But the opinion against peoples arises because everyone speaks ill of peoples without fear and freely, even while they reign; princes are always spoken of with a thousand fears and a thousand hesitations. Nor does it appear to me outside the purpose, since this matter draws it from me, to dispute in the following chapter about which confederations can be trusted more: those made with a republic or those made with a prince.

59

Which Confederation or Other League Can Be More Trusted, That Made with a Republic or That Made with a Prince

[1] Because it occurs every day that one prince makes a league and a friendship together with another, or one republic with another, and similarly too confederation and accord are contracted between a republic and a prince, it appears to me to be examined which faith is more stable, and of which more account should be taken: that of a republic or that of a prince. Examining everything, I believe that in many cases they are similar, and in some there is some lack of conformity. I believe, therefore, that accords made with you by force will not be observed either by a prince or by a republic; I believe that if fear for the state comes, both will break faith with you so as not to lose it, and will practice ingratitude to you. Demetrius, who was called the capturer of cities, had conferred infinite benefits on the Athenians; then it occurred that after he was defeated by his enemies and was taking refuge in Athens as in a friendly city obligated to him, he was not received by it, which grieved him very much more than the loss of his troops and army had done.[1] Pompey, defeated as he was by Caesar in Thessaly, took refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy, who in the past had been put back in his kingdom by him; and he was killed by him.[2] Such things are seen to have had the same cause; nonetheless, more humanity was used and less injury done by the republic than by the prince. Where there is fear, therefore, will be found the same faith in fact. If either a republic or a prince will be found that expects to be ruined so as to observe faith with you, this too can arise from similar causes. As to the prince, it can very well occur that he is friendly with a powerful prince who he can hope with time may restore him in his principality, if indeed he does not have opportunity then to defend him; or truly that, having followed him as a partisan, he does not believe he will find either faith or accord with that one's enemy. Those princes of the realm of Naples who have followed the French party[3] have

had this fate.[4] As to republics, Saguntum in Spain, which expected ruin for having followed the Roman party, had this fate;[5] and so did Florence, for having followed the French party in 1512.[6] When everything has been computed, I believe that in cases in which there is urgent danger, some stability will be found more in republics than in princes. For although republics have the same intent and the same wish as a prince, their slow motion will make them always have more trouble in resolving than the prince, and because of this have more trouble in breaking faith than he. Confederations are broken for utility. In this, republics are by far more observant of accords than are princes. Examples could be brought up in which the least utility[7] has made a prince break faith and a great utility has not made a republic break faith. Such was the policy that Themistocles proposed to the Athenians, to whom he said in the assembly that he had a counsel that would be of great utility to their fatherland, but he could not tell it because he could not disclose it, for by disclosing it the opportunity to act upon it would be taken away. Hence the people of Athens chose Aristides, to whom the affair might be communicated, and then it would decide about it according as it appeared to him. Themistocles showed him that the fleet[8] of all Greece, though it remained under their faith, was in a spot where it could easily be gained or destroyed, which would make the Athenians wholly arbiters of that province. Hence Aristides reported to the people that the policy of Themistocles was very useful but very dishonest, for which the people wholly refused it.[9] Philip the Macedonian would not have done that nor the other princes who have sought and gained more utility[10] by breaking faith than with any other mode. I do not speak of breaking pacts for some cause of nonobservance, an ordinary thing; but I do speak of those that are broken for extraordinary causes, in which I believe, because of the things said, the people makes lesser errors than the prince, and because of this can be trusted more than the prince.

60

That the Consulate and Any Other Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was Given without Respect to Age

[1] One sees through the order of the history that after the consulate came to the plebs, the Roman republic conceded it to its citizens without respect to age or to blood, and even that respect to age was never in Rome; but it always went out to find virtue, whether it was in the young or in the old. That is seen through the testimony of Valerius Corvinus, who was made consul at twenty-three years;[1] and the said Valerius, speaking to his soldiers, said that the consulate was "the reward of virtue, not of blood."[2] Whether that thing was well considered or not would be very much to be disputed. As to blood, this was conceded through necessity; and the necessity that was in Rome would be in every city that wished to produce the effects that Rome produced, as has been said another time;[3] for men cannot be given trouble without a reward, nor can the hope of attaining the reward be taken away from them without danger. Therefore it was fitting at an early hour that the plebs have hope of gaining the consulate, and it was fed a bit with this hope without having it; then the hope was not enough, and it was fitting that it come to the effect. But the city that does not put its plebs to work in any glorious affair can treat it in its own mode, as is disputed elsewhere;[4] the one that wishes to do what Rome did does not have to make this distinction. Given that it is thus, there is no reply to that [lack of respect] for time. It is even necessary, for in choosing a youth for a rank that has need of the prudence of the old, it must be that some very notable action makes him reach that rank, since the multitude has to choose him for it. When a youth is of so much virtue that he makes himself known in some notable thing, it would be a very harmful thing for the city not to be able to avail itself of him then, and for it to have to wait until that vigor of spirit and that readiness grow old with him, which his fatherland could have

availed itself of at that age, as Rome availed itself of Valerius Corvinus, Scipio,[5] Pompey,[6] and many others who triumphed very young.

SECOND BOOK

Preface

[1] Men always praise ancient times—but not always reasonably—and accuse the present; they are partisans of past things in such a mode that they celebrate not only those ages known to them through the memory that writers have left of them, but also those that once they are old they remember having seen in their youth. When this opinion of theirs is false, as it most often is, I am persuaded that the causes that lead them to this deception are various. The first I believe to be that the truth of ancient things is not altogether understood and that most often the things that would bring infamy to those times are concealed and others that could bring forth their glory are rendered magnificent and very expansive. For most writers obey the fortune of the victors, so that, to make their victories glorious, they not only increase what has been virtuously worked by them but also render illustrious the actions of their enemies. They do it so that whoever is born later in whichever of the two provinces, the victorious or the defeated, has cause to marvel at those men and those times and is forced to praise and love them most highly. Besides this, as men hate things either from fear or from envy, two very powerful causes of hatred come to be eliminated in past things since they cannot offend you and do not give you cause to envy them. But the contrary happens with those things that are managed and seen. Since the entire knowledge of them is not in any part concealed from you, and, together with the good, you know many other things in them that displease you, you are forced to judge them much inferior to ancient things, even though the present may in truth deserve much more glory and fame than they. I am not reasoning about things pertaining to the arts, which have so much clarity in themselves that the times can take away or give them little more glory than they may deserve in themselves, but am speaking of those pertaining to the life and customs of men, of which such clear testimonies are not seen.

[2] I reply, therefore, that the custom written about above of praising and blaming is true, but it is not at all always true that to do so is to err. For it is necessary that they sometimes judge the truth, for since human things are always in motion, either they ascend or they descend. A city or a province is seen to be ordered for the political way of life by some excellent man and to go on for a time, always increasing toward the best by the virtue of that orderer. He who is born then, in such a state, and praises ancient times

more than modern deceives himself; and his deception is caused by the things that were said above. But they who are born later in that city or province, when the time has come for it to descend toward the worse side, do not deceive themselves then. And, in thinking about how these things proceed, I judge the world always to have been in the same mode and there to have been as much good as wicked in it. But the wicked and the good vary from province to province, as is seen by one who has knowledge of those ancient kingdoms, which varied from one to another because of the variation of customs, though the world remained the same. There was this difference only: that where it had first placed its virtue in Assyria, it put it in Media, then in Persia, until it came to be in Italy and Rome.[1] And if no empire followed after the Roman Empire that might have endured and in which the world might have kept its virtue together, it is seen nonetheless to be scattered in many nations where they lived virtuously, such as was the kingdom of the Franks, the kingdom of the Turks, that of the sultan, and the peoples of Germany today—and that Saracen sect earlier, which did so many great things and seized so much of the world after it destroyed the eastern Roman Empire. The virtue that is desired and is praised with true praise has thus been in all these provinces after the Romans were ruined, and in all these sects, and still is in some part of them. And one who is born there and praises past times more than the present could be deceived. But whoever is born in Italy and in Greece and has not become either an ultramontane[2] in Italy or a Turk in Greece has reason to blame his times and to praise the others, for in the latter there are very many things that make them marvelous and in the former there is nothing that recompenses them for every extreme misery, infamy, and reproach—there is no observance of religion, of laws, and of the military but they are stained with every type of filth.[3] And these vices are so much more detestable as they are in those who sit as tribunals, command everyone, and wish to be adored.

[3] But returning to our reasoning, I say that if the judgment of men is corrupt in judging which is better—the present epoch or the ancient—in those things of which, because of their antiquity, it could not have perfect knowledge as it has of its own times, it should not be corrupted among the old in judging the times of their youth and old age, since they have known and seen the former and the latter equally. This would be true if men were of the same judgment and had the same appetites through all the times of their life; but since these vary even if the times do not vary, they cannot appear the same to men, who have other appetites, other delights, and other

considerations in old age than in youth. Since men when they get old lack force and grow in judgment and prudence, it is necessary that those things that appear to them endurable and good during youth turn out unendurable and bad when they get old; and whereas for this they should accuse their judgment, they accuse the times. Besides this, human appetites are insatiable, for since from nature they have the ability and the wish to desire all things and from fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there continually results from this a discontent in human minds and a disgust with the things they possess. This makes them blame the present times, praise the past, and desire the future, even if they are not moved to do this by any reasonable cause. I do not know thus if I deserve to be numbered among those who deceive themselves, if in these discourses of mine I praise too much the times of the ancient Romans and blame ours. And truly, if the virtue that then used to reign and the vice that now reigns were not clearer than the sun, I would go on speaking with more restraint, fearing falling into this deception of which I accuse some. But since the thing is so manifest that everyone sees it, I will be spirited in saying manifestly that which I may understand of the former and of the latter times, so that the spirits of youths who may read these writings of mine can flee the latter and prepare themselves to imitate the former at whatever time fortune may give them opportunity for it. For it is the duty of a good man to teach others the good that you could not work because of the malignity of the times and of fortune, so that when many are capable of it, someone of them more loved by heaven may be able to work it. And having spoken in the discourses of the book above of decisions made by the Romans pertaining to the inside of the city, in this [book] we will speak of those that the Roman people made pertaining to the increase of its empire.

1

Which Was More the Cause of the Empire the Romans Acquired, Virtue or Fortune

[1] Many have had the opinion—and among them Plutarch, a very grave writer—that the Roman people in acquiring the empire was favored more by fortune than by virtue. Among the other reasons he brings up for it, he says that the confession of that people demonstrates that it acknowledged all its victories came from fortune, since it built more temples to Fortune than to any other god.[1] And Livy seems to come close to this opinion, for it is rare that he makes any Roman speak where he tells of virtue and does not add fortune to it. I do not wish to confess this thing in any mode, nor do I believe even that it can be sustained. For if there has never been a republic that has made the profits that Rome did, this arose from there never having been a republic that has been ordered so as to be able to acquire as did Rome. For the armies' virtue made them acquire the empire; and the order of proceeding and its own mode found by its first lawgiver[2] made them maintain what was acquired, as will be narrated extensively below in several discourses. They say that never having two very powerful wars combined at the same time was the fortune and not the virtue of the Roman people.[3] For they did not have war with the Latins until they had so beaten the Samnites that that war was made by the Romans in defense of them;[4] they did not combat the Tuscans before they had subjugated the Latins and almost entirely worn out the Samnites with frequent defeats.[5] For, if two of these powers, when they were fresh, had been combined together intact, one can easily conjecture without doubt that the ruin of the Roman republic would have followed from it.[6] But however this thing arose, it never happened that they had two very powerful wars at the same time; rather it always appeared either that when one arose the other was eliminated or that when one was eliminated the other arose. This can easily be seen from the order of the wars made by them: for, leaving aside those that they made before Rome was taken by the French, never while they combated the Aequi and the Volsci and while these peoples were powerful were other races seen to rise

up against them.[7] When they were subdued, war arose against the Samnites;[8] and although the Latin people rebelled against the Romans before that war finished, nonetheless when that rebellion occurred the Samnites were in league with Rome and with their armies helped the Romans to subdue Latin insolence.[9] When these were subdued, the war of Samnium rose again.[10] When because of the many defeats given to the Samnites their forces were beaten, the war of the Tuscans arose. When that was settled, the Samnites rose up anew during the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.[11] As soon as he was repelled and sent back into Greece, they started the first war with the Carthaginians.[12] Not before that war was finished did all the French, both on that and on this side of the Alps, conspire against the Romans, until between Popolonia and Pisa, where the tower of San Vincenzo is today, they were overcome with the greatest slaughter.[13] When this war was finished,[14] for a space of twenty years they had wars of not much importance, for they did not combat others besides the Ligurians and the remnant of the French that was in Lombardy.[15] And thus they stayed until the second Carthaginian war arose, which kept Italy occupied for sixteen years.[16] When this was finished with the greatest glory, the Macedonian War arose; when this was finished, there came that of Antiochus and of Asia.[17] After that victory, in all the world there remained neither prince nor republic that by itself or together with all could oppose the Roman forces.

[2] But before that last victory, whoever considers well the order of these wars and the mode of their proceeding will see inside them a very great virtue and prudence mixed with fortune. Therefore, whoever may examine the cause of such fortune will easily recover it. For it is a very certain thing that as soon as a prince and a people come into so much reputation that every neighboring prince and people is afraid for itself to assault it, and fears it, it always happens that none of them will ever assault it if not necessitated to do so. So it will be almost in the choice of that power to make war with whichever of its neighbors it likes, and to quiet the others with its devices. And, partly out of respect for its power, partly deceived by those modes that it used to put them to sleep, those are easily quieted. Those other powers that are distant and do not have business with it care for the thing as a distant affair that does not belong to them. They stay in that error until this fire comes near them; when it has come, they have no remedy to eliminate it unless with their own forces, which then are not

enough, since it has become very powerful. I wish to omit how the Samnites stood by to see the Volsci and the Aequi be conquered by the Roman people; and, not to be too prolix, I will make do with the Carthaginians, who were of great power and great estimation when the Romans combated the Samnites and the Tuscans. For they already held all Africa, they held Sardinia and Sicily, and they had dominion in part of Spain. Their power, together with the distance between their borders and the Roman people, made them never think of assaulting the latter or of succoring the Samnites and the Tuscans; instead they acted rather in their favor, as is done with things that grow, linking up with them and seeking their friendship. Nor did they perceive the error they made before the Romans, having subdued all the peoples between them and the Carthaginians, began to combat them over the empire of Sicily and of Spain. The same happened with the French as with the Carthaginians, and thus with Philip, king of the Macedonians,[18] and with Antiochus; and while the Roman people was occupied with the other, each of them believed that the other would overcome it and there would be time to defend itself from it either by peace or by war. So, I believe that all those princes who proceeded as did the Romans and were of the same virtue as they would have the fortune that the Romans had in this aspect.

[3] The mode taken by the Roman people in entering into the provinces of others would have to be shown for this purpose if we had not spoken of it at length in our treatise of principalities,[19] for in it this matter is disputed thoroughly. I will say only this, lightly, that in new provinces they always tried to have some friend who should be a step or a gate to ascend there or enter there, or a means to hold it. So they were seen to enter by means of the Capuans into Samnium,[20] of the Camertines into Tuscany,[21] of the Mamertines into Sicily,[22] of the Saguntines into Spain,[23] of Massinissa into Africa,[24] of the Aetolians into Greece,[25] of Eumenes[26] and other princes into Asia, and of the Massilians and the Aedui into France.[27] And thus they never lacked similar supports to make their enterprises easier, both in acquiring provinces and in holding them. Those peoples who observe this will see they have less need of fortune than those who are not good observers of it. And so that everyone can know better how much more virtue could do than their fortune in acquiring that empire, in the following chapter we shall discourse about the quality of those peoples they had to combat, and how obstinate they were in defending their freedom.

2

What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat, and That They Obstinately Defended Their Freedom

[1] Nothing made it more laborious for the Romans to overcome the peoples nearby and parts of the distant provinces than the love that many peoples in those times had for freedom; they defended it so obstinately that they would never have been subjugated if not by an excessive virtue. For what dangers they put themselves in to maintain or recover it and what revenges they took against those who had seized it are known through many examples. The harms that peoples and cities receive through servitude are also known from reading histories. And whereas in these times there is only one province that can be said to have free cities in it,[1] in ancient times there were very many very free peoples in all provinces. One sees that in Italy, in those times of which we speak at present, from the mountains[2] that now divide Tuscany from Lombardy to the point of Italy,[3] all were free peoples, such as were the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and many other peoples who inhabited the rest of Italy. Nor is it ever reported[4] that there was any king there outside of those who reigned in Rome and Porsenna, king of Tuscany.[5] How his line was extinguished history does not tell. But one sees quite well that in those times, when the Romans took the field at Veii, Tuscany was free and enjoyed its freedom so much and hated the name of prince so much that when the Veientes, having made a king in Veii for their defense, and asked for aid from the Tuscans against the Romans, they decided after many consultations not to give aid to the Veientes so long as they lived under the king. For they judged it not to be good to defend the fatherland of those who had already submitted to another.[6] It is an easy thing to know whence arises among peoples this affection for the free way of life, for it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom. And truly it is a marvelous thing to consider how much

greatness Athens arrived at in the space of a hundred years after it was freed from the tyranny of Pisistratus.[7] But above all it is very marvelous to consider how much greatness Rome arrived at after it was freed from its kings.[8] The reason is easy to understand, for it is not the particular good but the common good that makes cities great. And without doubt this common good is not observed if not in republics, since all that is for that purpose is executed, and although it may turn out to harm this or that private individual, those for whom the aforesaid does good are so many that they can go ahead with it against the disposition of the few crushed by it. The contrary happens when there is a prince, in which case what suits him usually offends the city and what suits the city offends him. In this mode, as soon as a tyranny arises after a free way of life, the least evil that results for those cities is not to go ahead further nor to grow more in power or riches, but usually—or rather always—it happens that they go backward. And if fate should make emerge there a virtuous tyrant, who by spirit and by virtue of arms expands his dominion, the result is of no utility to that republic, but is his own. For he cannot honor any of the citizens he tyrannizes over who are able and good since he does not wish to have to have suspicion of them. He also cannot make the cities he acquires submit or pay tribute to the city of which he is tyrant, for making it powerful does not suit him. But it does suit him to keep the state disunited and have each town and each province acknowledge him. So he alone, and not his fatherland, profits from his acquisitions. Whoever wishes to confirm this opinion with infinite other reasons should read the treatise Xenophon makes *Of Tyranny*.[9] It is thus not marvelous that the ancient peoples persecuted tyrants with so much hatred and loved the free way of life, and that the name of freedom was so much esteemed by them. Thus it happened that when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero the Syracusan, was killed in Syracuse and the news of his death came to his army, which was not very far from Syracuse, it began first to raise a tumult and take up arms against his slayers; but when it heard that freedom was being cried out in Syracuse, being attracted by that name, it became entirely quiet, put down its anger against the tyrannicides, and took thought of how a free way of life could be ordered in that city.[10] It is also not marvelous that peoples take extraordinary revenges against those who have seized their freedom. There have been very many examples of that, of which I intend to refer to one alone that occurred in Corcyra, a city in Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian War.[11] Since that province was divided into two parties, of which one followed the Athenians and the other

the Spartans, it arose from this, in many cities that were divided among themselves, that one party took up friendship with Sparta, the other with Athens. When it occurred in the said city that the nobles prevailed and took freedom away from the people, the popular [party] regained their strength by means of the Athenians, laid hands on all the nobility and shut them up in a prison capable of holding them all. They drew them out of there eight or ten at a turn under pretense of sending them into exile in diverse places and had them killed with many examples of cruelty. When those who remained became aware of this, they decided to escape this ignominious death as much as was possible for them. Having armed themselves with whatever they could, they engaged in combat with those who wished to enter there and defended the entrance of the prison. So that, at this noise, the people made a crowd, uncovered the upper part of that place, and suffocated them with the ruins. Many other similarly horrible and notable cases also occurred in the said province, so that one sees it to be true that freedom that is taken away from you is avenged with greater vehemence than that which is wished to be taken away.

[2] Thinking then whence it can arise that in those ancient times peoples were more lovers of freedom than in these, I believe it arises from the same cause that makes men less strong now, which I believe is the difference between our education and the ancient, founded on the difference between our religion and the ancient. For our religion, having shown the truth and the true way,[12] makes us esteem less the honor of the world, whereas the Gentiles, esteeming it very much and having placed the highest good in it, were more ferocious in their actions. This can be inferred from many of their institutions, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices as against the humility of ours, where there is some pomp more delicate than magnificent but no ferocious or vigorous action. Neither pomp nor magnificence of ceremony was lacking there, but the action of the sacrifice, full of blood and ferocity, was added, with a multitude of animals being killed there. This sight, being terrible, rendered men similar to itself. Besides this, the ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of worldly glory, as were captains of armies and princes of republics. Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative more than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable of making men very strong. And if our religion asks that you have strength in yourself, it wishes you to be capable more of

suffering than of doing something strong. This mode of life thus seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them. And although the world appears to be made effeminate and heaven disarmed, it arises without doubt more from the cowardice of the men who have interpreted our religion according to idleness and not according to virtue. For if they considered how it permits us the exaltation and defense of the fatherland, they would see that it wishes us to love and honor it and to prepare ourselves to be such that we can defend it. These educations and false interpretations thus bring it about that not as many republics are seen in the world as were seen in antiquity; nor, as a consequence, is as much love of freedom seen in peoples as was then. Still, I believe the cause of this to be rather that the Roman Empire, with its arms and its greatness, eliminated all republics and all civil ways of life. And although that empire was dissolved, the cities still have not been able to put themselves back together or reorder themselves for civil life except in very few places of that empire. However that may be, in every least part of the world the Romans found a conspiracy of republics very armed and very obstinate in defense of their freedom. This shows that without a rare and extreme virtue the Roman people would never have been able to overcome them.

[3] To give an example of some part of this, I wish the example of the Samnites to be enough for me. It seems a wonderful thing—and Titus Livy confesses it—that they were so powerful and their arms so sound that they could resist the Romans up to the time of the consul Papirius Cursor, son of the first Papirius (which was a space of forty-six years),[13] after so many defeats, ruinings of towns, and so many slaughters received in their country, especially when that country, where there were so many cities and so many men, is now seen to be almost uninhabited. So much order and so much force were there then that it was impossible to overcome were it not assaulted by a Roman virtue. It is an easy thing to consider whence that order arose and whence this disorder proceeds; for it all comes from the free way of life then and the servile way of life now. For all towns and provinces that live freely in every part (as was said above)[14] make very great profits. For larger peoples are seen there, because marriages are freer and more desirable to men since each willingly procreates those children he believes he can nourish. He does not fear that his patrimony will be taken away, and he knows not only that they are born free and not slaves, but that

they can, through their virtue, become princes. Riches are seen to multiply there in larger number, both those that come from agriculture and those that come from the arts. For each willingly multiplies that thing and seeks to acquire those goods he believes he can enjoy once acquired. From which it arises that men in rivalry think of private and public advantages, and both the one and the other come to grow marvelously.

[4] The contrary of all these things occurs in those countries that live servilely; and the more they decline from the accustomed good, the harder is their servitude. And of all hard servitudes, that is hardest that submits you to a republic. First, because it is more lasting and there can be less hope to escape from it; second, because the end of the republic is to enervate and to weaken all other bodies so as to increase its own body. A prince who makes you submit does not do this, if that prince is not some barbarian prince, a destroyer of countries and waster of all the civilizations of men, such as are the oriental princes. But if he has within himself human and ordinary orders, he usually loves his subject cities equally and leaves them all their arts and almost all their ancient orders. So if they cannot grow like the free, still they are not ruined like the slaves (understanding the servitude into which the cities come as serving a foreigner, for I have spoken above of that to a citizen of their own).[15] Whoever will thus consider all that was said will not marvel at the power the Samnites had when they were free and at the weakness into which they came when they were serving [others]. Titus Livy vouches[16] for this in several places, especially in the war of Hannibal, in which he shows that when the Samnites were crushed by a legion of men who were in Nola, they sent spokesmen to Hannibal to beg[17] him to succor them. They said in their speech that for a hundred years they had combated the Romans with their own soldiers and their own captains, and many times had stood up against two consular armies and two consuls, and that then they had sunk so low that they could hardly defend themselves against one small Roman legion that was in Nola.[18]

3

Rome Became a Great City through Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Easily Admitting Foreigners to Its Honors

[1] Meanwhile Rome grew from the ruin of Alba."[1] Those who plan for a city to make a great empire should contrive with all industry to make it full of inhabitants, for without this abundance of men one will never succeed in making a city great. This is done in two modes: by love and by force. By love through keeping the ways open and secure for foreigners who plan to come to inhabit it so that everyone may inhabit it willingly; by force through undoing the neighboring cities and sending their inhabitants to inhabit your city. This was observed by Rome so much that in the time of the sixth king[2] eighty thousand men able to bear arms inhabited Rome. For the Romans wished to act according to the usage of the good cultivator who, for a plant to thicken and be able to produce and mature its fruits, cuts off the first branches it puts forth, so that they can with time arise there greener and more fruitful, since the virtue remains in the stem of the plant. The example of Sparta and of Athens demonstrates that this mode taken to expand and make an empire was necessary and good. Though they were two republics very armed and ordered with very good laws, nonetheless they were not led to the greatness of the Roman Empire; and Rome seemed more tumultuous and not so well ordered as they. No other cause of this can be brought up than that cited before: that through having thickened the body of its city by those two ways, Rome could already put in arms two hundred eighty thousand[3] men, and Sparta and Athens never passed beyond twenty thousand each. This arose not from Rome's site's being more benign than theirs, but only from its different mode of proceeding. For since Lycurgus, founder of the Spartan republic, considered that nothing could dissolve his laws more easily than the mixture of new inhabitants, he did everything so that foreigners should not have to deal[4] there. Besides not admitting them into marriages, into citizenship, and into the other dealings[5]

that make men come together, he ordered that leather money should be spent in his republic to take away from everyone the desire to come there, to bring merchandise there, or to bring some art there, so the city never could thicken with inhabitants.[6] And since all our actions imitate nature, it is neither possible nor natural for a thin trunk to support a thick branch. So a small republic cannot seize cities or kingdoms that are sounder or thicker than it. If, however, it seizes one, what happens is as with a tree that has a branch thicker than the stem: it supports it with labor, and every small wind breaks it. Thus it was seen to happen to Sparta, which had seized all the cities of Greece. No sooner did Thebes rebel than all the other cities rebelled, and the trunk alone remained without branches.[7] This could not happen to Rome since its stem was so thick it could easily support any branch whatever. Thus this mode of proceeding, together with the others that will be said below, made Rome great and very powerful. Titus Livy demonstrates this in two words when he says, “Meanwhile Rome grew from the ruin of Alba.”[8]

4

Republics Have Taken Three Modes of Expanding

[1] Whoever has observed the ancient histories finds that republics have taken three modes of expanding. One has been that which the ancient Tuscans observed, being a league of several republics together, in which none was before another in either authority or rank; in acquiring other cities they made them partners, in a like mode to what the Swiss do in this time and what the Achaeans and the Aetolians did in Greece in ancient times. Since the Romans made war with the Tuscans very often, I will expatiate in giving knowledge of them particularly to show better the qualities of this first mode. In Italy, before the Roman Empire, the Tuscans were very powerful by sea and by land.[1] Although there is no particular history of their affairs, there is, however, some little memory and some sign of their greatness. It is known that they sent a colony, which they called Adria, on the upper sea, which was so noble that it gave the name to that sea the Latins still call Adriatic. It is also understood that their arms were obeyed from the Tiber as far as the foot of the mountains[2] that encircle the thick part of Italy. Notwithstanding this, two hundred years before the Romans grew into much strength, the said Tuscans lost the empire of the country called Lombardy today. That province was seized by the French, who, moved either by necessity or by the sweetness of the fruit and especially of the wine, came into Italy under their duke Bellovesus. Having defeated and expelled those living in the province, they set themselves up in that place, where they built many cities. From the name they held then, they called that province Gaul and held it until they were subdued by the Romans. The Tuscans lived thus with that equality and proceeded in expanding in that first mode said above. There were twelve cities—among which were Chiusi, Veii, Arezzo, Fiesole, Volterra, and the like—that governed their empire by way of a league.[3] They could not go beyond Italy with their acquisitions, and even a great part of [Italy] remained intact for the causes that will be said below. Another mode is to get partners but not

so much that the rank of command, the seat of empire, and the title of the enterprises do not remain with you, which mode was observed by the Romans. The third mode is to get not partners but direct subjects, as did the Spartans and the Athenians. Of these three modes, the last is entirely useless, as was seen in the two republics written about above, which were not ruined otherwise than by having acquired dominion they could not keep. For taking care of governing cities by violence, especially those accustomed to living freely, is a difficult and laborious thing. If you are not armed and massive with arms, you can neither command nor rule them. To be like that it is necessary to get partners who aid you and make your city massive with people. Since these two cities did neither the one nor the other, their mode of proceeding was useless. Since Rome, which is in the example of the second mode, did the one and the other, it therefore rose to such excessive power. Since it was alone in living thus, it was also alone in becoming so powerful. For it got many partners throughout all Italy who in many things lived with it under equal laws, and, on the other side, as was said above, it always reserved for itself the seat of empire and the title of command. So its partners came to subjugate themselves by their own labors and blood without perceiving it. For they began to go out of Italy with their armies, to reduce kingdoms to provinces, and to get subjects who did not care about being subjects since they were accustomed to living under kings and who did not acknowledge a superior other than Rome since they had Roman governors and had been conquered by armies with the Roman title. In this mode the partners of Rome who were in Italy found themselves in a stroke encircled by Roman subjects and crushed by a very big city, such as Rome was. And when they perceived the deception under which they had lived, they were not in time to remedy it, so much authority had Rome taken with its external provinces and so much force had it found within its breast since it had its city very big and very armed. Although its partners conspired against it to avenge their injuries, in a little time they were losers of the war and worsened their condition, since from partners they too became subjects. This mode of proceeding, as was said, has been observed by the Romans alone; nor can a republic that wishes to expand take another mode, for experience has not shown us any more certain or more true.

[2] The previously cited mode of leagues (which the Tuscans, the Achaeans, and the Aetolians lived in, and the Swiss live in today) is the best mode after that of the Romans. Since you cannot expand very much with it, two goods follow: one, that you do not easily take a war on your back; the other, that

you easily keep as much as you take. The cause of its inability to expand is its being a republic that is disunited and placed in various seats, which enables them to consult and decide only with difficulty. It also makes them not be desirous of dominating; for since there are many communities to participate in dominion, they do not esteem such acquisition as much as one republic alone that hopes to enjoy it entirely. Besides this, they govern themselves through a council, and they must be slower in every decision than those who inhabit within one and the same wall.[4] The like mode of proceeding is also seen by experience to have a fixed limit, of which we have no example that shows it may be passed. It is to reach twelve or fourteen communities and then not to seek to go further. For having arrived at a rank that seems to enable them to defend themselves from everyone, they do not seek larger dominion, both because necessity does not constrain them to have more power and because they do not see any usefulness in acquisitions, for the causes said above. For they would have to do one of two things: either they go on getting partners, and this multitude would make for confusion; or they would have to get subjects, and since they see difficulty in this and not much usefulness in holding them, they do not esteem it. Therefore, when they have come to such a number that they seem to live securely, they turn to two things. One is to receive clients and take protectorates, and by these means to obtain money from every part, which they can easily distribute among themselves. The other is to serve in the military for others and take pay from this and that prince who pays them for his campaigns, as the Swiss are seen to do today and as those cited before are read to have done. Titus Livy is a witness of this where he says that Philip, king of Macedon, came to talk with Titus Quintius Flaminius and discussed[5] an accord in the presence of a praetor of the Aetolians. When the said praetor came to have words with him, Philip reproved him for avarice and faithlessness, saying that the Aetolians were not ashamed to serve in the military with one and then still send their men in the service of the enemy, so that the insignia of Aetolia were often seen in two opposed armies.[6] This mode of proceeding by leagues is known therefore to have always been similar and to have had similar effects. The mode of getting subjects is also seen to have always been weak and to have made small profits; and when they have somehow passed beyond the mode, they have soon been ruined. And if the mode of making subjects is useless in armed republics, it is very useless in those that are unarmed, as the republics of Italy have been in our times. That which the Romans took is known

therefore to be the true mode, which is so much more wonderful inasmuch as before Rome there is no example of it, and after Rome there was no one who imitated it. As to leagues, only the Swiss and the League of Swabia are found to imitate them. As will be said at the end of this matter, so many orders observed by Rome, pertaining to the things inside as well as to those outside, are not only not imitated but not held of any account in our present times, since some are judged not true, some impossible, some not to the purpose and useless. So much so that, since we are in this ignorance, we are prey to whoever has wished to overrun this province. And if the imitation of the Romans seems difficult, that of the ancient Tuscans should not seem so, especially to the present Tuscans. For if they could not, for the causes said, make an empire like that of Rome, they could acquire the power in Italy that their mode of proceeding conceded them. This was secure for a great time, with the highest glory of empire and of arms and special praise for customs and religion. This power and glory were first diminished by the French, then eliminated by the Romans; and were eliminated so much that although two thousand years ago the power of the Tuscans was great, at present there is almost no memory of it. This thing has made me think whence arises this oblivion of things, which will be discoursed of in the following chapter.

5

That the Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things

[1] To those philosophers who would have it that the world is eternal,[1] I believe that one could reply that if so much antiquity were true it would be reasonable that there be memory of more than five thousand years—if it were not seen how the memories of times are eliminated by diverse causes, of which part come from men, part from heaven.[2] Those that come from men are the variations of sects and of languages. For when a new sect—that is, a new religion—emerges, its first concern is to extinguish the old to give itself reputation; and when it occurs that the orderers of the new sect are of a different language, they easily eliminate it. This thing is known from considering the modes that the Christian sect took against the Gentile. It suppressed all its orders and all its ceremonies and eliminated every memory of that ancient theology. It is true that they did not succeed in eliminating entirely the knowledge of the things done by its excellent men. This arose from having maintained the Latin language, which they were forced to do since they had to write this new law with it. For if they had been able to write with a new language, considering the other persecutions they made, we would not have any record of things past. Whoever reads of the modes taken by Saint Gregory[3] and by the other heads of the Christian religion will see with how much obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memories, burning the works of the poets and the historians, ruining images, and spoiling every other thing that might convey some sign of antiquity. So if they had added a new language to this persecution, in a very brief time everything would be seen to be forgotten. It is therefore to be believed that what the Christian sect wished to do against the Gentile sect, the Gentile would have done against that which was prior to it.[4] And because these sects vary two or three times in five or in six thousand years, the memory of the things done prior to that time is lost; and if, however,

some sign of them remains, it is considered as something fabulous and is not lent faith to—as happened to the history of Diodorus Siculus, which, though it renders an account of forty or fifty thousand years, is nonetheless reputed, as I believe it to be, a mendacious thing.

[2] As to the causes that come from heaven, they are those that eliminate the human race[5] and reduce the inhabitants of part of the world to a few. This comes about either through plague or through famine or through an inundation of waters.[6] The most important is the last, both because it is more universal and because those who are saved are all mountain men and coarse, who, since they do not have knowledge of antiquity, cannot leave it to posterity. And if among them someone is saved who has knowledge of it, to make a reputation and a name for himself he conceals it and perverts it in his mode so that what he has wished to write alone, and nothing else, remains for his successors. That these inundations, plagues, and famines come about I do not believe is to be doubted, because all the histories are full of them, because this effect of the oblivion of things is seen, and because it seems reasonable that it should be so. For as in simple bodies, when very much superfluous matter has gathered together there, nature many times moves by itself and produces a purge that is the health of that body, so it happens in this mixed body of the human race[7] that when all provinces are filled with inhabitants (so that they can neither live there nor go elsewhere since all places are occupied and filled) and human astuteness and malignity have gone as far as they can go, the world must of necessity be purged by one of the three modes, so that men, through having become few and beaten, may live more advantageously and become better. Tuscany was then, as was said above,[8] once powerful, full of religion and of virtue, and had its customs and ancestral language, all of which were eliminated by Roman power. So, as was said, the memory of its name alone remains of it.

6

How the Romans Proceeded in Making War

[1] Having discoursed of how the Romans proceeded in expanding, we shall now discourse of how they proceeded in making war. In every action of theirs it will be seen with how much prudence they deviated from the universal mode of others so as to make easy for themselves the way to arrive at a supreme greatness. The intention of whoever makes war through choice —or, in truth, ambition—is to acquire and maintain the acquisition, and to proceed with it so that it enriches and does not impoverish the country and his fatherland. It is necessary, then, in acquiring and in maintaining not to think of spending but instead to do everything for the utility of his public. Whoever wishes to do all these things must take the Roman style and mode. This was first to make their wars, as the French say, short and massive; since they came into the field with big armies, all the wars they had with the Latins, Samnites, and Tuscans were dispatched in a very brief time. And if all those that they made from the beginning of Rome up to the siege of the Veientes are noted, all will be seen to have been dispatched, some in six, some in ten, some in twenty days.[1] For their usage was this: as soon as the war was declared,[2] they came outside with their armies opposite the enemy and at once did battle. Once it was won, the enemy agreed to conditions so that their countryside would not be quite spoiled. The Romans condemned them to a loss of land, which land they converted to private advantage or consigned to a colony that, placed on their frontiers, came to be a guard of the Roman borders useful to the colonists who had those fields and useful to the Roman public, who kept that guard without expense.[3] Nor could this mode be more secure, stronger, or more useful. For while the enemies were not in the field, that guard was enough; and if they came outside massively to crush that colony, the Romans also came outside massively and came to a battle with them. When the battle was done and won, having imposed heavier conditions on them, they returned home. Thus they gradually[4] came to acquire reputation over them and force within themselves.

[2] They continued to take this mode until they changed their mode of proceeding in war. This was after the siege of the Veientes, when to be able to make war at length they ordered the paying of the soldiers, whom they did not pay before since it was not necessary when the wars were brief.[5] Although the Romans gave that pay and by virtue of this could make their wars longer, and although necessity kept them more in the field because they made them at a greater distance, nonetheless they never varied from their first order of finishing them quickly, according to the place and the time, nor did they ever vary from sending colonies. For besides their natural usage, the ambition of the consuls kept them in the first order, that of making wars brief. Since they had a term of a year to serve, and of that year six months were in quarters, they wished to finish the war so as to have a triumph. Its usefulness and the great advantage resulting from the sending of colonies kept them to it. They varied somewhat about the booty. They were not as liberal with it as they had been at first, both because it did not seem to them so necessary since the soldiers had a salary and because they planned once the booty was larger to fatten the public with it so that they would not be constrained to carry on campaigns with taxes from the city. In a little time this order made their treasury very rich. These two modes—about distributing the booty and about sending colonies—thus made Rome get rich from war, whereas the other princes and republics, not being wise, impoverished themselves from it. The thing reached the limit when a consul did not appear able to have a triumph if with his triumph he did not bring very much gold and silver and every other sort of booty into the treasury. Thus the Romans, through the limits written above and through finishing wars quickly—being able to wear out their enemies at length through defeats, through raids, and through accords made to their own advantage—became ever richer and more powerful.

7

How Much Land the Romans Gave per Colonist

[1] How much land the Romans gave per colonist is, I believe, difficult to find the truth about since I believe they gave more or less of it according to the places where they sent colonies. It is judged that in every mode and in every place the distribution was sparing: first so as to be able to send more men, since they were deputed as the guard of that country; then, since they lived poorly at home, it was not reasonable that they should wish their men to have too much of an abundance outside. And Titus Livy says that when Veii was taken they sent a colony there and distributed to each three and seven-twelfths *jugera* (which is in our mode . . .);[1] for besides the things written above, they judged that not very much land but that which was well cultivated was enough.[2] It is quite necessary that the whole colony should have public fields where each can feed his cattle, and forests from which to take firewood to burn, things without which a colony cannot be ordered.

8

The Cause Why Peoples Leave Their Ancestral Places and Inundate the Country of Others

[1] Since the mode of proceeding in war observed by the Romans is reasoned about above, as is how the Tuscans were assaulted by the French,[1] it does not seem to me alien to the matter to discourse of two kinds of wars that are made. One is made through the ambition of princes or of republics who seek to propagate empire, such as were the wars Alexander the Great made and those the Romans made, and those that one power makes with another every day. These wars are dangerous, but they do not entirely expel the inhabitants of a province; for the obedience of the peoples alone is enough for the victor, and he most often lets them live with their laws, and always with their homes and their goods. The other kind of war is when an entire people, with all its families, removes from a place, necessitated by either famine or war, and goes to seek a new seat and a new province, not to command it like those above but to possess it all individually,[2] and expel or kill the ancient inhabitants of it. This war is very cruel and very frightful. Sallust reasons about these wars at the end of the *Jugurthine*, when he says that once Jugurtha was conquered the motion of the French who came into Italy was felt.[3] He says there that the Roman people combated all other races solely over who would command, but they combated the French always over the salvation of everyone. For it is enough to a prince or a republic that assaults a province to eliminate only those who command, but these populations must eliminate everyone, since they wish to live on what others were living on. The Romans had three of these very dangerous wars. The first was when Rome was taken; it was seized by those French who had, as was said above,[4] taken Lombardy from the Tuscans and made it their seat, for which Titus Livy cites two causes.[5] The first, as was said above,[6] was that they were attracted by the sweetness of the fruit and the wine of Italy, which they lacked in France. The second was that since the French

kingdom had multiplied in men so much that they could no longer nourish themselves there, the princes of those places judged that it was necessary for a part of them to go to seek new land. This decision being made, they elected Bellovesus and Sigovesus, two kings of the French, as captains of those who had to leave; Bellovesus came into Italy and Sigovesus passed into Spain. From the coming of Bellovesus arose the seizure of Lombardy, and from that the first war the French made on Rome. After this was that which they made after the first Carthaginian war, when they killed more than two hundred thousand French between Piombino and Pisa.[7] The third was when the Germans and Cimbri came into Italy; after conquering several Roman armies, they were conquered by Marius.[8] The Romans thus won these three very dangerous wars. Nor was less virtue necessary to win them; for it was seen that when Roman virtue was lacking and their arms lost their ancient valor, that empire was destroyed by similar peoples, such as were the Goths, the Vandals, and the like, who seized the whole Western Empire.

[2] Such peoples go out of their countries, as was said above, expelled by necessity; the necessity arises either from famine or from a war and oppression inflicted on them in their own countries such that they are constrained to seek new lands. When they are a great number, then they enter with violence into the countries of others, kill the inhabitants, take possession of their goods, make a new kingdom, and change the province's name, as did Moses and the peoples who seized the Roman Empire. For the new names that are in Italy and in the other provinces do not arise from anything other than having been thus named by the new occupants: as what was called Gallia Cisalpina is Lombardy; France was called Gallia Transalpina and now is named after the Franks, as the peoples who seized it were thus called; Slavonia was called Illyria; Hungary Pannonia; England Britannia; and many other provinces that have changed names, which it would be tedious to tell of. Moses also called that part of Syria seized by him Judea. And since I have said above that sometimes such peoples are expelled from their own seat by war, wherefore they are constrained to seek new lands, I wish to bring up the example of the Maurusians, a people in Syria in antiquity. Since they heard the Hebrew peoples were coming and judged that they could not resist them, they thought it was better to save themselves and leave their own country than to lose themselves also in trying to save it. They removed with their families and went from there into Africa, where they placed their seat, expelling the inhabitants they found in those places. Thus those who had not been able to defend their own country

were able to seize that of others. Procopius, who writes of the war that Belisarius made with the Vandals, who had seized Africa, reports that he read letters written on certain columns in places these Maurusians inhabited that said: “We are Maurusians, who fled before the face of Joshua the robber son of Nun”;[9] whence appears the cause of their departure from Syria. These peoples therefore are very frightful, since they have been expelled by an ultimate necessity; and if they do not encounter good arms, they will never be contained.

[3] But when those who are constrained to abandon their fatherland are not many, they are not so dangerous as the peoples who were reasoned about, for they cannot use so much violence but must seize some place with art, and having seized it maintain themselves there by way of friends and confederates. Aeneas, Dido, the Massilians, and the like are seen to have done so, all of whom were able to maintain themselves through the consent of the neighbors where they settled.

[4] Large peoples come out, and almost all have come out, from the country of Scythia, cold and poor places. Because there are very many men there and the country is of a quality that cannot nourish them, they are forced to come out of there, having many things that expel them and nothing that retains them. And if it has not happened for five hundred years that any of these peoples has inundated any country, it has arisen from many causes. The first is the great evacuation that country made during the decline of the empire, when more than thirty peoples came out. The second is that Germany and Hungary, from which these peoples also come out, have now improved their country so that they can live there comfortably so that they are not necessitated to change their place. On the other side, since they are very warlike men, they are like a bastion to hold back the Scythians, who border them; so they do not presume they can conquer them or pass by them. Very great movements of the Tartars often occur, which are contained by the Hungarians and by those of Poland, who often glorify themselves, saying that if it were not for their arms, Italy and the church would have often felt the weight of the Tartar armies. I wish this to be enough as to the previously mentioned peoples.

9

What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise among Powers

[1] The cause that made war arise between the Romans and the Samnites, who had been in league for a great time, is a common cause that arises among all powerful principalities. That cause either comes about by chance or is made to arise by whoever desires to start the war. That which arose between the Romans and the Samnites was by chance; for the intention of the Samnites in starting war against the Sidicini and then against the Campanians was not to start it against the Romans.[1] But when the Campanians were crushed and had recourse to the Romans—contrary to the expectation of the Romans and of the Samnites—since the Campanians gave themselves to the Romans, they were forced to defend them as a thing of their own and to take on a war that it seemed to them they could not escape with honor. For it seemed quite reasonable to the Romans that they could not defend the Campanians as friends against their friends the Samnites; but it seemed to them quite a shame not to defend them as subjects or truly as clients. For they judged that if they did not take on such a defense it would shut the way to all those who might plan to come under their power. Since Rome had as its end empire and glory and not quiet, it could not reject this enterprise. The same cause gave a beginning to the first war against the Carthaginians through the defense the Romans undertook of the Messinians in Sicily, which was also by chance.[2] But it was not again by chance that the second war arose between them. For Hannibal, a Carthaginian captain, assaulted the Saguntines, friends of the Romans in Spain, not to offend them but to start up the Roman arms and have an opportunity to combat them and pass into Italy.[3] This mode of setting off new wars has always been customary among the powerful, who have some respect both for faith and for each other. For if I wish to make war with a prince and solid treaties have been observed between us for a great time, I will with more justification and more color assault a friend of his than himself. For I know especially that if I assault his friend, either he will

resent it and I will have my intention of making war with him, or by not resenting it he will uncover his weakness or faithlessness in not defending a client of his. Both the one and the other of these two things are able to take away his reputation and to make my plans easier. From the surrender of the Campanians should thus be noted what is said above about starting a war, and further what remedy a city has that cannot defend itself by itself and wishes to defend itself by every mode from one who assaults it. That is to give yourself freely to one who you plan should defend you, as the Capuans did to the Romans[4] and the Florentines to King Robert of Naples—who, not wishing to defend them as friends, then defended them as subjects against the forces of Castruccio of Lucca, who was crushing them.[5]

10

Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is according to the Common Opinion

[1] Since everyone can begin a war at will but not finish it thus, a prince should measure his forces before he undertakes a campaign and govern himself according to them. But he should have so much prudence that he does not deceive himself about his forces; he will always deceive himself if he measures them by money or by the site or by the benevolence of men while he lacks his own arms on the other side. For the aforesaid things increase your forces well, but do not give them to you well, and by themselves are null and do not help anything without faithful arms. For without these, very much money is not enough for you, nor does the strength of the country help you; the faith and benevolence of men do not last, for they cannot be faithful to you if you cannot defend them. Where strong defenders are lacking, every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible place becomes a plain. Money also not only does not defend you but makes you into prey the sooner. Nor can the common opinion be more false that says that money is the sinew of war.[1] This sentence was said by Quintus Curtius in the war that was between Antipater the Macedonian and the Spartan king, where he narrates that the king of Sparta was necessitated by want of money to fight and was defeated, and that if he had deferred the fight for a few days, the news of the death of Alexander would have arrived in Greece, whereby he would have remained victor without combat.[2] But since he lacked money and feared that for want of it his army would abandon him, he was constrained to try the fortune of battle. So from this cause Quintus Curtius affirms that money is the sinew of war. This sentence is cited every day and is followed by princes who are not prudent enough. For having founded themselves on that, they believe that to defend themselves it is enough to have very much treasure and do not think that if treasure were enough to conquer, then Darius would have conquered Alexander, the Greeks would have conquered the Romans, in our times Duke Charles would have conquered the Swiss, and a few days ago the pope

and the Florentines together would not have had difficulty in conquering Francesco Maria, the nephew of Pope Julius II, in the war of Urbino.[3] But all those named above were conquered by those who esteem not money but good soldiers to be the sinew of war. Among the other things that Croesus, king of the Lydians, showed to Solon the Athenian was an innumerable treasure; when he asked how his power seemed to him, Solon replied to him that he did not judge him more powerful for that, since war is made with steel and not with gold, and one who had more steel than he did could come and take it away.[4] Aside from this, when a multitude of French passed into Greece and then into Asia after the death of Alexander the Great, and the French sent spokesmen to the king of Macedon to negotiate a solid accord, the king showed them very much gold and silver to show his power and to terrify them. Whereupon the French, who already held the peace as if it were firm, broke it, so much had desire grown in them to take away that gold; and thus was that king despoiled for that thing he had accumulated for his defense.[5] When the Venetians a few years ago had their treasury still full of treasure, since they could not be defended by that, they lost all their state.[6]

[2] I say therefore that not gold, as the common opinion cries out, but good soldiers are the sinew of war; for gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite sufficient to find gold. For if the Romans had wished to make war more with money than with steel, all the treasure of the world would not have been enough, considering the great campaigns that they waged and the difficulties they had in them. But since they made their wars with steel, they never suffered a dearth of gold, for it was brought to them, even to their camps, by those who feared them. And if that Spartan king had to try the fortune of battle from dearth of money, what happened to him on account of money has happened often from other causes. For it is seen that when an army lacks supplies and is necessitated either to die of hunger or to fight, it always takes up the policy of fighting, for that is more honorable and is where fortune can favor you in some mode. It has also happened often that when a captain has seen help coming to the army of his enemy, it has suited him to fight with them, and to try the fortune of battle, rather than to wait for them to grow more massive and have to combat them anyway with a thousand disadvantages for himself. It is also seen that a captain necessitated either to flee or to engage in combat (as happened to Hasdrubal when he was assaulted in the Marches by Claudius Nero together with the other Roman consul)[7] always chooses combat, since although this

policy is very doubtful, it seems to him that he can win by it, and by the other he has to lose anyway. There are thus many necessities that make a captain take the policy of fighting outside of his intention, among which can sometimes be a dearth of money; but money should not be judged the sinew of war because of this any more than the other things that induce men to a like necessity. Thus I repeat anew that not gold but good soldiers are the sinew of war.

[3] Money is quite necessary in second place, but it is a necessity that good soldiers win it by themselves; for it is as impossible for money to be lacking to good soldiers as for money by itself to find good soldiers. Every history shows in a thousand places that what we are saying is true, notwithstanding that Pericles counseled the Athenians to make war with all the Peloponnesus, showing that they could win that war with industry and with the force of money.[8] And although the Athenians prospered in that war for a while, they ultimately lost it; and the counsel and good soldiers of Sparta were worth more than the industry and the money of Athens. But Titus Livy is a truer witness than any other for this opinion, where, in discoursing of whether Alexander the Great would have conquered the Romans if he had come into Italy, he shows that three things are necessary in war: very many and good soldiers, prudent captains, and good fortune. Examining there whether the Romans or Alexander would have prevailed in those things, he then comes to his conclusion without ever mentioning money.[9] The Capuans must have measured their power by money and not by soldiers when they were asked by the Sidicini to take up arms for them against the Samnites; for having taken up the policy of aiding them, they were constrained after two defeats to make themselves tributaries of the Romans if they wished to save themselves.[10]

11

It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a Friendship with a Prince Who Has More Reputation Than Force

[1] Since Titus Livy wished to show the error of the Sidicini in trusting in the aid of the Campanians, and the error of the Campanians in believing they could defend them, he could not speak in more lively words than when he says, “The Campanians brought to the aid of the Sidicini a name rather than strength for defense.”[1] It ought to be noted there that leagues that are made with princes who do not have either the occasion for aiding you because of the distance of their site, or the force to do it because of his[2] own disorder or some other cause of his own, bring more fame than aid to those who trust in them. So it happened in our day to the Florentines, when in 1479 the pope and the king of Naples assaulted them, that while being friends of the king of France they drew from that friendship[3] “a name rather than defense.”[4] So it would happen also to that prince who undertakes some enterprise trusting in Emperor Maximilian,[5] for this is one of those friendships that brings to him who makes it “a name rather than defense,” as is said in this text that of the Capuans brought to the Sidicini.

[2] The Capuans thus erred in this part, because they seemed to themselves to have more forces than they had. And thus sometimes the little prudence of men, who neither know how nor are able to defend themselves, makes them wish to undertake the enterprise of defending others. So also did the Tarentines, who, when the Roman armies went against the Samnite army, sent ambassadors to the Roman consul to make him understand that they wished for peace between these two peoples, and that they would make war against whichever departed from peace. So the consul, laughing at this proposal, had the call to battle sounded in the presence of said ambassadors and commanded his army to go to meet[6] the enemy, showing the Tarentines with work and not with words what reply they were worthy of.[7] Having

reasoned in the present chapter of the policies to the contrary that princes take up for the defense of others, I wish in the following to speak of those that they take up for their own defense.

12

Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It Is Better to Bring On or Await War

[1] I have heard it sometimes disputed by men very practiced in things of war: if there are two princes of almost equal forces and the mightier has declared war against the other, which is the better policy for the other—to await the enemy inside his own borders or to go to meet him at home and assault him; and I have heard reasons brought up on each side. He who defends going to assault others cites for this the counsel that Croesus gave to Cyrus when the latter arrived at the borders of the Massageti to make war against them, and their queen Tamyris sent to say that he should choose which of the two policies he wanted: either to enter into her kingdom where she awaited him or to let her come to meet him. When the thing came under debate, Croesus, contrary to the opinion of the others, said he should go to meet her. He cited [the consideration] that if he should conquer her at a distance from her kingdom he would not take away the kingdom, since she would have time to recover; but if he should conquer her inside her borders, he could follow her in her flight, not giving her space to recover, and take away her state.[1] He also cites for this the counsel that Hannibal gave to Antiochus, when that king planned to make war against the Romans. There he shows that the Romans could not be conquered except in Italy, for there others could avail themselves of their arms, riches, and friends; but whoever combated them outside Italy, and left Italy free for them, left them a source that never lacks life to supply forces where needed; and he concludes that Rome could be taken away from the Romans sooner than the empire, and Italy sooner than the other provinces.[2] He also cites Agathocles, who, though unable to sustain the war at home, assaulted the Carthaginians who were waging it against him and reduced them to asking for peace.[3] He cites Scipio, who assaulted Africa to remove the war from Italy.[4]

[2] He who speaks to the contrary says that whoever wishes to make evil befall an enemy gets him at a distance from home. He cites for this the

Athenians, who remained superior while they made war advantageously in their home and lost their freedom when they got at a distance and went with their armies into Sicily.[5] He cites the poetic fables that show that Antaeus, king of Libya, when assaulted by Hercules the Egyptian, was unconquerable while he awaited him inside the borders of his kingdom, but when he got at a distance from it through the astuteness of Hercules, he lost his state and his life. This gave rise to the fable that Antaeus, being on the earth, got back his strength from his mother who was the Earth and that Hercules, perceiving this, raised him high and got him at a distance from the earth.[6] He also cites modern judgments for this. Everyone knows that Ferdinand, king of Naples, was held in his times to be a very wise prince; when the rumor came (two years before his death) that the king of France, Charles VIII, wished to come to assault him, having made very many preparations, he fell sick and, approaching death, left among other notes to Alfonso his son one that he should await his enemy inside his kingdom, and not for anything in the world draw his forces outside his state, but await him inside his borders entirely intact.[7] This was not observed by the latter; but he sent an army into the Romagna and without combat lost it and his state.

[3] Besides the things said, the reasons that are brought up by each side are: that he who assaults comes with greater spirit than he who awaits, which makes his army more confident; besides this, he takes away from the enemy the many advantages of being able to avail himself of his things, since he cannot avail himself of those subjects who are plundered. And through having the enemy at home, the lord is constrained to have more hesitation in drawing money from them and belaboring them, so that he comes to dry up that source, as Hannibal said, that makes him able to sustain the war. Besides this, because they find themselves in another's country, his soldiers are more necessitated to engage in combat, and this necessity produces virtue, as we have often said. On the other side it is said that to await the enemy is to await with great advantage, for without any trouble you can give him many troubles with supplies and with any other thing an army has need of. You can better impede his plans because you have more knowledge of the country than he. You can encounter him with more forces because you can unite them easily but you cannot get them all at a distance from home. Being defeated, you can easily recover, both because much of your army will be saved through having refuges nearby and because the reinforcement does not have to come from a distance. So you come to risk all your forces and not all your fortune; getting at a distance, you risk all

your fortune and not all your forces. There have been some who, better to weaken his[8] enemy, let him enter several days into their country and take many towns, so that by leaving garrisons in all he weakens his army, and they can then combat him more easily.

[4] But for me to say now what I understand[9] of it, I believe that this distinction has to be made either I have my country armed, as the Romans had or as the Swiss have, or I have it unarmed, as the Carthaginians had or as the king of France and the Italians have. In the latter case the enemy ought to be held at a distance from home; for, since your virtue is in money and not in men, whenever your way of getting it is impeded you are done for;[10] nor does anything impede it for you as much as a war at home. Examples of this are the Carthaginians, who could make war with the Romans with their revenues when they had their home free, yet could not resist Agathocles when they had it assaulted. The Florentines did not have any remedy against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, for he made war with them at home, so that they had to give themselves to King Robert of Naples to be defended.[11] But when Castruccio was dead, these same Florentines had the spirit to assault the duke of Milan at home and to work[12] to take away his kingdom;[13] so much virtue did they show in faraway wars and so much cowardice in those nearby. But when kingdoms are armed, as Rome was armed and as the Swiss are, they are more difficult to conquer the more you draw near them, for these bodies can unite more force to resist a thrust than they can to assault another. Nor does the authority of Hannibal move me in this case, for passion and his utility made him speak thus to Antiochus. For if the Romans had had those three defeats in France in such a space of time that they had in Italy from Hannibal,[14] without doubt they would have been done for. For they would not have availed themselves of the remnants of their armies as they availed themselves in Italy; they would not have had the occasions to recover, nor would they have been able to resist the enemy with those forces they were able to. They are never found to have sent armies outside surpassing fifty thousand persons to assault a province, but to defend their home they put in arms eighteen hundred thousand against the French after the First Punic War.[15] Nor would they have been able to defeat the latter in Lombardy as they defeated them in Tuscany; for against such a number of enemies they would not have been able to lead such forces to such a distance or to have combated them with such advantage. The Cimbri defeated a Roman army in Germany, and the Romans had no remedy there.

But when they arrived in Italy, and they were able to put all their forces together, they did them in.[16] It is easy to conquer the Swiss outside their home, where they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men, but to conquer them at home, where they can gather a hundred thousand, is very difficult. I thus conclude anew that a prince who has his people armed and ordered for war should always await a powerful and dangerous war at home, and not go to encounter it. But he who has his subjects unarmed and his country unaccustomed to war should always get as much at a distance from home as he can. And so both the one and the other, each in his rank, will defend himself best.

13

That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More through Fraud Than through Force

[1] I esteem it to be a very true thing that it rarely or never happens that men of small fortune come to great ranks without force and without fraud, although the rank that another has attained may be given or left by inheritance to them. Nor do I believe that force alone is ever found to be enough, but fraud alone will be found to be quite enough; as he will clearly see who will read the life of Philip of Macedon,[1] that of Agathocles the Sicilian,[2] and those of many others like them who from obscure or base fortune attained a kingdom or very great empires. Xenophon in his life of Cyrus shows this necessity to deceive, considering that the first expedition that he has Cyrus make against the king of Armenia is full of fraud, and that he makes him seize his kingdom through deception and not through force. And he does not conclude otherwise from this action than that it is necessary for a prince who wishes to do great things to learn to deceive. Besides this, he makes him deceive Cyaxares, king of the Medes, his maternal uncle, in several modes; without which fraud he shows that Cyrus could not have attained that greatness he came to.[3] Nor do I believe that anyone placed in base fortune is ever found to attain great empire through open force alone and ingenuously, but it is done quite well through fraud alone, as Giovan Galeazzo did in taking away the state and empire of Lombardy from his uncle, Messer Bernabo.[4]

[2] What princes are necessitated to do at the beginnings of their increase, republics also are necessitated to do until they have become powerful and force alone is enough. And since by fate or by choice Rome on every side held to all the modes necessary to come to greatness, it did not fail in this either. Nor could it use a greater deception in the beginning than taking the mode (discoursed of by us above)[5] of making partners, for under this name it made them servile, as were the Latins and other peoples round about. For

first it availed itself of their arms in subduing the neighboring peoples and taking the reputation of the state; then, having subdued them, it achieved so much increase that it could beat everyone. The Latins never perceived that they were altogether servile until they saw the Samnites given two defeats and constrained to an accord. As this victory greatly increased the reputation of the Romans with far-off princes who by means of it heard[6] the Roman name and not their arms, it thus generated envy and suspicion in those who saw and heard their arms, among whom were the Latins.[7] This envy and this fear were able to do so much that not the Latins alone but the colonies they had in Latium, together with the Campanians, who had been defended a little before, conspired against the Roman name. The Latins started this war in the mode in which it is said above the greater part of wars are started,[8] not by assaulting the Romans but by defending the Sidicini against the Samnites, who were making war on them with license from the Romans. That it is true that the Latins started it because they recognized this deception Titus Livy demonstrates in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin praetor, who in their council said these words: “For if even now under the shadow of an equal league we can endure servitude, etc.”[9] The Romans therefore are seen in their first increases not to be lacking even in fraud, which it is always necessary for those who wish to climb from small beginnings to sublime ranks to use and which is less worthy of reproach the more it is covert, as was that of the Romans.

14

Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing That through Humility They Will Conquer Pride

[1] It is often seen how humility not only does not help but hurts, especially used with insolent men who, either by envy or by another cause, have conceived hatred for you. Our historian vouches[1] for this in this cause of war between the Romans and the Latins. For when the Samnites complained to the Romans that the Latins had assaulted them, the Romans did not wish to forbid such a war to the Latins, desiring not to anger them. This not only did not anger them, but made them become more spirited against them and uncover themselves as enemies sooner.[2] The words used by the aforementioned Annius the Latin praetor in the same council vouch for this, where he says, "You have tried their patience by denying them soldiers; who doubts that they were enraged? Yet they endured this pain. They heard that we are preparing an army against the Samnites, their confederates, and they have not moved from the city. Whence this so great restraint of theirs, if not from consciousness of our strength and theirs?"[3] How much the patience of the Romans increased the arrogance of the Latins is therefore very clearly known from this text. And yet a prince should never wish to fall short of his rank and should never let anything go by accord, wishing to let it go honorably, except when he can—and it is believed that he can—hold onto it. For when the thing is brought to such a point that you cannot let it go in the said mode, it is almost always better to let it be taken away through force than through fear of force. For if you let it go through fear, you do it to avoid war, and most often you do not avoid it. For he to whom you will have conceded this and uncovered your cowardice will not stand still but will wish to take other things away from you and will get more inflamed against you since he esteems you less. In the other party you will find colder defenders in your favor, since it seems to them that you are weak or cowardly. But if, when the wish of the adversary

is uncovered, you prepare forces at once, although they may be inferior to his, he will begin to esteem you, and since the other princes round about will esteem you more, the wish to aid you when you are under arms will come to him who would never aid you when you abandon yourself. This is understood when you have one enemy, but when you have more of them, to give some of the things you possess to one of them to win him over, although war may be already declared,[4] and to detach him from your other confederated enemies is always a prudent policy.

15

Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in Their Resolutions; and Slow Decisions Are Always Hurtful

[1] In this same matter, and in these same beginnings of war between the Latins and the Romans, it can be noted how in every consultation it is good to get to the particular[1] of what has to be decided, and not to stay always in ambiguity or uncertainty about the thing. This is seen manifestly in the consultation the Latins held when they were thinking of alienating themselves from the Romans. Since the Romans had foreseen this bad humor that had entered into the Latin peoples, so as to make certain of the affair and see if they could win those peoples over without putting their hands to arms, they gave them to understand that they should send eight citizens to Rome, for they had to consult with them.[2] Having understood this, and being conscious[3] of having done many things against the wish of the Romans, the Latins held a council to order who should go to Rome and to give them a commission as to what they had to say. And while Annius, their praetor, was in the council during this dispute, he said these words: "I judge it to belong to the highest of our affairs for you to consider more what we ought to do than what is to be said. Once the counsels are made clear, it will be easy to accommodate words to things."[4] Without doubt these words are very true and should be relished by every prince and by every republic. For when they are in ambiguity and uncertainty as to what they wish to do, they do not know how to accommodate their words; but once their spirit is firm and what is to be executed is decided, it is an easy thing to find the words. I have noted this part the more willingly inasmuch as I have often known such ambiguity to have hurt public actions, with harm and with shame for our republic. It will be verified that among doubtful policies, where spirit is needed to decide them, this ambiguity will always be there when weak men have to give counsel about and decide them. Slow and tardy decisions are not less hurtful than ambiguous ones, especially those

that have to be decided in favor of some friend; for with their slowness one aids no one and hurts oneself. Decisions made thus proceed either from weakness of spirit and of force or from the malignity of those who have to decide, who, moved by their own passion to wish to ruin the state or to fulfill some other desire of theirs, do not let the decision be carried out but impede it and cross it. For even when they see popular fervor taking a pernicious part, the good citizens never impede the decision, especially in things that cannot wait on time.

[2] When Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, was dead, and there was a great war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, the Syracusans came to dispute whether they should follow the Roman friendship or the Carthaginian.[5] The ardor of the parties was such that the thing remained ambiguous, nor was any policy taken up until Apollonides, one of the first men in Syracuse, showed with an oration full of prudence that whoever held the opinion that they should adhere to the Romans was not to be blamed, nor were those who wished to follow the Carthaginian party, but it was good to detest ambiguity and tardiness in taking up a policy. For he saw the ruin of the republic altogether in such ambiguity, but once the policy was taken up, whatever it might be, some good could be hoped for. Nor could Titus Livy show the harm drawn from remaining in suspense more than he does in this regard. He demonstrates it in the case of the Latins also: when the Lavinians were asked by them for aid against the Romans, they deferred deciding it so much that when they had gotten right outside the gate with their troops to give them help, the news came that the Latins were defeated. Milonius their praetor said of this: “This little way will cost us very much with the Roman people.”[6] For had they decided at first either to aid or not to aid the Latins, either by not aiding them they would not have angered the Romans or by aiding them the aid would have been in time and they could have made them win with the addition of their forces. But by deferring they came to lose in any case, as happened to them. If the Florentines had noted this text, they would not have had so much harm or so much trouble from the French as they had from the coming into Italy of King Louis XII of France against Ludovico, duke of Milan.[7] For when the king was negotiating his coming and sought an accord with the Florentines, the spokesmen who were with the king came to an accord with him that they would stay neutral, and that when the king came into Italy he would have to maintain them in their state and receive them under his protection, and he gave a month’s time to the city to ratify this. Whoever with little prudence

favored the affairs of Ludovico deferred such ratification until the king was already near victory and the Florentines wished to ratify it, when the ratification was not accepted. For he knew that the Florentines had come forcibly and not willingly into his friendship. This cost the city of Florence very much money, and it was about to lose its state, as happened to it later for a similar cause. This policy was so much the more to be condemned[8] since it did not serve even Duke Ludovico, who would have shown many more signs of enmity to the Florentines if he had won than did the king. Although the evil that arises for republics from this weakness has been discoursed of above in another chapter,[9] nonetheless, having opportunity for it anew through a new accident, I wished to repeat it, since it seems to me a matter that should be especially noted by republics like ours.

16

How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do Not Conform to the Ancient Orders

[1] The most important battle ever waged by the Roman people in any war with any nation was that which it waged with the Latin peoples in the consulate of Torquatus and Decius.[1] For every reason agrees[2] that as the Latins became servile through having lost it, so the Romans would have become servile if they had not won it. Titus Livy is of this opinion, for he makes the armies alike in every aspect, in order, virtue, obstinacy, and number; the only difference he makes is that the heads of the Roman army were more virtuous than those of the Latin army. One also sees how two accidents arose in the managing of this battle that had not arisen before and of which there have been rare examples since: to keep the spirits of the soldiers firm, obedient to their commands, and decided on combat, one of the two consuls killed himself and the other his son. The likeness that Titus Livy says there was between these armies was that from having served in the military together a long time they were alike in language, order, and arms. For they kept to the same mode in ordering the battle, and the ranks and heads of ranks had the same names. It was necessary, then, since they were of like forces and like virtue, that something extraordinary should arise that would make the spirits of the one firm and more obstinate than the other; victory, as was said at other points,[3] consists in such obstinacy, for while it endures in the breasts of those who engage in combat, armies never turn back. For it to endure more in the breasts of the Romans than in those of the Latins, partly fate and partly the virtue of the consuls made it arise that Torquatus had to kill his son[4] and Decius [had to kill] himself.[5] In showing this likeness of forces, Titus Livy shows the whole order that the Romans kept in armies and in fighting. Since he explains it extensively, I will not repeat it otherwise, but will discourse only of that in it that I judge notable and the neglect of which by all the captains of these times has produced many disorders in armies and in fights. I say thus that from the text of Livy one gathers that the Roman army had three principal divisions, which in

Tuscan they would call three *schiere*:[6] they called the first *astati*, the second *principi*,[7] the third *triari*; and each of these had its own [troop of] horse. In ordering a battle, they put the *astati* in front, in the second place right in back of them they put the *principi*, and third yet in the same file they placed the *triari*. They put the horse of all these ranks on the right and on the left of these three battalions. The lines of the horse were called *alae* from their form and place, for they appeared like two wings of the body. They ordered the first line, that of the *astati*, which was in the front, to be locked together in such a mode that it could contain and stand up against the enemy. Since the second line, that of the *principi*, was not the first in combat but was well suited to relieve the first when beaten or pushed back, they did not make it tight but kept its ranks sparse and of such a quality that without disordering itself it could receive the first into itself whenever shoved back by the enemy and necessitated to withdraw. The third line, that of the *triari*, had its ranks still more sparse than the second to be able when needed to receive into itself the first two lines, those of the *principi* and the *astati*. These lines placed thus in this form joined the fight. If the *astati* were forced back or defeated, they withdrew into the spaces between the ranks of the *principi*, and all united together made one body from two lines and rejoined the fight. If these were also repelled and forced back, they all withdrew into the spaces between the ranks of the *triari*, and all three lines became one body and renewed the fight. If they were overcome then, since they were no longer able to recover, they lost the fight. Since the army was in danger whenever this last line of the *triari* was put to work, the proverb arose, "The affair has been brought back to the *triari*,"[8] which in the Tuscan usage means, "We have played our last stake."

[2] As the captains of our times have abandoned all the other orders and do not observe any part of ancient discipline, so they have abandoned this part, which is of no little importance. For whoever orders himself so that he can recover three times in battles has to have fortune his enemy three times to be able to lose, and has to have against him a virtue capable of conquering him three times. But whoever does not stand except against the first push, as do all the Christian armies today, can lose easily, for any disorder, any middling virtue, can take victory away from them. What makes our armies lack the ability to recover three times is having lost the mode of receiving one line into another. This arises because at present battles are ordered with one of these two disorders: either they put their lines shoulder to shoulder and make their battle array extensive across and thin in depth, which makes

it weaker because it has little between front and rear; or when instead, to make it stronger, they shorten the lines in the Roman style. If the first front is defeated, since there is no order by which it can be received by the second, they get all tangled together and break themselves. For if the one in front is shoved back, it pushes the second; if the second wishes to go in front, it is impeded by the first; with the first pushing the second, and the second the third, so much confusion arises that often the least accident ruins an army. The Spanish and French armies in the fighting at Ravenna (where Monsieur de Foix, captain of the troops of France, died), which was a battle of very well done combat for our times, were ordered by one of the modes written above: that is, both the one and the other army came with their troops ordered shoulder to shoulder, in such a mode that neither the one nor the other had more than one front, and they were much wider across than deep. This always happens to them where they have a great field, as they had at Ravenna. For, knowing the disorder that they produce in withdrawing, they avoid it when they can by putting themselves in one file, making the front extensive as was said; but when the country constrains them, they stay in the disorder written of above without thinking of the remedy. In this same disorder they ride through enemy country, either if they prey upon it or if they manage another affair of war. In Santo Regolo, in the territory of Pisa, and elsewhere—where the Florentines were defeated by the Pisans in the time of the war between the Florentines and that city because of its rebellion after the coming into Italy of Charles, king of France—ruin did not arise from anywhere else than from the friendly cavalry. Being in front and beaten back by the enemy, it crashed into and broke the Florentine infantry, wherefore all the remainder of the troops turned back. Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, former head of the Florentine infantry, has often affirmed in my presence never to have been defeated except by the cavalry of friends. When they serve in the military with the French, the Swiss, who are the masters of modern wars, take care above all things to put themselves on the side so that if the friendly cavalry is beaten back it will not push into them. Although these things appear easy to understand, and very easy to do, nonetheless not even one of our contemporary captains is found who imitates the ancient orders and corrects the modern. And although they may still have their army tripartite, calling one part the vanguard, another the battalion, and another the rearguard, they do not make it serve other than to command them in their quarters. But in putting them to work it is rare, as is said above, that they do not make all these bodies incur one and the same fortune.

[3] Because to excuse their ignorance many cite the violence of artillery, which does not suffer many orders of the ancients to be used in these times, I wish to dispute this matter in the following chapter, and I wish to examine if artillery is such an impediment that one cannot use ancient virtue.

17

How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed by Armies in the Present Times; and Whether the Opinion Universally Held of It Is True

[1] When I was considering, besides the things written above, how many fights I in the field (in our times called with a French word "days,"[1] and by the Italians "feats of arms") were waged by the Romans in different times, there came into my consideration the universal opinion of many who would have it that if there had been artillery in those times, the Romans would not have been permitted—or not so easily—to take provinces and make peoples pay tribute to them, as they did, nor would they in any mode have made such mighty acquisitions. They also say that by means of these firearms men cannot use or show their virtue as they could in antiquity. They add a third thing: that one comes to battle with more difficulty than one came to it then, and that one cannot keep there to the orders of those times, so that war will in time be reduced to artillery. Judging it not to be outside the purpose to dispute whether these opinions are true, how much artillery has increased or diminished the force of armies, and whether it takes away or gives opportunities to good captains to work virtuously, I shall begin to speak to their first opinion: that the ancient Roman armies would not have made the acquisitions they made if there had been artillery. Responding to that, I say that war is made either to defend oneself or to take the offensive; hence, first to be examined is to which of these two modes of war it is more useful or more harmful. Although there may be something to say on each side, nonetheless I believe that without comparison it does more harm to whoever defends himself than to whoever takes the offensive. The reason I say this is that whoever defends himself either is inside a town or is in camp inside a stockade. If he is inside a town, either this town is small, as are the larger part of fortresses, or it is great. In the first case, he who defends himself is altogether lost, for the thrust of the artillery is such that no wall is

found, however thick, that it does not knock down in a few days. And if he who is inside does not have good spaces to withdraw into, with trenches and embankments,[2] he is lost. Nor can he stand up against the thrust of the enemy who then tries to enter through the breach in the wall; nor does the artillery he may have help him in this, for it is a maxim that where men can go en masse and with a thrust, artillery cannot stand up against them. Therefore in the defense of towns the ultramontane furies are not stood up to; Italian assaults are stood up to well since they are led into battles (which they call by the very appropriate name of skirmishes), not en masse but in small groups. Those who go with such disorder and coldness against a breach in a wall where there is artillery go to a manifest death and artillery avails against them. But when those who are compacted en masse, with one shoving the other, go against a breach, if they are not sustained from trenches or embankments, they enter in every place and artillery does not hold them; and if some of them die, they cannot be so many that they impede victory. This is known to be true from many stormings performed by the ultramontanes in Italy, especially that of Brescia. For when that town rebelled from the French and the fortress was still held for the king of France, the Venetians, so as to sustain the thrust that could come from it against the town, provided the whole street that descended from the fortress to the city with artillery, putting it in front and on the flanks and in every other appropriate place. Monsieur de Foix took no account of this. Instead, with his squadron dismounted on foot, he passed through the middle of it and seized the city; nor is it heard that he received any memorable harm from it. So whoever defends himself in a small town, as was said, and finds the walls on the ground, and does not have space for embankments and trenches to withdraw to, and has to trust in artillery, is lost at once.

[2] If you defend a great town, and you have the advantage of being able to withdraw, artillery is nonetheless beyond comparison more useful to whoever is outside than to whoever is inside. First, because for artillery to hurt those who are outside you are compelled of necessity to raise it above the level of the town; for if you stay on that level, any little barricade and embankment the enemy makes remains secure and you cannot hurt them. So since you have to lift or pull yourself onto the walkway of the walls, or in whatever mode raise yourself above the ground, you draw onto yourself two difficulties. First is that you cannot bring there artillery of the massiveness and power that anyone can bring from outside, since you are not able to manage great things in small spaces. The other is that if you can actually

bring it there, you cannot make the faithful and secure embankments for saving said artillery that those outside can make, as they are on the terrain and have the advantage and the space that they themselves wish, so much that it is impossible for whoever defends a town to keep artillery in high places when those who are outside have very much and powerful artillery. And if they have to come into low places with it, it becomes in good part useless, as was said. So the defense of the city has to be reduced to defending it with one's arms,[3] as was done in antiquity, and with light artillery. If a little utility is obtained with respect to light artillery, a disadvantage is obtained from it that counterbalances the advantage of artillery. For thanks[4] to it the walls of towns are kept low and almost buried underground in the trenches, so that when it comes to a hand-to-hand battle, either because the walls are beaten down or because the trenches are filled up, he who is inside has more disadvantages than he had before. And so, as was said above, these instruments help him who besieges towns much more than him who is besieged.

[3] As to the third thing—being reduced to a camp inside a stockade so as not to do battle if it is not to your convenience or advantage—I say that in this situation you ordinarily do not have any remedy with which to defend yourself from combat other than what the ancients had; and sometimes, on account of artillery, you are at a greater disadvantage. For if the enemy comes upon you and has a little advantage from the country, as can easily happen, and finds himself higher than you, or if on his arrival you have not yet made your barricades and covered yourself well with them, he dislodges you at once and without your having any remedy, and you are forced to go out from your fortresses and come to fight. This happened to the Spanish in the Battle of Ravenna, where they had dug in between the Ronco River and a barricade. Because they had not raised it up high enough and the French had a little advantage in the terrain, they were constrained by the artillery to go out from their fortresses and come to fight. But given that the place you have taken for a camp is, as it often must be, more eminent than the others opposite it, and that the barricades are good and secure, so that by means of the site and your other preparations the enemy does not dare to assault you, in this case one will come to those modes that one came to in antiquity when one individual was with his army in a spot that could not be attacked. These are to overrun the country, to take or besiege towns friendly to you, or to impede your supplies—so much so that you will be forced by some necessity to dislodge and come to battle, where artillery, as will be said

below, does not work much. Whoever considers thus what types of wars the Romans made, and sees how they made almost all their wars taking the offensive against others and not defending against them, will see, if the things said above are true, that they would have had more advantage, and would have made their acquisitions more quickly, if there had been [artillery] in those times.

[4] As to the second thing—that by means of artillery men cannot show their virtue as they could in antiquity—I say it is true that men incur more dangers than back then when they have to show themselves in small groups, when they have to scale a town or make similar assaults, when they are not confined together but have to appear by themselves one by one. It is also true that captains and heads of armies are subjected more to the danger of death than back then, since they can be reached with artillery in every place; nor does it help them to be in the last squadrons and be provided with very strong men. Nonetheless, both the one and the other of these two dangers rarely inflict extraordinary harm since well-protected towns are not scaled or assaulted with weak assaults, but when one wishes to capture them the affair is reduced to a siege, as was done in antiquity. And even in those that are captured by assaults, the dangers are not much greater than they were back then. For whoever defended towns in that time also did not lack things to shoot with, which, if they were not so furious, had a similar effect as to killing men. As to the deaths of captains and condottieri, there are fewer examples of them in the twenty-four years[5] that the wars have lasted in recent times in Italy than there were in ten years in the time of the ancients. For outside of Count Lodovico della Mirandola, who died at Ferrara when the Venetians assaulted that state a few years ago,[6] and the duke of Nemours, who died at Cirignuola,[7] it has not occurred that any of them have died from artillery—for Monsieur de Foix died at Ravenna from steel, not from fire.[8] So if men do not particularly demonstrate their virtue, it arises not from artillery but from the bad orders and the weakness of armies, for lacking virtue in the whole, they cannot show it in the part.

[5] As to the third thing they say—that one cannot get hand to hand and that war will be conducted altogether by artillery—I say this opinion is altogether false, and thus it will always be held by those who will try to put their armies to work according to ancient virtue. For it suits whoever wishes to make a good army to accustom his men with exercises either feigned or true to get close to the enemy, to come at him wielding the sword, and to stand chest to chest with him. And one ought to found oneself

more on infantry than on horse for the reasons that will be said below. If one founds oneself on infantrymen and on the modes said before, artillery becomes altogether useless. For in getting close to the enemy, infantry can flee the blows of artillery with more ease than in antiquity they could flee the thrust of the elephants, the scythed chariots, and the other unaccustomed opponents the Roman infantry opposed, against which they always found the remedy. So much more easily would they have found it against artillery inasmuch as the time during which it can hurt you is briefer than was that during which elephants and chariots could hurt. For the latter disordered you in the middle of the fight, while the former may impede you only before the fight—and infantry easily escape this impediment when they shoot, either by seeking cover from the nature of the site or by lowering themselves on the ground when they shoot. Even this is seen by experience not to be necessary, especially to defend oneself from heavy artillery, which cannot be balanced in such a mode that it does not either go high and not find you or go low and not reach you. When armies then get hand to hand, it is clearer than light that neither the heavy nor the small ones can hurt[9] you. For if they have the artillery in front, it becomes your prisoner; if it is behind, it hurts[10] their friends rather than you; on the flanks[11] it still cannot wound you in such a mode that you cannot go and encounter it, and from that will follow the said effect. Nor is this much disputed. For one sees the example of the Swiss, who at Novara in 1513 went without artillery and without horse to meet the French army, which was provided with artillery inside its fortresses, and broke it without suffering any impediment from them. And the reason is, besides the things said above, that for artillery to be able to work it needs to be guarded by walls or by trenches or by barricades; and if it lacks one of these guardians, it becomes a prisoner or useless, as happens when it has to be defended by men, which happens in battles and fights in the field. On the flank it cannot be put to work except in the mode that the ancients put to work shooting instruments, which they put outside their squadrons so they could engage in combat outside their ranks; and whenever they were shoved back by cavalry or by others, their refuge was behind the legions. Whoever counts on it otherwise does not understand it well, and trusts in a thing that can easily deceive him. And if the Turk has had victory over the Sophy and the sultan by means of artillery,[12] it arose not from any virtue of it other than the fright that its unaccustomed noise put into their cavalry.

[6] Coming to the end of this discourse, I therefore conclude that artillery is useful in an army when ancient virtue is mixed with it, but without that, against a virtuous army, it is very useless.

18

How by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of the Ancient Military Infantry Should Be Esteemed More Than Horse

[1] It can be clearly demonstrated by many reasons and many examples how much more the Romans esteemed the military on foot than on horseback in all their military actions. On it they founded all the plans of their forces, as is seen by many examples, among others when they fought with the Latins near Lake Regillus, where, when the Roman army was already bending, they made their men on horseback dismount on foot to relieve it, and by renewing the fight in this way had the victory.[1] The Romans are manifestly seen here to have trusted in them more when they were on foot than when they were kept on horseback. They used this same extreme in many other fights and always found it the best remedy for their dangers.

[2] Nor should one oppose to this the opinion of Hannibal, who, on seeing that the consuls in the battle of Cannae had made their cavalrymen dismount on foot, made a joke of such a policy, saying: "Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites!"[2]—that is, "I should prefer that they give them to me bound." Even though this opinion may have been in the mouth of a very excellent man, nonetheless if one has to follow authority, one should believe in a Roman republic and so many very excellent captains who were in it more than in one Hannibal alone. Even without authorities there are manifest reasons for it. For a man on foot can go many places where a horse cannot go. He can be taught to observe order, and that he has to resume it if it is disturbed; it is difficult to make horses observe order, and impossible to reorder them when they are disturbed. Besides this, as in men, some horses are found that have little spirit and some that have very much; and often it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by a cowardly man, and a cowardly horse by a spirited one, and, in whichever mode this

disparity occurs, from it arises uselessness and disorder. Ordered infantry can easily break horse, and only with difficulty be defeated by them. Besides many ancient and modern examples, this opinion is corroborated by the authority of those who give rules for civil things, where they show that at first wars began to be made with horse, since there was yet no order for infantry. But when they were put in order, it was known at once how much more useful they were than the former. It is not so, however, that because of this, horse are not necessary in armies to perform reconnaissances, to raid and prey upon countries, to follow enemies when they are in flight, and to be also in part an opposition to the horse of the adversaries. But the foundation and the sinew of the army, and that which should be esteemed more, should be the infantry.

[3] Among the sins of the Italian princes that have made Italy servile toward foreigners, there is none greater than having taken little account of this order, and having turned all one's care to the military on horseback. This disorder has arisen from the malignity of the heads and from the ignorance of those who held states. For since the Italian military was transferred twenty-five years ago to men who did not hold states but were like captains of fortune,[3] they at once thought of how they could maintain their reputation while staying armed themselves with the princes unarmed. Since a large number of infantrymen could not be continually paid by them, and they did not have subjects they could avail themselves of, and a small number did not give them reputation, they turned to keeping horse. For two hundred or three hundred horse that were paid by a condottiere maintained his reputation, and the payment was not such that it could not be fulfilled by the men who held states. So that this would continue more easily and so as to maintain their reputation, they removed all affection and reputation for infantrymen, and transferred it to their horse. They increased so much in this disorder that in the largest army whatever the least part was infantry. This usage, together with many other disorders that were mixed with it, made the Italian military weak in such a mode that this province has been easily trampled on by all the ultramontanes. This error of esteeming horse more than infantry is shown more openly by another Roman example. When the Romans were encamped at Sora, a crowd of horse came out of the town to assault the camp, and the Roman master of the horse went against them with his cavalry and met them chest to chest. Fate had it that in the first encounter the heads of both armies died. While the others remained without government and the fight continued nonetheless, the

Romans dismounted on foot so as to overcome the enemy more easily and constrained the enemy cavalrymen to do likewise, if they wished to defend themselves. Because of all this, the Romans brought back the victory.[4] No example could be greater than this in demonstrating how much more virtue there is in infantry than in horse. For if in other struggles the consuls made the Roman cavalrymen dismount, it was to relieve the infantry who were suffering and had need of aid, but in this place they dismounted neither to succor the infantry nor to combat enemy men on foot, but, doing combat on horseback against horse, they judged that while they could not overcome them on horseback they could more easily defeat them by dismounting. I wish thus to conclude that ordered infantry cannot be overcome without very great difficulty, unless by other infantry. The Romans Crassus and Mark Antony ran through the dominion of the Parthians for many days with very few horse and very many infantry, and had innumerable horse of the Parthians against them. Crassus with part of the army was left there dead; Mark Antony virtuously saved himself. Nonetheless in these Roman afflictions it is seen how much infantry prevailed over horse; for being in an extensive country, where mountains are rare, rivers very rare, the seas far away, and distant from every advantage, Mark Antony nonetheless, in the judgment of the Parthians themselves, very virtuously saved himself. Nor did all the Parthian cavalry ever dare to try the ranks of his army. If Crassus was left there, whoever will read well of his actions will see that it was by deception rather than force, nor did the Parthians ever in all his disorders dare to push against him; instead, always skirting around him, impeding his supplies, making promises and not observing them, they led him to extreme misery.[5]

[4] I would believe I had to undergo more labor in arguing[6] how much the virtue of infantry is more powerful than that of horse if there were not very many modern examples of it that render very full testimony for it. Nine thousand Swiss have been seen at Novara, cited by us above, to go and confront ten thousand horse and as many infantrymen, and defeat them. For the horse could not take the offensive against them, and they little esteemed the infantrymen because they were in good part Gascon troops and badly ordered. Then twenty-six thousand Swiss were seen to go above Milan to meet Francis, king of France, who had with him twenty thousand horse, forty thousand infantrymen, and a hundred artillery wagons. And if they did not win the battle as at Novara, they did combat virtuously for two days and then, when they were defeated, half of them saved themselves.[7] Marcus

Regulus Attilius presumed with his infantry to stand up against not horse alone but elephants. And if his plan did not succeed, it was not because the virtue of his infantry was not so much that he could trust in it so much as to believe it could overcome that difficulty.[8] I repeat, therefore, that to overcome ordered infantrymen it is necessary to oppose them with infantrymen better ordered than they; otherwise one goes to a manifest loss. In the times of Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand Swiss descended into Lombardy, where the duke, having Carmignuola then for his captain, sent him with about a thousand horse and a few infantrymen against them.[9] Not knowing their order of combat, he went to encounter them with his horse, presuming he could break them at once. But finding them immovable, and having lost many of his men, he withdrew. Being a very able man and knowing how to take up new policies among new accidents, he recovered more troops and went to meet them. Coming against them, he made all his men-at-arms dismount on foot, put them at the head of his infantry, and went to beset the Swiss. They did not have any remedy, for since the men-at-arms of Carmignuola were on foot and well armed they could easily enter among the ranks of the Swiss without suffering any damage, and having entered among them they could easily attack them, so that of all their number there remained alive [only] that part that was preserved by the humanity of Carmignuola.[10]

[5] I believe that many know the difference of virtue that there is between the one and the other of these orders; but so great is the unhappiness of these times that neither ancient examples nor modern nor confession of error is sufficient to make modern princes repent. They should think that if they wish to bestow reputation on the military of a province or a state, it is necessary to resuscitate these orders, keep near them, give them reputation, give them life, so that they may bestow both life and reputation on him.[11] And as they deviate from these modes, so they deviate from the other modes spoken of above. Hence it arises that acquisitions are for the harm, not the greatness, of a state, as will be said below.

19

That Acquisitions by Republics That Are Not Well Ordered and That Do Not Proceed according to Roman Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not Their Exaltation

[1] These opinions contrary to the truth, founded on the bad examples that have been introduced by these corrupt centuries of ours, keep men from thinking of deviating from accustomed modes. When would one have been able to persuade an Italian up to thirty years ago that ten thousand infantrymen could assault ten thousand horse and as many infantrymen in a plain, and not only combat but defeat them, as one saw, by the example often cited by us, at Novara?[1] And although the histories may be full of it, they still would not have lent it their faith. And if they had lent it their faith, they would have said that in these times one is better armed, and that a squadron of men-at-arms would be capable of charging a cliff and not merely infantry—and thus they corrupted their judgment with these false excuses. Nor would they have considered that Lucullus with a few infantrymen broke a hundred and fifty thousand horse of Tigranes, and that among those cavalrymen were a sort of cavalry altogether similar to our men-at-arms.[2] And thus, as this fallacy has been uncovered by the example of the ultramontane troops, and as it is seen by it that all that is narrated about infantry in the histories is true, they ought to believe all the other ancient orders to be true and useful.[3] And if this were believed, republics and princes would err less, would be stronger in opposing a thrust that might come against them, and would not put their hope in flight; and those who have in their hands a civil way of life would know better how to direct it, either by way of expanding it or by way of maintaining it. And they would believe that increasing the inhabitants of one's city, getting partners and not subjects, sending colonies to guard countries that have been acquired, making capital out of booty, subduing the enemy with raids and battles and not with sieges, keeping the public rich and the private poor, and

maintaining military exercises with the highest seriousness is the true way to make a republic great and to acquire empire. And if this mode of expanding does not please them, one should think that acquisitions made by any other way are the ruin of republics, and should put a check on every ambition, regulate one's city inside with laws and customs, prohibit acquisition, and think only of defending oneself and of keeping one's defenses well ordered—as do the republics of Germany, which live and have lived freely in these modes for a time. Nonetheless, as I said at another point when I discoursed of the difference there was between ordering to acquire and ordering to maintain, it is impossible for a republic to succeed in staying quiet and enjoying its freedom and little borders.[4] For if it will not molest others, it will be molested, and from being molested will arise the wish and the necessity to acquire; and if it does not have an enemy outside, it will find one at home, as it appears necessarily happens to all great cities. And if the republics of Germany can live in that mode, and have been able to endure for a time, it arises from certain conditions in that country that are not elsewhere, without which they could not keep to a like mode of life.

[2] That part of Germany of which I speak was subject to the Roman Empire as were France and Spain, but when it came into decline and its title to empire was reduced in that province, the more powerful of those cities, to make themselves free, began buying themselves off from the empire by reserving to it a small annual payment, according to the cowardice or necessity of the emperors, so that little by little all those cities that were directly under the emperor and not subject to any prince bought themselves off in like mode. In the same times that these cities bought themselves off, it occurred that certain communities subject to the duke of Austria rebelled against him, among which were Fribourg and the Swiss and the like. Prospering in the beginning, they little by little achieved so much increase that they not only did not return under the yoke of Austria, but put all their neighbors in fear—they are those who are called the Swiss. Thus this province was divided into the Swiss, republics (whom they call free towns), princes, and emperor. And the cause why wars do not arise among so much diversity of ways of life, or if they arise they do not long endure, is that sign of the emperor, who, should he happen not to have forces, nonetheless has so much reputation among them that he is a conciliator for them, and eliminates every scandal with his authority by interposing himself as a mediator. The greater and longer wars that have

been there are those that have occurred between the Swiss and the duke of Austria; and although for many years the emperor and the duke of Austria have been one and the same thing, he has not therefore ever been able to overcome the audacity of the Swiss, with whom there has never been any mode of accord unless by force. Nor has the rest of Germany brought him much aid; both because the communities do not know how to take the offensive against whoever wishes to live freely like them, and because those princes partly cannot because they are poor and partly will not because they are envious of his power. Those communities can thus live content with their small dominion, because, thanks[5] to the imperial authority, they do not have cause to desire more. They can live united inside their walls because they have nearby the enemy who would take the opportunity to seize them whenever they should be in discord. If that province were in other conditions, it would suit them to seek to expand and break that quiet of theirs. Since there are no such conditions elsewhere, one cannot take this mode of life and needs either to expand by way of leagues or to expand like the Romans. Whoever governs himself otherwise seeks not his life but his death and ruin, for in a thousand modes and from many causes his acquisitions are harmful. For he very likely acquires empire without forces, and whoever acquires empire without forces will be fittingly ruined. Whoever impoverishes himself through wars cannot acquire forces, even should he be victorious, since he spends more than he obtains from his acquisitions, as the Venetians and the Florentines have done, who have been much weaker when one had Lombardy and the other Tuscany than they were when one was content with the sea and the other with six miles of borders. For all arose from their having wished to acquire and not having known how to take up the mode to do so. They deserve more blame inasmuch as they have less excuse, since they saw the mode the Romans took and could have followed their example, while the Romans, without any example, by their own prudence, knew how to find it by themselves. Besides this, acquisitions sometimes do no middling harm to every well-ordered republic, when it acquires a city or a province full of delights,[6] whereby it can take their customs through the intercourse[7] it has with them, as happened first to Rome and then to Hannibal in the acquisition of Capua.[8] If Capua had been more distant from the city, so that the remedy for the error of the soldiers would not have been nearby, or if Rome had been corrupt in some part, without doubt that acquisition would have been the ruin of the Roman republic. Titus Livy vouches for this with these words:

“Even then least wholesome for military discipline, Capua, with its means for every pleasure, diverted the charmed spirits of the soldiers from the memory of their fatherland.”[9] And truly, similar cities or provinces avenge themselves against their conqueror without fighting and without blood, for by permeating it with their bad customs they expose it to being conquered by whoever assaults it. Juvenal in his *Satires* could not have better considered this part, saying that through the acquisition of foreign lands, foreign customs entered Roman breasts, and in exchange for thrift and other very excellent virtues, “gluttony and luxury have made their home and avenge a conquered world.”[10] If acquiring was thus about to be pernicious for the Romans in the times when they proceeded with so much prudence and so much virtue, what will it be for those who proceed so distantly from their modes, and who avail themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers, besides the other errors they make, which are much discoursed of above? From this the harms that will be mentioned in the following chapter often result for them.

20

What Danger That Prince or Republic Runs That Avails Itself of Auxiliary or Mercenary Military

[1] If I had not treated at length in another work of mine[1] how useless mercenary or auxiliary military is, and how useful one's own is, I would extend myself in this discourse much more than I will do. But since I have spoken of it at length elsewhere, I will be brief in this part. Nor has it seemed to me that I should pass it by, since I found in Titus Livy such an extensive example as to auxiliary soldiers. For auxiliary soldiers are those whom a prince or republic sends, captained and paid by it, for your aid. Coming to the text of Livy, I say that when the Romans with their armies, which they had sent for the relief of the Capuans, had defeated two armies of Samnites in two different places, and thereby freed the Capuans from the war the Samnites made against them, and they wished to return to Rome, they left two legions in the country of Capua to defend the Capuans so they would not be despoiled of a garrison and become prey anew to the Samnites.[2] These legions, rotting in idleness, began to take delight in it; so much so that, having forgotten their fatherland and their reverence for the Senate, they thought about taking up arms and making themselves lords of that country that they had defended with their virtue. For it appeared to them that the inhabitants were not worthy of possessing those goods that they did not know how to defend. Having foreseen this thing, the Romans crushed and corrected it,[3] as will be shown extensively where we speak of conspiracies.[4] I therefore say anew that of all the other kinds of soldiers, auxiliaries are the most harmful, for the prince or republic who puts them to work in his aid does not have any authority over them, but he who sends them alone has authority there. For auxiliary soldiers are those who are sent to you by a prince, as I have said, under his captains, under his insignia, and paid by him, as was that army the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers, when they have conquered, usually prey as much on him who has led them

as on him against whom they are led; they do so either through the malignity of the prince who sends them or through their own ambition. Although the intention of the Romans was not to break the accord and the conventions they had made with the Capuans, nonetheless the ease with which those soldiers could crush them seemed so great that it could persuade them to think of taking from the Capuans their town and their state. Very many examples of this could be given, but I wish this to be enough and also that of the Rhegini, whose life and town were taken away by a legion that the Romans had put there as a guard.[5] A prince or a republic should then take up any other policy rather than having recourse to leading auxiliary troops into his state for his defense if he has to trust altogether in them, for any pact, any convention, however hard, that he has with the enemy will be lighter for him than such a policy. If past things are read well and those of the present are reviewed, it will be found that for one who has had a good end from this, infinite ones were left deceived by it. A prince or an ambitious republic cannot have a greater opportunity for seizing a city or a province than to be asked to send his armies to its defense. Therefore he who is so ambitious that he calls in such aid, not only to defend himself but to take the offensive against others, seeks to acquire that which he cannot hold and which can be easily taken away from him by him who acquires it for him. But so great is the ambition of man that to obtain a present wish he does not think of the evil that in a brief time is to result from it. Nor in this, as in other things discoursed of, do ancient examples move him, for if they[6] were moved by them they would see that the more liberality is shown toward neighbors and the more aversion to seizing them, the more they fling themselves into one's lap, as will be said below through the example of the Capuans.

21

The First Praetor the Romans Sent Anyplace Was to Capua, Four Hundred Years after They Began to Make War

[1] How different the Romans were in their mode of proceeding in acquisition from those who in the present times expand their jurisdiction has been very much discoursed of above;[1] also that they let those towns they did not demolish live under their own laws, even those that surrendered not as partners but as subjects. They did not leave in them any sign of the empire of the Roman people but obliged them to some conditions, which, if observed, kept them in their state and dignity. These modes are known to have been observed until they went out of Italy and began to reduce kingdoms and states to provinces.

[2] There is no clearer example of this than that the first praetor sent by them to any place was to Capua, which they sent there not from their ambition but because they were asked by the Capuans, who, since there was discord among them, judged it necessary to have a Roman citizen inside the city who would reorder and reunite them. Moved by this example and constrained by the same necessity, the Anzianti also asked them for a prefect.[2] Titus Livy says about this accident and this new mode of ruling, "For now not only Roman arms, but laws, prevailed."[3] One sees, therefore, how much this mode made Roman increase easy. For those cities especially that are used to living freely or accustomed to being governed by those of their own province remain content more quietly under a dominion they do not see, even though it may have in itself some hardship, than under one they see every day that appears to them to reprove them every day for their servitude. There follows closely from this another good for the prince. Since his ministers do not have in hand the judges and magistrates who render civil or criminal justice[4] in those cities, there can never arise a judgment[5] with disapproval or infamy for the prince; and this way many causes of calumny and hatred toward him are lacking. [To see] that this is true,

besides the ancient examples of it that could be brought up, there is a fresh example of it in Italy. For, as everyone knows, Genoa having often been seized by the French, the king has always, except in the present times, sent a French governor who governs it in his name. At present alone, not by the king's choice but because necessity has thus ordered it, he has let that city be governed by itself and by a Genoese governor.[6] Without doubt whoever seeks which of these two modes brings more security to the king in his rule over it, and more contentment to the populace, would without doubt approve this last mode. Besides this, men fling themselves into your lap so much more the more you appear averse from seizing them; and they fear you so much less on account of their freedom the more you are humane and tame with them. This tameness and liberality made the Capuans run to the Romans to ask for a praetor; if the Romans had demonstrated the least wish to send one, they would at once have become jealous and would have distanced themselves from them. But what need is there to go for examples to Capua and Rome, having them in Florence and Tuscany? Everyone knows how much time it has been since the city of Pistoia came voluntarily under Florentine rule.[7] Everyone also knows how much enmity there has been between the Florentines and the Pisans, Lucchese, and Sienese. This difference of spirit has arisen not because the Pistoiese do not prize their freedom as do the others and do not judge themselves as highly as the others but because the Florentines have always comported themselves with them like brothers but with the others like enemies. This has made the Pistoiese run willingly under their rule, while the others have exerted and exert all their force so as not to come under it. And without doubt if the Florentines by way either of laws or of aids had tamed their neighbors and not made them savage, they would without doubt at this hour be lords of Tuscany. This does not mean I judge that arms and force do not have to be put to work, but they should be reserved for the last place, where and when other modes are not enough.

22

How False the Opinions of Men Often Are in Judging Great Things

[1] How false the opinions of men often are has been seen and is seen by those who find themselves witnesses of their decisions, which, if they are not decided by excellent men, are often contrary to every truth. Because excellent men in corrupt republics, especially in quiet times, are treated as enemies, either from envy or from other ambitious causes, one goes behind someone who either is judged to be good through a common deception or is put forward by men who wish for the favor rather than the good of the collectivity. This deception is uncovered afterward in adverse times, and by necessity refuge is sought in those who were nearly forgotten in quiet times, as will be fully discoursed of in its place.[1] Certain accidents also arise about which men who have not had great experience of things are easily deceived, since the accident that arises has in itself much verisimilitude capable of making men believe whatever they are persuaded of about such a thing. These things have been said because of what Numisius the praetor persuaded the Latins of after they were defeated by the Romans[2] and because of what was believed by many a few years ago when Francis I, king of France, came to acquire Milan, which was defended by the Swiss.[3] I say, therefore, that when Louis XII was dead and Francis of Angoulême, who succeeded to the kingdom of France, desired to restore to the kingdom the duchy of Milan seized a few years before by the Swiss at the encouragement of Pope Julius II,[4] he desired to have aid in Italy that would make his enterprise easier. Besides the Venetians, whom Louis had won over,[5] he tried the Florentines and Pope Leo X, for it seemed to him that his enterprise would be easier when he should have won them over, since troops of the king of Spain were in Lombardy and other forces of the emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo did not cede to the king's wishes but was persuaded by those who counseled him (according to what is said) to stay neutral, since they showed him that in this policy consisted certain victory.[6] For it did not suit the church to have powers in Italy, neither the

king nor the Swiss, but since he wished to return it to its ancient freedom, it was necessary to free it from servitude to both the one and the other. Because it was not possible to conquer the one and the other, either by themselves or both together, one of them had to overcome the other, so that the church with its friends might strike the one that then would be left the victor. It was impossible to find a better opportunity than the present, since both the one and the other were in the field, and the pope had his forces in order so they could present themselves on the borders of Lombardy near both the one and the other armies, under color of wishing to guard his own affairs, and stay there until they should come to battle. It was reasonable, since both the one and the other armies were virtuous, that this would be bloody for all in both parties, and leave the victor in a weakened mode, so that it would be easy for the pope to assault him and break him. Thus he would be left with his glory as the lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all Italy. How false this opinion was is seen from the result of the affair: for when the Swiss were overcome after a long fight,[7] the troops of the pope and of Spain did not presume to assault the victors but prepared for flight. Even that would not have helped them if it had not been for the humanity or the coldness of the king, who did not seek a second victory, but for whom it was enough to make an accord with the church.

[2] This opinion has certain reasons that at a distance appear true but are altogether alien from the truth. For it rarely happens that the victor loses very many of his soldiers, for some of the victors die in the fight but none in the flight—and in the ardor of combat, when men have turned face to face, few of them fall, especially because it most often lasts for a short time. And if, however, it lasts for very much time and very many of the victors die, so great are the reputation that victory draws behind it and the terror that it carries with it that it by far exceeds the harm that he has endured through the death of his soldiers. So that if one army went to find him in the opinion that he would be weakened, it would find itself deceived, unless that army were such that it could already combat him at any time, both before the victory and afterward. In this case it could win or lose according to its fortune and virtue, but that which fought before and won would have the advantage rather than the other. This is known with certainty from the experience of the Latins, from the fallacy that Numisius the praetor took up, and from the harm the peoples who believed him received from it. After the Romans had conquered the Latins, he cried out through all the country of Latium that then was the time to assault the Romans, who were

weakened by the fight they had had with them; that the Romans were left a victory only in name, while they had endured all the other harms as if they had been conquered; and that any little force that should assault them anew could finish them. Therefore the peoples who believed him made a new army and were at once defeated and suffered the harm that those always will suffer who hold such opinions.[8]

23

How Much the Romans, in Judging Subjects for Some Accidents That Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled from the Middle Way

[1] “Now in Latium the state of affairs was such that they could endure neither peace nor war.”[1]

[2] Of all unhappy states the unhappiest is that of a prince or a republic brought to the extreme where it cannot accept peace or sustain war. Those are brought there who are offended too much by the conditions of peace and, on the other side, if they wish to make war, must either throw themselves forth as prey for whoever aids them or be left as prey for the enemy. To all these extremes one comes through bad counsels and bad policies from not having measured one’s forces well, as is said above.[2] For the republic or prince that measures them well is led only with difficulty into the extreme the Latins were led into. When they should not have come to an accord with the Romans they did come to an accord, and when they should not have declared[3] war with them they did declare it. Thus they knew how to act in such a mode that the enmity and the friendship of the Romans were equally harmful to them. The Latins were then conquered and altogether afflicted first by Manlius Torquatus and then by Camillus, who, after constraining them to give in and consign themselves into the arms[4] of the Romans, putting guards through all the towns of Latium, and taking hostages from all of them, returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that all Latium was in the hands of the Roman people.[5] Because this judgment is notable and deserves to be observed so that it can be imitated when similar opportunities are given to princes, I wish to bring up the words of Livy put in the mouth of Camillus. They vouch both for the mode of expansion the Romans took and for how in judgments of state they always fled from the middle way and turned to extremes. For a government is

nothing other than holding subjects in such a mode that they cannot or ought not offend you. This is done either by securing oneself against them altogether, taking from them every way of hurting you, or by benefiting them in such a mode that it would not be reasonable for them to desire to change fortune. All this is comprised first by Camillus's proposal and then by the judgment on it given by the Senate. His words were these: "The immortal gods have made you so powerful over this decision as to put the decision in your hands whether Latium is to be or not to be. Therefore you can provide perpetual peace for yourselves, as far as pertains to the Latins, either by raging or by forgiving. Do you wish to make very cruel decisions against those who have surrendered and been conquered? You may destroy all Latium. Do you wish to increase the Roman republic[6] on the example of your forefathers by accepting the conquered into citizenship? Matter is at hand for growing by means of the greatest glory. That rule is certainly the firmest that is obeyed gladly. Therefore, while their spirits are stupefied with expectation, you should preoccupy them either with punishment or with benefit."[7] The decision of the Senate followed this proposal in accordance with the words of the consul.[8] Bringing forward, town by town, all those of some moment, they either benefited them or eliminated them. They gave exemptions and privileges to those who were benefited, giving them citizenship[9] and securing them on every side. They demolished the towns of the others, sent colonies there, brought them to Rome, and dispersed them so that they could no longer hurt either through arms or through counsel. Nor did they, as I said,[10] ever use the neutral way in affairs of moment.

[3] Princes ought to imitate this judgment. The Florentines ought to have come close to this when Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rebelled in 1502.[11] If they had done so, they would have secured their rule, made the city of Florence very great, and given themselves the fields they lacked to live off. But they used that middle way that is very harmful in judging men: they exiled part of the Aretines, fined part of them, took away from all of them their honors and former ranks in the city, and left the city intact. If any citizen counseled in the deliberations that Arezzo should be demolished, those who to themselves seemed wiser said that it would be of little honor to the republic to demolish it since it would seem that Florence lacked forces to hold it. These reasons are among those that seem true and are not, since by this same reason a parricide or someone criminal and scandalous would not have to be killed, since it would be a shame for the prince to show he does not have forces able to check one man alone. Such

as have similar opinions do not see that men individually, and a whole city together, sometimes sin against a state so that a prince has no remedy other than to eliminate it as an example to the others and for his own security. Honor consists in being able and knowing how to punish it, not in being able to hold it with a thousand dangers, for the prince who does not punish whoever errs in such a mode that he can err no more is held to be either ignorant or cowardly.

[4] How necessary this judgment is that the Romans gave is also confirmed by the sentence they gave on the Privernates.[12] Here two things should be noted from Livy's text: one, that which is said above, that subjects should be either benefited or eliminated; the other, how much generosity of spirit, how much speaking the truth helps, when it is said in the presence of prudent men. The Roman Senate was gathered to judge the Privernates, who after having rebelled were then by force returned under Roman obedience. Many citizens were sent by the people of Privernum to beseech pardon from the Senate, and when they came into its presence one of the senators asked one of them "what punishment did he consider the Privernates deserved."[13] To this the Privernate responded, "That which they deserve who consider themselves worthy of freedom." To this the consul replied, "If we remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have with you?" To which he responded, "If you give a good one, both faithful and perpetual; if a bad one, not long-lasting."[14] Whereupon, even though many were upset by this, the wiser part of the Senate said, "The voice of a free man had been heard, nor could it be believed that any people or indeed any man should remain in a condition that was painful longer than was necessary. Peace is faithful where men are willingly pacified, nor could faith be hoped for in that place where they wished for servitude." Upon these words they decided that the Privernates should be Roman citizens and honored them with the privileges of citizenship, saying, "Only those who think of nothing except freedom are worthy to become Romans."[15] So much did this true and generous response please generous spirits, for any other response would have been lying and cowardly. Those who believe otherwise of men, especially of those used to being or to seeming to themselves to be free, are deceived in this, and under this deception take up policies that are not good for themselves and not such as to satisfy them. From this arise frequent rebellions and the ruin of states. But to return to our discourse, I conclude from this and from the judgment given on the Latins that when one has to judge powerful cities that are used

to living freely, one must either eliminate them or caress them; otherwise every judgment is in vain.[16] One ought to flee altogether from the middle way, which is harmful, as it was to the Samnites when they had closed off the Romans at the Caudine Forks.[17] They did not then wish to follow the view of the old man who counseled them to let the Romans go honorably or kill them all, but took a middle way, disarming them and putting them under the yoke, letting them go full of ignominy and indignation. So a little later they came to know through their harm that the judgment of that old man had been useful and their decision harmful, as will be fully discoursed of in its place.[18]

24

Fortresses Are Generally Much More Harmful Than Useful

[1] To the wise of our times it will perhaps seem a thing not well considered that when the Romans wished to secure themselves against the peoples of Latium and of the city of Privernum,[1] they did not think of building some fortress, which would be a check to keep them faithful,[2] especially since it is a saying in Florence, cited by our wise ones, that Pisa and other similar cities should be held with fortresses.[3] And truly if the Romans had been made like them, they would have thought of building some; but because they were of another virtue, of another judgment, of another power, they did not build any. While Rome lived freely and followed its orders and its virtuous institutions, it never built any to hold either cities or provinces; but it did save[4] some of those that had been built. Hence, having seen the Romans' mode of proceeding in this business and that of the princes of our times, it seems to me that it must be put into consideration whether it is good to build fortresses, or whether they do harm or are useful to him who builds them. Thus it should be considered that fortresses are made either to defend oneself from enemies or to defend oneself from subjects. In the first case they are not necessary; in the second they are harmful. Beginning to give reasons why they are harmful in the second case, I say that for the prince or republic that fears his or its subjects and their rebellion, such fear must first arise from the hatred one's subjects have for one, the hatred from one's bad behavior, and the bad behavior either from believing one can hold them by force or from the lack of prudence of whoever governs them. One of the things that make one believe he can force them is having fortresses next to them; for the bad treatment that is the cause of their hatred arises in good part from the prince's or the republic's having fortresses, which, when this is true, are far more hurtful than useful. For first, as was said, they make you more audacious and more violent toward your subjects. Then there is not the security inside them that you persuade yourself of, since all the forces and all the violence that are used to hold a people are null except for

two: either you are always able to put a good army in the field, as the Romans were; or you disperse, eliminate, disorder, and disunite them in such a mode that they cannot get together to hurt you. Because if you impoverish them, "arms remain to the despoiled";[5] if you disarm them, "fury supplies arms";[6] if you kill their heads and follow by injuring the others, the heads are reborn like those of the Hydra. If you make fortresses, they are useful[7] in times of peace because they give you more spirit to do evil to them, but they are very useless in times of war because they are assaulted by the enemy and by subjects; nor is it possible for them to put up resistance to both the one and the other. And if ever they were less than useless, it is in our times, in respect to artillery, because of whose fury it is impossible to defend small places where one cannot withdraw to embankments, as we discoursed of above.[8]

[2] I wish to dispute this matter in more detail. Either you, prince, wish to hold the people of your city in check with these fortresses, or you, prince or republic, wish to check a city seized by war. I wish to turn to the prince, and I say to him that to hold his citizens in check such a fortress cannot be more useless, for the causes said above. For it makes you more prompt and less hesitant to crush them, and this crushing makes them so disposed toward your ruin and inflames them so that the fortress, which is the cause of that, cannot then defend you. So much so that a wise and good prince, so as to keep himself good and not to give cause to or dare his sons to become bad, will never make a fortress, so that they may found themselves not upon fortresses but upon the benevolence of men. And if Count Francesco Sforza, who became duke of Milan, was reputed wise and nonetheless made a fortress in Milan, I say that in this he was not wise, and the effect has demonstrated that such a fortress was for his heirs' harm, not their security. For, judging that by means of it they could live securely while offending their citizens and subjects, they did not spare[9] any kind of violence, so that having become hateful beyond measure,[10] they lost that state when the enemy first assaulted them.[11] In war that fortress neither defended them nor was at all useful to them, and in peace it was of very much harm to them. For if they had not had it, and if by their little prudence they had harshly managed their citizens, they would have uncovered the danger sooner and have withdrawn from it, and then would have been able to resist the French thrust more spiritedly with friendly subjects and without a fortress than with enemy ones and with the fortress. They do not help you in any aspect, for

they are lost either through the fraud of whoever guards them, or through the violence of whoever assaults them, or through starvation. And if you wish that they should help you and aid you to recover a lost state, where the fortress alone is left to you, you must have an army with which you can assault him who has expelled you. And if you had that army, you would get the state back in any case, even if the fortress were not there, and so much the more easily as the men would be more friendly to you than they were to you when you had badly treated them because of the pride of the fortress. It is seen from experience that this fortress of Milan has not done anything useful to either of them, neither the Sforzas nor the French, in times adverse to the one or the other. Instead it has brought very much harm and ruin to all, since because of it they did not think of a more honest mode of holding that state. When Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino and son of Federico, who in his times was such an esteemed captain, was expelled from his state by Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI, and then returned there through an accident that arose, he had all the fortresses that were in that province ruined, since he judged them harmful. Since he was loved by men, out of respect for them he did not want [fortresses]; and he saw he could not defend [fortresses] on the enemy's account, since an army in the field was needed to defend them; so he turned to ruining them. Having expelled the Bentivogli from Bologna, Pope Julius made a fortress in that city, and then had the people vexed[12] by his governor.[13] The people therefore rebelled, he lost the fortress at once, and thus the fortress did not help him and did hurt him, whereas if he had behaved otherwise it would have helped him. When Niccolò da Castello, father of the Vitelli,[14] returned to his fatherland, from which he had been exiled, he at once demolished two fortresses Pope Sixtus IV had built there, judging that not the fortress but the benevolence of the people had to keep him in that state. But of all the other examples, that of Genoa, which ensued in very recent times, is the freshest and most notable in every aspect, and capable of showing the uselessness of building [fortresses] and the utility of demolishing them. Everyone knows that in 1507 Genoa rebelled against Louis XII, king of France, who came in person with all his forces to reacquire it. When he had recovered it, he made a fortress stronger than all the others of which there is knowledge at present. For it was impregnable by its site and by every other circumstance, being placed upon the top of a hill that extends into the sea, called Codefa by the Genoese. From it he could fire on the whole port and a great part of the city of Genoa. It occurred then in 1512 that when the French troops were expelled from Italy, Genoa rebelled, notwithstanding the fortress; Ottaviano

Fregoso took over its state; and, with all industry, within a limit of sixteen months he captured it by starvation. Everyone believed and many counseled that he should have preserved it as his refuge for any accident, but being very prudent he knew that not fortresses but the will of men maintains princes in their states, and he ruined it. Thus founding his state not upon the fortress but upon his virtue and prudence, he has held and holds it. And whereas a thousand infantrymen were customarily enough to vary the state of Genoa, his adversaries have assaulted him with ten thousand and have not been able to hurt him. By this it is thus seen that demolishing the fortress has not hurt Ottaviano and making it did not defend the king. For if he were able to come into Italy with his army, he could have recovered Genoa though he did not have a fortress there; but if he were unable to come into Italy with his army, he could not have held Genoa though he did have the fortress there. Thus for the king it was expensive to make and shameful to lose; for Ottaviano it was glorious to reacquire and useful to ruin.

[3] But let us come to the republics that make fortresses not in their fatherlands but in towns they acquire. And if the said example of France and Genoa should not be enough to show this fallacy, I wish Florence and Pisa to be enough for me. The Florentines made fortresses there to hold that city. They did not know that if they wished to hold a city that had always been an enemy to the Florentine name, had lived freely, and had in rebellion had freedom as its refuge, it was necessary to observe the Roman mode: either to make it a partner or to demolish it. For the fortresses' virtue was seen during the coming of King Charles,[15] to whom they were given up either through the lack of faith of those who guarded them or through fear of a greater evil; whereas if there had not been any, the Florentines would not have founded on them their ability[16] to hold Pisa, and the king would not have been able to deprive the Florentines of that city in that way. The modes by which it had been kept until that time would perhaps have been sufficient to preserve it, and without doubt would not have given a worse proof than the fortresses. I conclude thus that for holding one's own fatherland a fortress is harmful, and for holding towns that have been acquired fortresses are useless. I wish to be enough for me the authority of the Romans, who knocked down walls and did not put up walls in the lands they wished to hold by violence. To whoever cites to me against this opinion Taranto[17] in ancient and Brescia in modern times (which places were recovered from the rebellion of subjects by means of fortresses), I respond

that for the recovery of Taranto at the end[18] of a year Fabius Maximus was sent with all of his army, which would have been capable of recovering it even if the fortress had not been there—and even if Fabius did use that way, if it had not been there he would have used another that would have had the same effect. I do not know of what utility a fortress may be to restore a town to you that for its recovery has need of a consular army and a Fabius Maximus for captain. And that the Romans would have retaken it in any case is seen by the example of Capua, where there was no fortress and they reacquired it by virtue of the army. But let us come to Brescia. I say that what occurred in that rebellion rarely occurs: that the fortress that is left with your forces when the town has rebelled has an army that is big and nearby, like that of the French. For Monsieur de Foix, the king's captain, was with his army at Bologna, and when he heard of the loss of Brescia he went without at that point deferring it, arrived in three days at Brescia, and got back the town through the fortress. To be able to help, therefore, even the fortress of Brescia had need of a Monsieur de Foix and of a French army that brought it relief in three days. Thus this example is not enough against the contrary examples; for in the wars of our times very many fortresses have been taken and retaken with the same fortune with which the countryside was retaken and taken, not only in Lombardy, but in the Romagna, in the kingdom of Naples, and throughout all parts of Italy.

[4] But as to the building of fortresses to defend oneself from enemies from outside, I say that they are not necessary to peoples and kingdoms that have good armies and are useless to those that do not have good armies. For good armies without fortresses are sufficient to defend oneself, and fortresses without good armies cannot defend you. This is seen from the experience of those who have been held to be excellent both in government and in other things, as is seen with the Romans and the Spartans: for if the Romans did not build fortresses, the Spartans not only abstained from them but did not permit their cities to have walls, for they wished for the virtue of the individual man to defend them, and no other defense. Wherefore when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian if the walls of Athens seemed to him beautiful, he responded, "Yes, if they were inhabited by women."[19] Thus if a prince who has good armies has some fortress upon the seacoast at the frontier of his state that can stand up against the enemy for several days until he is in order, it would sometimes be a useful thing but is not necessary. But if the prince does not have a good army, to have fortresses throughout his state or at the frontiers is harmful or useless. Harmful since

he easily loses them, and when lost they make war on him; or if they are, however, so strong that the enemy cannot seize them, they are left behind by the enemy army and come to be fruitless. For when they do not have very hardy opposition, good armies enter into enemy countries without hesitation over cities or fortresses that they may leave behind, as is seen in the ancient histories and as is seen to have been clone by Francesco Maria,[20] who to assault Urbino in very recent times left behind ten enemy cities without any hesitation. Thus a prince who can make a good army can do without building fortresses; one who does not have a good army should not build them. He should fortify well the city he inhabits and keep it provided and its citizens well disposed, to be able to sustain an enemy thrust until either an accord or external aid may free him. All other plans are expensive in times of peace and useless in times of war. And so he who will consider all I have said will come to know that as the Romans were wise in every other order of theirs, so were they prudent in this judgment of the Latins and of the Privernates, in which, not thinking of fortresses, they secured themselves against them with more virtuous and wiser modes.

25

To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize It by Means of Its Disunion Is a Contradictory Policy

[1] There was so much disunion between the plebs and the nobility in the Roman republic that the Veientes, together with the Etruscans, thought that by means of such disunion they could extinguish the Roman name. When they had made an army and overrun the fields of Rome, the Senate sent against them Gaius Manilius and Marcus Fabius. When they led their army near the army of the Veientes, the Veientes did not cease both with assaults and with opprobrium to offend and reproach the Roman name. So great was their temerity and insolence that the Romans from being disunited became united and, coming to fight, broke them and won.[1] It is seen, therefore, how much men are deceived, as we discoursed of above,[2] in taking up policies, and how often they believe they will gain a thing and they lose it. The Veientes believed that by assaulting the disunited Romans they would conquer them; and this assault was the cause of the union of the latter and of their own ruin. For the cause of the disunion of republics is usually idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war. Therefore, if the Veientes had been wise, the more they saw Rome disunited, the more they would have kept war distant from them and sought to crush them with the arts of peace. The mode is to seek to become trusted by the city that is disunited, and to manage oneself between the parties as an arbiter until they come to arms. When they do come to arms, it is to give favors slowly to the weaker party, both to keep them at war longer and make them consume themselves and so that very large forces will not make them all fear that you wish to crush them and become their prince. When this business is well governed, it will almost always turn out to have the end that you set for yourself. The city of Pistoia, as I said in another discourse[3] and for another purpose, did not come under the republic of Florence by any art other than this. Since it was divided, with the Florentines favoring now one party and

now the other, they led it, without disapproval from either the one or the other, to the limit where, tired of its tumultuous way of life, it came spontaneously to throw itself into the arms[4] of Florence. The city of Siena has never changed its state through the favor of the Florentines except when the favors have been weak and few. For when they have been very large and vigorous, they have made that city united in defense of the ruling state. I wish to add one other example to those written above. Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, often started wars with the Florentines, founding himself on their disunion, and was always left the loser, so that he had to say, grieving over his enterprises, that the craziness of the Florentines had made him spend two million in gold uselessly.

[2] Thus, as is said above, the Veientes and the Tuscans were left deceived by this opinion and were finally overcome in one battle by the Romans. And so in the future will anyone be left deceived by it who believes that by a similar way and by a similar cause he can crush a people.

26

Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred against Those Who Use Them, without Any Utility to Them

[1] I believe that one of the great prudences men use is to abstain from menacing or injuring anyone with words. For neither the one nor the other takes forces away from the enemy, but the one makes him more cautious and the other makes him have greater hatred against you and think with greater industry of how to hurt you. This is seen from the example of the Veientes, who were discoursed of in the chapter above. They added to the injury of the war against the Romans the opprobrium of words, from which every prudent captain should make his soldiers abstain. For they are things that ignite and inflame the enemy to revenge and, as was said, in no aspect impede his offense, so much so that those who come against you are all arms. A notable example of this once occurred in Asia, where Gabades, captain of the Persians, had been in camp at Amida for some time and, being tired of the tedium of the siege, decided to depart. Once he removed his camp, those in the town all came onto the walls, made proud by the victory, and did not spare[1] any kind of injury, reproaching, accusing, and reproving the cowardice and poltroonery of the enemy. Angered by this, Gabades changed his counsel and returned to the siege, and so great was the indignation from the injury that in a few days he took and plundered it.[2] The same happened to the Veientes, for whom it was not enough, as was said, to make war on the Romans; they also vituperated them with words. Going as far as the stockade of their camp to speak injuriously to them, they angered them much more with words than with arms. Those soldiers who before had combated unwillingly constrained the consuls to join the fight so that the Veientes, like the aforesaid, bore the punishment of their contumacy.[3] Good princes of armies and good governors of republics have then to take every opportune remedy so that these injuries and reproofs may not be used either in the city or in his army, either among themselves or

against the enemy. For used against the enemy the inconveniences written above come from them, and among themselves they would do worse if not provided against as prudent men have always provided against them. The Roman legions, having been left at Capua, conspired against the Capuans, as will be narrated in its place,[4] and when a sedition that arose from this conspiracy was quieted by Valerius Corvinus, among the other institutions in the convention that was made, they ordered very heavy punishments for those who should ever reprove any of those soldiers for that sedition.[5] When Tiberius Gracchus in the war with Hannibal was made captain over a certain number of slaves that the Romans from lack of men had armed, among the first things he ordered was capital punishment for anyone who should reprove any one of them for their servitude.[6] So much was it esteemed a harmful thing by the Romans, as was said above, to vilify men or to reprove them for anything shameful, for there is nothing that inflames their spirits so much or generates greater indignation, whether said as true or as a joke. “For pungent jokes, when drawn too much from truth, leave a bitter memory.”[7]

27

For Prudent Princes and Republics It Should Be Enough to Conquer, for Most Often When It Is Not Enough, One Loses

[1] Using words of little honor against the enemy arises most often from an insolence that either victory or the false hope of victory gives you. This false hope makes men err not only in speaking but also in working. For when this hope enters into the breasts of men, it makes them pass beyond the mark and most often lose the opportunity of having a certain good through hoping to have an uncertain better. Because this is a limit that deserves consideration, since men are very often deceived about it to the harm of their state, it seems to me that it should be demonstrated through particulars, with ancient and modern examples, since it cannot be demonstrated so distinctly through reasons. After Hannibal had defeated the Romans at Cannae, he sent his spokesmen to Carthage to announce the victory and request assistance.[1] What had to be done was disputed in the Senate there. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian citizen, counseled that this victory should be used wisely to make peace with the Romans, since they, having won, could have it with honorable conditions, and one should not wait to have to make one after a loss. For the intention of the Carthaginians should have been to show the Romans that they were able enough to combat them, and, having had victory over them, one should not seek to lose it through the hope of a greater. This policy was not taken up, but it was known well by the Carthaginian Senate to have been wise later when the opportunity was lost.

[2] When Alexander the Great had already taken all of the East, the republic of Tyre (which was noble and powerful in those times through having their city in water like the Venetians), having seen the greatness of Alexander, sent him spokesmen to say to him that they wished to be his good servants and to give him the obedience he wished but that they were not ready to accept either him or his troops into the town.[2] Whereupon,

indignant that a city wished to close to him the gates that all the world had opened to him, Alexander repelled them, did not accept their conditions, and encamped there. The town was in water and very well supplied with provisions and other supplies necessary for its defense—so much so that after four months Alexander perceived that one city was taking him more time to its glory than many other acquisitions had taken him, and he decided to try for an accord and concede them what they themselves had asked. But those of Tyre had been made proud and not only did not wish to accept the accord, but killed those who came to put it into practice. Indignant at this, Alexander set himself to its capture with so much force that he took it, demolished it, and killed and made slaves of the men.

[3] In 1512 a Spanish army came into the Florentine dominion to put the Medici back in Florence and tax the city, brought by citizens from inside who had given them hope that once they were in the Florentine dominion they would take up arms in their favor. Having entered onto the plain and not discovering anyone, and having a lack of provisions, they tried for an accord, which the people of Florence, having become proud, did not accept, whence arose the loss of Prato and the ruin of that state.[3]

[4] Therefore princes who are assaulted cannot make a greater error, when the assault is made by men very much more powerful than they, than to refuse every accord, especially when it is offered to them. For one will never be offered so base that there is not inside it in some part the well-being of him who accepts it, and there will be a part of victory for him. For it should have been enough for the people of Tyre that Alexander accepted the conditions he had refused before, and their victory was enough when with arms in hand they had made such a man condescend to their wish. It should have been enough also for the Florentine people and have been victory enough for them if the Spanish army yielded to some of their wishes and did not fulfill all of its own. For the intention of that army was to change the state in Florence, to remove it from its devotion to France, and to draw money from it. If of three things it had two of them (which were the last two) and one remained to the people (which was the preservation of its state), each had in that some honor and some satisfaction. Nor should the people have cared about the two things since it remained alive; nor should it have wished to put that—even if it had seen a greater and almost certain victory—in any part at the discretion of fortune, thereby going to the last stake, which nobody prudent ever risks unless necessitated. When Hannibal departed from Italy, where for sixteen years he had been glorious, called

back by his Carthaginians to relieve the fatherland, he found Hasdrubal and Syphax defeated and found the kingdom of Numidia lost and Carthage restricted to the limits of its walls, with no refuge remaining to it other than him and his army.[4] Knowing that this was the last stake of his fatherland, he did not wish to put it at risk before he had tried every other remedy. He was not ashamed to ask for peace since he judged that if his fatherland had any remedy it was in that and not in war. When that was denied him, he did not wish to fail to engage in combat, even if he should lose, since he judged that he was still able to win or, losing, to lose gloriously. And if Hannibal, who was so virtuous and had his army intact, sought peace before fighting, when he saw that by losing it his fatherland would become servile, what should another do of less virtue and of less experience than he? But men make this error who do not know how to put limits to their hopes, and, by founding themselves on these without otherwise measuring themselves, they are ruined.

28

How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a Prince Not to Avenge an Injury Done against the Public or against a Private Person[1]

[1] What indignation makes men do is easily known from what happened to the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as spokesmen to the French who had come to assault Tuscany and Chiusi in particular.[2] Since the people of Chiusi had sent to Rome for aid against the French, the Romans sent ambassadors who in the name of the Roman people were to signify to the French that they should abstain from making war on the Tuscans. When the French and the Tuscans came to fight, these spokesmen, being on the spot and more capable of doing than saying, put themselves among the first to combat against the former. From this it arose that since they were recognized by them, [the French] turned against the Romans all the indignation they had against the Tuscans. This indignation became greater because when the French through their ambassadors made a complaint to the Roman Senate about this injury, and asked that in satisfaction of that harm the Fabii written above should be given over to them, not only were they not consigned to them or punished in any other mode, but when the electoral meetings came they were made tribunes with consular power. So that when the French saw those honored who should have been punished, they took all to have been done for their disparagement and ignominy. Inflamed with indignation and anger, they came to assault Rome and took it, except for the Capitol. This ruin arose for the Romans only through the inobservance of justice, for when their ambassadors sinned "against the law of nations"[3] and should have been punished, they were honored. It is therefore to be considered how much every republic and every prince should take account of doing similar injuries, not only against a collectivity but even against an individual. For if a man is greatly offended either by the

public or by a private person[4] and is not avenged according to his satisfaction, if he lives in a republic he seeks to avenge himself, even if with its ruin; and if he lives under a prince and has any generosity in himself he is never quiet until he avenges himself against him, even if he sees evil for himself in that.

[2] To verify this there is no example more beautiful or more true than that of Philip King of Macedon, father of Alexander. He had in his court Pausanias, a beautiful and noble youth, with whom Attalus, one of the first men near Philip, was in love. Having often sought to get him to consent to him, and finding him averse to such things, he decided to have by deception and by force that which he saw he could not have by any other direction. Having made a festive[5] banquet to which came Pausanias and many other noble barons, after everyone was full of food and wine, he had Pausanias taken and brought bound, and not only vented his own lust by force, but also for greater ignominy had him reproached in a similar mode by many of the others. Pausanias complained of this injury often to Philip, who, after holding him for a time in hope that he would be avenged, not only did not avenge him but elevated Attalus to the government of a province of Greece. Whereupon Pausanias, seeing his enemy honored and not punished, turned all his indignation not against the one who had done him the injury but against Philip, who had not avenged him. On the festive[6] morning of the wedding of Philip's daughter, whom he had married to Alexander of Epirus, when Philip was going to the temple to celebrate it in the middle of the two Alexanders, son-in-law and son, he killed him.[7] This example is very similar to that of the Romans and notable for whoever governs. For he should never esteem a man so little that he believes that when he adds injury on top of injury, he who is injured will not think of avenging himself with every danger and particular harm for himself.

29

Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans

[1] If how human affairs proceed is considered well, it will be seen that often things arise and accidents come about that the heavens have not altogether wished to be provided against. And if what I say happened at Rome (where there was so much virtue, so much religion, and so much order), it is no marvel that it should happen much more often in a city or a province that lacks the things said above. Because this place is very notable for demonstrating the power of heaven over human affairs, Titus Livy demonstrates it extensively and in very efficacious words, saying that since heaven for some end wished the Romans to know its power, it first made the Fabii err, whom they sent as spokesmen to the French, and by means of their work incited the latter to make war on Rome. Then it ordered that nothing worthy of the Roman people should be done in Rome to put down that war, having ordered before that Camillus, who alone could have been the sole remedy for such an evil, should be sent into exile at Ardea.[1] Then, when the French came toward Rome, they who had often created a dictator as a remedy for the thrust of the Volsci and other neighboring enemies of theirs did not create one when the French came. Also, in making the levy of soldiers, they made it weakly and without any extraordinary diligence; and they were so lazy in taking up arms that they were only with trouble in time to encounter the French above the river Allia, ten miles distant from Rome.[2] There the tribunes put their camp without any of the accustomed diligence—not looking at the place in advance, not surrounding it with a trench and a stockade, and not using any remedy, human or divine. And in ordering the battle they made the ranks[3] sparse and weak, in such a mode that neither the soldiers nor the captains did anything worthy of Roman discipline. They engaged in combat without any blood, for they fled before they were assaulted; the greater part of them went to Veii and the others withdrew to Rome. Without otherwise entering their homes, they entered the Capitol in such a mode that the Senate, without thinking of defending

Rome, did not even close the gates, and part of them fled and part of them entered the Capitol with the others. In defending it, however, they used some orders without tumult. For they did not weigh it down with useless persons; they put there all the grain they could so that they would be able to endure the siege; and of the useless crowd of old men, women, and children, the greater part fled to the towns round about and the remainder stayed in Rome as prey for the French. So whoever had read of the things done by that people for so many years before and then read of those times could not believe in any mode that it was one and the same people. After speaking of all the disorders spoken of above, Titus Livy concludes by saying, "So much does Fortune blind spirits where it does not wish its gathering strength checked."[4] Nor can this conclusion be more true, so that men who live ordinarily in great adversity or prosperity deserve less praise or less blame. For most often it will be seen that they have been brought to ruin or to greatness through a great advantage that the heavens have provided them, giving or taking away from them an opportunity to be able to work virtuously.

[2] Fortune does this well, since when it wishes to bring about great things it elects a man of so much spirit and so much virtue that he recognizes the opportunities that it proffers him. Thus in the same manner, when it wishes to bring about great ruin, it prefers men who can aid in that ruin. And if anyone should be there who could withstand it, either it kills him or it deprives him of all faculties of being able to work anything well. One knows very well from this text that to make Rome greater and lead it to that greatness it came to, fortune judged it was necessary to beat it (as we will discourse of at length in the beginning of the following book),[5] but still did not wish to ruin it altogether. For this it is seen to have had Camillus exiled but not killed; made Rome be taken but not the Capitol; and ordered that the Romans not think of any good thing to protect Rome but later not lack any good order to defend the Capitol. So that Rome would be taken, it made the greater part of the soldiers who had been defeated at the Allia go from there to Veii and thus cut off all ways for the defense of the city of Rome. In ordering this, it prepared everything for its recovery, having led an intact Roman army to Veii and Camillus to Ardea, so it would be possible to make a massive body[6] under a captain not stained with any ignominy from the loss and with his reputation intact for the recovery of his fatherland.

[3] We could bring up some modern example in confirmation of the things said, but because we do not judge it necessary since this can satisfy anyone whatever, we will omit it. I indeed affirm it anew to be very true, according to what is seen through all the histories, that men can second fortune but not oppose it, that they can weave its warp but not break it. They should indeed never give up[7] for, since they do not know its end and it proceeds by oblique and unknown ways, they have always to hope and, since they hope, not to give up in whatever fortune and in whatever travail they may find themselves.

30

Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy Friendships Not with Money but with Virtue and the Reputation of Strength

[1] The Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and although they awaited relief from Veii and Camillus, since they were being expelled by starvation, they came to a settlement with the French to buy themselves off for a certain quantity of gold.[1] The gold was already being weighed on the basis of such a convention when Camillus came up with his army. Fortune did this, the historian says, "so that Romans should not live redeemed by gold."[2] This affair is notable not only in this aspect but throughout the course of this republic's actions, in which it is seen that they never acquired lands with money, never made peace with money, but always with the virtue of arms—which I do not believe ever happened to any other republic. Among the other signs by which the power of a strong state is known is seeing how it lives with its neighbors. And if it governs itself so that to keep it friendly the neighbors become its tributaries, then that is a certain sign that state is powerful; but if said neighbors, although inferior to it, draw money from it, then that is a great sign of its weakness.

[2] Let all the Roman histories be read, and you[3] will see that the Massilians,[4] the Aedui,[5] the Rhodians,[6] Hiero the Syracusan,[7] and Kings Eumenes[8] and Massinissa,[9] who all were neighbors of the borders of the Roman Empire, contributed to expenses and tributes for its needs so as to have its friendship, not seeking any reward from it other than to be defended. The contrary will be seen in weak states. Beginning with ours of Florence, in times past, when its reputation was greater, there was no lordling in the Romagna who did not have a stipend from it; and furthermore it gave to the Perugians, the Castellans, and all its other neighbors. For if that city had been armed and vigorous, all would have gone to the contrary: to have protection from it, many would have given money to it, and sought not to sell it their friendship but to buy its. Nor have

the Florentines alone lived in this cowardice, but also the Venetians, and the king of France, who with so great a kingdom lives as a tributary of the Swiss and of the king of England. All of which arises from his having disarmed his people and from that king and the others named before having wished rather to enjoy the present utility of being able to plunder their peoples, and to escape an imagined rather than a true danger, than to do things that might secure them and make their states perpetually happy. If this disorder brings forth some quiet, with time it is of necessity a cause of irremediable harms and ruin. It would be lengthy to tell how often the Florentines, the Venetians, and that kingdom have bought themselves off in their wars, and how often they have submitted to an ignominy to which the Romans only once were about to submit. It would be lengthy to tell how many lands the Florentines and the Venetians have bought: one saw later the disorder of this, and that the things they acquire with gold they do not know how to defend with steel. The Romans observed this generosity and this mode of life while they lived freely; but later, when they entered under the emperors, and the emperors began to be bad and to love the shade more than the sun, they also began to buy themselves off, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans, now from other peoples round about, which was the beginning of the ruin of so great an empire.

[3] Similar inconveniences proceed, therefore, from having disarmed your people, from which results another greater one: that the nearer the enemy draws to you, the weaker he finds you. For he who lives in the modes said above treats those subjects inside his empire badly and those on the borders of his empire well, so as to have well-disposed men to keep the enemy distant. From this it arises that to keep him more distant, he gives stipends to the lords and peoples who are nearby his borders. Hence it arises that states made thus put up a little resistance on his borders, but when the enemy has passed them, they do not have any remedy. And they do not perceive that this mode of proceeding of theirs is against every good order. For the heart and the vital parts of a body have to be kept armed and not its extremities, since without the latter it lives, but if the former are hurt it dies; and these states keep the heart unarmed and the hands and feet armed.

[4] What this disorder has done to Florence was seen and is seen every day: as soon as an army passes beyond its borders and enters near its heart, it does not find any more remedy. Of the Venetians the same proof was seen a few years ago; and if their city were not wrapped by the waters, its end would have been seen. This experience is not seen so often in France,

because it is so great a kingdom that it has few enemies superior to it; nonetheless, when the English assaulted that kingdom in 1513, the whole province shook, and the king himself and everyone else judged that one defeat alone might have taken away from him the kingdom and the state.[10] The contrary happened to the Romans, for the nearer the enemy drew to Rome, the more powerful he found that city in resisting him. In the coming of Hannibal into Italy, one sees that after three defeats[11] and so many deaths of captains and soldiers, they could not only stand up against the enemy but win the war. All this arose from having the heart well armed and taking less account of the extremities. For the foundation of its state was the people of Rome, the Latin name, the other partner towns in Italy, and their colonies, from which they drew so many soldiers that with them they were sufficient to combat and hold the world. That this is true is seen from the question Hanno the Carthaginian asked Hannibal's spokesmen after the defeat of Cannae.[12] After they had magnified the things done by Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether anyone had come from the Roman people to ask for peace and whether any town of the Latin name or of the colonies had rebelled against the Romans. When they answered negatively as to both the one thing and the other, Hanno replied, "This war is still as intact as before."[13]

[5] One sees, therefore, both from this discourse and from what we have often said elsewhere, how much difference there is between the mode of proceeding of the present republics and that of the ancient ones. Because of this, one also sees miraculous losses and miraculous acquisitions every day. For where men have little virtue, fortune shows its power very much; and because it is variable, republics and states often vary and will always vary until someone emerges who is so much a lover of antiquity that he regulates it in such a mode that it does not have cause to show at every turning of the sun how much it can do.

31

How Dangerous It Is to Believe the Banished

[1] It does not seem to me outside the purpose to reason, among these other discourses, about how dangerous it is to believe those who have been expelled from their fatherland, these being things that have to be put into practice every day by those who hold states, especially since this can be demonstrated by a memorable example brought up by Titus Livy in his histories, although outside his purpose.[1] When Alexander the Great passed with his army into Asia, Alexander of Epirus, his brother-in-law and uncle, came with troops into Italy, called by the banished Lucanians, who gave him hope that by means of them he could seize all of that province. Hence, having come into Italy under their faith and hope, he was killed by them, since they had been promised a return to their fatherland by their fellow citizens if they killed him. It should therefore be considered how vain are both the faith and the promises of those who find themselves deprived of their fatherland. For as to faith, it has to be reckoned that whenever they can reenter their fatherland by means other than yours, they will leave you and draw close to others, notwithstanding whatever promises they have made you. And as to vain promises and hopes, their wish to return home is so extreme that they naturally believe many things that are false, and from art add many more to them. So that between what they believe and what they say they believe, they fill you with such hope that by founding yourself on it, either you make an expense in vain or you undertake an enterprise in which you are ruined.

[2] I wish the aforesaid Alexander and furthermore Themistocles the Athenian to be enough for me as examples. The latter, when he was made a rebel, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so much if he would assault Greece that Darius turned to the enterprise. When Themistocles then could not observe those promises to him, either from shame or from fear of torture, he poisoned himself. And if this error was made by Themistocles, a very excellent man, it should be reckoned how much those

err in this who from less virtue let themselves be pulled more by their wish and their passion.[2] A prince should thus go slowly in taking up enterprises on the report of someone banished,[3] since most often he is left either with shame or with very grave harm. And because taking towns furtively and through intelligence from others in them rarely succeeds, it does not seem to me outside the purpose to discourse of that in the following chapter, adding to that by how many modes the Romans acquired them.

32

In How Many Modes the Romans Seized Towns

[1] Since all the Romans turned to war, they always made it with every advantage, both as to expense and as to every other thing sought in it. From this it arose that they guarded themselves from taking towns by siege, for they judged the expense and inconvenience of this mode to be so great as to overcome by far the utility that could be drawn from what it acquired. Because of this they thought it would be better and more useful to subjugate towns by every other mode than by besieging them—hence, in so many wars and in so many years, there are very few examples of sieges made by them. The modes, then, by which they acquired cities were either by storm or by surrender. Storming was either by force and open violence or by force mixed with fraud. Open violence was either by assault without knocking down the walls (which they called "attacking the city with a crown,"[1] for they surrounded the city with the whole army and engaged in combat from all sides, and they very often succeeded in taking even a very big city in one assault, as when Scipio took New Carthage in Spain);[2] or, if this assault was not enough, they addressed themselves to breaking the walls with rams and with other of their war machines; or they made a mine and entered the city through it (by which mode they took the city of the Veientes);[3] or, to be equal to those who defended the walls, they made towers of wood or made barricades of earth leaning on the walls from outside so as to reach their height on those. Against these assaults, whoever defended in the first case, that of being assaulted all around, bore more immediate danger and had more doubtful remedies. For he needed to have very many defenders in every place, and either those that he had were not so many that they could either cope everywhere or reinforce one another, or, if they could, they were not all of equal spirit to resist, and through one part that yielded in the fighting they all lost. Therefore it often occurred, as I have said, that this mode had a happy outcome. But when it did not succeed at first, they did not retain it much because it was a dangerous mode for the army. For it

extended itself over so much space that it was left too weak everywhere to be able to resist a sortie that those inside might make, and also the soldiers disordered and tired themselves; but once and unexpectedly they would try such a mode. As to breaking the walls, it was opposed, as in the present times, with embankments. To resist mines they made a countermine, and through it opposed the enemy either with arms or with other devices, among which were filling barrels with feathers that they set fire to and, once inflamed, put in the mine, which with smoke and stench impeded the enemy's entry. And if they assaulted them with towers, they devised how to ruin them with fire. And as to embankments of earth, they broke the wall at the lower part where the embankment leaned and drew inside the earth that those outside piled up there; so that with the earth being put there from outside and removed from inside, the embankment did not grow. These modes of storming cannot be tried at length, but one needs either to leave the field or seek to win the war by other modes (as Scipio did when, having entered into Africa and having assaulted Utica and not succeeded in taking it, he left the field and sought to break the Carthaginian armies),[4] or truly to turn to the siege (as they did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and similar towns they seized by siege). As to acquiring towns by furtive violence, it occurs as happened at Palaepolis, which the Romans seized through a treaty with those inside.[5] Many stormings of this sort have been tried by the Romans and by others, and few have succeeded. The reason is that every least impediment breaks the plan, and impediments come about easily. For either[6] the conspiracy is uncovered before one gets to the act—and it is uncovered without much difficulty, partly because of the faithlessness of those to whom it is communicated and partly because of the difficulty of putting it into practice, since one has to meet with enemies and with those with whom you are not permitted to speak unless under some color. But if the conspiracy is not uncovered in managing it, a thousand difficulties emerge later in the act. For if you come before the planned time or if you come afterward, everything is spoiled; if a fortuitous noise is raised, as by the geese of the Capitol, if an accustomed order is broken—every least error, every least mistake that is made ruins the enterprise. Added to this is the darkness of the night, which puts more fear in whoever labors in those dangerous things. And since the greater part of the men who are led to similar enterprises are inexpert in the site of the country and the places where they are brought, they become confused, cowardly, and embroiled from every least and fortuitous accident, and every false

imagination is able to make them turn about. Nor was anyone ever found who was more happy in these fraudulent and nocturnal expeditions than Aratus of Sicyon,[7] who was as worthy in these as he was pusillanimous in daylight and open struggle. This can be judged to have been rather from a hidden virtue in him than because there should naturally have been more happiness in these. Thus of these modes very many are put into practice, few are brought to the proof, and very few succeed.

[2] As to acquiring towns by surrender, they give themselves either willingly or forcibly. The will arises either from some extrinsic necessity that constrains them to take refuge with you, as Capua did with the Romans, or from desire to be well governed, when they are attracted by the good government that prince holds over those who willingly consign themselves into his lap, as did the Rhodians, the Massilians, and other similar cities who gave themselves to the Roman people. As to forced surrender, either such force arises from a long siege, as was said above, or it arises from a continual crushing by raids, depredations, and other ill treatment, wishing to escape from which a city surrenders. Of all the said modes, the Romans used the last more than any; for more than four hundred fifty years they paid attention to tiring out their neighbors with defeats and raids and to gaining reputation over them by means of accords, as we have discoursed of elsewhere.[8] On such a mode they always founded themselves, although they tried them all, but in the others they found things that were either dangerous or useless. For in a siege, there are length and expense; in storming, doubt and danger; in conspiracies, uncertainty. They saw that with a defeat of an enemy army they acquired a kingdom in a day, and in taking an obstinate city by siege they consumed many years.

33

How the Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies

[1] I reckon that when reading this Livian history and wishing to profit from it, all the modes of proceeding of the Roman people and Senate should be considered. Among the other things that deserve consideration is seeing with what authority they sent their consuls, dictators, and other captains of armies outside. Their authority is seen to have been very great and the Senate not to have reserved any authority to itself other than that of starting new wars and of ratifying peace, and it consigned all other things to the judgment and power of the consul. For once the people and the Senate had decided upon a war—for instance, against the Latins—they consigned all the rest to the judgment of the consul, who could either wage a battle or not wage it, encamp at this town or that other one, as he liked.[1] These things are verified by many examples, especially by what occurred in an expedition against the Tuscans.[2] For when Fabius the consul had defeated them near Sutri and then planned to pass with his army through the Ciminian forest and go into Tuscany, not only did he not take counsel with the Senate, but he did not give them any knowledge of it, although the war would have to be waged in a new, doubtful, and dangerous country. This is testified to also by the decisions made by the Senate about that. It had heard of the victory Fabius had had and feared he would take up the policy of passing through the said forest into Tuscany. Judging that it would be good not to attempt that war and run into that danger, it sent two legates to Fabius to make him understand he was not to pass into Tuscany. They arrived when he had already passed through there and had had the victory, and instead of being impeders of the war they turned into ambassadors of the acquisition and the glory that was gained. Whoever will consider this limit well will see it was used very prudently. For if the Senate had wished that a consul should proceed into war little by little[3] according to his commission, it would have made him less circumspect and more slow, for it would not have seemed to him that the victory would have been all his but that the Senate, by whose

counsel he was governed, would share in it. Besides this, the Senate would have been obliged to wish to give counsel about a thing that it could not understand, for notwithstanding that in it were men all very much trained in war, nonetheless, since it was not on the spot and did not know infinite particulars that are necessary to know for whoever wishes to give counsel well, it would have made infinite errors in giving counsel. Because of this they wished that the consul should act by himself and that the glory should be all his—the love of which, they judged, would be a check and a rule to make him work well. This part is more willingly noted by me since I see that the republics of the present times, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, understand it otherwise, and if their captains, superintendents, or commissioners have to set up one artillery piece, they wish to understand and give counsel about it. This mode deserves the praise that the others deserve, all of which together have led them to the limits where they at present find themselves.

THIRD BOOK

1

If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Live Long, It Is Necessary to Draw It Back Often toward Its Beginning

[1] It is a very true thing that all worldly things have a limit to their life; but generally those go the whole course that is ordered for them by heaven, that do not disorder their body but keep it ordered so that either it does not alter or, if it alters, it is for its safety and not to its harm. Because I am speaking of mixed bodies, such as republics and sects, I say that those alterations are for safety that lead them back toward their beginnings. So those are better ordered and have longer life that by means of their orders can often be renewed or indeed that through some accident outside the said order come to the said renewal. And it is a thing clearer than light that these bodies do not last if they do not renew themselves.

[2] The mode of renewing them is, as was said, to lead them back toward their beginnings. For all the beginnings of sects, republics, and kingdoms must have some goodness in them, by means of which they may regain their first reputation and their first increase. Because in the process of time that goodness is corrupted, unless something intervenes to lead it back to the mark, it of necessity kills that body. Speaking of the bodies of men, these doctors of medicine say "that daily something is added that at some time needs cure."[1] Speaking of republics, this return toward the beginning is done through either extrinsic accident or intrinsic prudence. As to the first, one sees that it was necessary that Rome be taken by the French, if one wished that it be reborn and, by being reborn, regain new life and new virtue, and regain the observance of religion and justice, which were beginning to be tainted in it. This is very well understood through Livy's history, where he shows that in taking out the army against the French, and in creating the tribunes with consular power, they did not observe any religious ceremony.[2] So, likewise, not only did they not punish the three Fabii who "against the law of nations"[3] had engaged in combat against the

French, but they created them tribunes.[4] It ought to be easily presupposed that they were beginning to take less account of other good institutions ordered by Romulus and by the other prudent princes than was reasonable and necessary to maintain their free way of life. Thus came this external[5] beating, so that all the orders of the city might be regained and that it might be shown to that people that it was necessary not only to maintain religion and justice but also to esteem its good citizens and to take more account of their virtue than of those advantages that it appeared to them they lacked through their works. This, one sees, succeeded exactly; for as soon as Rome was retaken, they renewed all the orders of their ancient religion, they punished the Fabii who had engaged in combat "against the law of nations,"[6] and next they so much esteemed the virtue and goodness of Camillus that they put aside all envy—the Senate and the others—and they again placed all the weight of that republic on him.[7] It is thus necessary, as was said, that men who live together in any order whatever often examine themselves either through these extrinsic accidents or through intrinsic ones. As to the latter, it must arise either from a law that often looks over the account for the men who are in that body or indeed from a good man who arises among them, who with his examples and his virtuous works produces the same effect as the order.

[3] Thus this good emerges in republics either through the virtue of a man or through the virtue of an order. As to this last, the orders that drew the Roman republic back toward its beginning were the tribunes of the plebs, the censors, and all the other laws that went against the ambition and the insolence of men. Such orders have need of being brought to life by the virtue of a citizen who rushes spiritedly to execute them against the power of those who transgress them. Notable among such executions, before the taking of Rome by the French,[8] were the death of the sons of Brutus,[9] the death of the ten citizens,[10] and that of Maelius the grain dealer;[11] after the taking of Rome it was the death of Manlius Capitolinus,[12] the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus,[13] the execution of Papirius Cursor against his master of the cavalrymen Fabius,[14] and the accusation of the Scipios.[15] Because they were excessive and notable, such things made men draw back toward the mark whenever one of them arose; and when they began to be more rare, they also began to give more space to men to corrupt themselves and to behave with greater danger and more tumult. For one should not wish ten years at most to pass from one to another of such executions; for

when this time is past, men begin to vary in their customs and to transgress the laws. Unless something arises by which punishment is brought back to their memory and fear is renewed in their spirits, soon so many delinquents join together that they can no longer be punished without danger. Those who governed the state of Florence from 1434 up to 1494 used to say, to this purpose, that it was necessary to regain the state every five years; otherwise, it was difficult to maintain it.[16] They called regaining the state putting that terror and that fear in men that had been put there in taking it, since at that time they had beaten down those who, according to that mode of life, had worked for ill. But as the memory of that beating is eliminated, men began to dare to try new things and to say evil; and so it is necessary to provide for it, drawing [the state] back toward its beginnings. This drawing back of republics toward their beginning arises also from the simple virtue of one man, without depending on any law that stimulates you to any execution; nonetheless, they are of such reputation and so much example that good men desire to imitate them and the wicked are ashamed to hold to a life contrary to them. In Rome those who particularly produced these good effects were Horatius Coclus,[17] Scaevola,[18] Fabricius,[19] the two Decii,[20] Regulus Attilius,[21] and some others who with their rare and virtuous examples produced in Rome almost the same effect that laws and orders produced. If the executions written above, together with these particular examples, had continued at least every ten years in that city, it follows of necessity that it would never have been corrupt; but as both of these two things began to diminish, corruptions began to multiply. For after Marcus Regulus no like example may be seen there, and although the two Catos emerged in Rome, there was so much distance from him to them and between them from one to the other, and they remained so alone, that with their good examples they were not able to do any good work—and especially the last Cato, who, finding the city in good part corrupt, was not able to make the citizens become better with his example.[22] Let this be enough as to republics.

[4] But as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the example of our religion, which would be altogether eliminated if it had not been drawn back toward its beginning by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick. For with poverty and with the example of the life of Christ they brought back into the minds of men what had already been eliminated there. Their new orders were so powerful that they are the cause that the dishonesty of the prelates and of the heads of the religion do not ruin it. Living still in

poverty and having so much credit with peoples in confessions and sermons, they give them to understand that it is evil to say evil of evil, and that it is good to live under obedience to them and, if they make an error, to leave them for God to punish. So they do the worst they can because they do not fear the punishment that they do not see and do not believe. This renewal, therefore, has maintained and maintains this religion.[23]

[5] Kingdoms also have need of renewing themselves and of bringing back their laws toward their beginnings. How much good effect this part produces is seen in the kingdom of France, which lives under laws and under orders more than any other kingdom. Parlements are those who maintain these laws and orders, especially that of Paris.[24] They are renewed by it whenever it makes an execution against a prince of that kingdom and when it condemns the king in its verdicts. Up until now it has maintained itself by having been an obstinate executor against the nobility; but whenever it should leave any of them unpunished and they should come to multiply, without doubt it would arise either that they would have to be corrected with great disorder or that that kingdom would be dissolved.

[6] One therefore concludes that nothing is more necessary in a common way of life, whether it is sect or kingdom or republic, than to give back to it the reputation it had in its beginnings, and to contrive that it be either good orders or good men that produce this effect, and not have an extrinsic force to produce it. For although sometimes it is the best remedy, as it was in Rome, it is so dangerous that it is not in any way to be desired. To demonstrate to anyone how much the actions of particular men made Rome great and caused many good effects in that city, I shall come to the narration and discourse of them; within these limits this third book and last part of this first decade will conclude. Although the actions of the kings were great and notable, nonetheless since the history states them thoroughly, I shall omit them; nor shall I speak of them otherwise except for anything they may have worked pertaining to their private advantage; and I shall begin with Brutus, father of Roman liberty.[25]

2

That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Craziness at the Right Time[1]

[1] There was never anyone so prudent nor esteemed so wise for any eminent work of his than Junius Brutus deserves to be held in his simulation of stupidity. Although Titus Livy expresses but one cause that induced him to such simulation, which was to be able to live more securely and to maintain his patrimony, nonetheless when his mode of proceeding is considered, it can be believed that he also simulated this to be less observed and to have more occasion for crushing the kings and freeing his own fatherland whenever opportunity would be given him. That he thought of this may be seen, first, in the interpreting of the oracle of Apollo, when he simulated falling so as to kiss the earth, judging that through this he would have the gods favorable to his thoughts,[2] and afterward, when over the dead Lucretia he was the first among her father and husband and other relatives to draw the knife from the wound and to make the bystanders swear that they would never endure that in the future anyone should reign in Rome.[3] From his example all those who are discontented with a prince have to learn: they should first measure and first weigh their forces, and if they are so powerful that they can expose themselves as his enemies and make war on him openly, they should enter on this way, as less dangerous and more honorable. But if they are of such quality that their forces are not enough for making open war, they should seek with all industry to make themselves friends to him; and to this effect, they should enter on all those ways that they judge to be necessary, following his pleasures and taking delight in all those things they see him delighting in. This familiarity, first, makes you live secure, and without carrying any danger it makes you enjoy the good fortune of that prince together with him and affords you every occasion for satisfying your intent. It is true that some say that with princes one should not wish to stand so close that their ruin includes you, nor so far that you would not be in time to rise above their ruin when they are being ruined. Such a middle way would be the truest if it could be observed, but because I

believe that it is impossible, one must be reduced to the two modes written above—that is, either to distance oneself from or to bind oneself to them. Whoever does otherwise, if he is a man notable for his quality, lives in continual danger. Nor is it enough to say: “I do not care for anything; I do not desire either honors or useful things; I wish to live quietly and without quarrel!” For these excuses are heard and not accepted; nor can men who have quality choose to abstain even when they choose it truly and without any ambition, because it is not believed of them; so if they wish to abstain, they are not allowed by others to abstain. Thus one must play crazy, like Brutus, and make oneself very much mad, praising, speaking, seeing, doing things against your intent so as to please the prince. Since we have spoken of the prudence of this man in recovering freedom in Rome, we shall now speak of his severity in maintaining it.

3

That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain a Newly Acquired Freedom

[1] Not less necessary than useful was the severity of Brutus in maintaining in Rome the freedom that he had acquired there. It is an example rare in all memories of things to see the father sit on the tribunals and not only condemn his sons to death but be present at their death. This will always be known by those who read of ancient things: that after a change of state, either from republic to tyranny or from tyranny to republic, a memorable execution against the enemies of present conditions is necessary. Whoever takes up a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and whoever makes a free state and does not kill the sons of Brutus, maintains himself for little time.[1] And because this topic is largely discoursed of above,[2] I refer to what was said then; I will bring up only one example here that has been memorable in our days and in our fatherland. This is Piero Soderini, who believed he would overcome with his patience and goodness the appetite that was in the sons of Brutus for returning to another government, and who deceived himself. Although because of his prudence he recognized this necessity, and though fate and the ambition of those who struck him gave him opportunity to eliminate them, nonetheless he never turned his mind to doing it. For besides believing that he could extinguish ill humors with patience and goodness and wear away some of the enmity to himself with rewards to someone, he judged (and often vouched for it with his friends) that if he wished to strike his opponents vigorously and to beat down his adversaries, he would have needed to take up extraordinary authority and break up civil equality together with the laws. Even though afterward it would not be used tyrannically by him, this thing would have so terrified the collectivity that it would never after join together, after his death, to remake a gonfalonier for life—which order, he judged, it would be good to increase and maintain.[3] Such respect was wise and good; nonetheless he should never allow an evil

to run loose out of respect for a good, when that good could easily be crushed by that evil. Since his works and his intention had to be judged by the end, he should have believed that if fortune and life had stayed with him, everyone could certify that what he had done was for the safety of the fatherland and not for his own ambition; and he could regulate things so that a successor of his would not be able to do for evil what he had done for good. But his first opinion deceived him, as he did not know that malignity is not tamed by time or appeased by any gift. So much so that, through not knowing how to be like Brutus, he lost not only his fatherland but his state and his reputation. And as it is a difficult thing to save a free state, so it is difficult to save a royal one, as will be shown in the following chapter.

4

A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a Principality While Those Who Have Been Despoiled of It Are Living

[1] The death of Tarquin Priscus, caused by the sons of Ancus, and the death of Servius Tullius, caused by Tarquin the Proud, show how difficult and dangerous it is to despoil one individual of the kingdom and to leave him alive, even though one might seek to win him over by compensation.[1] And one sees that Tarquin Priscus was deceived because it appeared to him that he possessed the kingdom lawfully, since it had been given to him by the people and confirmed by the Senate. Nor did he believe that there could be so much indignation in the sons of Ancus that they would not have to be content with what contented all Rome. Servius Tullius deceived himself in believing he could win over the sons of Tarquin with new compensations.[2] So, as to the first, every prince can be warned that he never lives secure in his principality as long as those who have been despoiled of it are living. As to the second, every power can be reminded that old injuries are never suppressed by new benefits, and so much the less as the new benefit is less than the injury was.[3] Without doubt, Servius Tullius was hardly prudent to believe that the sons of Tarquin would be patient to be the sons-in-law of him over whom they judged they ought to be king. This appetite for reigning is so great that it enters the breasts of not only those who expect the kingdom but also those who do not expect it, as it was in the wife of young Tarquin, the daughter of Servius. Moved by this rage, against all paternal piety, she moved her husband against her father to take away from him his life and the kingdom—so much more did she esteem it to be queen than daughter of a king. Thus, if Tarquin Priscus and Servius Tullius lost the kingdom through not knowing how to secure themselves against those from whom they had usurped it,[4] Tarquin the Proud lost it through not observing the orders of the ancient kings, as will be shown in the following chapter.

5

What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a Kingdom Lose It

[1] When Tarquin the Proud had killed Servius Tullius, and there were no heirs remaining of him, he came to possess the kingdom securely, since he did not have to fear those things that had offended his predecessors. Although the mode of seizing the kingdom had been extraordinary and hateful, nonetheless, if he had observed the ancient orders of the other kings, he would have been endured and would not have excited the Senate and plebs against him so as to take the state away from him. Thus he was expelled not because his son Sextus had raped Lucretia[1] but because he had broken the laws of the kingdom and governed it tyrannically, as he had taken away all authority from the Senate and adapted it for himself. That business that was done in public places to the satisfaction of the Roman Senate he brought to do in his palace, with disapproval and envy for him; so in a brief time he despoiled Rome of all the freedom it had maintained under the other kings. Nor was it enough for him to make the Fathers enemies of himself, for he also excited the plebs against himself, tiring it out in mechanical things all alien to what his predecessors had put them to work in.[2] So, having filled Rome with cruel and proud examples, he had already disposed the spirits of all Romans to rebellion whenever they would have opportunity for it. If the accident of Lucretia had not come, as soon as another had arisen it would have brought the same effect. For if Tarquin had lived like the other kings and Sextus his son had made that error, Brutus and Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarquin and not to the Roman people for vengeance against Sextus.[3] Thus princes may know that they begin to lose their state at the hour they begin to break the laws and those modes and those customs that are ancient, under which men have lived a long time. And if when deprived of the state they ever become so prudent that they recognize with how much ease principalities may be held by those who take counsel wisely, they would grieve much more for their loss and condemn themselves to a greater penalty than they would have been

condemned to by others. For it is much easier to be loved by the good than by the wicked, and to obey the laws than to wish to command them. If they wish to understand the mode they have to keep to do this, they do not have to go to more trouble than to take for their mirror the lives of good princes, such as would be Timoleon of Corinth,[4] Aratus of Sicyon,[5] and the like. In their lives he will find so much security and so much satisfaction for whoever rules and whoever is ruled that the wish to imitate them ought to come to him, since, for the reasons given, he can easily do it. For when men are governed well they do not seek or wish for any other freedom, as happened to the peoples governed by the two named before, whom they constrained to be princes while they lived even though they often attempted to return to private life. And because in this and the two preceding chapters humors excited against princes and the conspiracies made by the sons of Brutus against the fatherland and those made against Tarquin Priscus and Servius Tullius have been reasoned about, it does not appear to me a thing outside the purpose to speak of them thoroughly in the following chapter, since there is matter worthy of being noted by princes and private individuals.[6]

6

Of Conspiracies

[1] It did not appear to me that reasoning about conspiracies should be omitted, since it is a thing so dangerous to princes and private individuals; for many more princes are seen to have lost their lives and states through these than by open war. For to be able to make open war on a prince is granted to few; to be able to conspire against them is granted to everyone. On the other side, private men enter upon no enterprise more dangerous or more bold than this, for it is difficult and very dangerous in every part of it. Hence it arises that many of them are attempted, and very few have the desired end. Thus, so that princes may learn to guard themselves from these dangers and private individuals may put themselves into them more timidly—indeed, that they may learn to be content to live under the empire that has been proposed for them by fate—I shall speak of them thoroughly, not omitting any notable case in the evidence of both. And truly, the verdict of Cornelius Tacitus is golden, which says that men have to honor past things and obey present ones; and they should desire good princes and tolerate them, however they may be made.[1] And truly, whoever does otherwise most often ruins himself and his fatherland.

[2] Thus, entering into the matter, we should consider first against whom conspiracies are made; and we shall find them to be made either against the fatherland or against a prince, of which two I wish to reason at present. For those that are made to give a town to enemies that besiege it or that have, for any cause, a similarity with this, have been sufficiently spoken of above.[2] We shall treat, in this first part, of those against the prince, and first we shall examine the causes of these, which are many. But one of them is very important, more than all the others; and this is being hated by the collectivity. For it is reasonable that the prince who has excited this universal hatred against himself has particular individuals who have been more offended by him and who desire to avenge themselves. This desire of theirs is increased by that universal bad disposition that they see to be excited against him. A prince, thus, should flee these private charges,[3] and what he has to do to flee them I do not wish to speak of here, since it has been treated elsewhere;[4] for if he guards himself from this, simple particular offenses will make less trouble[5] for him. First, because one rarely meets men who reckon an injury so much that they put themselves in so much danger to avenge it; the other, because if they were even of the spirit and had the power to do it, they are held back by the universal benevolence that they see a prince has. It must be that the injuries are in property, in blood, or in honor. Of those having to do with blood, menaces are more dangerous than executions;[6] indeed, menaces are very dangerous, and in executions there is no danger. For whoever is dead cannot think of vengeance; those who remain alive most often leave the thought of it to you.[7] But he who is menaced and who sees himself constrained by a necessity either to act or to suffer becomes a man very dangerous for the prince, as we shall tell particularly in its place. Outside this necessity, property and honor are the two things that offend men more than any other offense, from which the prince should guard himself. For he can never despoil one individual so much that a knife to avenge himself does not remain for him, and he can never dishonor one individual so much that a spirit obstinate for vengeance is not left to him. Of honors taken away from men, that concerning women is most important; after this, contempt of one's person. This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon;[8] this has armed many others against many other princes. In our times Giulio Belanti would not have been moved to conspire against Pandolfo, tyrant of Siena, if not because he had been given by him and then had taken away a daughter of his for a wife, as we shall tell in its place.[9] The greatest cause that made the Pazzi conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei, which was taken away from them by the latter's order.[10] Another cause of it—and a very great one—that makes men conspire against the prince is the desire to free the fatherland that has been seized by him. This cause moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar;[11] this has moved many others against the Phalarises,[12] Dionysiuses,[13] and other seizers of their fatherland. Nor can any tyrant guard himself from this humor except by laying down the tyranny. And because no one is found who does this, few are found who do not come out badly. Hence arises that verse of Juvenal:

> To the son-in-law of Ceres few kings descend without killing and wounds, and few tyrants with a dry death.[14]

The dangers that are borne in conspiracies, as I said above, are great, since they are borne at all times; for in such cases danger is encountered in managing them, in executing them, and after they are executed. Those who conspire are either one individual or they are more. With one individual, it cannot be said that it is a conspiracy, but a firm disposition arisen in one man to kill the prince. This alone lacks the first of the three dangers incurred in conspiracies; for before the execution no danger is borne, since no other has his secret, nor does he bear the danger

that his plan will come back to the ear of the prince. This decision so made can fall to any man of whatever sort: great, small, noble, ignoble, familiar or not familiar to the prince; for it is permitted to everyone to speak to him some time, and to whomever it is permitted to speak it is permitted to vent his spirit. Pausanias, who has been spoken of other times,[15] killed Philip of Macedon, who was going to the temple between his son and his son-in-law with a thousand armed men around. But he was noble and known to the prince. A Spaniard, poor and abject, gave a stab in the neck to King Ferdinand, king of Spain; it was not a mortal wound, but one may see from this that he had spirit and occasion to do it.[16] A dervish, a Turkish priest, drew a scimitar on Bajazet, father of the present Turk; he did not wound him, but he had indeed the spirit and occasion to wish to do it.[17] Of spirits so made very many are found, I believe, who would wish to do it because in wishing there is neither penalty nor any danger; but few who do it. But of those who do it, there are very few or none who are not killed in the deed; so no one is found who wishes to go to a certain death. But let us drop these individual wishes and come to conspiracies among more.

[3] I say it is to be found in the histories that all conspiracies are made by great men or those very familiar to the prince.[18] For others, if they are not quite mad, are unable to conspire, since weak men and those not familiar to the prince lack all those hopes and all those occasions that are required for the execution of a conspiracy. First, weak men are unable to find a match in whoever might keep faith with them. For one individual cannot consent to their will under any of those hopes that make men enter into great dangers, so that as they are enlarged to two or three persons, they find an accuser and are ruined. But even if they have been so happy as to lack this accuser, in the execution they are surrounded by such difficulties, for not having easy entry to the prince, that it is impossible for them not to be ruined in its execution. For if great men, who have easy entry, are crushed by those difficulties that will be told of below, it must be that in these the difficulties increase without end. Therefore men (since where life and property enter into it, they are not altogether insane), when they see themselves weak, guard themselves about doing it; and when they are fed up with a prince, they attend to cursing him and wait for those who have greater quality than they to avenge them. And even if it should be found that anyone such as these had attempted something, the intention and not the prudence should be praised in them. One sees, therefore, that those who have conspired have all been great men, or familiars of the prince. Many of them have conspired, moved as much by too many benefits as by too many injuries, as was Perennius against Commodus,[19] Plautianus against Severus,[20] Sejanus against Tiberius.[21] All these were placed by their emperors in so much wealth, honor, and rank that it did not appear they lacked anything for the perfection of their power but the empire; and since they did not wish to be lacking this, they were moved to conspire against the prince. All their conspiracies had the end that their ingratitude deserved, although of similar ones in fresher times, that of Jacopo d'Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, prince of Pisa, had a good end. Jacopo, though raised and nourished and given reputation by him, then took away the state from him.[22] In our times, that of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon was among these. Having come to so much greatness that it did not appear to him that he lacked anything except the kingdom, Coppola lost his life because he wished also for that.[23] And truly, if any conspiracy against princes made by great men ought to have had a good end, it ought to be this, since it was made by another king, so to speak, and by one who has so much occasion to fulfill his desire; but the greed for dominating that blinds him also blinds him in managing the enterprise. For if they knew how to do this wickedness with prudence it would be impossible that they not succeed. Thus, a prince who wishes to guard himself against conspiracies should fear more those to whom he has done too many favors[24] than those to whom he has done too many injuries.[25] For the latter are lacking in occasion, the former abound in it; and the wish is similar because the desire to dominate is as great as or greater than is that of vengeance. They should therefore give so much authority to their friends as there may be some interval between it and the principate, and that in the middle there may be something to desire; otherwise it will be a rare thing if it does not happen to them as to the princes written about above. But let us return to our order.

[4] I say that since those who conspire have to be great men and have easy access to the prince, one has to discourse of the results of their enterprises, such as they have been, to see the cause that made them be happy or unhappy. As I said above, dangers are found within them at three times: before, in the deed, and after. Few are found that have a good outcome because it is impossible—almost—to pass through them all happily. And beginning to discourse of the dangers before, which are the most important, I say that one needs to be very prudent and to have great luck in managing a conspiracy for it not to be exposed. They are exposed either by report or by conjecture. Report arises from finding lack of faith, or lack of prudence, in the men to whom you communicate it. Lack of faith is easily found because you cannot communicate it except to your trusted ones, who for your love will put themselves in the way of death, or to men who are discontented with the prince. Of the trusted one might be able to find one or two; but as you extend yourself to many, it is impossible for you to find them. Next, the benevolence that they bear for you indeed needs to be great if the danger and the fear of punishment are not to appear greater to them. Next, men most often deceive themselves about the love that you judge a man bears to you,

nor can you ever secure yourself of it unless you make experiment of it; and to make experiment of it in this is very dangerous. Even if you have made experiment of it in some other dangerous thing in which they have been faithful to you, you cannot from that faith measure this one, since this surpasses every other kind of danger by very far. If you measure faith by the discontent that one individual has with the prince, you can easily deceive yourself in this; for as soon as you have manifested your intent to that discontented one, you give him matter with which to content himself, and to maintain him in faith it must indeed be either that the hatred is great or that your authority is very great.

[5] From here it arises that very many [conspiracies] are revealed and crushed in their first beginnings, and that when one has been secret among many men a long time, it is held a miraculous thing, as was that of Piso against Nero[26] and, in our times, that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici.[27] More than fifty men were aware of these, and they were led into execution before being exposed. As to being exposed by lack of prudence, it arises when a conspirator speaks of it with little caution, so that a slave or another third person hears you, as happened to the sons of Brutus, who in managing the affair with the legates of Tarquin were heard by a slave, who accused them;[28] or indeed when through levity you come to communicate it to a woman or boy whom you love or to a similar, flighty person, as did Dymnus, one of the conspirators with Philotas against Alexander the Great, who communicated the conspiracy to Nicomachus, a boy loved by him; he told it at once to Cebalinus, his brother, and Cebalinus to the king.[29] As to being exposed by conjecture, there is the conspiracy of Piso against Nero for an example. In this Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, made a will the day before he had to kill Nero; ordered that Milichus, his freedman, sharpen an old and rusty dagger of his; freed all his slaves and gave them money; and had bandages ordered to bind wounds—by which conjectures Milichus became aware of the thing and accused him to Nero. Scaevinus was taken and with him Natalis, another conspirator, who had been seen to speak together at length and in secret the day before; and since they were not in accord on the discussion[30] they had had, they were forced to confess the truth; so the conspiracy was exposed, with ruin to all the conspirators.[31]

[6] It is impossible to guard oneself from these causes of the exposure of conspiracies, so that through malice, imprudence, or levity it is not exposed at whatever time the knowers of it surpass the number of three or four. When more than one of them is taken, it is impossible not to find it out, because two cannot be agreed together in all their reasonings. When only one of them is taken, and he is a strong man, he can silence the conspirators with the strength of his spirit; but the conspirators must not have less spirit than he to stay steady and not expose themselves by flight, for the conspiracy is exposed by one party in which the spirit fails, whether by the one who is held or the one who is free. Rare is the example introduced by Titus Livy in the conspiracy made against Hieronymus, king of Syracuse, in which Theodorus, one of the conspirators, was taken and with great virtue concealed all the conspirators and accused the friends of the king. On the other hand, the conspirators trusted so much in the virtue of Theodorus that no one left Syracuse or gave any sign of fear.[32] Thus one passes through all these dangers in managing a conspiracy before one comes to its execution, for which, if one wishes to escape, there are these remedies. The first and the most true—indeed, to say better, the only one—is not to give time to the conspirators to accuse you, and to communicate the thing to them when you want to do it, and not before. Those who have done thus escape for certain the dangers in practicing it, and most often the others; indeed they have all had a happy end, and any prudent individual would have occasion to govern himself in this mode. I wish it to be enough for me to bring up two examples.

[7] Nelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus, gathered many relatives and friends in his house; and when he had urged them to free the fatherland, some of them requested time to deliberate and order themselves. Then Nelematus had his slaves lock the house, and to those whom he had called in, he said: "Either you swear to go now to do this execution or I will give you all as prisoners to Aristotimus." Moved by these words, they swore, and having gone without lapse of time, they executed the order of Nelematus happily.[33] When a Magian had by deception seized the kingdom of the Persians, and Ortanes, one of the great men of the kingdom, had understood and exposed the fraud, he conferred with six other princes of that state, saying that he was about to avenge the kingdom from the tyranny of that Magian. When someone of them asked for time, Darius, one of the six called by Ortanes, got up and said: "Either we shall go now to do this execution or I will go there to accuse all." And so, getting up in accord, without giving time for someone to repent, they executed their plans happily.[34] Similar to these two examples also is the mode that the Aetolians adopted for killing Nabis, the Spartan tyrant. They sent their citizen Alexamenus to Nabis with thirty horse and two hundred infantrymen under color of sending him aid; and the secret they communicated only to Alexamenus, and on the others they imposed obedience to him in anything whatsoever, under penalty of exile. He went to Sparta and never communicated his commission except when he wished to execute it; hence they succeeded in killing him.[35] Thus by these modes these men escaped the dangers that are borne in managing conspiracies; and whoever imitates them will always escape them.

[8] [To show] that everyone can do as they did, I wish to give the example of Piso, cited above. Piso was a very great and very reputed man and a familiar of Nero, in whom he trusted very much. Nero often went to his gardens to eat with him. Thus Piso could make friends with men of spirit, of heart, and of disposition apt for such an execution (which is very easy for someone great); and when Nero was in his gardens, he could communicate the affair to them, and with fitting words he inspired them to do that which they did not have time to refuse and in which it was impossible not to succeed.[36] So, if all the others are examined, few will be found that could not be conducted in the same mode. But because men ordinarily understand little of the actions of the world, they often make very grave errors, and so much the greater in those that have more of the extraordinary, as is this. Thus the thing should never be communicated unless necessary and in the deed; and if indeed you wish to communicate it, communicate it to one alone, of whom you have had very long experience or who is moved by the same causes as you. To find one individual so made is much easier than to find more, and because of this there is less danger in it. Then, if even he deceives you, there is some remedy for defending yourself, which there is not where the conspirators are very many. For from someone prudent I have heard it said that to one individual everything can be spoken of, because if you do not let yourself be led to write in your hand, the *yes* of one individual is worth as much as the *no* of the other. Everyone should guard himself from writing as from a reef, for there is nothing that convicts you more easily than what is written by your hand. When Plautianus wished to have Severus the emperor and his son Antoninus killed, he commissioned the thing to Saturninus, the tribune, who—since he wished to accuse him, not to obey him, and feared that when it came to the accusation, Plautianus would be more believed than he—asked for a note in his hand that would vouch for this commission. Plautianus, blinded by ambition, did that for him; hence it followed that he was accused and convicted by the tribune. Without that note and certain other marks, Plautianus would have been superior, so boldly did he deny.[37] Thus some remedy is found for the accusation of one individual when you cannot be convicted by a writing or other marks, from which one individual should guard himself.

[9] In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman called Epicharis, who in the past had been the mistress of Nero. Judging that it would be to the purpose to put among the conspirators a captain of some triremes whom Nero kept as his guard, she communicated to him the conspiracy but not the conspirators. Hence, when that captain broke his faith and accused her to Nero, so much was Epicharis's audacity in denying it that Nero, left confused, did not condemn her.[38] There are thus two dangers in communicating the thing to one alone: one, that he accuses you in evidence; the other, that having been convicted and constrained by the punishment, he accuses you after he has been taken because of some suspicion or some indication from him. But in both of these two dangers there is some remedy, as one can deny the one by citing the hatred that he has for you, and deny the other by citing the force that constrained him to tell lies. Thus it is prudence not to communicate the thing to anyone, but to act according to the examples written above; or, if indeed you communicate it, not to pass beyond one individual, where if there is some more danger, there is very much less of it than to communicate it to many.

[10] Close to this mode is when a necessity constrains you to do to the prince that which you see the prince would like to do to you, which is so great that it does not give you time except to think about securing yourself. This necessity almost always brings the affair to the end desired, and to prove it I wish two examples to be enough. Commodus the emperor had Letus and Elettus as heads of the praetorian soldiers and among his first friends and familiars; he had Marcia among his first concubines or mistresses. Because he was at some time reprehended by them for the modes with which he stained his person and the empire, he decided to have them killed; and he wrote on a list Marcia, Letus, Elettus, and some others that he wished to have killed the following night, and he put the list under the pillow of his bed. When he went to wash himself, a boy favorite of his came to find that list while playing about the room and on the bed; and as he went outside with it in hand, he met Marcia, who took it away from him and, having read it and seen its content, at once sent for Letus and Elettus. Having all three recognized the danger they were in, they decided to forestall it; and without losing time, they killed Commodus the following night.[39]

[11] Antoninus Caracalla, the emperor, was with his armies in Mesopotamia and had as his prefect Macrinus, a man more civil than warlike. As it happens that princes who are not good always fear that another may work against them that which they fear they deserve for themselves, Antoninus wrote to his friend Maternianus in Rome that he should learn from the astrologers if there was anyone who aspired to the empire and make him aware of it. Hence Maternianus wrote him that Macrinus was the one who aspired to it; and when the letter reached the hands of Macrinus before those of the emperor, and because of that he recognized the necessity either of killing him before a new letter arrived from Rome or of dying, he commissioned the centurion Martial, his trusted one, whose brother Antoninus had killed a few days before, to kill him; which was executed by him happily.[40] Thus one sees that the necessity that does not give time produces almost the same effect as the mode told above by me that Nelematus of Epirus held to. One also sees that which I said almost at the beginning of this discourse: that menaces offend princes more and are the cause of more efficacious conspiracies than offenses. From those a prince

should guard himself, for they have either to caress men or secure themselves against them,[41] and never reduce them to such straits that they have to think that they must either die or make someone else die.

[12] As to dangers that are incurred at the execution, these arise either from varying the order, or from spirit lacking in him who executes, or from an error that the executor makes through lack of prudence or through not bringing the thing to perfection by leaving alive part of those who were planned to be killed. I say, thus, that there is not anything that produces so much disturbance and hindrance to all actions of men as there is to have to vary an order in an instant, without having time, and to have to bend it from what had been ordered before. If this variation produces disorder in anything, it does so in things of war and in things similar to those of which we are speaking. For in such actions there is nothing so necessary to produce as that men firm up their spirits to execute the part that touches them. If men had turned their fancy for many days to one mode and to one order, and that suddenly varies, it is impossible that all not be disturbed, and that everything not be ruined, so that it is far better to execute a thing according to the order given, even though one sees some inconvenience in it, than to enter into a thousand inconveniences through wishing to suppress that. This happens when one has no time to reorder oneself, for if one has time, man can govern himself by his own mode.

[13] The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici is known. The order given was that they give a breakfast for the cardinal of San Giorgio and kill them at that breakfast, in which it had been assigned who had to kill them, who had to seize the palace, and who had to run through the city and call the people to freedom. It befell that when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the cardinal were in the cathedral church in Florence for a solemn office, it was understood that Giuliano was not breakfasting there that morning. That made the conspirators assemble together, and what they had to do in the house of the Medici they decided to do in church. That came to disturb the whole order because Giovambatista da Montesecco did not wish to share in the homicide, saying that he did not wish to do it in church. So they had to change new ministers in every action, who did not have time to firm up their spirits and made such errors that in its execution they were crushed.[42]

[14] Spirit is lacking in whoever executes either through reverence or through the executor's own cowardice. So great are the majesty and the reverence that accompany the presence of a prince that it is an easy thing for them either to soften or to terrify an executor. After Marius had been taken by the Minturnans, a slave was sent to kill him, who, frightened by the presence of that man and by the memory of his name, became cowardly and lost all force for killing him.[43] If this power is in a man bound and a prisoner, and drowned in bad fortune, how much greater can it be held to be in an unshackled prince with the majesty of his ornaments, pomp, and retinue! So much pomp as this can frighten you, or, truly, with some gratifying greeting mollify you. Some persons conspired against Sitalces, king of Thrace; they fixed the day of the execution; they assembled at the place that had been fixed, where the prince was; but no one of them moved to hurt[44] him, so that they left without having attempted anything and without knowing what had impeded them; and they faulted one another. They fell into such an error many times, so that when the conspiracy was discovered, they bore the penalty for the evil that they were able and not willing to do.[45] Two of his brothers conspired against Alfonso, duke of Ferrara, and they used Giannes, priest and cantor of the duke, as a middleman. Many times at their request he brought the duke to them so that they had the liberty to kill him. Nonetheless, never did one of them dare to do it, so that, when discovered, they bore the penalty of their wickedness and lack of prudence.[46] This negligence could not have arisen from other than that either the presence [of the prince] must have terrified them or some humanity of the prince must have humiliated them. In such executions, inconvenience or error arises through lack of prudence or lack of spirit; for both of these two things possess you, and when carried away by that confusion of brain, you say or do that which you ought not.

[15] That men are possessed and confused Titus Livy cannot demonstrate better than when he describes Alexamenus the Aetolian when he wished to kill Nabis the Spartan, of whom we have spoken above.[47] When the time of the execution came and he had exposed to his men what had to be done, Titus Livy says these words: "And he himself gathered his spirit, confused by the thought of so great a thing."[48] For it is impossible that anyone not be confused, even though of firm spirit and used to the death of men and to putting steel to work. Therefore one ought to choose men experienced in such managing and to believe in no one else, even though held very spirited. For of spirit in great things there is no one who may promise himself a sure thing without having had experience. Thus this confusion can either make the arms drop from your hands or make you say things that produce the same effect. Lucilla, sister of Commodus, ordered that Quintianus kill him. He awaited Commodus in the entrance of the amphitheater and, approaching him with a naked dagger, cried out, "The Senate sends you this!"—which words made him be taken before he had lowered his arm to strike.[49] Messer Antonio da Volterra, delegated, as was said above, to kill Lorenzo de' Medici, said in approaching him, "Oh, traitor"—which utterance was the salvation of Lorenzo and the ruin of that conspiracy.[50] For the causes that have been said, one cannot bring the thing to perfection when one conspires against one head; but one does not easily bring it to perfection when one conspires against two heads. Indeed it is so difficult that it is almost impossible that it succeed. For to do a like action at the

same time in different places is almost impossible, for one cannot do it at different times if one does not wish the one to spoil the other. So if conspiring against a prince is a thing doubtful, dangerous, and hardly prudent, conspiring against two is altogether vain and flighty. If there were not reverence for the historian, I would never believe possible what Herodian says of Plautianus, when he commissioned Saturninus the centurion that he alone kill Severus and Antoninus, who inhabited different countries.[51] For it is a thing so distant from the reasonable that any other than this authority would not make me believe it.

[16] Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants of Athens. They killed Diocles; and Hippias, who was left, avenged him.[52] Chion and Leonidas, Heracleans and disciples of Plato, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, tyrants; they killed Clearchus, and Satirus, who remained alive, avenged him.[53] The Pazzi, many times cited by us, succeeded in killing only Giuliano.[54] So, everyone ought to abstain from similar conspiracies against many heads, because one does not do good either to oneself or to the fatherland or to anyone. Indeed, those who are left become more unendurable and more bitter, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea know, which were cited before by me. It is true that the conspiracy that Pelopidas made to free his fatherland, Thebes, had all the difficulties, though nonetheless it had a very happy end because Pelopidas conspired not only against two tyrants but against ten. Not only was he not trusted, and entry to the tyrants was not easy for him, but he was a rebel; nonetheless, he was able to come to Thebes, kill the tyrants, and free the fatherland. Yet nonetheless he did everything with the aid of one Charon, counselor of the tyrants, from whom he had easy entry for his execution.[55] There should not be anyone, nonetheless, who takes example from him because it was an impossible enterprise, and a marvelous thing to succeed, as was and is held by the writers who celebrate it as a thing rare and almost without example. Such an execution can be interrupted by a false imagination or by an unforeseen accident that arises in the deed. The morning that Brutus and the other conspirators wished to kill Caesar, it happened that he spoke at length with Gnaeus Popilius Lenatus, one of the conspirators; and seeing this lengthy speaking, the others suspected that the said Popilius had revealed the conspiracy to Caesar. They were about to try to kill Caesar there and not wait for him to be in the Senate; and they would have done it if the discussion had not ended, and having seen that it did not produce any extraordinary movement in Caesar, they were reassured.[56] These false imaginations are to be considered and, with prudence, to be held in respect; and so much the more since it is easy to have them. For whoever has a stained conscience easily believes that one speaks of him; one can hear a word, said for another end, that perturbs your spirit and makes you believe it was said about your case. It either makes you expose the conspiracy yourself by flight or confuses the action by hastening it out of its time. And this arises all the more easily when there are many to be aware of the conspiracy.

[17] As to accidents, because they are unexpected, one cannot show them except with examples so as to make men cautious in accord with them. Because of the indignation he had against Pandolfo, who had taken away from him the daughter whom previously he had given as wife, Giulio Belanti of Siena, of whom we have made mention above, decided to kill him and chose this time. Pandolfo used to go almost every day to visit an invalid relative of his, and in going there he would pass by the houses of Giulio. Thus, having seen this, he ordered his conspirators to be in the house in order to kill Pandolfo while he was passing; and when they had placed themselves armed inside the exit, he kept one at the window so that as Pandolfo passed, when he was close to the exit, he would make a sign. It happened that when Pandolfo came, and that one had made the sign, he met a friend who stopped him; and some of those who were with him kept coming onward, and as they saw and heard the noise of arms, they discovered the ambush, so that Pandolfo saved himself and Giulio and his partners had to flee from Siena. The accident of that encounter prevented that action and made Giulio ruin his enterprise.[57] Because such accidents are rare, one cannot produce any remedy for them. It is surely necessary to examine all those that can arise and remedy them.

[18] At present it remains only to dispute about the dangers that are incurred after the execution. These are only one, and that is when someone is left who may avenge the dead prince. Thus his brothers can be left or his sons or other adherents for whom the principality awaits. And they who may produce this vengeance can be left either by your negligence or by the causes said above, as happened to Giovanni Andrea da Lampagnano, together with his conspirators, when they killed the duke of Milan. Since a son of his and two of his brothers were left, they were in time to avenge the dead.[58] And truly in these cases the conspirators are excused because they have no remedy for it; but when someone is left alive from it through lack of prudence or by their negligence, then it is that they merit no excuse. Some Forlì conspirators killed Count Girolamo, their lord, and took his wife and his children, who were small. Since it appeared to them that they could not live secure if they did not become masters of the fortress, and the castellan was not willing to give it to them, Madonna Caterina (so the countess was called) promised the conspirators that if they let her enter it, she would deliver it to them and they might keep her children with them as hostages. Under this faith they let her enter it. As soon as she was inside, she reproved them from the walls for the death of her husband and threatened them with every kind of revenge. And to show that she did not care for her

children, she showed them her genital parts, saying that she still had the mode for making more of them. So, short of counsel and late to perceive their error, they suffered the penalty of their lack of prudence with a perpetual exile.[59] But of all the dangers that can come after the execution, there is none more certain nor more to be feared than when the people is the friend of the prince that you have killed. For conspirators do not have any remedy for this since they can never secure themselves against it. As example there is Caesar, who, because he had the people of Rome as his friend, was avenged by it; for having expelled the conspirators from Rome, it was the cause that in various times and in various places all were killed.[60]

[19] Conspiracies that are made against the fatherland are less dangerous for the ones who make them than are those against princes. For in managing them there are fewer dangers than in the latter; in executing them they are the same; after the execution there is not any. In managing them there are not many dangers because a citizen can order himself for power without making his mind and his plan manifest to anyone. And unless these orders of his are interrupted, his enterprise can proceed happily; if they are interrupted with some laws, he can bide his time and enter by another way. It is understood that this is in a republic where there is some part of corruption, for since one not corrupt has no place for a wicked beginning, these thoughts cannot befall one of its citizens. Thus citizens can aspire to the principality by many means and many ways when they do not bear the danger of being crushed, both because republics are slower than a prince, suspect less, and through this are less cautious and because they have more respect for their great citizens and through this the latter are bolder and more spirited in acting against them. Everyone has read the conspiracy of Catiline written by Sallust and knows that after the conspiracy was exposed, Catiline not only stayed in Rome but came to the Senate and spoke rudely to the Senate and to the consul, so much was the respect that that city had for its citizens.[61] When he had left Rome and he was already out with his armies, Lentulus and those others would not have been taken if there had not been letters in their hands that accused them manifestly.[62] Hanno, a very great citizen in Carthage aspiring to tyranny, had ordered that the whole Senate be poisoned at the wedding of a daughter of his, and afterward that he be made prince. When this affair was learned of, the Senate did not make any provision for it other than a law that put limits on the expenses for banquets and weddings, so much was the respect that they had for his qualities.[63] It is indeed true that in executing a conspiracy against the fatherland there are more difficulty and greater dangers because it is rare that your own forces conspiring against so many are enough; and not everyone is prince of an army, as was Caesar,[64] or Agathocles,[65] or Cleomenes,[66] and such, who have seized their fatherland at a stroke and with their forces. For to such the way is very easy and very secure; but others who do not have so many added forces must do things either with deception and art or with foreign forces. As to deception and art, when Pisistratus the Athenian had conquered the Megarians, and through this acquired favor in the people, he went out one morning wounded, saying that out of envy the nobility had injured him, and he asked to be able to lead armed men with him as his guard. From this authority he easily rose up to so much greatness that he became tyrant of Athens.[67] Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Siena, and the guard of the piazza was given to his government as a mechanical affair that others had refused; nonetheless, in time those armed men gave him so much reputation that in a short time he became prince of it.[68] Many others have adopted other devices and other modes, and in space of time and without danger they have led themselves to it. Those who have conspired to seize the fatherland with their forces or with external armies have had various outcomes according to fortune. Catiline, cited before, came to ruin beneath it.[69] Since poison did not succeed for Hanno, of whom we have made mention above, he armed many thousands of persons from his partisans, and they and he were killed.[70] So as to make themselves tyrants, some of the first citizens of Thebes called a Spartan army in aid, and they took the tyranny of that city.[71] So when all conspiracies made against the fatherland are examined, none—or few—will be found that were crushed in their managing, but all either were successful or were ruined in the execution. When they were executed, they no longer bore any other dangers than the nature of the principality bears in itself, for when one individual has become tyrant, he has the natural and ordinary dangers that tyranny brings him, for which he has no remedies other than have been discoursed of above.[72]

[20] This is how much it occurs to me to write on conspiracies; and if I have reasoned on those that are done with steel and not with poison, it arises because they all have one same order. It is true that those of poison are more dangerous, being more uncertain, because not everyone has the occasion for it and one needs to delegate to whoever has it, and this necessity of delegating makes danger for you. Then for many causes a draft of poison can be not fatal, as happened to those who killed Commodus, for after he had thrown up the poison they had given him, they were forced to strangle him if they wished for him to die.[73] Princes therefore have no greater enemy than conspiracy, for when a conspiracy is made against them, either it kills them or it brings them infamy. For if it succeeds, they are dead; if it is exposed, and they kill the conspirators, it is always believed that it was the invention of that prince to vent his avarice and cruelty at the expense of the blood and property of those whom he has killed. Yet I do not wish to fail to warn that prince or that republic that might be conspired against, so that they

may have warning that when a conspiracy manifests itself to them, they should seek out and learn very well its quality, and measure well the conditions of the conspirators and of themselves, before they undertake an enterprise to avenge it. When they find it large and powerful, they should never expose it until they have prepared themselves with sufficient forces to crush it; if they do otherwise, they would expose their own ruin. So they ought to dissimulate it with all industry, for conspirators, seeing themselves exposed, are driven by necessity and work without hesitation. As example, when the Romans left two legions of soldiers as guard of the Capuans against the Samnites, as we have said elsewhere,[74] the heads of the legions conspired together to crush the Capuans. When this thing was learned in Rome, they commissioned Rutilius, the new consul, to provide for it. To put the conspirators to sleep, he made public that the Senate had reaffirmed the stations of the Capuan legions. Since these soldiers believed that, and it appeared to them they had time to execute their plan, they did not seek to hasten the affair; and so they stayed until they began to see that the consul was separating them one from another—which generated suspicion in them and made them expose themselves, and they put their wish into execution.[75] Nor can there be a greater example than this on one side and the other, for through this one sees how slow men are in affairs when they believe they have time and how quick they are when necessity drives them. Nor can a prince or a republic that wishes to defer the exposure of a conspiracy to its advantage use better means than with art to offer opportunity soon to conspirators, so that in waiting for it—or since it appears to them that they have time—they give time to the former or the latter to punish them. Whoever has done otherwise has hastened his own ruin, as did the duke of Athens and Guglielmo de' Pazzi. When the duke became tyrant of Florence and learned that he was being conspired against, he had one of the conspirators taken without otherwise examining the affair, which made the others at once take up arms and take the state from him.[76] When Guglielmo was commissioner in Val di Chiana in 1501 and had learned that there was a conspiracy in Arezzo in favor of the Vitelli to take that town away from the Florentines, he went at once to that city, and without thinking about the strength of the conspirators or about his own, and without preparing himself with any force, with the counsel of his son the bishop he had one of the conspirators taken. After his taking, the others at once took arms and took away the town from the Florentines; and from commissioner, Guglielmo became prisoner.[77] But when conspiracies are weak, they can and should be crushed without hesitation. Nor also to be imitated in any mode are two means that are used, almost contrary to one other: the one by the duke of Athens named before, who had one individual killed who made a conspiracy manifest to him to show that he believed he had the benevolence of Florentine citizens.[78] The other [was used] by Dion the Syracusan: to try out the intent of anyone whom he had under suspicion, he consented that Callippus, in whom he trusted, make a show of making a conspiracy against him. Both of these turned out badly; for the one took away spirit from accusers and gave it to whoever wished to conspire. The other gave an easy way to his own death; indeed, he was his own head of his conspiracy, as came to him by experience, because Callippus, being able to deal against Dion without hesitation, dealt so much that he took from him his state and his life.[79]

7

Whence It Arises That Changes from Freedom to Servitude and from Servitude to Freedom Are Some of Them without Blood, Some of Them Full of It

[1] Someone perhaps will doubt whence it arose that of many changes that are made from free life to tyrannical, and to the contrary, some of them are made with blood, some without; for as is understood through the histories, in similar variations sometimes infinite men have been put to death, sometimes no one has been injured. That came about in the change that Rome made from kings to consuls, where none other than the Tarquins were expelled, with no offense to anyone else.[1] That depends on this: for the state that is changed arises with violence or not, and because when it arises with violence it must arise with the injury of many, it is necessary later, in its ruin, that the injured wish to avenge themselves, and from this desire for vengeance arise the blood and death of men. But when that state is caused by common consent of a collectivity that has made it great, later, when it is ruined, the said collectivity does not have cause to offend other than the head. And of this sort was the state of Rome with the expulsion of the Tarquins, as was also the state of the Medici in Florence, in the ruin of whom later, in 1494, none other than themselves were offended.[2] So such changes do not come to be dangerous, but those are indeed very dangerous that are made by those who have to avenge themselves, which have always been of a sort to terrify whoever does nothing but reads of them. And because the histories are full of these examples, I wish to omit them.

8

Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic Should Consider Its Subject

[1] It has been discoursed of above[1] that a wicked citizen cannot work for ill in a republic that is not corrupt, which conclusion is fortified, beyond the reasons that were said then, with the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. This Spurius was an ambitious man, and he wished to take up extraordinary authority in Rome and to gain the plebs for himself by conferring on them many benefits, such as dividing among them the fields that the Romans had taken away from the Hernici. This ambition of his was exposed by the Fathers and brought under so much suspicion that when he spoke to the people and offered to give them the money that had been drawn from the grain that the public had made to come from Sicily, they refused him altogether, since it appeared to them that Spurius wished to give them the price of their freedom.[2] But if such a people had been corrupt, it would not have refused the said price, and it would have opened the way to tyranny that it closed. Manlius Capitolinus makes a much greater example of this, for through him one sees how much virtue of spirit and body, how many good works done in favor of the fatherland, an ugly greed for rule later cancels.[3] As one sees, it arose in him because of the envy that he had for the honors that were done to Camillus. He came to such blindness in his mind that, not thinking of the mode of life of the city, not examining the subject it had, which was not yet apt to receive a wicked form, he set out to make tumults in Rome against the Senate and against the laws of the fatherland. There one knows the perfection of that city and the goodness of its matter, for in his case none of the nobility moved to favor him, although they had been very fierce defenders of one another; none of his relatives undertook an enterprise in his favor. With the other accused, unkempt persons were accustomed to appear, clad in black, all sad-looking so as to beg for pity in favor of the accused; with Manlius, none was seen. The tribunes of the plebs, who were always accustomed to favor what appeared would come to the benefit of the people—and the more those things went

against the nobles, the more did they bring them to the fore—in this case united with the nobles so as to crush a common plague. Although the people of Rome, very desirous of its own utility and a lover of things that went against the nobility, did very many favors to Manlius, nonetheless, as the tribunes summoned him and delivered his cause to the judgment of the people, that people, from defender having become judge, without any respect condemned him to death. Therefore I do not believe that there is an example in this history more apt to show the goodness of all the orders of that republic than this, seeing that no one in that city moved to defend a citizen full of every virtue, who publicly and privately had performed very many praiseworthy works. For love of the fatherland was able to do more in all of them than any other respect, and they considered present dangers that depended on him much more than past merits, so much that with his death they freed themselves. And Titus Livy says: "This end had a man who would have been memorable if he had not been born in a free city."[4] Two things are to be considered here: one, that one has to seek glory in a corrupt city by modes other than in one that still lives politically; the other (which is almost the same as the first), that men in their proceeding—and so much the more in great actions—should consider the times and accommodate themselves to them.

[2] Those who by bad choice or by natural inclination are in discord with the times most often live unhappily, and their actions have a bad outcome; but it is to the contrary with those who are in concord with the time. And without doubt, from the words of the historian cited before, one can conclude that if Manlius had been born in the times of Marius and Sulla, when the matter was already corrupt and he would have been able to impress the form of his ambition, he would have had the same results and successes as Marius and Sulla and as others later who aspired to tyranny after them. So, likewise, if Sulla and Marius had been in the times of Manlius, they would have been crushed amidst their first enterprises. For a man can indeed begin to corrupt a people of a city with his modes and his wicked means, but for him it is impossible that the life of one individual be enough to corrupt it so that he himself can draw the fruit from it. Even if it might be possible for him to do it with length of time, it would be impossible because of the mode of proceeding of men, who are impatient and cannot defer a passion of theirs for long. Next, they deceive themselves in things that concern them and in those especially that they very much desire, so that either by lack of patience or by deceiving themselves in it,

they would enter upon an enterprise against the time and would come out badly. So if one wishes to take up authority in a republic and put a wicked form in it, there is need to find the matter disordered by time, and which little by little and from generation to generation may be led to disorder—which is led there of necessity if, as is discoursed of above,[5] it is not often refreshed with good examples or pulled back toward its beginnings with new laws. Thus Manlius would have been a rare and memorable man if he had been born in a corrupt city. And so citizens who in republics make any enterprise, either in favor of freedom or in favor of tyranny, ought to consider the subject that they have, and to judge from that the difficulty of their enterprises. For as much as it is difficult and dangerous to wish to make a people free that wishes to live servilely, so much is it to wish to make a people servile that wishes to live free. Because it is said above that men in their working ought to consider the qualities of the times and to proceed according to them, we shall speak of this at length in the following chapter.

9

How One Must Vary with the Times If One Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune

[1] I have often considered that the cause of the bad and of the good fortune of men is the matching of the mode of one's proceeding with the times. For one sees that some men proceed in their works with impetuosity, some with hesitation and caution. And because in both of these modes suitable limits are passed, since one cannot observe the true way, in both one errs. But he comes to err less and to have prosperous fortune who matches the time with his mode, as I said, and always proceeds as nature forces you. Everyone knows that Fabius Maximus proceeded hesitantly and cautiously with his army, far from all impetuosity and from all Roman audacity, and good fortune made this mode of his match well with the times. For when Hannibal, young and with fresh fortune, had come into Italy and had already defeated the Roman people two times, and when that republic was almost deprived of its good military and was terrified, better fortune could not have come than to have a captain who held the enemy at bay with his slowness and caution. Nor also could Fabius have been matched with times more suitable to his modes, from which he became glorious. One sees that Fabius did this by nature and not by choice because when Scipio wished to cross to Africa with the armies to put an end to the war, Fabius spoke against it very much, as one who was unable to detach himself from his modes and his custom; so that Hannibal would still be in Italy if it had been up to him, as he was not aware that the times had changed for him and that he needed to change the mode of war. If Fabius had been king of Rome, he could easily have lost that war; for he did not know how to vary his procedure as the times varied. But he was born in a republic where there were diverse citizens and diverse humors; as it had Fabius, who was the best in times proper for sustaining war,[1] so later it had Scipio in times apt for winning it.

[2] Hence it arises that a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality, for it can accommodate itself better than one prince can to the diversity of times[2] through the diversity of the citizens

that are in it. For a man who is accustomed to proceed in one mode never changes, as was said; and it must be of necessity that when the times change not in conformity with his mode, he is ruined.

[3] Piero Soderini, cited before at other times,[3] proceeded in all his affairs with humanity and patience. He and his fatherland prospered while the times were conformable to the mode of his proceeding; but as times came later when he needed to break with patience and humility, he did not know how to do it, so that he together with his fatherland was ruined.[4] Pope Julius II proceeded all the time of his pontificate with impetuosity and fury, and because the times accompanied him well, all his enterprises succeeded for him. But if other times had come that had demanded other counsel, of necessity he would have been ruined, for he would not have changed either mode or order in managing himself.[5] Two things are causes why we are unable to change: one, that we are unable to oppose that to which nature inclines us; the other, that when one individual has prospered very much with one mode of proceeding, it is not possible to persuade him that he can do well to proceed otherwise. Hence it arises that fortune varies in one man, because it varies the times and he does not vary the modes. The ruin of cities also arises through not varying the orders of republics with the times, as we discoursed of at length above.[6] But they are slower, for they have trouble varying because they need times to come that move the whole republic, for which one alone is not enough to vary the mode of proceeding.

[4] And because we have made mention of Fabius Maximus, who held Hannibal at bay, it appears to me good to discourse in the following chapter of whether, if a captain wishes to do battle in any mode with the enemy, he can be prevented by him from doing it.

10

That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When the Adversary Wishes Him to Engage in It in Any Mode

[1] “Gnaeus Sulpitius the dictator dragged out the war against the Gauls, as he was unwilling to commit himself to fortune against an enemy whom time and a foreign place were daily making weaker.”[1]

When an error is followed in which all men or the greater part deceive themselves, I do not believe that it is bad to reprove it often. Therefore, although I have often shown above how actions in great things do not conform to those of ancient times,[2] nonetheless it does not appear to me superfluous to repeat it at present. For if one deviates from ancient orders in any part, it is especially in military actions, in which at present not one of those things is observed that were very much esteemed by the ancients. This inconvenience has arisen because republics and princes have imposed this care on others, and to flee the dangers they have withdrawn from this exercise. If indeed one sometimes sees a king of our times go [to war] in person, one does not believe, therefore, that other modes arise from him that deserve more praise. For they do that exercise, when indeed they do it, for pomp and not for any other praiseworthy cause. Yet they make lesser errors when they sometimes look their armies in the face, keeping for themselves the title of command, than republics make—and especially the Italian ones—that entrust themselves to others and do not understand anything that belongs to war;[3] and, on the other hand, since they wish to decide about it so as to appear to be the prince themselves, they make a thousand errors in such a decision. Although I have discoursed of some of them elsewhere,[4] at present I do not wish to be silent about a very important one. When these idle princes or effeminate republics send out a captain of theirs, the wisest commission it seems to them they give him is to impose on him that he not come to battle in some mode[5]—indeed, that above all he guard himself against fighting. Since it appears to them that

they are imitating in this the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who in deferring combat saved the state for the Romans, they do not understand that most often this commission is null or is harmful. For one ought to accept this conclusion: that a captain who wishes to stay in the field cannot flee battle whenever the enemy wishes to engage in it in any mode. This commission is nothing other than to say: "Do battle to the enemy's purpose and not yours." For if one wishes to stay in the field, and not to do battle, there is no secure remedy for it other than to put oneself at least fifty miles distant from the enemy and then to keep good spies so that you have time to distance yourself when he comes to you. Another policy for it is to shut oneself in a city, and both of these two policies are very harmful. In the first, one leaves one's country as prey to the enemy; and a worthy prince will rather try the fortune of battle than lengthen the war with so much harm to the subjects. In the second policy is manifest loss, for it must be that when you retire with an army into a city, you come to be besieged, and in a short time suffer hunger and come to surrender. So to escape battle by these two ways is very harmful. The mode that Fabius Maximus adopted of staying in strongholds is good when you have so virtuous an army that the enemy does not dare to come to meet you in the midst of your advantages. Nor can one say that Fabius fled from battle, but rather that he wished to wage it at his advantage.[6] For if Hannibal had gone to meet him, Fabius would have awaited him and done battle with him, but Hannibal never dared to engage in combat with him in his mode. So the battle was fled by Hannibal as well as by Fabius; but if one of them had wished to engage in it in any mode, the other would have had only one of three remedies: the two said above, or to flee.

[2] That what I say is true one sees manifestly with a thousand examples, and especially with the war that the Romans made with Philip of Macedon, father of Perseus. For when Philip was assaulted by the Romans, he decided not to fight, and so as not to come to it he wished to do first as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy; and he put himself with his army on the summit of a mountain, where he fortified himself very much, judging that the Romans would not dare go to meet him. But when they went there and engaged in combat with him, they expelled him from that mountain; and he, unable to resist, fled with the greater part of the troops. What saved him, so that he was not entirely wasted, was the unevenness of the country, which made the Romans unable to follow him. Thus, not willing to fight and having encamped himself near the Romans, Philip had to flee; and having

come to know by this experience that when he did not wish to engage in combat it was not enough to stay on top of mountains, and since he did not wish to close himself up in towns, he decided to take up the other mode of staying many miles distant from the Roman camp. Hence, if the Romans were in one province, he went off to the other; and so always wherever the Romans left, he entered. Seeing at last that in lengthening the war in this way his condition was worsening, and that his subjects were being crushed now by him, now by the enemy, he decided to try the fortune of battle, and so came to a real battle with the Romans.[7] Thus it is useful not to engage in combat when armies are in the conditions that Fabius's army had and that Gnaeus Sulpitius's had then:[8] that is, having an army so good that the enemy does not dare come to meet you inside your fortresses, and when the enemy is in your home, and so suffers from the necessities of living, without having gotten much of a foothold. In this case it is the useful policy for the reasons that Titus Livy says: "He was unwilling to commit himself to fortune against an enemy whom time and a foreign place were daily making weaker."[9] But, in every other situation, you cannot flee battle except with your dishonor and danger. For to flee as did Philip is like being defeated, and with the more shame the less proof has been made of your virtue. If he succeeded in saving himself, no other would succeed who had not been aided by the country as he. That Hannibal was not master of war no one will ever say; and when he was up against Scipio in Africa, if he had seen advantage in lengthening the war he would have done it; and perchance, being a good captain and having a good army, he would have been able to do it, as did Fabius in Italy. But since he did not do it, one ought to believe that some important cause moved him. For a prince who has put an army together and sees that by lack of money or friends he cannot hold such an army for long is altogether mad if he does not try fortune before such an army has to dissolve; for by waiting he loses for certain, by trying he might be able to win.

[3] One other thing here is also very much to be esteemed, which is that one ought to wish to acquire glory even when losing; and one has more glory in being conquered by force than through another inconvenience that has made you lose. So Hannibal ought to have been constrained by these necessities. On the other hand, if Hannibal had deferred battle and Scipio had not had enough spirit to go to meet him in his strongholds, he would not have allowed him to be able to stay there secure and with advantage as in Italy, because he had already conquered Syphax and acquired so many

towns in Africa. That did not happen to Hannibal when he was up against Fabius, nor to the French who were up against Sulpitius.

[4] So much the less can he flee battle who assaults another's country with an army; for if he wishes to enter into the enemy's country, he must fight with him if the enemy puts himself against him. If he encamps before a town, he is all the more obliged to fight, as happened in our times to Duke Charles of Burgundy who, when he was encamped at Morat, a town of the Swiss, was assaulted and defeated by the Swiss, and as happened to the army of France that was likewise defeated by the Swiss as it was encamping at Novara.

11

That Whoever Has to Deal with Very Many, Even Though He Is Inferior, Wins If Only He Can Sustain the First Thrusts

[1] The power of the tribunes of the plebs in the city of Rome was great, and it was necessary, as has been discoursed of by us many times,[1] because otherwise one would not have been able to place a check on the ambition of the nobility, which would have corrupted that republic a long time before it did corrupt itself. Nonetheless, as has been said other times,[2] because in everything some evil is concealed that makes new accidents emerge, it is necessary to provide for this with new orders. When, therefore, the tribunate authority became insolent and formidable to the nobility and to all Rome, some inconvenience would have arisen from it harmful to Roman freedom had they not been shown by Appius Claudius[3] the mode with which they had to defend themselves against the ambition of the tribunes. This was that they always found among them someone who was either fearful or corruptible or a lover of the common good, so that they disposed him to oppose the will of the others, who wished to press forward some decision against the will of the Senate. That remedy was a great tempering of so much authority, and it often helped Rome. This has made me consider that whenever there are many powers united against another power, even though all together are much more powerful, nonetheless one ought always to put more hope in that one alone, who is less mighty, than in the many, even though very mighty. For, leaving aside all those things in which one alone can prevail over many (which are infinite), this will always occur: that by using a little industry, he will be able to disunite the very many and to weaken the body that was mighty. In this I do not wish to bring up ancient examples, of which there are very many; but I wish modern ones, followed in our times, to suffice for me.

[2] In 1483 all Italy conspired against the Venetians, and after they were altogether lost and could no longer remain with an army in the field, they

corrupted Signor Ludovico,[4] who was governing Milan; and through such corruption made an accord in which they not only got back the lost towns but usurped part of the state of Ferrara. So those who lost in the war remained superior in the peace.[5] A few years ago the whole world conspired against France; nonetheless, before the end of the war was seen, Spain rebelled from the confederates and made an accord with it so that the other confederates were constrained, soon after, to come to accord too.[6] So without doubt, when one sees a war started by many against one,[7] one ought always to make a judgment that that one[8] has to remain superior, if it is of such virtue that it can sustain the first thrusts and with temporizing await the time. For if it were not so, it would bear a thousand dangers, as happened in ’08 to the Venetians, who would have escaped that ruin if they had been able to temporize with the French army and had time to win over to themselves one of those who were leagued against them. But not having virtuous arms so that they could temporize with the enemy, and because of this not having had time to separate one of them, they were ruined. For one may see that when he got back his things the pope made himself their friend, and so did Spain; and both of these princes would very willingly have saved the state of Lombardy for them against France, so as not to make it so great in Italy, if they had been able. Thus the Venetians could have given part to save the rest. If they had done that in time—so that it did not appear that it had been necessity, and before the start of the war—it would have been a very wise policy; but after the start it was worthy of reproach and perchance of little profit. But before such a start, few of the citizens in Venice could see the danger, very few could see the remedy, and no one could counsel it.[9] But to return to the beginning of this discourse, I conclude that as the Roman Senate had a remedy for the safety of the fatherland against the ambition of the tribunes, because they were many, so any prince whoever who is assaulted by many will have a remedy whenever he knows how to use with prudence suitable means to disunite them.

12

That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose Every Necessity to Engage in Combat on His Soldiers and Take It Away from Those of Enemies

[1] At other points we have discoursed of how useful is necessity to human actions and to what glory they have been led by it.[1] As it has been written by certain moral philosophers, the hands and the tongue of men—two very noble instruments for ennobling him—would not have worked perfectly nor led human works to the height they are seen to be led to had they not been driven by necessity.[2] Thus, since the virtue of such necessity was known by the ancient captains of armies, and how much the spirits of soldiers through it became obstinate in engaging in combat, they would do every work so that their soldiers were constrained by [necessity]; and on the other hand, they used all industry so that enemies would be freed from it. Because of this they often opened the way to the enemy that they could have closed to it, and to their own soldiers they closed that which they could have left open. Thus he who desires either that a city be defended obstinately or that an army in the field engage in combat obstinately ought to contrive above every other thing to put such necessity in the breasts of whoever has to engage in combat. Hence a prudent captain who has to go capture a city ought to measure the ease or the difficulty of capturing it from knowing and considering what necessity constrains its inhabitants to defend themselves; and if he finds there very much necessity that constrains them to defense, he should judge the capture difficult; otherwise he should judge it easy. Therefore it arises that towns are more difficult to acquire after rebellion than they were in the first acquiring, for in the beginning they surrendered easily, not having cause to fear punishment because they had not offended; but since it appears to them that they have offended when they have rebelled afterward, and because of this they fear punishment, they become difficult to capture. Such obstinacy also arises from the natural hatreds that

neighboring princes and neighboring republics have for one another, which proceeds from the ambition to dominate and from jealousy for their state—especially if they are republics—as happened in Tuscany. Such rivalry and contention have made and will always make the capture of one by another difficult. Therefore, whoever considers well the neighbors of the city of Florence and the neighbors of the city of Venice will not marvel, as many do, that Florence had more expense in wars and acquired less than Venice. For it all arises from the Venetians' not having had neighboring towns so obstinate for defense as Florence has had, because all the cities next to Venice had been used to living under a prince, and not free, and those who were accustomed to serving often reckoned little a change of patron—indeed, they often desired it. So although Venice has had more powerful neighbors than Florence, because it found the towns less obstinate, it has been able to conquer them sooner than did the latter, which was surrounded all by free cities.

[2] Thus, to return to the first discourse, when he assaults a town, a captain ought to contrive with all diligence to lift such necessity from its defenders, and in consequence such obstinacy—if they have fear of punishment, he promises pardon, and if they had fear for their freedom, he shows he does not go against the common good but against the ambitious few in the city, which has many times made campaigns and captures of towns easier. Although such coloring over as this is easily recognized, and especially by prudent men, nonetheless peoples are often deceived in it who, greedy for present peace, close their eyes to whatever other snare might be laid under the big promises. Infinite cities have become servile in this way, as happened to Florence in very near times,[3] and as happened to Crassus and his army. Although he recognized the vain promises of the Parthians, which were made to take away from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves, he was not therefore able to keep them obstinate, blinded by the offers of peace that were made to them by their enemies, as one sees particularly from reading his life.[4] I say therefore that when the Samnites overran and plundered the fields of the Roman confederates, outside the agreements in the accord and through the ambition of the few, and when they then sent ambassadors to Rome to ask for peace, offering to restore the things plundered and to give as prisoners the authors of the tumults and the plundering, they were rebuffed by the Romans. After they returned to Samnium without hope of accord, Claudius Pontius, then captain of the army of the Samnites, showed with a notable oration of his that the Romans

wished for war in any mode, and although they by themselves desired peace, necessity made them continue the war, saying these words: “War is just to whom it is necessary, and arms are pious to those for whom there is no hope save in arms.”[5] On that necessity he, with his soldiers, founded hope of victory. So as not to have to return again to this matter, it appears to me good to bring up those Roman examples that are most worthy of notice. Gaius Manilius was with the army up against the Veientes, and since part of the Veientian army entered the stockade of Manilius, Manilius ran with a band to their relief; and they seized all the exits in the camp so that the Veientes could not save themselves. Hence, seeing themselves closed in, the Veientes began to combat with so much rage that they killed Manilius and would have crushed all the rest of the Romans if by the prudence of one tribune the way had not been opened for them to go out.[6] Here one sees that while necessity constrained the Veientes to combat, they combated very ferociously; but when they saw the way open, they thought more of fleeing than of engaging in combat.

[3] The Volsci and the Aequi had entered into Roman borders with their armies. The consuls were sent up against them. So in the travail of the fight, the army of the Volsci, whose head was Vettius Messius, found itself at a stroke enclosed between its stockade, which had been seized by the Romans, and the other Roman army; and seeing that they needed either to die or to make a way for themselves with steel, he said these words to his soldiers: “Go with me; neither wall nor ditch oppose you but the armed oppose the armed; alike in virtue, you are superior in necessity, which is the last and greatest weapon.”[7] So this necessity is called by Titus Livy “the last and greatest weapon.” When Camillus, the most prudent of all the Roman captains, was already inside the city of the Veientes with his army and wanted to make its taking easier and to take away from the enemy a last necessity of defending themselves, he commanded—so that the Veientes heard—that no one should hurt those who were unarmed, so that when the arms were thrown to earth, that city was taken almost without blood.[8] Such a mode was later observed by many captains.

13

Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good Captain Who Has a Weak Army or a Good Army That Has a Weak Captain

[1] When Coriolanus had become an exile from Rome, he went to the Volsci, and having contracted an army there to avenge himself against his citizens, he came to Rome. From there he later departed, more through piety for his mother than by the strength of the Romans. At this place Titus Livy says that it is to be known by this that the Roman republic grew more by the virtue of the captains than of the soldiers, considering that in the past the Volsci had been conquered and that they had conquered only after Coriolanus was their captain.[1] Although Livy holds such an opinion, nonetheless in many places of his history one sees that the virtue of the soldiers had given marvelous proofs of itself without a captain and that they had been more orderly and more ferocious after the death of their consuls than before they died, as occurred in the army that the Romans had in Spain under the Scipios. When the two captains died, it was able with its virtue not only to save itself but to conquer the enemy and to preserve that province for the republic.[2] So reviewing[3] the whole, one will find many examples where only the virtue of the soldiers won the battle, and many others where only the virtue of the captains has produced the same effect, so that one can judge that the one has need of the other, and the other of the one.

[2] Here it is good to consider, first, what is more to be feared, a good army badly captained or a good captain accompanied by a bad army. And following Caesar's opinion in this, one ought to reckon little of both. For as he was going into Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who had a very good army, he said that he reckoned them little "because he was going against an army without a leader," showing the weakness of the captains. On the contrary, when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, he said, "I go against a leader without an army."[4]

[3] One can consider another thing: to whom is it easier, to a good captain to make a good army or to a good army to make a good captain? On which I say that such a question appears decided, because many who are good will more easily find or instruct one individual so that he becomes good than one individual will make many. When Lucullus was sent against Mithridates he was altogether inexpert in war; nonetheless that good army, in which there were very many very good heads, soon made him a good captain.[5] The Romans, for lack of men, armed very many slaves and gave them to Sempronius Gracchus to exercise, who in a short time made a good army.[6] As we have said elsewhere,[7] a short time after Pelopidas and Epaminondas had drawn their fatherland, Thebes, from servitude to the Spartans, they made very good soldiers of Theban peasants, who were able not only to withstand the Spartan military but to conquer it. So the affair is even, because the one good can find the other. Nonetheless, a good army without a good head usually becomes insolent and dangerous, as the army of Macedon became after the death of Alexander,[8] and as the veteran soldiers in the civil wars were.[9] So I believe that a captain who has time to instruct men and occasion to arm them is very much more to be trusted than an insolent army with a head made tumultuously by it. Thus the glory and the praise are to be doubled for those captains who have had not only to conquer the enemy but to instruct their army and make it good before they come hand to hand with him; for in these a double virtue is shown, and so rare that if such a task had been given to many, they would be reckoned and reputed very much less than they are.

14

What Effects New Inventions That Appear in the Middle of the Fight and New Voices That Are Heard May Produce

[1] Of how much moment in conflicts and in fighting a new accident may be that arises because of a thing newly seen or heard is demonstrated in very many places, and especially by this example that occurred in the fighting that the Romans did with the Volsci. Here Quintius, seeing one of the wings of his army bending, began to cry out loudly that it should stand steady because the other wing of the army was victorious, and—this word having given spirit to his men and terrified the enemy—he won.[1] If such voices produce great effects in a well-ordered army, in a tumultuous and badly ordered one they produce the greatest because the whole is moved by a like wind. I wish to bring up one notable example of this that occurred in our times. The city of Perugia was divided a few years ago into two parties, Oddi and Baglioni. The latter were reigning; the others were exiles who, having gathered an army by means of their friends and brought themselves down to some town of theirs near Perugia, entered that city one night with the favor of the party and without being discovered came to take the piazza. Because that city has chains on all the corners of the streets that keep it locked up, the Oddi troops had one individual in front who broke the locks on them with a steel sledgehammer so that the horse could pass through. When all that remained for them to break was the one that blocked the piazza, and the call to arms had already been raised, he who was breaking it was pressed by the crowd that was coming behind him and, because of this, was unable to lift his arms well to break. To be able to manage, he came out and said, “Get back!”—and this voice going from rank to rank saying “Back!” began to make the last ones flee, and little by little the others, with so much fury that they were broken by themselves. So the plan of the Oddi was in vain, because of so weak an accident.[2]

[2] Here it is to be considered that the orders in an army are necessary not so much to be able to engage in combat in orderly fashion as that every least accident not disorder you. For it is not because of anything else that popular multitudes are useless for war except that every noise, every voice, every uproar upsets them and makes them flee. So a good captain among his other orders ought to order whoever are those who have to pick up his voice and relay it to others, and accustom his soldiers not to believe any but them and his captains not to say anything but what has been commissioned by him. For when this part has not been well observed, it has often been seen to have produced the greatest disorders.

[3] As to seeing new things, every captain ought to contrive to make one of them appear while the armies are hand to hand, which gives spirit to his men and takes it away from the enemy; for among the accidents that give you victory, this is most efficacious. As witness of this, one can bring up Gaius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator. Coming to battle with the French, he armed all the pillagers and vile people in the camp, and when they had been mounted on mules and other pack animals with arms and ensigns to appear as troops on horseback, he put them under the ensigns behind a hill and commanded that at a given sign, at the time when the fighting was most vigorous, they be exposed and shown to the enemies. When that thing was so ordered and done, it gave so much terror to the French that they lost the battle.[3] Thus a good captain ought to do two things: one, with some of these new inventions, to see to terrifying the enemy; the other, to be prepared so that when such have been done by the enemy against him, he can expose them and make them turn out vain. So did the king of India to Semiramis, who, seeing that that king had a good number of elephants, and wishing to terrify him and to show him that she too had plenty of them, constructed[4] very many of them with the hides of buffaloes and cows, and having put them on top of camels, sent them ahead. But when the deception was recognized by the king, he made that plan of hers turn out not only vain but harmful.[5] The dictator Mamercus was opposing the Fidenates, who to terrify the Roman army ordered that in the ardor of fighting a number of soldiers should come out of Fidenae with flames on spears so that the Romans, seized by the newness of the thing, would break orders within themselves. On this it is to be noted that when such inventions have more of the true than the fictional, one can indeed then represent them to men because, having very much of the mighty, one cannot expose their weakness so soon; but when they have more of the fictional than the true, it is good

either not to do them or, when doing them, to hold them at a distance such that they cannot be exposed so soon, as did Gaius Sulpitius with the mule riders. For when there is weakness inside them, as they are brought close they are soon exposed and do harm to you, and not favor, as did the elephants to Semiramis and the flames to the Fidenates. Although in the beginning they disturbed the army a little, nonetheless, as the dictator intervened and began to cry out to them—saying that they should not shame themselves by fleeing smoke like bees, and that they should turn around to them, crying out, "Destroy Fidenae with its own flames, which you were unable to placate with your benefits"—that shift turned out to be useless to the Fidenates, and they were left losers in the fighting.[6]

15

That One Individual and Not Many Should Be Put over an Army; and That Several Commanders Hurt

[1] When the Fidenates had rebelled and had killed the colony that the Romans had sent to Fidenae, to remedy this insult the Romans created four tribunes with consular power. They left one of them for the guarding of Rome and sent three against the Fidenates and the Veientes. Because they were divided among themselves and disunited, they brought back dishonor and not harm. For they were themselves the cause of the dishonor; the virtue of the soldiers was the cause of not receiving harm. Hence the Romans, seeing this disorder, had recourse to the creation of the dictator[1] so that one alone might reorder what three had disordered. Hence one recognizes the uselessness of many commanders in an army or in a town that has to be defended; and Titus Livy cannot say it more clearly than with the words written below: "Three tribunes with consular power documented how useless plural command is for war; since each insisted on his own counsel, while to the others it seemed otherwise, they made room for opportunity to the enemy."[2] Although this example is enough to prove the disorder that several commanders produce in war, I wish to bring up some others, both modern and ancient, for greater clarification of the thing.

[2] In 1500, after the recapture of Milan by the king of France, Louis XII, he sent his troops to Pisa so as to restore it to the Florentines; Giovambatista Ridolfi and Luca di Antonio degli Albizzi were sent there as commissioners. Because Giovambatista was a man of reputation and of greater age, Luca left the governing of everything entirely to him; and if he did not demonstrate his ambition by opposing him, he demonstrated it by keeping silent, and by neglecting and disparaging everything so that he did not help actions in the camp either by work or by counsel, as if he had been a man of no moment. But one may then see quite the contrary when, because of a certain accident that followed, Giovambatista had to return to

Florence; there Luca, left alone, demonstrated how much he was worth with spirit, with industry, and with counsel—all of which things were lost while there was company with him.[3] In confirmation of this, I wish to bring up anew the words of Titus Livy, who—in referring to how, when Quintius and his colleague Agrippa were sent by the Romans against the Aequi, Agrippa wished for the whole administration of the war to be with Quintius—says: "It is most healthy in the administration of great things that the summit of command be with one individual."[4] That is contrary to what these republics and princes of ours do today in sending to places more than one commissioner, more than one head, to administer them better, which produces confusion beyond reckoning. If one seeks the causes of the ruin of Italian and French armies in our times, one will find the most powerful to have been this. And it can be concluded truly that it is better to send one man of common prudence alone on an expedition than two very worthy men together with the same authority.

16

That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find True Virtue; and in Easy Times Not Virtuous Men but Those with Riches or Kinship Have More Favor

[1] It has always been, and will always be, that great and rare men are neglected in a republic in peaceful times. For through the envy that the reputation their virtue has given them has brought with it, one finds very many citizens in such times who wish to be not their equals but their superiors. On this there is a good passage in Thucydides, the Greek historian. He shows that when the Athenian republic was on top in the Peloponnesian War, and had checked the pride of the Spartans and almost subdued all the rest of Greece, it rose to so much reputation that it planned to seize Sicily. This enterprise came under dispute in Athens. Alcibiades and some other citizen, planning to be the heads of such an enterprise, counseled that it be done, as those who, while thinking little of the public good, thought of their honor. But Nicias, who was the first among those reputed in Athens, argued against it. The greatest reason that he brought up in haranguing the people, so that they might lend him faith, was this: that in counseling that this war not be made, he was counseling a thing that would do nothing for him. For while Athens was at peace, he knew that there were infinite citizens who wished to go ahead of him; but if war was made, he knew that no citizen would be superior or equal to him.[1]

[2] By this one sees, therefore, that in republics there is the disorder of giving little esteem to worthy men in quiet times. That thing makes them indignant in two modes: one, to see themselves lacking their rank; the other, to see unworthy men of less substance[2] than they made partners and superiors to themselves. That disorder in republics has caused much ruin, because those citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised and know that easy and not dangerous times are the cause of it strive to disturb them,

starting new wars to the prejudice of the republic. Thinking over what could be the remedies, I find two of them: one, to maintain the citizens poor so that they cannot corrupt either themselves or others with riches and without virtue; the other, to be ordered for war so that one can always make war and always has need of reputed citizens, as did the Romans in their first times. For since armies were always kept outside that city, there was always a place for the virtue of men; nor could rank be taken away from one individual who deserved it and given to another individual who did not deserve it. For if indeed [the Roman republic] did so at some time by error or for trial, so much disorder and danger soon followed for it that it at once returned to the true way. But the other republics that are not ordered like that one and that make war only when necessity constrains them cannot defend themselves from such an inconvenience; indeed, they always run into them, and disorder will always arise when that neglected and virtuous citizen is vindictive and has some reputation and connection in the city. The city of Rome at one time had a defense; but also, after it had conquered Carthage and Antiochus (as was said elsewhere)[3] and no longer feared wars, it appeared to it that it could commit armies to whomever it wished, with regard not so much to virtue as to other qualities that gave them favor among the people. For one may see that Paulus Aemilius often suffered rejection for the consulate, nor was he made consul before the Macedonian War broke out, which, being judged dangerous, was committed to him by agreement of the whole city.[4]

[3] When in our city of Florence many wars continued after 1494, and all the Florentine citizens had made a bad showing, the city by fate came upon one individual who showed how armies have to be commanded, who was Antonio Giacomini. While dangerous wars had to be made, all the ambition of the other citizens ceased, and in the choice of commissioner and head of the armies he had no competitor; but as soon as a war had to be made in which there was no doubt, and very much honor and rank, he found so many competitors for it that when three commissioners had to be chosen to encamp before Pisa, he was omitted. Although one did not plainly see that ill to the republic followed from not having sent Antonio there, nonetheless one could very easily have made a conjecture about it; for since the Pisans no longer had the wherewithal to defend themselves or to live, if Antonio had been there they would have been pressed so much that they would have given themselves to the discretion of the Florentines. But since they were besieged by heads who knew neither how to press them nor how to force

them, they were treated so that the city of Florence bought them when it could have had them by force. Such indignation must have been able to do very much in Antonio, and he needed to be patient and good indeed not to desire to avenge himself, either with the ruin of the city, if he was able, or with the injury of some particular citizen.[5] From that a republic ought to guard itself, as will be discoursed of in the following chapter.

17

That One Individual Should Not Be Offended and Then That Same One Sent to an Administration and Governance of Importance

[1] A republic ought to consider very much not putting someone over any important administration to whom any notable injury has been done by another. Claudius Nero, who left the army that he had confronting Hannibal, and with part of it went to the Marches to meet the other consul so as to do combat with Hasdrubal before he could join with Hannibal, had in the past been confronting Hasdrubal in Spain. Then he had enclosed him in a place with his army so that Hasdrubal needed either to engage in combat to his disadvantage or die of hunger, and he was so astutely detained by Hasdrubal with certain negotiations of an accord that he came out from under and took away from him the opportunity of crushing him. When that thing was known in Rome, it prompted a great charge against him among the Senate and the people, and throughout the city he was spoken of indecently, not without great dishonor and indignation for him.[1] But since he had then been made consul and sent up against Hannibal, he adopted the policy written above, which was very dangerous, so that all Rome remained doubtful and stirred up until the news came of the defeat of Hasdrubal. When Claudius was then asked for what cause he had adopted so dangerous a policy, whereby without an extreme necessity he had almost staked the freedom of Rome, he replied that he had done it because he knew that if he succeeded he would reacquire the glory he had lost in Spain; and if he did not succeed, and this policy of his had had a contrary end, he knew that he would have avenged himself against the city and the citizens who had so ungratefully and indiscreetly offended him.[2] When the passions of such offenses are able to do so much in a Roman citizen, and in those times when Rome was still uncorrupt, one ought to think about how much they are able to do in a citizen of another city that is not made as it was

then. Because one cannot give a certain remedy for such disorders that arise in republics, it follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways.

18

Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain Than to Foretell the Policies of the Enemy

[1] Epaminondas the Theban used to say that nothing was more necessary and more useful to a captain than to know the decisions and policies of the enemy.[1] Because such knowledge is difficult, he who employs himself so as to make conjectures about them deserves so much the more praise. It is not so difficult to understand the plans of the enemy as it is sometimes difficult to understand his actions, and not so much actions that are done by him at a distance as ones present and near. For it has often happened that when a fight has lasted until night, whoever has won believes he has lost, and whoever has lost believes he has won. That error has made things be decided contrary to the safety of the one who decided, as happened to Brutus and Cassius, who lost the war because of this error; for when Brutus had won on his wing, Cassius believed he had lost, so that the whole army was defeated; and, made desperate for his safety by this error, he killed himself.[2] In our times, in the battle that Francis, king of France, made with the Swiss in Lombardy at Santa Cecilia, that part of the Swiss who were left whole when night came over believed they had won, not knowing of those who had been defeated and killed. That error made them not save themselves and made them wait to engage in combat again in the morning, at such a disadvantage to them; and they also made the army of the pope and of Spain err, and through such an error come close to ruin, for upon the false news of victory it crossed the Po, and if it had proceeded too far ahead, it would have been left prisoner of the victorious French.[3]

[2] The like error occurred in the Roman camps and in those of the Aequi. When the consul Sempronius was there with the army up against the enemy, and after the fighting was set off, the battle dragged on until evening, with varying fortune for the one and the other. When night came, both armies being half-defeated, neither of them returned to its quarters; indeed, each retreated to hills nearby where it believed it would be secure. The Roman army divided into two parts: one went with the consul, the other

with Tempanius, a centurion, by the virtue of whom the Roman army had not been entirely defeated that day. When morning came, the Roman consul, without further understanding of the enemy, withdrew toward Rome; the army of the Aequi did likewise because each of these believed that the enemy had won and so each retreated without caring about leaving its quarters as booty. It happened that Tempanius, who was retiring with the rest of the Roman army, learned from certain wounded of the Aequi that their captains had left and had abandoned the lodgings. Hence, upon this news, he entered the Roman quarters and saved them, and then he plundered those of the Aequi, and returned to Rome victorious.[4] That victory, as one sees, consisted only in whichever of them first understood the disorders of the enemy. Here one ought to note that it can often occur that two armies that are confronting each other may be in the same disorder and be suffering the same necessity, and that the one is then left the victor that is the first to understand the necessity of the other.

[3] I wish to give a domestic and modern example of this. In 1498, the Florentines had a large army around Pisa and were strongly pressing that city, which the Venetians had taken under protection, and the Venetians, not seeing another mode of saving it, decided to divert the war by assaulting the dominion of Florence from another side. Having made a powerful army, they entered by the Val di Lamona and seized the village of Marradi and besieged the castle of Castiglione, which is on the hill above. When the Florentines heard of this, they decided to come to the aid of Marradi and not to diminish the forces they had around Pisa; and having made new infantry and ordered new troops on horseback, they sent them in that direction. Their heads were Jacopo IV d'Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio da Marciano. Thus when these troops were led to the top of the hill above Marradi, the enemy got out from around Castiglione, and all went to the village. After both of these two armies had been at the front for some days, both suffered very much for provisions and for every other necessary thing. The one not having dared to confront the other, nor knowing each other's disorders, both decided on the same evening to move their quarters on the coming morning and to retire to the rear, the Venetian toward Bersighella and Faenza, the Florentine toward Casaglia and the Mugello. Thus when morning came and each of the camps had begun to get its baggage under way, by chance a woman left the village of Marradi and came toward the Florentine camp, secure because of old age and poverty, and desirous of seeing certain of her relatives who were in that camp.[5]

When the captains of the Florentine troops learned from her that the Venetian camp was leaving, they were made bold by the news; and having changed their counsel, they went after the enemies as if they had dislodged them, and they wrote to Florence that they had repelled them and won the war. That victory arose from nothing other than having learned before the enemies that they were going—which knowledge, if it had come first to the other side, would have had the same effect against ours.

19

Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment

[1] The Roman republic was stirred up by the enmities of the nobles and of the plebs; nonetheless, when war was upon them, they sent out Quintius and Appius Claudius with the armies. Because Appius was cruel and coarse in commanding he was badly obeyed by his men, so that he fled almost defeated from his province; because Quintius was kind and of humane disposition, he had his soldiers obedient, and he brought back victory.[1] Hence it appears that in governing a multitude, it is better to be humane rather than proud, merciful rather than cruel. Nonetheless, Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other writers consent, concludes the contrary in one of his judgments, when he says:[2] "In ruling a multitude, punishment is worth more than compliance."[3] Considering how one could save both of these opinions, I say: you have to rule either men who are ordinarily partners with you or men who are always subject to you. When they are partners with you, one cannot use punishment entirely, nor that severity on which Cornelius reasons; and because the Roman plebs had equal command in Rome with the nobility, one individual who became prince of it for a time could not manage it with cruelty and coarseness. One may often see that the Roman captains who made themselves loved by their armies and who managed them with compliance had better fruit than those who made themselves extraordinarily feared, unless they were accompanied by an excessive virtue, as was Manlius Torquatus. But whoever commands subjects, of whom Cornelius reasons, ought to turn rather to punishment than to compliance so that they do not become insolent and do not trample on you because of too much easiness from you. But this ought also to be moderated so that one escapes hatred, for to make oneself hated never turns out well for any prince. The mode of escaping it is to let the property of subjects be, for no prince is desirous of bloodshed if robbery is not concealed underneath it, unless he is necessitated, and this necessity comes rarely. But when robbery is mixed with it, it always comes; nor are the

causes and the desire of shedding it ever lacking, as is broadly discoursed of in another treatise on this matter.[4] Thus Quintius deserved more praise than Appius, and the judgment of Cornelius, within its limits and not in the cases observed of Appius, deserves to be approved.

[2] And because we have spoken of punishment and compliance, it does not appear to me superfluous to show that one example of humanity was able to do more with the Falisci than arms.

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One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do More with the Falisci Than Any Roman Force

[1] When Camillus was with the army around the city of the Falisci and besieging it, a schoolmaster of the noblest children of that city, thinking to gratify Camillus and the Roman people, went out of the town with them under color of exercise, led them all to the camp before Camillus, and presented them, saying that through them the town would give itself into his hands. Not only was that present not accepted by Camillus, but, having stripped that master and bound his hands behind him, and given each one of those children a rod in hand, he had him accompanied to town with many beatings from them. When that affair was learned of by the citizens, the humanity and integrity of Camillus pleased them so much that, without wishing to defend themselves more, they decided to give them the town.[1] Here it is to be considered with this true example how much more a humane act full of charity is sometimes able to do in the spirits of men than a ferocious and violent act, and that often those provinces and those cities that arms, warlike instruments, and every other human force have not been able to open have been opened by one example of humanity and of mercy, of chastity or of liberality. Many other examples of that besides this one are in the histories. One sees that Roman arms were unable to expel Pyrrhus from Italy, and the liberality of Fabricius expelled him from it, when he made manifest to him the offer that that familiar of his had made to the Romans to poison him.[2] One sees too that the capture of New Carthage did not give Scipio Africanus so much reputation in Spain as that example of chastity gave him, of having returned the wife—young, beautiful, and untouched—to her husband, the fame of which action made all Spain friendly to him.[3] One sees too how much this part is desired in great men by peoples, and how much it is praised by writers, and by those who describe the life of princes, and by those who order how they ought to live. Among

them Xenophon toils very much to demonstrate how many honors, how many victories, how much good fame being humane and affable brought to Cyrus, and not giving any example of himself either as proud, or as cruel, or as lustful, or as having any other vice that stains the life of men.[4] Yet nonetheless, seeing that Hannibal attained great fame and great victories with modes contrary to these, it appears to me good to discourse in the following chapter on whence this arises.

21

Whence It Arises That with a Different Mode of Proceeding Hannibal Produced Those Same Effects in Italy as Scipio Did in Spain

[1] I reckon that some might be able to marvel when they see that some captain, notwithstanding that he has held to a contrary life, may have nonetheless produced effects similar to those who have lived in the mode written about above. So it appears that the cause of the victories does not depend on the causes said before; indeed, it appears that those modes bring you neither more force nor more fortune, since one can acquire glory and reputation through contrary modes. So as not to depart from the men written about above, and to clarify better what I wished to say, I say that one sees Scipio enter Spain and with his humanity and mercy at once make that province friendly to him, and make himself adored and admired by its peoples.[1] To the contrary, one sees Hannibal enter Italy and with modes all contrary—that is, with cruelty, violence, robbery, and every type of faithlessness—produce the same effect that Scipio had produced in Spain; for all the cities of Italy rebelled to Hannibal, all the peoples followed him.[2]

[2] Thinking over whence this could arise, one sees several reasons within it. The first is that men are desirous of new things, so much that most often those who are well off desire newness as much as those who are badly off. For, as was said another time,[3] and it is true, men get bored with the good and grieve in the ill. Thus this desire makes the doors open to everyone who makes himself head of an innovation in a province: if he is foreign, they run after him; if he is from the province, they are around him, promoting and favoring him, so that in whatever mode he proceeds he succeeds in making great progress in those places. Besides this, men are driven by two principal things, either by love or by fear; so whoever makes himself loved commands, as does he who makes himself feared. Indeed, most often whoever makes

himself feared is more followed and more obeyed than whoever makes himself loved.[4]

[3] Therefore it is of little import to a captain whichever of these ways he walks in, provided that he is a virtuous man and that the virtue makes him reputed among men. For when it is great, as it was in Hannibal and in Scipio, it cancels all those errors that are made so as to make oneself loved too much or to make oneself feared too much. For great inconveniences apt to make a prince come to ruin can arise from both of these two modes: for he who desires too much to be loved becomes despicable, however little he departs from the true way; the other, who desires too much to be feared, becomes hateful, however little he exceeds the mode. One cannot hold exactly to the middle way, for our nature does not consent to it, but it is necessary to mitigate those things that exceed with an excessive virtue, as did Hannibal and Scipio. Nonetheless, one may see that both were hurt by their modes of life, and were exalted as well.

[4] The exaltation of both has been told of. The hurt,[5] as to Scipio, is that his soldiers in Spain rebelled against him, together with part of his friends, an affair that arose from nothing other than their not fearing him. For men are so unquiet that however little the door to ambition is opened for them, they at once forget every love that they had placed in the prince because of his humanity, as did the soldiers and friends told of before. So, to remedy this inconvenience, Scipio was constrained to use part of the cruelty he had fled from.[6] As to Hannibal, there is no particular example where his cruelty and lack of faith hurt him, but one can well presuppose that Naples and many other towns that stayed faithful to the Roman people stayed for fear of that. One may see this well, that his impious mode of life made him more hateful to the Roman people than any other enemy that that republic ever had,[7] so that whereas they made the one who wished to poison him manifest to Pyrrhus while he was with his army in Italy, they never pardoned Hannibal even though he was unarmed and dispersed, so that they had him killed.[8] Thus arose these disadvantages for Hannibal because he was held impious and a breaker of faith and cruel. But as against these, a very great advantage resulted to him from them, which is admired by all the writers: that although his army was composed of various kinds of men, no dissension ever arose in it, either among them or against him. That could not have derived from anything other than the terror that arose from his person, which was so great—mixed with the reputation that his virtue gave

him—that it held his soldiers quiet and united. Thus I conclude that the mode in which a captain proceeds is not very important, provided that in it is the great virtue that seasons both modes of life; for as was said, in both there is defect and danger unless they are corrected by an extraordinary virtue. And if Hannibal and Scipio produced the same effect—one with praiseworthy things, the other with detestable—it does not appear to me good to omit discoursing also of two Roman citizens who by diverse modes, but both praiseworthy, attained the same glory.

22

That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Kindness of Valerius Corvinus Acquired for Each the Same Glory

[1] There were two excellent captains in Rome at one and the same time, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus. They lived in Rome with like virtue, with like triumphs and glory, and each of them, in what pertained to the enemy, acquired it with like virtue; but in what belonged to the armies and to their dealings with the soldiers, they proceeded very diversely. For Manlius commanded his soldiers with every kind of severity, without interrupting either toil or punishment; Valerius, on the other hand, dealt with them with every humane mode and means and full of a familiar domesticity. For one may see that to have the obedience of the soldiers, one killed his son and the other never offended anyone. Nonetheless, with so much diversity of proceeding, each produced the same fruit, both against enemies and in favor of the republic and of himself. For no soldier ever drew back from fighting or rebelled from them or was in any part discrepant from their wish, although the commands of Manlius were so harsh that all other commands that exceeded the mode were called "Manlian commands."[1] Here it is to be considered, first, whence it arises that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly; another, whence it came that Valerius could proceed so humanely; another, what cause made these diverse modes produce the same effect; and last, which of them is better and more useful to imitate. If anyone considers well the nature of Manlius from where Titus Livy begins to make mention of him, he will see him as a very strong man, pious toward his father and his fatherland, and very reverent to his superiors. These things can be known from the death of the Frenchman, from the defense of his father against the tribune, and from the fact that before he went to the fight with the Frenchman he went to the consul with these words: "Without your command I will never fight against the enemy, not if I should see certain victory."[2] Thus when a man so made comes to the

rank that commands, he desires to find all men similar to himself, and his strong spirit makes him command strong things; and that same one wishes them to be observed when they are commanded. And it is a very true rule that when one commands harsh things, one must make them observed with harshness; otherwise you will find yourself deceived. Here it is to be noted that if one wishes to be obeyed, it is necessary to know how to command; and those know how to command who make a comparison between their qualities and those of whoever has to obey, and when they see proportion there, then they may command; when disproportion, they abstain from it.

[2] So a prudent man used to say that to hold a republic with violence, there must have been proportion from whoever is forcing to that which is forced.[3] At whatever time there is this proportion, one can believe that the violence would be lasting, but if the one to whom violence is done is stronger than the one doing violence, one can suspect that any day that violence might cease.

[3] But returning to our discourse, I say that to command strong things one must be strong; and he who is of this strength and who commands them cannot then make them observed with mildness. But whoever is not of this strength of spirit ought to guard himself from extraordinary commands and can use his humanity in ordinary ones, because ordinary punishments are imputed not to the prince but to the laws and to those orders. Thus one ought to believe that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly by his extraordinary commands, to which his nature inclined him. They are useful in a republic because they return its orders toward their beginning and into its ancient virtue. As we said above, if a republic were so happy that it often had one who with his example might renew the laws, and not only restrain it from running to ruin but pull it back, it would be perpetual.[4] So Manlius was one of those who retained military discipline in Rome with the harshness of his commands—constrained first by his nature, then by the desire he had that what his natural appetite had made him order be observed. On the other hand, Valerius could proceed humanely as one to whom it was enough that things be observed that were customary to observe in the Roman armies. That custom, because it was good, was enough to honor him; and it was not toilsome to observe it, and it did not necessitate Valerius's punishing transgressors, whether because there were none or because, when there had been some, they imputed their punishment, as was said, to the orders and not to the cruelty of the prince. So Valerius was able to make all humanity arise from him, from which he could acquire the

soldiers' favor and their contentment. Hence it arises that since both had the same obedience, they could produce the same effect while working diversely. Those who might wish to imitate them can fall into those vices of scorn and hatred of which I told above of Hannibal and Scipio. You escape that with an excessive virtue that is in you, and not otherwise.

[4] It remains now to consider which of these two modes of proceeding is more praiseworthy. I believe that is disputable because the writers praise both the one mode and the other. Nonetheless, those who write about how a prince has to govern side more with Valerius than with Manlius; and Xenophon, cited before by me, by giving many examples of the humanity of Cyrus,[5] conforms very much with what Titus Livy says of Valerius. For when he had been made consul against the Samnites, and the day came when he ought to engage in combat, he spoke to his soldiers with that humanity with which he governed himself, and after such speaking Titus Livy says these words: "Nowhere else was a leader more familiar with the soldier, since he undertook all obligations ungrudgingly among the meanest of the soldiers. Also in military sport, when those of the same age entered contests among themselves in swiftness and strength, he was courteously easygoing; he would win and lose with the same face, nor would anyone be rejected who offered himself as a peer; in deeds he was kind according to circumstance; in words he was no less mindful of the freedom of another than of his own dignity; and (than which nothing is more popular) he carried on the magistracies with the same arts by which he sought them." [6] Titus Livy speaks honorably in the same way of Manlius, showing that his severity in the death of his son made the army so obedient to the consul that it was the cause of the victory that the Roman people had against the Latins. He proceeds so far in praising him that after such a victory—having described, as he has, all the order of the battle and shown all the dangers that the Roman people incurred there and the difficulties there were in winning—he makes this conclusion: that only the virtue of Manlius gave that victory to the Romans. Making comparison of the strength of both armies, he affirms that that side would have won that had Manlius for consul.[7] So, when all that which the writers speak of it has been considered, it would be difficult to judge. Nonetheless, so as not to leave this part undecided, I say that in a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I believe the proceeding of Manlius is more praiseworthy and less dangerous, because this mode is wholly in favor of the public and does not in any part have regard to private ambition. For by such a mode, showing oneself

always harsh to everyone and loving only the common good, one cannot acquire partisans; for whoever does this does not acquire particular friends for himself, which we call, as was said above, partisans.[8] So a similar mode of proceeding cannot be more useful or more desirable in a republic, since the public utility is not lacking in it and there cannot be any suspicion of private power. But the contrary is in Valerius's mode of proceeding, for if indeed the same effects are produced as to the public, nonetheless, because of the particular goodwill that he acquires with the soldiers, many doubts resurge as to the bad effects on freedom of a long command.

[5] If these bad effects did not arise in Publicola, the cause was that the spirits of the Romans were not yet corrupt, and he had not been in their government for long and continually[9] But if we have to consider a prince, as Xenophon is considering, we shall take the side altogether of Valerius, and leave Manlius; for a prince ought to seek obedience and love in soldiers and in subjects. Being an observer of the orders and being held virtuous give him obedience; affability, humanity, mercy, and the other parts that were in Valerius—and that, Xenophon writes, were in Cyrus—give him love.[10] For being a prince particularly well wished for and having the army as his partisan conform with all the other parts of his state; but in a citizen who has the army as his partisan, this part already does not conform with his other parts, which have to make him live under the laws and obey the magistrates.

[6] Among the ancient things of the Venetian republic, one reads that when the Venetian galleys returned to Venice and a certain difference came between those in the galleys and the people, whence they came to tumult and to arms, and since the affair could not be quieted either by the force of the ministers or by the reverence of citizens or by fear of the magistrates, at once a gentleman appeared before those seamen who had been their captain the year before, for love of whom they departed and gave up fighting. That obedience generated such suspicion in the Senate that a short time afterward the Venetians secured themselves against him either by prison or by death.[11] I conclude, therefore, that the proceeding of Valerius is useful in a prince and pernicious in a citizen, not only to the fatherland but to himself: to it, because those modes prepare the way for tyranny; to himself, because in suspecting his mode of proceeding, his city is constrained to secure itself against him to his harm. So by the contrary I affirm that the proceeding of Manlius is harmful in a prince and useful in a citizen, and especially to the fatherland; and also it rarely offends, unless indeed the

hatred that your severity brings you is increased by the suspicion that your other virtues bring upon you because of their great reputation, as will be discoursed of Camillus below.

23

For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled from Rome

[1] We have concluded above that proceeding as did Valerius hurts the fatherland and oneself, and proceeding as did Manlius helps the fatherland and sometimes hurts oneself. That is proved very well by the example of Camillus, who in his proceeding resembled Manlius rather than Valerius. Hence Titus Livy, speaking of him, says that "the soldiers both hated and marveled at his virtue."[1] What made him held marvelous was the solicitude, the prudence, the greatness of his spirit, the good order that he observed in employing himself and in commanding the armies; what made him hated was being more severe in punishing them than liberal in rewarding them. Titus Livy brings up these causes of the hatred: first, that he applied to the public the money that was drawn from the goods of the Veientes that were sold and did not divide it as booty; another, that in the triumph, he had his triumphal chariot pulled by four white horses, from which they said that because of his pride he wished to be equal to the sun; third, that he made a vow to give to Apollo the tenth part of the booty of the Veientes, which, since he wished to satisfy the vow, he had to take out of the hands of the soldiers who had already seized it.[2] Here those things that make a prince hateful to the people are well and easily noted, of which the principal one is to deprive it of something useful.[3] That is a thing of very much importance, because when a man is deprived of things that have utility in themselves, he never forgets, and every least necessity makes you remember them; and because necessities come every day, you remember them every day. The other thing is appearing proud and swollen, which cannot be more hateful to peoples, and especially to free ones. Although no disadvantage arises for them from that pride and that pomp, nonetheless they hold whoever uses them in hatred. A prince ought to guard himself from that as from a reef, because to draw on hatred without profit for oneself is a policy altogether rash and hardly prudent.[4]

24

The Prolongation of Commands Made Rome Servile

[1] If one considers well the proceeding of the Roman republic, one will see that two things were the cause of the dissolution of that republic: one was the contentions that arose from the Agrarian law; the other, the prolongation of commands. If these things had been known well from the beginning, and proper remedies produced for them, a free way of life would have been longer and perhaps quieter. Although, as to the prolongation of command, one does not see that any tumult ever arose in Rome, nonetheless one may see in fact how much the authority that citizens took through such decisions hurt the city. If the other citizens for whom the magistracy was extended had been wise and good as was Lucius Quintius,[1] one would not have run into this inconvenience. His goodness is of notable example, for when a convention of accord had been made between the plebs and the Senate, and the plebs had prolonged the command of the tribunes for a year, judging them capable of resisting the ambition of the nobles, the Senate, because of rivalry with the plebs and so as not to appear any less than it, wished to prolong the consulate for Lucius Quintius. He altogether rejected this decision, saying that one should wish to seek to eliminate bad examples, not to increase them with another worse example; and he wished for new consuls to be made.[2] If that goodness and prudence had been in all Roman citizens, the custom of prolonging magistracies would not have been allowed to be introduced, and from those one would not have come to the prolongation of commands, a thing that in time ruined the republic. The first for whom the command was extended was Publius Philo.[3] When he was in camp at the city of Palaepolis, and the end of his consulate was coming, and it appeared to the Senate that he had that victory in hand, they did not send a successor for him but made him proconsul, so that he was the first proconsul. Although started by the Senate for public utility, that thing was what in time made Rome servile. For the farther the Romans went abroad with arms, the more such extension appeared necessary to them and

the more they used it. That thing produced two inconveniences: one, that a lesser number of men were practiced in commands, and because of this they came to restrict reputation to a few; the other, that when a citizen remained commander of an army for a very long time, he would win it over to himself and make it partisan to him, for the army would in time forget the Senate and recognize that head. Because of this, Sulla and Marius could find soldiers who would follow them against the public good; because of this, Caesar could seize the fatherland. For if the Romans had never prolonged magistracies and commands, if they would not have come so soon to so much power, and if their acquisitions had been later, they would have come later still to servitude.

25

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of Many Roman Citizens

[1] We have reasoned elsewhere that the most useful thing that may be ordered in a free way of life is that the citizens be kept poor.[1] Although in Rome it does not appear which order was the one that produced this effect, since the Agrarian law especially had so much opposition, nonetheless one may see from experience that four hundred years after Rome had been built, very great poverty was there. Nor can one believe that any greater order produced this effect other than seeing that the way to any rank whatever and to any honor whatever was not prevented for you because of poverty, and that one went to find virtue in whatever house it inhabited. That mode of life made riches less desirable. One sees this manifested, for when the consul Minucius was besieged with his army by the Aequi, Rome was filled with fear lest that army be lost; so they had recourse to creating a dictator, the ultimate remedy in things that afflicted them. They created Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then at his small villa, on which he labored with his own hands. That thing is celebrated with golden words by Titus Livy, who says, "It is worth listening to by those who scorn all human things in comparison with wealth and do not think there is any place for great honor and virtue except where riches flow lavishly."[2] Cincinnatus was plowing his small villa, which did not surpass a limit of four *jugera*,[3] when the legates of the Senate came from Rome to convey to him the election to his dictatorship, to show him in what danger the Roman republic found itself. Having put on his toga, come to Rome, and gathered an army, he went to free Minucius; and when he had defeated and despoiled the enemy and freed him, he did not wish the besieged army to share in the plunder, saying these words to it: "I do not wish that you share in the plunder of those of whom you were about to be the plunder."[4] And he deprived Minucius of the consulate and made him a legate, saying to him, "Stay in this rank until you learn to know how to be a consul."[5] He had made Lucius Tarquinius, who served in the military on foot because of his poverty, his

master of the horse. One notes, as was said, the honor that was paid in Rome to poverty, and that to a good and worthy man, such as Cincinnatus was, four *jugera* of earth was enough to nourish him. One sees that poverty as it was still in the times of Marcus Regulus, for when he was in Africa with the armies, he asked license from the Senate to be able to return to look after his villa, which was spoiled for him by his workers.[6] Here one sees two very notable things: one, poverty, and the fact that they were content with it, and that it was enough to those citizens to get honor from war, and everything useful they left to the public. For if [Marcus Regulus] had thought of getting rich from war, it would have given him little trouble that his fields had been spoiled. The other is to consider the generosity of spirit of those citizens whom, when put in charge of an army, the greatness of their spirit lifted above every prince. They did not esteem kings, or republics; nothing terrified or frightened them. When they later returned to private status, they became frugal, humble, careful of their small competencies, obedient to the magistrates, reverent to their superiors, so that it appears impossible that one and the same spirit underwent such change. This poverty even lasted until the times of Paulus Aemilius, which were almost the last happy times of that republic, when one citizen who enriched Rome with his triumph nonetheless kept himself poor. Poverty was still so much esteemed that Paulus, in honoring whoever had borne himself well in the war, gave to his son-in-law a cup of silver that was the first silver to have been in his house.[7] One could show with a long speech how much better fruits poverty produced than riches, and how the one has honored cities, provinces, sects, and the other has ruined them, if this matter had not been celebrated many times by other men.[8]

26

How a State Is Ruined Because of Women

[1] In the city of Ardea a sedition arose between the patricians and the plebeians because of a wedding in which, when a rich woman had to marry, a plebeian and a noble alike asked for her. Since she did not have a father, the tutors wished to join her to the plebeian, the mother to the noble. From this arose so much tumult that they came to arms, in which the whole nobility armed itself in favor of the noble and the whole plebs in favor of the plebeian. So when the plebs had been overcome, it left Ardea and sent to the Volsci for aid; the nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were first, and when they reached the surroundings of Ardea, they encamped. The Romans came up and enclosed the Volsci between the town and themselves so that they constrained them, pressed by hunger, to surrender at discretion. When the Romans entered into Ardea and killed all the heads of the sedition, they settled things in that city.[1]

[2] In this text are several things to be noted. First, one sees that women have been causes of much ruin, and have done great harm to those who govern a city, and have caused many divisions in them. As has been seen in this history of ours, the excess done against Lucretia took the state away from the Tarquins;[2] another, done against Virginia, deprived the Ten of their authority.[3] Among the first causes Aristotle puts down of the ruin of tyrants is having injured someone on account of women, by raping them or by violating them or by breaking off marriages, as this part is spoken of in detail in the chapter where we treat conspiracies.[4] I say thus that absolute princes and governors of republics are not to take little account of this part, but they should consider the disorders that can arise from such an accident and remedy them in time so that the remedy is not with harm and reproach for their state or for their republic, as happened to the Ardeans. For having allowed that rivalry to grow among their citizens, they were led to divide among themselves; and when they wished to reunite, they had to send for external help, which is a great beginning of a nearby servitude.

[3] But let us come to the other notable thing, the mode of reuniting cities, of which we shall speak in the coming chapter.

27

How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and How That Opinion Is Not True That to Hold Cities One Needs to Hold Them Divided

[1] By the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the Ardeans together, one notes the mode by which a divided city ought to be composed.[1] That is none other than to kill the heads of the tumults; nor ought it to be healed otherwise. For it is necessary to pick one of three modes: either to kill them, as they did; or to remove them from the city; or to make them make peace together under obligations not to offend one another. Of these three modes, this last is most harmful, least certain, and most useless. For it is impossible where very much blood has run, or other similar injuries, that a peace made by force last, since every day they together look themselves in the face; and it is difficult for them to abstain from injuring one another, since every day new causes of quarrel can arise among them through interchange.[2]

[2] Of this one cannot give a better example than the city of Pistoia. That city was divided fifteen years ago, as it is still, into Panciatichi and Cancellieri; but then it was up in arms and today it has laid them down.[3] After many disputes among them, they came to bloodshed, to the ruin of houses, to plundering property from one another, and to every other extreme of enemies. The Florentines, who had to settle them, always used that third mode with them; and always greater tumults and greater scandals arose from it. So, worn out, they came to the second mode of removing the heads of the parties, of whom they put some in prison; some others they confined in various places so that the accord they made could remain, and it has remained until today. But without doubt the first [mode] would have been most secure. Because such executions have in them something of the great and the generous, however, a weak republic does not know how to do

them and is so distant from them that it is led to the second remedy only with trouble. These are among the errors I told of at the beginning[4] that the princes of our times make who have to judge great things, for they ought to wish to hear how those who have had to judge such cases in antiquity governed themselves. But the weakness of men at present, caused by their weak education and their slight knowledge of things, makes them judge ancient judgments in part inhuman, in part impossible. They have certain modern opinions of theirs altogether distant from the true, as was that which the wise of our city used to say a while ago: that one needed to hold Pistoia with parties and Pisa with fortresses.[5] They do not perceive how both of these two things are useless.

[3] I wish to omit fortresses because we speak of them above at length,[6] and I wish to discourse on the uselessness that derives from keeping the towns that you have to govern divided. First, it is impossible for you to maintain both these parties friendly to yourself, whether you govern them as prince or as republic. For it is given by nature to men to take sides in any divided thing whatever, and for this to please them more than that. So having one party of that town discontented makes you lose it in the first war that comes, for it is impossible to guard a city that has enemies outside and inside. If it is a republic that governs it, there is no finer mode of making your citizens wicked and of making your city divided than to have a divided city to govern; for each party seeks to have support, and each makes friends for itself with various corruptions. So two very great inconveniences arise from it: one, that you never make them friends to yourself through not being able to govern them well, since the government often varies, now with one, now with the other humor; the other, that such concern for party of necessity divides your republic. Biondo, speaking of the Florentines and the Pistoiese, vouches for it by saying. “While the Florentines planned to reunite Pistoia, they divided themselves.”[7] One can therefore easily consider the ill that arises from this division.

[4] In 1502, when Arezzo was lost, and all the Val di Tevere and the Val di Chiana, seized from us by the Vitelli and by Duke Valentino, a Monsieur de Lant came, sent by the king of France to have all those lost towns restored to the Florentines. When Lant found men in every fortified town who, in visiting him, said that they were of the party of the Marzocco, he very much blamed this division, saying that if in France one of the subjects of the king should say he was of the party of the king, he would be punished, because such a word would signify nothing other than that in that town there were

people unfriendly to the king; and that king wishes that all the town be his friends, united and without a party.[8] But all these modes and these opinions diverging from the truth arise from the weakness of whoever is lord, who, when they see that they cannot hold states with force and with virtue, turn to such devices, which sometimes in quiet times help somewhat; but when adversities and hard times come, they show their fallaciousness.

28

That One Should Be Mindful of the Works of Citizens Because Many Times underneath a Merciful Work a Beginning of Tyranny Is Concealed

[1] When the city of Rome was overburdened with hunger, and public provisions were not enough to stop it, one Spurius Maelius, who was very rich for those times, had the intent to make provision of grain privately, and to feed the plebs with it, gaining its favor for him. Because of this affair he had such a crowd of people in his favor that the Senate, thinking of the inconvenience that could arise from that liberality of his, so as to crush it before it could pick up more strength, created a dictator over him and had him killed.[1] Here it is to be noted that many times works that appear merciful, which cannot reasonably be condemned,[2] become cruel and are very dangerous for a republic if they are not corrected in good time. And to discourse of this thing more particularly, I say that a republic without reputed citizens cannot stand, nor can it be governed well in any mode. On the other side, the reputation of citizens is the cause of the tyranny of republics. If one wishes to regulate this thing, one needs to order oneself so that the citizens are reputed for a reputation that helps and does not hurt the city and its freedom. So one ought to examine the modes with which they get reputation, which are in effect two: either public or private. The public modes are when one individual by counseling well, by working better in the common benefit, acquires reputation. One ought to open to citizens the way to this honor and to put up rewards both for counsel and for works so that they have to be honored and satisfied with them. If these reputations, gained by these ways, are clear and simple, they will never be dangerous; but when they are gained by private ways, which is the other mode cited before, they are very dangerous and altogether hurtful. The private ways are doing benefit to this and to that other private individual—by lending him money, marrying his daughters for him, defending him from the magistrates, and

doing for him similar private favors that make men partisans to oneself and give spirit to whoever is so favored to be able to corrupt the public and to breach the laws. A well-ordered republic ought, therefore, to open the ways, as was said, to whoever seeks support[3] through public ways and close them to whoever seeks it through private ways, as one sees Rome did. For to reward whoever worked well for the public, it ordered triumphs and all the other honors that it gave to its citizens; and to harm whoever sought under various colors to make himself great by private ways it ordered accusations. And if these were not enough, because the people was blinded by a species of false good, it ordered [the creation of] the dictator, who with his kingly arm made whoever had gone out of bounds return within them, as it did by punishing Spurius Maelius. One of these things that may be left unpunished is capable of ruining a republic, for with that example it is only with difficulty later brought back on the true way.

29

That the Sins of Peoples Arise from Princes

[1] Princes should not complain of any sin that the peoples whom they have to govern commit, for it must be that such sins arise either by his negligence or by his being stained with like errors. Whoever reviews[1] the peoples who in our times have been held full of robberies and of like sins will see that it has arisen entirely from those who governed them, who were of a like nature. Before those lords who commanded the Romagna were eliminated in it by Pope Alexander VI, it was an example of every most criminal life, because there one saw very great slaughter and pillage occur for every slight cause. That arose from the wickedness of those princes, not from the wicked nature of men, as they used to say. For since those princes were poor and wished to live like the rich, they were necessitated to turn to much pillaging and to use it in various modes. Among the other dishonest ways they held to, they would make laws and would prohibit some action; then they were the first who gave cause for their nonobservance; nor did they ever punish the nonobservers except later, when they saw very many to have incurred a like prejudice. Then they would turn to punishment, not out of zeal for the law that had been made but out of greed for collecting the penalty. Hence arose many inconveniences and above all this: that the peoples became impoverished and were not corrected; and those who were impoverished contrived to prevail against those less powerful than themselves.[2] Hence all those ills rose up that were told of above, the cause of which was the prince. That this is true Titus Livy shows when he narrates that as the Roman legates were carrying the booty of the Veientes to Apollo, they were taken by pirates of Lipari in Sicily and led to that town. When Timasitheus, their prince, learned what gift this was, where it was going, and who was sending it, though born at Lipari, he bore himself as a Roman man and showed the people how impious it was to seize a gift such as this. So with the consent of the collectivity, he let the legates go with all their things. The words of the historian are these: “Timasitheus filled the

multitude, which is always like the ruler, with religion."[3] And Lorenzo de' Medici, in confirmation of this judgment, says:

And that which the lord does, many do later; For all eyes are turned to the lord.[4]

30

For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by His Authority, It Is Necessary First to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City

[1] When the Roman Senate learned that all Tuscany had made a new levy so as to come to do harm to Rome, and that the Latins and the Hernici, who in the past had been friends of the Roman people, had taken sides with the Volsci, perpetual enemies of Rome, it judged that this war must be dangerous. When Camillus found himself tribune with consular power, it[1] thought that they could do without creating the dictator if the other tribunes, his colleagues, were willing to yield him the summit of command. The said tribunes did that voluntarily: “Nor did they believe (says Titus Livy) that anything they yielded to his majesty was taken away from their majesty.”[2] Hence Camillus, having taken this obedience at its word, commanded that three armies be enrolled.[3] He wished to be head of the first himself, so as to go against the Tuscans. He made Quintus Servilius the head of the second, which he wished to stay close to Rome, so as to oppose the Latins and the Hernici if they should move. He put Lucius Quintius in charge of the third army, which he enrolled so as to keep the city guarded and the gates and the court defended in every case that might arise. Besides this, he ordered that Horatius, one of his colleagues, provide the arms and the grain and the other things that times of war require. He put Cornelius, also his colleague, at the Senate and the public council, so that he might be able to counsel actions that they had to do and execute daily; so that the tribunes in those times were disposed to command and obey for the safety of the fatherland. By this text one notes what a good and wise man may do,

and of how much good he may be the cause, and how useful he can be to his fatherland when by means of his goodness and virtue he has eliminated envy. That is many times the cause that men cannot work well, since the said envy does not permit them to have the authority that it is necessary to have in things of importance. This envy is eliminated in two modes: either through some strong and difficult accident in which each, seeing himself perishing, puts aside every ambition and runs voluntarily to obey him who he believes can free him with his virtue, as happened to Camillus. After he had given by himself so many samples of a most excellent man, and had been dictator three times, and had always administered in that rank for public usefulness and not for his own utility, he had made men not fear his greatness; and because he was so great and so reputed, they did not esteem it a shameful thing to be inferior to him (and so Titus Livy wisely says those words: "Nor did they . . . "). In another mode, envy is eliminated when, either by violence or by natural order, those who have been your competitors in coming to some reputation and to some greatness die. As they see you reputed more than they, it is impossible that they ever acquiesce and remain patient. When they are men who are used to living in a corrupt city, where the education has not produced any goodness in them, it is impossible that by any accident they ever gainsay themselves; and to obtain their wish and to satisfy their perversity of spirit, they would be content to see the ruin of their fatherland. To conquer this envy, there is no remedy other than the death of those who have it; and when fortune is so propitious to the virtuous man that they die ordinarily, he becomes glorious without scandal, when without obstacle and without offense he is able to show his virtue. But if he does not have this luck, he must think of every way of removing them from in front; and before he does anything, he needs to hold to the modes that overcome this difficulty. And whoever reads the Bible judiciously will see that since he wished his laws and his orders to go forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, were opposed to his plans.[4] Friar Girolamo Savonarola knew this necessity very well; Piero Soderini, gonfalonier of Florence, knew it too. The one was not able to conquer it because he did not have the authority to enable him to do it (that was the friar) and because he was not understood well by those who followed him, who would have had authority for it. Not therefore because of him did it remain undone, and his sermons are full of accusations of the wise of the world, and of invectives against them, for so he called the envious and those who were opposed to his orders. The other believed that with time, with goodness, with his fortune, with benefiting

someone, he would eliminate this envy; seeing himself very young of age, and with so much new support that the mode of his proceeding brought him, he believed he could overcome as many as were opposed to him through envy without any scandal, violence, and tumult. He did not know that one cannot wait for the time, goodness is not enough, fortune varies, and malignity does not find a gift that appeases it. So both of these two were ruined, and their ruin was caused by not having known how or having been able to conquer this envy.

[2] The other notable point is the order that Camillus gave inside and outside for the safety of Rome. And truly, not without cause do good historians, as is ours, put certain cases particularly and distinctly so that posterity may learn how they have to defend themselves in such accidents. One ought to note in this text that there is no more dangerous nor more useless defense than that which is done tumultuously and without order. This is shown through that third army that Camillus had enrolled so as to leave it in Rome as guard of the city. For many would have judged and would judge this part superfluous, since that people was in the ordinary course armed and warlike; and because of this, that it would not otherwise be needed to enroll them, but it would be enough to arm them when the need came. But Camillus, and whosoever might be wise as he was, judged it otherwise; for he never permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a certain order and a certain mode. So upon this example, one individual who is put in charge of the guard of a city ought to avoid like a reef having it arm the men tumultuously, but he ought first to have those enrolled and selected whom he wishes to be armed, whomever they have to obey, where to meet, where to go. Those who are not enrolled he ought to command to stay each in his house to guard it. Those who hold to this order in a city that has been assaulted can easily defend themselves; whoever does otherwise will not imitate Camillus and will not defend himself.

31

Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Spirit and Their Same Dignity in Every Fortune

[1] Among the other magnificent things that our historian makes Camillus say and do, so as to show how an excellent man ought to be made, he puts these words in his mouth: “Neither did the dictatorship ever raise my spirits nor did exile take them away.”[1] Through them one sees that great men are always the same in every fortune; and if it varies—now by exalting them, now by crushing them—they do not vary but always keep their spirit firm and joined with their mode of life so that one easily knows for each that fortune does not have power over them. Weak men govern themselves otherwise, because they grow vain and intoxicated in good fortune by attributing all the good they have to the virtue they have never known. Hence it arises that they become unendurable and hateful to all those whom they have around them. On that depends the sudden variation of fate; as they see it in the face, they fall suddenly into the other defect and become cowardly and abject. It arises from this that in adversities princes so made think more of fleeing than of defending themselves, as those who are unprepared for any defense because they have used good fortune badly.

[2] The virtue and the vice that I say are to be found in one man alone are also found in a republic; and for example there are the Romans and the Venetians. As to the first, no bad fate ever made them become abject, nor did any good fortune ever make them insolent, as may be seen manifestly after the defeat they had at Cannae and after the victory they had against Antiochus. For they never grew cowardly because of the defeat even though it was very grave because it had been the third;[2] they sent out armies; they did not wish to ransom their prisoners against their orders; they did not send to Hannibal or to Carthage to ask for peace. But, leaving behind all these abject things, they thought always of war, arming the old and their slaves because of a scarcity of men.[3] When this thing became known by Hanno the

Carthaginian, as was said above,[4] he showed to the Senate how little account was to be taken of the defeat of Cannae.[5] So one may see that difficult times did not terrify them nor render them humble. On the other hand, prosperous times did not make them insolent, for when Antiochus sent spokesmen to Scipio to ask for an accord before they came to battle and before he had lost, Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace, which were that he should retire inside Syria and leave the rest to the will of the Roman people. Antiochus, having refused that accord, came to battle and lost it, and sent back ambassadors to Scipio with the commission that they accept all the conditions that were given them by the conqueror, to which he did not propose another pact than what had been offered before he won, adding these words: "For the Romans are not weakened in spirits if they are conquered, nor are they accustomed to become insolent if they conquer."[6]

[3] The exact contrary of this was seen to be done by the Venetians. In good fortune—since to them it appeared they had gained it with the virtue they did not have—they came to so much insolence that they called the king of France the son of San Marco; they did not esteem the church; they would not be contained in Italy in any mode; and they had disposed themselves in spirit to have a monarchy made like the Roman. Then, as good luck abandoned them and they had a half-defeat at Vailà from the king of France, they not only lost all their state by rebellion but gave a good part of it to the pope and to the king of Spain out of cowardice and abjectness of spirit. They grew so cowardly that they sent ambassadors to the emperor to make themselves his tributaries, and they wrote letters to the pope full of cowardice and submission so as to move him to compassion. They came to that unhappiness in four days, and after a half-defeat; for after their army had been in combat and was retiring, about half of it came into combat and was crushed, so that one of the superintendents who saved himself arrived at Verona with more than twenty-five thousand soldiers among those on foot and on horseback.[7] So if there had been any quality of virtue at Venice and in their orders, they could easily have remade themselves and showed their face to fortune anew, and they could have been in time either to conquer, or to lose most gloriously, or to have a very honorable accord. But the cowardice of their spirit, caused by the quality of their orders, which were not good in things of war, made them lose state and spirit in a stroke. And it will always happen thus to anyone whatsoever who governs himself like them. For becoming insolent in good fortune and abject in bad arises from your mode of proceeding and from the education in which you are raised.

When that is weak and vain, it renders you like itself; when it has been otherwise, it renders you also of another fate; and by making you a better knower of the world, it makes you rejoice less in the good and be less aggrieved with the bad. What is said of one alone is said of many who live in one and the same republic: they are made to that perfection that its mode of life has.

[4] Although it was said another time that the foundation of all states is a good military, and that where this does not exist there can be neither good laws nor any other good thing, it does not appear to me superfluous to repeat it.[8] For at every point in reading this history one sees this necessity appear; and one sees that the military cannot be good unless it is trained, and that it cannot be trained unless it is composed of your subjects. For one does not always remain at war, nor can one remain at it; so one must be able to train in time of peace, and with others than subjects one cannot do this training out of regard for the expense. When, as we said above,[9] Camillus had come with his army against the Tuscans and his soldiers had seen the greatness of the enemy's army, they were all frightened since it appeared to them that they were so inferior that they could not resist their thrust. When this bad disposition in the camp came to the ears of Camillus, he showed himself outside, and as he went through the camp speaking to these and those soldiers, he got this opinion out of their heads; and at last, without ordering the camp otherwise, he said: "What anyone has learned or is accustomed to, he will do."[10] Whoever considers well this means, and the words he said to them so as to give them spirit to go against the enemy, will consider that he could neither have said nor have done any of those things to an army that had not first been ordered and trained both in peace and in war. For a captain cannot trust in those soldiers who have not learned to do anything, nor believe that they may do anything that is good; and if a new Hannibal commanded them, he would be ruined under them. For while the battle is on, a captain cannot be in every part. Unless he has first ordered it in every part so as to be able to have men who have his spirit,[11] and indeed the orders and modes of his proceeding, he must of necessity come to ruin. Thus, if a city is armed and ordered as was Rome, and every day it falls to its citizens, both in particular and in public, to make experiment both of their virtue and of the power of fortune, it will always happen that they are of the same spirit in every condition of time and will maintain their same dignity. But if they are unarmed and rely only on the thrust of fortune and

not on their own virtue, they vary with its varying and they will always give an example of themselves such as the Venetians gave.

32

What Modes Some Have Held to for Disturbing a Peace

[1] When the Circeii[1] and the Velitrae,[2] two of its colonies, had rebelled from the Roman people in the hope of being defended by the Latins, and when the Latins later were defeated and that hope failed, very many citizens counseled that they ought to send spokesmen to Rome to recommend themselves to the Senate. That policy was disturbed by those who had been the authors of the rebellion, who feared that the entire penalty might come down on their heads. To take away every argument[3] for peace, they incited the multitude to arm itself and to overrun the Roman borders. And truly, when anyone wishes that either a people or a prince should altogether take away the spirit for an accord, there is no remedy more true or more stable than to make them use some grave criminality against the one with whom you do not wish the accord to be made. For the fear of that penalty which will appear deserved to him because of the error committed will always keep it at a distance. After the first war the Carthaginians had with the Romans, the soldiers who had been put to work in that war by the Carthaginians in Sicily and in Sardinia went to Africa when peace was made. There, not being satisfied with their pay, they turned their arms against the Carthaginians. When they had made two heads for themselves, Matho and Spendius, they seized many towns from the Carthaginians and sacked many of them. So as to try first every way other than fighting, the Carthaginians sent to them as ambassador their citizen Hasdrubal,[4] who they thought would have some authority with them since he had been their captain in the past. When he arrived, and Spendius and Matho wished to oblige all those soldiers not to hope ever again to have peace with the Carthaginians and through this to oblige them to war, they persuaded them that it was better to kill him, along with all the Carthaginian citizens who were their prisoners nearby. Hence not only did they kill them but they tormented them first with a thousand tortures, adding to this criminality an edict that all Carthaginians who might be taken in the future ought to be

slain in a similar mode. That decision and execution made the army cruel and obstinate against the Carthaginians.[5]

33

If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is Necessary to Make the Army Confident Both among Themselves and in the Captain

[1] If one wishes an army to win a battle, it is necessary to make it confident so that it believes it ought to win in every mode. The things that make it confident are: that it be armed and ordered well, that [its members] know one another. Nor can this confidence or this order arise except in soldiers who have been born and have lived together. The captain must be esteemed of a quality that they trust in his prudence; and they will always trust if they see him ordered, solicitous, and spirited and if he holds up the majesty of his rank well and with reputation. He will always maintain it if he punishes them for errors and does not tire them in vain, observes promises to them, shows the easy way to winning, and conceals or makes light of things that at a distance could show up as dangers. Such things, well observed, are the great cause that the army trusts and, by trusting, wins. The Romans used to make their armies pick up this confidence by way of religion; hence it arose that with auguries and auspices they created consuls, made the conscription, left with the armies, and came to battle. Without having done any of these things, a good and wise captain would never have attempted any struggle, judging that he could easily have lost it if his soldiers had not first understood the gods to be on their side. If any consul or other captain of theirs had come to combat against the auspices, they would have punished him as they punished Claudius Pulcher.[1] Although this part is known in all the Roman histories, nonetheless it is proven more certainly by the words that Livy used in the mouth of Appius Claudius. When complaining to the people about the insolence of the tribunes of the plebs, and showing that by means of them the auspices and other things relating to religion were being corrupted, he says thus: “It is permitted for them now to make fun of religion. For what difference does it make if the

chickens do not feed, if they come out of the cage slowly, if a bird sounds off? These are little things, but by not despising these little things, our ancestors made this republic the greatest."[2] For in these little things is the force for holding the soldiers united and confident, which thing is the first cause of every victory. Nevertheless, virtue must accompany these things; otherwise they have no value. When they had their army out against the Romans, the Praenestines went to encamp on the river Allia, the place where the Romans had been conquered by the French. They did that so as to put confidence in their soldiers and to terrify the Romans by the fortune of the place. Although this policy of theirs was commendable for the reasons that were discoursed of above, nonetheless the end of the thing showed that true virtue does not fear every least accident. The historian says that very well with the words put in the mouth of the dictator, who speaks thus to his master of the horse: "Do you see that they, trusting in fortune, have taken a position at Allia; but you, trusting in arms and spirit, attack the middle of the line of battle?"[3] For a true virtue, a good order, a security taken from so many victories, cannot be eliminated with things of little moment, nor can a vain thing make them fear, nor a disorder offend them. This one sees certainly when two Manlii were consuls against the Volsci: because they had rashly sent part of the camp to plunder, it followed in time that both those who had gone and those who had remained found themselves besieged, from which danger not the prudence of the consuls but the virtue of the soldiers themselves freed them. Whereupon Titus Livy says these words: "The steady virtue of the soldiers even without a leader protected it."[4]

[2] I do not wish to omit a means used by Fabius to make his army confident when he had newly entered into Tuscany with it, as he judged that such trust was necessary because he had led it into a new country against new enemies. So speaking to the soldiers before the fight, and having said that he had many reasons through which they could hope for victory, he said that he could also tell them certain good things, in which they would see victory was certain, if it were not dangerous to make them manifest.[5] As that mode was wisely used, so it deserves to be imitated.

34

What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the People Begin to Favor a Citizen; and Whether It Distributes Magistracies with Greater Prudence Than a Prince

[1] Another time we have spoken of how Titus Manlius, who was later dubbed Torquatus, saved Lucius Manlius, his father, from an accusation that had been made against him by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the plebs.[1] Although the mode of saving him was somewhat violent and extraordinary, nonetheless that filial piety toward his father was so gratifying to the collectivity that not only was he not reproved for it but, when they had to make tribunes of the legions, Titus Manlius was put in the second place. Because of that success, I believe it is good to consider the mode that the people holds to when judging men in its distributions, and because of what we see, whether it is true, as was concluded above,[2] that the people is a better distributor than a prince.

[2] Thus I say that the people in its distributing goes by what is said of one individual through public word and fame when one does not otherwise know him through his known works, or through the presumption or opinion that one has of him. Those two things are caused either by the fact that the fathers of such have been great men and worthy in the city, and it is believed that their sons ought to be like them until by their works the contrary is understood; or it is caused by the modes held to by him of whom it is spoken. The best modes that can be held to are to keep company with grave men of good customs reputed wise by everyone. Because one can have no greater indication of a man than the company that he keeps, one individual who keeps honest company deservedly acquires a good name because it is impossible that he not have some similarity with it. Or truly this public fame is acquired by some extraordinary and notable action, even though private, which has resulted honorably for you. Of all these three

things that in the beginning give good reputation to one individual, none gives it greater than this last. For the first one of relatives and fathers is so fallacious that men go to it slowly, and it is soon consumed when the virtue proper to him who has to be judged does not accompany it. The second, which makes you known by way of your practices, is better than the first but is much inferior to the third, for until some sign is seen that arises from you, your reputation remains founded on opinion, which it is very easy to cancel. But the third, having been begun and founded on fact and on your work, gives you so much name at the beginning that you indeed need to work many things contrary to this later if you wish to annul it. Thus men who are born in a republic ought to take this direction and contrive with some extraordinary works to begin to raise themselves up. Many in Rome did that in their youth, either by promulgating a law that went for the common utility, or by accusing some powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by doing such notable and new things of which one would have to speak. Nor are such things necessary only to begin to give oneself reputation, but they are also necessary to maintain it and increase it. If one wishes to do this, one needs to renew them, as did Titus Manlius for the whole time of his life; for after he had defended his father so virtuously and extraordinarily, and through this action had got his first reputation, in a few years he did combat with the Frenchman and, having killed him, took off from him that collar of gold that gave him the name of Torquatus. Nor was this enough, for later, by then of mature age, he killed his son for having engaged in combat without license, even though he had overcome the enemy. These three actions, then, gave him more name and made him more celebrated for all centuries than did any triumph and any other victory, for which he was decorated as much as any other Roman.[3] The cause is that in those victories Manlius had very many like him; in these particular actions he had either very few or no one.

[3] To Scipio the Elder, all his triumphs did not bring so much glory as having defended his father on the Ticino while still a boy[4] and after the defeat at Cannae, when with drawn sword he spiritedly made many young Romans swear that they would not abandon Italy as they had already decided among themselves.[5] Those two actions were the beginning of his reputation and made a ladder for him to the triumphs of Spain and Africa. That opinion of him was further increased when he sent back the daughter to her father and the wife to her husband in Spain.[6] Not only is this mode of proceeding necessary to those citizens who wish to acquire fame so as to

obtain honors in their republic, but it is also necessary to princes so as to maintain reputation for themselves in their principalities. For nothing makes them so much esteemed as to give rare examples of themselves with some rare act or saying conforming to the common good, which shows the lord either magnanimous, or liberal, or just, and is such as to become like a proverb among his subjects.

[4] But to return to where we began this discourse, I say that when the people begins to give a rank to one of its citizens, founding itself on the three causes written above, it does not found itself badly. But later, when the very many examples of good behavior of one individual make him more known, it founds itself better, because in such a case it can almost never be deceived. I speak only of those ranks that are given to men in the beginning, before they are known through firm experience, or as they pass from one action to another unlike it, in which, both as to false opinion and as to corruption, [the people] will always make lesser errors than princes. Because it can be that peoples might deceive themselves about the fame, opinion, and work of a man, esteeming them greater than they are in truth —which would not happen to a prince because he would be told and warned by whoever counseled him—so that peoples too do not lack these assemblies, good orderers of republics have ordered that when they have to create the supreme ranks of the city, where it would be dangerous to put inadequate men, and when it is seen that the popular vogue is directed toward creating someone who might be inadequate, it is permitted to every citizen and is attributed to his glory to make public in councils the defect of that one, so that the people, not lacking knowledge of him, can judge better. That this was used in Rome the oration of Fabius Maximus gives testimony. He made it to the people during the Second Punic War, when in the creation of the consuls favor was turning toward creating Titus Ottacilius. Since Fabius judged him inadequate to govern the consulate in those times, he spoke against him, showing his inadequacy, so that he took away the rank from him and turned the favor of the people to whoever deserved it more than he.[7] Thus in the election of magistrates peoples judge according to the truest marks[8] that they can have of men; and when they can be counseled like princes, they err less than princes; and the citizen who wishes to begin to have the support[9] of the people ought to gain it for himself with some notable act, as did Titus Manlius.

35

What Dangers Are Borne in Making Oneself Head in Counseling a Thing; and the More It Has of the Extraordinary, the Greater Are the Dangers Incurred in It

[1] How dangerous a thing it is to make oneself head of a new thing that pertains to many, and how difficult it is to treat it and to lead it and, when led, to maintain it, would be too long and too high a matter to discourse of. So, reserving it for a more convenient place,[1] I shall speak only of those dangers that citizens or those who counsel a prince bear in making oneself head of a grave and important decision, so that all the counsel of it may be attributed to him. For since men judge things by the end, all the ill that results from it is attributed to the author of the counsel; and if good results from it, he is commended for it, but the reward by far does not counterbalance the harm. When the present Sultan Selim, dubbed the Grand Turk, had prepared himself to make a campaign to Syria and Egypt (as report some who came from his countries), he was encouraged by one of his bashaws, whom he kept on the border of Persia, to go against the Sophy. Moved by that counsel, he went on that campaign with a very large army; and arriving in a very wide country, where there were very many deserts and few rivers, and finding those difficulties there that had already brought many Roman armies to ruin, he was crushed by them, so that he lost a great part of this troops through hunger and plague, even though he had been superior in the war. So, angered at the author of the counsel, he killed him.[2] One reads that very many citizens have been encouragers of an enterprise and because it had a bad end were sent into exile. Some Roman citizens made themselves heads in making the plebeian consul in Rome.[3] It happened that the first who went out with his armies was defeated; hence some harm would have come to those counselors if the party in whose honor the decision had come had not been so rash.[4]

[2] Thus it is a very certain thing that those who counsel a republic and those who counsel a prince are placed in these straits: if they do not counsel without hesitation the things that appear to them useful—either for the city or for the prince—they fail in their office; if they do counsel them, they enter into danger of life and state, since all men are blind in this, in judging good and bad counsel by the end. Thinking over in what mode they can escape either this infamy or this danger, I do not see any other way for it but to take things moderately, and not to seize upon any of them for one's own enterprise, and to give one's opinion without passion and defend it without passion, with modesty, so that if the city or the prince follows it, it follows voluntarily, and it does not appear to enter upon it drawn by your importunity. When you do thus, it is not reasonable that a prince and a people wish you ill for your counsel, since it was not followed against the wish of many—for one bears danger where many have contradicted, who then at the unhappy end concur to bring you to ruin. And if in this case one lacks the glory that is acquired in being alone against many to counsel a thing when it has a good end, there are two goods in the comparison: first, in the lack of danger; second, that if you counsel a thing modestly, and because of the contradiction your counsel is not taken, and by the counsel of someone else some ruin follows, very great glory redounds to you. Although the glory that is acquired from ills that either your city or your prince has cannot be enjoyed, nonetheless it is to be held of some account.

[3] I do not believe other counsel can be given to men in this part, for in counseling them to be silent and not to say their opinion, it would be a useless thing to the republic or to their prince, and they would not escape the danger; for in a short time they would become suspect. It could even happen to them as to those friends of Perseus, king of the Macedonians, to whom it befell that when he had been defeated by Paulus Aemilius and was fleeing with a few friends, one of them in talking over things past began to tell Perseus of the many errors made by him that had been the cause of his ruin. Turning to him, Perseus said, "Traitor, so you put off telling me it until now, when I have no further remedy!" Upon these words he killed him by his own hand.[5] So he bore the penalty of having been quiet when he ought to speak, and of having spoken when he ought to be silent; he did not escape the danger by not having given the counsel. So I believe the limits written above are to be held and observed.

36

The Causes Why the French Have Been and Are Still Judged in Fights at the Beginning As More Than Men and Later As Less Than Women

[1] The ferocity of that Frenchman who by the river Anio challenged any Roman to engage in combat with him, as well as the fighting between him and Titus Manlius,[1] remind me of what Titus Livy says several times: that the French are more than men at the beginning of the fight, and in the succeeding combat they come out less than women.[2] Thinking over whence this arises, it is believed by many that their nature is made so, which I believe is true; but because of this it is not that their nature, which makes them ferocious at the beginning, cannot be ordered with art so that it maintains them ferocious to the last.

[2] Wishing to prove this, I say that there are armies of three types: one, where there is fury and order—because from order arises fury and virtue—as was that of the Romans. For one sees in all the histories that in that army there was a good order, which had brought military discipline to it for a long time. For in a well-ordered army no one ought to do any work if it is not regulated. Because of this, one will find that in the Roman army, which all other armies ought to take for example since it conquered the world, they did not eat, they did not sleep, they did not go whoring, they did not perform any action either military or domestic without the order of the consul. For those armies that do otherwise are not true armies, and if they produce any proof [to the contrary], they do it by fury and impetuosity, and not by virtue. But virtue, where ordered, uses its fury with modes and with the times; neither does any difficulty debase it nor make it lack spirit. For good orders refresh spirit and fury for them, nourished by the hope of conquering, which never fails as long as the orders remain steady. The contrary happens in those armies where there is fury and not order, as were

the French, who yet failed in combat. For when they did not succeed in conquering with their first thrust, and when that fury in which they hoped was not sustained by an ordered virtue, they had nothing beyond it in which they might have confidence, and as that was cooled, they failed.[3] To the contrary, the Romans, fearing dangers less because of their good orders, not mistrusting in victory, would engage in combat firmly and obstinately with the same spirit and the same virtue at the end as at the beginning; indeed, stirred by arms, they would always become inflamed. The third kind of armies is where there is neither natural fury nor accidental order, as are the Italian armies of our times, which are altogether useless; and if they do not meet with an army that flees because of some accident, they will never conquer. Without bringing up other examples, one sees every day how they make proof of not having any virtue. Because everyone understands with the testimony of Titus Livy how a good military ought to be made, and how a bad one is made, I wish to bring up the words of Papirius Cursor, when he wished to punish Fabius, master of the horse, and he said: "No one would have deference for men, no one for the gods; neither the edicts of commanders nor the auspices would be observed; soldiers would wander without leave in peaceful and in hostile territory forgetful of oaths, they would discharge themselves by their license alone when they wanted; they would leave the standards deserted, nor would they assemble on command, nor would they distinguish day from night, favorable location or unfavorable; they would fight by or against the order of the commander, and not comply with standards, nor orders; in the mode of banditry the military would be blind and haphazard instead of solemn and consecrated."[4] Thus by this text one can easily see whether the military of our times is blind and haphazard or consecrated and solemn, and how much it lacks to be like what could be called a military, and how far it is from being furious and ordered, like the Roman, or furious only, like the French.

37

Whether Small Battles Are Necessary before the Main Battle;[1] and If One Wishes to Avoid Them, What One Ought to Do to Know a New Enemy

[1] It appears that in the actions of men, as we have discoursed of another time,[2] besides the other difficulties in wishing to bring a thing to its perfection, one finds that close to the good there is always some evil that arises with that good so easily that it appears impossible to be able to miss the one if one wishes for the other. One sees this in all the things that men work on. So the good is acquired only with difficulty unless you are aided by fortune, so that with its force it conquers this ordinary and natural inconvenience. The fight between Manlius and the Frenchman has reminded me of this, where Titus Livy says: "This combat was of so much moment to the event of the whole war that the army of the Gauls having left its camp in panic, crossed over into the country of Tibur and then into Campania."[3] For I consider, on one side, that a good captain ought altogether to avoid working for anything that is of small moment and can produce bad effects on his army: for to begin a fight in which all one's forces are not at work and all one's fortune is risked is a thing altogether rash, as I said above, when I condemned the guarding of passes.[4]

[2] On the other side, I consider that when wise captains come up against a new enemy who is reputed, before they come to the main battle they are necessitated to make trial of such enemies with light fighting for their soldiers, so that by beginning to know and manage them they lose the terror that fame and reputation have given them. This part is very important in a captain, because it has within it almost a necessity that constrains you to do it, when you appear to be going to a manifest loss without first having taken away from your soldiers, by little experiences, the terror that the reputation of the enemy had put in their spirits.

[3] Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their armies against the Samnites, new enemies who in the past had never made trial of arms, one with the other. Here Titus Livy says that Valerius had the Romans engage in some light fighting with the Samnites, "lest a new war and a new enemy terrify them."[5] Nonetheless, it is a very grave danger lest when your soldiers are left conquered in those battles, their fear and cowardice grow and effects contrary to your plans follow from them; that is, that having planned to make them secure, you terrify them. So this is one of those things that have the evil so close to the good, and so much are they joined together that it is an easy thing to take one, believing one has picked the other. I say on this that a good captain ought to observe with all diligence lest something emerge that through some accident can take away spirit from his army. That which can take away spirit is to begin to lose; and so one ought to guard oneself against small fights and not permit them unless with a very great advantage and with hope of certain victory. One ought not to undertake enterprises of guarding passes, where one cannot hold all one's army; one ought not to guard towns except those where one's ruin would follow of necessity if they were lost. Those that one guards ought to be ordered, both with the guards and with the army, so that when it becomes a question of their capture, one can put to work all one's forces; the others one ought to leave undefended. For every time that one loses a thing that one abandons, and the army is still together, one does not lose reputation in the war nor the hope of winning it. But when a thing is lost that you had planned to defend, and everyone believes you will defend it, then is the harm and the loss; and like the French, you have almost lost the war with a thing of small moment.

[4] When Philip of Macedon, father of Perseus, a military man of great standing in his times, was assaulted by the Romans, he abandoned and despoiled very many of his countries, which he judged he could not guard. He was one who, because he was prudent, judged it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend what he had set out to defend than to lose it as a thing neglected by leaving it in the prey of the enemy.[6] When their affairs were in distress after the defeat at Cannae, the Romans denied aid to many of their clients and subjects, committing them to defend themselves the best they could.[7] These policies are very much better than to undertake defenses and then not defend them, for in this policy one loses friends and forces; in the former, friends only. But returning to small fights, I say that if indeed a captain is constrained by the newness of the enemy to

do some fighting, he ought to do it so much to his advantage that there is no danger of losing it; or truly he ought to do as Marius did (which is a better policy). He was going against the Cimbri, very ferocious people who came to plunder Italy and were coming with a great fright because of their ferocity and multitude; and because they had already conquered a Roman army, Marius judged it was necessary, before he came to fighting, to work something by which the army would give up the terror that fear of the enemy had given them; and as a very prudent captain, he gathered his army more than one time in a place where the Cimbri would be passing with their army. And so he wished his soldiers to see and to accustom their eyes to the sight of that enemy from inside the fortresses of his camp, so that when they saw a disordered multitude, full of baggage, with useless arms and in part unarmed, they would be reassured and would become desirous of fighting.[8] As that policy was wisely taken by Marius, so it ought to be diligently imitated by others so as not to incur those dangers I told of above, and not to have to do as the French, "who, frightened by a thing of small importance, retired into the fields of Tibur and into Campania."[9] And because we have cited Valerius Corvinus in this discourse, I wish to demonstrate by means of his words, in the following chapter, how a captain ought to be made.

38

How a Captain in Whom His Army Can Have Confidence Ought to Be Made

[1] Valerius Corvinus, as we said above,[1] was with the army against the Samnites, new enemies of the Roman people; hence, to make his soldiers secure and to get them to know the enemy, he had his own men do certain light fighting. And since this was not enough for him, he wished to speak to them before the battle, and he showed with all efficacy how little they ought to esteem such enemies, pleading the virtue of his soldiers, and his own. Here one can note how a captain in whom the army has to have confidence ought to be made, by the words that Livy makes him say, which words are these: “Then also they should consider under whose leadership and auspices they would have to fight, whether he was one to be listened to only as a magnificent orator, ferocious only in words, inexpert in military operations, or one who himself knew how to handle weapons, to advance ahead of the standards, to be engaged in the midst and in the effort of fighting. Soldiers, I want you to follow my deeds, not my words; to seek from me not only discipline but also example, who have won for myself with this right hand three consulates and the highest praise.”[2] These words, considered well, teach to anyone whatever how he ought to proceed if he wishes to hold the rank of captain; and one who has done otherwise will find in time that whether he was led to the rank by fortune or by ambition, it will be taken from him and will not give him reputation, for titles do not give luster to men, but men to titles. One ought also to consider from the beginning of this discourse that if great captains have used extraordinary extremes to firm the spirits of a veteran army when it must confront unaccustomed enemies, how much more greatly one has to use industry when one commands a new army that has never seen the enemy in the face. For if the unaccustomed enemy gives terror to the old army, so much more greatly must every enemy give it to a new army. Yet many times these difficulties have been seen to be conquered by good captains with the highest prudence, as did Gracchus the Roman and Epaminondas the Theban, of whom we

have spoken another time,[3] who with new armies conquered armies that were veteran and very much trained.

[2] The modes they kept to were to train them for several months in mock battles and to accustom them to obedience and order; then, after those, they put them to work with the greatest confidence in true fighting. Thus one ought not to lack confidence that any military man can make good armies if men are not lacking him; for that prince who has plenty of men and lacks soldiers ought to complain not of the cowardice of the men but only of his laziness and lack of prudence.[4]

39

That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of Sites

[1] Among the other things that are necessary to a captain of armies is the knowledge of sites and of countries, for without this general and particular knowledge a captain of armies cannot work anything well. Because all the sciences demand practice if one wishes to possess them perfectly, this is one that requires very great practice. This practice, or truly this particular knowledge, is acquired more through hunts than by any other training. So the ancient writers say that the heroes who governed the world in their time were nourished in the woods and by hunts, for besides this knowledge, hunting teaches infinite things that are necessary in war. In the life of Cyrus, Xenophon shows that when Cyrus was going to assault the king of Armenia, in devising that struggle he reminded his men that this was none other than one of those hunts that they had often undertaken with him. He reminded those whom he sent in ambush on top of mountains that they were like those who went to hold the nets on the ridges, and those who rode the plains that they were like those who went to flush the beast from the cover so that when hunted it would trip into the nets.[1]

[2] This is said to show that hunts, as Xenophon gives proof, are an image of a war; and because of this, such training is honorable and necessary to great men. One also cannot learn the knowledge of countries in any other advantageous mode than by way of hunting; for hunting, to one who uses it, makes one know the particular lay of that country in which he trains. Once one individual has made himself very familiar with a region, he then understands with ease all new countries; for every country and every member of the latter have some conformity together, so that one passes easily from the knowledge of one to the knowledge of the other. But whoever has not well practiced one of them can only with difficulty—indeed never, unless after a long time—know the other. Whoever has this practice knows with one glance of his eye how that plain lies, how that mountain rises, where this valley reaches, and all other such things of which

he has in the past made a firm science. That this is true Titus Livy shows with the example of Publius Decius, when he was tribune of the soldiers in the army that Cornelius the consul led against the Samnites; and as the consul retired into a valley where the army of the Romans could be enclosed by the Samnites, and seeing himself in so much danger, he said to the consul, “Do you see, Aulus Cornelius, that peak above the enemy? That is the citadel of our hope and salvation if (because the blind Samnites have left it) we take it quickly.” And before these words said by Decius, Titus Livy says, “Publius Decius, tribune of the soldiers, spotted a single hill rising in the pass, overhanging the enemy’s camp, of arduous approach to an army with baggage, hardly difficult to those lightly equipped.” Hence, after he had been sent up it with three thousand soldiers by the consul and had saved the Roman army, and as he was planning to leave when night came and to save himself and his soldiers too, he has him say these words: “Go with me so that while some light remains we may find out the places where the enemy have posted their guards and where the way out from here lies open. Wrapped in a military cloak so that the enemy would not notice the leader going about, he surveyed all these things.”[2] Thus whoever considers all this text will see how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the nature of countries. For if Decius had not understood and known them, he could not have judged how useful it would be to the Roman army to take that hill, nor could he have known from afar whether the hill was accessible or not; and when he had then gone to the top of it and wished to leave so as to return to the consul, with the enemy around, he would not have been able from afar to take sight of the ways to get away and the places guarded by enemies. So it was of necessity fitting that Decius had such knowledge perfected, which made him save the Roman army by taking that hill. Then, when besieged, he knew how to find the way to save himself and those who were with him.

40

That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a Glorious Thing

[1] Although the use of fraud in every action is detestable, nonetheless in managing war it is a praiseworthy and glorious thing, and he who overcomes the enemy with fraud is praised as much as the one who overcomes it with force. One sees this by the judgment those make of it who write the lives of great men, who praise Hannibal and others who were very notable in such modes of proceeding. Of the very many examples of that to be read I shall not repeat any. I shall say only this: that I do not understand that fraud to be glorious which makes you break faith given and pacts made; for although this may at some time acquire state and kingdom for you, as is discoursed of above,[1] it will never acquire glory for you. But I speak of the fraud that is used with the enemy who does not trust in you and that properly consists in managing war, as was that of Hannibal when at the lake of Perugia[2] he simulated flight so as to enclose the consul and the Roman army, and when he lit up the horns of his herd to escape the hands of Fabius Maximus.[3]

[2] Like such frauds was the one that Pontius, captain of the Samnites, used to enclose the Roman army within the Caudine Forks.[4] Having put his army close to the mountains, he sent more of his soldiers in shepherds' clothing with a very large herd to the plain. When they were taken by the Romans and asked where the Samnites' army was, they all agreed, according to the order given by Pontius, to say that it was at the siege of Nocera.[5] That thing, believed by the consuls, made them trap themselves within the Caudine cliffs, where, after they entered, they were at once besieged by the Samnites. This victory, had through fraud, would have been very glorious for Pontius if he had followed the counsels of his father, who wished the Romans either to save themselves freely or all be killed, and not to take the middle way, "which neither provides friends nor removes enemies."[6] That way was

always pernicious in things of state, as was discoursed of above in another place.[7]

41

That the Fatherland Ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with Glory; and It Is Well Defended in Any Mode Whatever

[1] As was said above,[1] the consul and the Roman army were besieged by the Samnites, who had set very ignominious conditions on the Romans (which were: wishing to put them under the yoke and sending them back to Rome disarmed), and because of this the consuls were as though dazed, and all the army in despair. Lucius Lentulus, the Roman legate, said that it did not appear to him that any policy whatever for saving the fatherland was to be avoided; for since the life of Rome consisted in the life of that army, it appeared to him it was to be saved in every mode, and that the fatherland is well defended in whatever mode one defends it, whether with ignominy or with glory. For if that army saved itself, Rome would have time to cancel the ignominy; if it did not save itself, even though it died gloriously, Rome and its freedom were lost. And so his counsel was followed.[2] That advice deserves to be noted and observed by any citizen who finds himself counseling his fatherland, for where one deliberates entirely on the safety of his fatherland, there ought not to enter any consideration of either just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or ignominious; indeed every other concern[3] put aside, one ought to follow entirely the policy that saves its life and maintains its liberty. That is imitated by the sayings and deeds of the French so as to defend the majesty of their king and the power of their kingdom, for they hear no voice more impatiently than that which would say: such a policy is ignominious for the king. For they say that their king cannot suffer shame in any decision whatever of his, whether in good or in adverse fortune, because whether he loses or wins, all—they say—are the king's affairs.

42

That Promises Made through Force Ought Not to Be Observed

[2] When the consuls returned to Rome with the army disarmed and the ignominy they received, the first to say in the Senate that the peace made at Caudium ought not to be observed was the consul Spurius Postumius. He said that the Roman people was not obligated, but that he and the others who had promised the peace were indeed obligated; and so if the people wished to free itself from every obligation, it had to give him and all the others who had promised it into the hands of the Samnites as prisoners. He held to this conclusion with so much obstinacy that the Senate was content with it, and sending him and the others to Samnium as prisoners, they protested to the Samnites that the peace was not valid. So favorable was fortune in this case to Postumius that the Samnites did not detain him, and when he returned to Rome, Postumius was more glorious with the Romans for having lost than was Pontius with the Samnites for having won.[1] Here two things are to be noted: one, that glory can be acquired in any action whatever, because in victory it is acquired ordinarily; in loss, it is acquired either by showing that such a loss did not come by your fault or through doing at once some virtuous action that cancels it. The other is that it is not shameful not to observe the promises that you have been made to promise by force; and when the force is lacking, forced promises that regard the public will always be broken and it will be without shame for whoever breaks them. Various examples of this are read in all the histories; and every day in present times they are seen. Not only are forced promises not observed among princes, when the force is lacking, but all other promises are also not observed when the causes that made them promise are lacking. Whether this is a praiseworthy thing or not, or whether like modes ought to be observed by a prince or not, is disputed by us at length in our treatise *Of the Prince*,[2] so for the present we shall be silent about it.

43

That Men Who Are Born in One Province Observe Almost the Same Nature for All Times

[1] Prudent men are accustomed to say, and not by chance or without merit, that whoever wishes to see what has to be considers what has been; for all worldly things in every time have their own counterpart in ancient times. That arises because these are the work of men, who have and always had the same passions, and they must of necessity result in the same effect. It is true that their works are more virtuous now in this province than in that, and in that more than in this, according to the form of education in which those people have taken their mode of life. To see a nation keep the same customs for a long time, being either continually avaricious or continually fraudulent or having some other such vice or virtue, also makes it easy to know future things by past. Whoever reads of things past in our city of Florence and considers also those that have occurred in the nearest times will find German and French peoples full of avarice, pride, ferocity, and faithlessness, for all those four things have much offended our city in diverse times. As to lack of faith, everyone knows how often money was given to King Charles VIII, and he would promise to give over the fortress of Pisa, and never gave it over.[1] In that the king showed a lack of faith and his very great avarice. But let us let these fresh things go. Everyone can understand what happened in the war that the Florentine people made against the Visconti dukes of Milan when Florence, deprived of other expedients, thought to bring the emperor into Italy to assault Lombardy with his reputation and forces. The emperor promised to come with very many troops, and to carry on that war against the Visconti, and to defend Florence from their power if the Florentines gave him a hundred thousand ducats to get started and a hundred thousand after he was in Italy. The Florentines consented to these pacts, and after they had paid him the first money and then the second, when he reached Verona he turned around

without doing[2] anything, asserting[3] he had been held back by those who had not observed the agreements among them.[4] So, if Florence had not been either constrained by necessity or overcome by passion, and had read and known the ancient customs of the barbarians, it would not have been deceived either this or many other times by them, as they have always been in one mode and have used the same means in every part and with everyone. One sees that they did so in antiquity to the Tuscans, who, being pressed by the Romans because they had many times been put to flight and defeated by them, and seeing that they could not resist their thrust by means of their own forces, agreed with the French who inhabited Italy on this side of the Alps to give them a sum of money so that they would be obliged to join armies with them and go against the Romans. Hence it followed that the French, having taken the money, did not wish then to take up arms for them, saying that they had accepted it not to make war with their enemies but so that they would abstain from plundering the Tuscan country. And so through the avarice and lack of faith of the French, the Tuscan peoples were left deprived at a stroke of their money and of the aid that they hoped for from them.[5] So one sees by this example of the ancient Tuscans and by that of the Florentines that the French have used the same means; and because of this, one can easily conjecture how much princes can trust in them.

44

One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and Audacity What One Would Never Have Obtained through Ordinary Modes

[1] When the Samnites were being assaulted by the army of Rome, and were unable with their army to stand up to the Romans in the field, they decided to leave their towns in Samnium guarded and to pass with their entire army into Tuscany, which was in truce with the Romans, and to see by such passing if they could induce the Tuscans by the presence of their army to take up arms again, which they had refused to their ambassadors. In the speaking that the Samnites did to the Tuscans, and especially in showing what cause had induced them to take up arms, they used a notable term when they said "they had rebelled because peace was harsher for slaves than was war for the free."[1] And so, partly with persuasions, partly by the presence of their army, they induced them to take up arms again. Here it is to be noted that when one prince desires to obtain a thing from another individual, if the opportunity allows he ought not to give him space to deliberate, and ought to act so that he sees the necessity of a quick decision, which is when he who is asked sees that from refusing or delaying arises a sudden dangerous indignation.

[2] This means has been seen to be well used in our times by Pope Julius with the French and by Monsieur de Foix, captain of the king of France, with the marquis of Mantua. For wishing to expel the Bentivogli from Bologna, Pope Julius judged that for this he had need of French forces and Venetian neutrality.[2] When he had inquired of both and received doubtful and shifty replies, he decided to make them both come along with his judgment by not giving them time; and departing from Rome with as many troops as he could gather, he went toward Bologna. He sent to tell the Venetians to remain neutral and to the king of France to send forces. So, since all were left constrained by the small space of time, and they saw that manifest indignation must arise in the pope if they delayed or refused, they

yielded to his wishes; and the king sent aid to him and the Venetians stayed neutral.

[3] Also, Monsieur de Foix, who was with the army in Bologna and had learned of the rebellion of Brescia, and wished to go for its recapture, had two ways: one through the dominion of the king, long and tedious; the other short, through the dominion of Mantua. Not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominion of that marquis, but he had to enter through certain enclosures between swamps and lakes, of which that region is full, which were locked and guarded from him with fortresses and other modes. Hence, having decided to go by the shorter way, and so as to conquer every difficulty and not to give time to the marquis to deliberate, de Foix at a stroke moved his troops by that way and notified him to send the keys to that passage. So the marquis, taken aback by this sudden decision, sent him the keys, which he would never have sent if de Foix had conducted himself more fearfully, since that marquis was in league with the pope and with the Venetians and had one of his sons in the hands of the pope, things that gave him many honest excuses for refusing them. But assaulted by the sudden policy, he yielded them for the causes that are told above.[3] So did the Tuscans with the Samnites, because of the presence of the army of Samnium, when they took the arms that they had refused to take up at other times.

45

What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to Resist the Thrust of Enemies and, Having Resisted It, to Charge Them; or Indeed to Assault Them with Fury from the First

[1] Decius and Fabius were the Roman consuls with two armies confronting the armies of the Samnites and the Tuscans; and since they came to the fight and to the battle together, it is to be noted which of the two diverse modes of proceeding held to by the two consuls in that struggle is better.[1] For Decius assaulted the enemy with every thrust and with every force of his; Fabius only resisted it, judging a slow assault to be more useful, reserving his thrust to the last, when the enemy had lost its first ardor for combat and, as we say, its wind. Here one sees by the success of the affair that the plan came out much better for Fabius than for Decius, who exhausted himself in his first thrusts, so that seeing his band of men rather turned around than otherwise, he sacrificed himself to the Roman legions in imitation of his father, so as to acquire with death the glory he had been unable to attain with victory. When Fabius learned of this thing, so as not to acquire less honor by living than his colleague had acquired by dying, he pushed on all the forces he had reserved for such a necessity; hence he carried off a very happy victory. Hence one sees that Fabius's mode of proceeding is more secure and more to be imitated.

46

Whence It Arises That One Family in One City Keeps the Same Customs for a Time

[1] It appears that not only does one city have certain modes and institutions diverse from another, and procreates men either harder or more effeminate, but in the same city one sees such a difference to exist from one family to another. That is attested to be true in every city, and in the city of Rome very many examples are read of. For one sees that the Manlii were hard and obstinate, the Publicoli kind men and lovers of the people, the Appii ambitious and enemies of the plebs; and so, many other families had each of them its qualities separate from those of others. These things cannot arise solely from the bloodline, because that must vary through the diversity of marriages, but it necessarily comes from the diverse education of one family from another. For it is very important that a boy of tender years begin to hear good or bad said of a thing, for it must of necessity make an impression on him, which afterward regulates the mode of proceeding in all the times of his life. If this had not been, it would be impossible for all the Appii to have had the same wish and to be agitated by the same passions, as Titus Livy notes of many of them.[1] And last, after one of them had been made censor, and his colleague had laid down the magistracy at the end of eighteen months, as the law disposed, Appius did not wish to relinquish it, saying that he could hold it for five years according to the first law ordered for censors. Although very many assemblies were held over this, and very many tumults generated, yet there was never any remedy by which he would relinquish it, though he was against the will of the people and of the greater part of the Senate. Whoever reads the oration he made against Publius Sempronius, tribune of the plebs, will note there all the Appian insolence and all the goodness and humanity used by infinite citizens so as to obey the laws and the auspices of their fatherland.

47

That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget Private Injuries for Love of His Fatherland

[1] Marcius the consul was with the army against the Samnites, and when he had been wounded in a fight, and because of this was putting his troops in danger, the Senate judged it necessary to send Papirius Cursor the dictator there to supply the defects of the consul. Since it was necessary that the dictator be named by Fabius, who was consul with the armies in Tuscany, and they feared that he would not wish to name him because he was his enemy, the senators sent two ambassadors to beg him that, private hatreds aside, he ought to name him for the public benefit. Fabius did that, moved by charity for his fatherland, even though by being silent and in many other modes he gave sign that such a nomination grieved him.[1] From that, all those who seek to be held good citizens ought to take example.

48

When One Sees a Great Error Made by an Enemy, One Ought to Believe That There Is a Deception Underneath

[1] When Fulvius the legate was left with the army that the Romans had in Tuscany, the consul having gone to Rome for some ceremonies, the Tuscans, to see if they could catch him in a trap, placed an ambush near the Roman camps and sent some soldiers in shepherds' dress with a very large herd and had them come within sight of the Roman army. So disguised, they approached the wall of the camp; hence the legate, marveling at their presumption since it did not appear reasonable to him, followed a mode by which he exposed the fraud. So the plan of the Tuscans was defeated.[1] Here one can advantageously note that a captain of armies ought not to put faith in an error that the enemy is evidently seen to make, for fraud will always be underneath it, as it is not reasonable that men be so incautious. But often the desire to conquer blinds the spirits of men, who do not see but what appears to be done for them.

[2] When the French had conquered the Romans at the Allia, and come to Rome and found the gates open and without guard, they stood all that day and night without entering, fearing fraud and unable to believe that there was so much cowardice and so little counsel in Roman breasts that they would abandon the fatherland.[2] When in 1508 the Florentines were encamped before Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a Pisan citizen, found himself a prisoner of the Florentines; and he promised that if he were free he would deliver a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army. He was freed; then, to accomplish the thing, he came often to speak with the legates of the commissioners. He would come not concealed but openly and accompanied by Pisans, whom he left aside when he spoke with the Florentines. So one could have conjectured his double intent because it was not reasonable, if his conduct had been faithful, that he would have dealt so openly. But the desire they had to have Pisa blinded the Florentines, so that when led

according to his order to the Lucca gate, they left many of their heads and other troops there to their dishonor, because of the double dealing done by the said Alfonso.[3]

49

A Republic Has Need of New Acts of Foresight Every Day If One Wishes to Maintain It Free; and for What Merits Quintus Fabius Was Called Maximus

[1] It is of necessity, as was said other times,[1] that in a great city accidents arise every day that have need of a physician, and according to their importance, one must find a wiser physician. If such accidents ever arose in any city, they arose in Rome, ones both strange and unhoped for, as when it appeared that all the Roman women had conspired against their husbands to kill them—so many were found who had poisoned them, and so many who had prepared the poison to poison them.[2] So also was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals that was exposed at the time of the Macedonian War, in which many thousands of men and women were actually involved.[3] If that had not been exposed, it would have been dangerous for that city, if indeed the Romans had not been accustomed to punish multitudes of the erring. For if the greatness of that republic and the power of its executions had not been seen by infinite other signs, it is seen through the kinds of penalty that it imposed on whoever erred. Nor did it hesitate to have killed by way of justice an entire legion at once, and a city, and to banish eight or ten thousand men under extraordinary conditions as would not be observed by one alone, much less by many, as happened to those soldiers who had engaged in combat unhappily at Cannae. It banished them to Sicily and imposed on them that they not lodge in the town, and that they eat standing up.[4]

[2] But of all other executions, decimating the armies was [most] terrible, in which by lot, out of the whole army, one individual of every ten was put to death. Nor in punishing a multitude could one find a more frightening punishment than this. For when a multitude errs and the author is not certain, all cannot be punished because they are too many; to punish a part

of them and leave a part of them unpunished would do wrong to those who are punished, and the unpunished would have spirit to err another time. But if the tenth part of them is killed by lot when all deserve it, whoever is punished grieves for his lot and whoever is not punished fears lest another time it touch him, and guards himself against erring.[5]

[3] Thus were punished the poisoners and the Bacchanals as their sins deserved. Although these diseases produce bad effects in a republic, they are not fatal because there is almost always time to correct them, but there is actually no time in those that regard the state, which ruin the city if they are not corrected by a prudent individual.

[4] Because of the liberality that the Romans practiced in giving citizenship[6] to foreigners, so many new men were born in Rome that they began to have so much share in the votes that the government began to vary, and it departed from the things and from the men with which it was accustomed to go. When Quintus Fabius, who was censor, perceived this, he put all these new men from whom this disorder derived under four tribes, so that by being shut in such small spaces they could not corrupt all Rome. This affair was well understood by Fabius, and he applied a convenient remedy without an alteration; it was so well received by the citizenry[7] that he deserved to be called Maximus.[8]

GLOSSARY

English terms appearing in the translation are in boldface, followed by the Italian or Latin terms they translate in italics and the listing of their occurrences by book, chapter, and paragraph number (except when the chapter has only one paragraph). Certain abbreviations are slightly different from those used in the introduction and the notes to the text: DL refers to the dedicatory letter, Pr to the prefaces, and T to a chapter title. A parenthetical number followed by a multiplication cross (×) indicates multiple occurrences. (L) indicates a Latin word. Negatives and other words with prefixes are listed with their root words. Indicators of parts of speech (n. for noun, v. for verb, adj. for adjective) are given only where the English terms are identical. *See also* refers to another English term used to translate that Italian term; *cf* refers to an etymologically or conceptually related term.

An asterisk next to an English or Italian term indicates that not all occurrences of that term are listed in the glossary; all occurrences are given for other listed English terms (when they translate Italian, not necessarily Latin) and for listed Italian terms (though it may be necessary to consult the entries cross-referenced under *See also* to locate all occurrences of a listed Italian term). Occurrences of English terms when they translate Latin are usually given only when the Latin terms are cognates of the Italian term translated. The glossary does not include words inserted in the translation in brackets for clarification.

abject, *abietta,* I 49.2, III 6.2, III 31.1, III 31.2 (2×), III 31.3; **abjectness,** *abiezione,* II 2.2, III 31.3

absolute, *assoluto,* I 9.2, I 25, I 35, I 40.3, I 55.4, III 26.2

absolve, *assolvere,* I 5.4, I 8.3, I 24.1

accident, *accidente,* 1 Pr.2, I 2.1 (4×), I 2.2, I 2.7, I 3 T, I 6.4, I 12.2, I 16 T, I 16.1, I 16.5, I 17.2, I 18.1, I 18.2, I 28.1, I 33.1, I 33.2 (3×), I 34.3 (3×), I 34.4, I 39 T, I 39.1, I 40 T, I 40.1, I 45.2 (2×), I 46 (2×), I 47.2, I 56 T, I 56 (2×), II 5 T, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 18.4, II 21.2, II 22.1 (2×), II 23 T, II 24.2 (2×), II 29.1, II 32.1, III 1.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 5, III 6.16, III 6.17 (3×), III 11.1, III 14.1 (2×), III 14.2, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 26.2, III 30.1 (2×), III 30.2, III 33.1, III 36.2, III 37.3, III 49.1 (2×); **accidental,** *accidentale,* III 36.2. *See also* incident

account,* *conto,* I 12, I 45.2, I 52.3, I 55.1, I 55.2, I 57, I 59, II 4.2, II 10.2, II 17.1, II 17.3, II 18.3, II 21.2, II 28.1, II 30.4, III 1.2 (3×), III 26.2 (2×), III 31.2, III 35.2; **account,*** *ragione,* II 5.1. For *ragione, see also* just; reason; type

accuse, accused, *accusate, accusato,* I 5.4, I 6.4, I 7.1 (2×), I 7.4 (3×), I 8.2 (3×), I 8.3 (3×), I 9.2, I 11.1, I 28, I 45.3 (2×), I 47.3, I 53.5, I 58.1, I 58.2 (2×), I 58.3, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3 (3×), II 26, III 6.5 (2×), III 6.6 (2×), III 6.7, III 6.8 (2×), III 6.9 (3×), III 6.19, III 8.1 (2×), III 34.2; **accusation,** *accusa,* I 5.4, I 7 T, I 7.4, I 7.5 (2×), I 8 T, I 8.2 (6×), I 8.4, I 11.1 (2×), III 1.3, III 6.8 (2×), III 28, III 30.1, III 34.1; **accuser,** *accusatore,* I 8.4 (2×), I 49.3, III 6.3 (2×), III 6.20

accustom, *assuefare,* II 17.5, III 14.2, III 37.4, III 38.2; **accustom, accustomed,** *consueto, consuesco* (L), I 21.2, I 51, II 2.4, II 4.1 (2×), II 19.1, II 21.2, II 29.1, II 32.1, III 9.2, III 12.1, III 31.4 (L), III 49.1, III 49.4; **accustom,** *solere, soleo* (L), DL, I 43, III 8.1 (2×), III 31.2 (L), III 43; **accustomed,** *usitato,* I 55.2; **unaccustomed,** *inconsueto,* III 38.1; **unaccustomed,** *inusitato,* I 11.2, I 29.3, II 12.4, II 17.5 (2×), III 38.1 (2×). For *consueto, solere, usitato, see also* custom

acquire, acquisition, *acquistare, acquisto, acquistato,* I 1.3, I 1.4, I 5 T, I 5.2 (2×), I 5.4 (5×), I 6.3, I 6.4 (3×), I 16.1 (2×), I 16.3, I 18.4, I 20 T, I 20, I 29.1 (3×), I 29.2 (2×), I 29.3 (3×), I 30.1 (3×), I 34.1, I 37.1 (2×), I 46, I 52.1, I 52.3, II 1 T, II 1.1 (4×), II 1.3 (2×), II 2.1 (2×), II 2.3 (2×), II 4.1 (3×), II 4.2 (3×), II 6.1 (4×), II 17.1 (2×), II 17.3, II 18.5, II 19 T, II 19.1 (6×), II 19.2 (12×), II 22.1 (2×), II 24.3 (2×), II 27.2, II 30.1, II 30.2, II 30.5, II 31.2, II 32.1 (3×), II

32.2 (2×), II 33, III 3 T, III 3, III 6.19, III 10.3 (2×), III 12.1 (3×), III 21.1, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.4 (3×), III 24, III 28, III 34.2 (2×), III 34.3, III 35.2 (2×), III 37.1, III 39.1, III 40.1 (2×), III 42 (3×), III 45 (2×); **reacquire,** *riacquistare,* II 24.2 (2×), II 24.3, III 17

action, *azione,* 1 Pr.1, I 9.2, I 11.1, I 14.1, I 40.1, I 50 T, I 50 (2×), I 51, I 53.1, I 58.1, I 60, 1 Pr.1, II 2.2 (3×), II 3, II 6.1, II 13.1, II 15.1, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 30.1, III 1.6 (2×), III 6.8, III 6.12 (2×), III 6.13, III 6.15, III 6.16, III 6.17, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 10.1 (2×), III 12.1, III 15.2, III 18.1 (2×), III 20, III 29, III 30.1, III 34.2 (4×), III 34.3, III 34.4, III 36.2, III 37.1, III 40.1, III 42 (2×)

administer, *amministrare,* 1 Pr.2, I 39.2 (2×), I 50 (2×), III 15.2, III 30.1; **administration,** *amministrazione, administratio* (L), I 2.3, I 4.2, I 6.1, III 15.2, III 15.2 (L), III 17 T, III 17.1

adore, *adorare,* I 5.2, I 29.3, 1 Pr.2, III 21.1

advantage, *vantaggio,* I 58.3, II 6.2, II 12.3, II 17.3 (4×), II 22.2, II 32.1, III 6.20, III 10.1 (2×), III 10.2, III 37.3, III 37.4; **advantage,** *commodità, commodo,* I 1.5 (2×), I 2.3, II 2.3, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 17.2 (3×), II 18.3, II 29.1, III 1.2, III 1.6, III 10.3, III 21.4; **advantageous, advantageously,** *commodo,* I 1.1, II 5.2, II 12.2, III 39.2, III 48.1; **disadvantage,** *disavvantaggio,* II 10.2, II 17.2, II 17.3, III 17, III 18.1; **disadvantage,** *incommodità,* II 17.2, III 21.4, III 23. For *commodità, see also* convenient; occasion

afraid, to be, *fare paura,* II 1.2; **to be afraid,** *temere,* I 16.3. *See also* fear

alive, *vivo,* I 3.2, I 17.3, I 22, I 44.1, I 57, II 18.4, II 27.4, III 4, III 6.2, III 6.12, III 6.16, III 6.18. *See also* lively

alone, *solo,* solus* (L), I 2.1, I 7.3, I 9 T, I 9.2 (2×), I 9.4, I 9.5, I 18.5, I 35, II 2.1 (2×), II 3, II 4.1 (3×), II 4.2, II 5.2 (2×), II 8.1 (2×), II 13.1 (4×), II 13.2 (2×), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20, II 23.3, II 24.2, II 29.1, II 30.2, II 30.4, III 1.3, III 6.2, III 6.8, III 6.9, III 6.15, III 9.3, III 11.1 (2×), III 15.1, III 15.2 (2×), III 31.2, III 31.3, III 35.2, III 36.2 (L), III 49.1

altars, *altari,* I 15 (2×)

alter, *alterare,* I 25, III 1.1 (2×), III 8 T; **alteration,** *alterazione,* I 5.4, I 25, III 1.1, III 49.4; **alternating,** *alterazione,* I 7.1. For *alterare, see also* upset; *cf* change

ambassador, *ambasciadore,* I 44.1, II 11.2 (2×), II 28.1 (3×), II 33, III 12.2, III 31.2, III 31.3, III 32, III 44.1, III 47. *Cf* spokesmen

ambiguity, ambiguous, *ambiguità, ambiguo,* I 30.1 (2×), II 15 T, II 15.1 (5×), II 15.2 (3×)

ambition, *ambizione,* DL, I 2.3, I 4.1, I 5.2, I 5.4 (2×), I 6.4, I 7.4, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.5, I 18.2, I 20, I 30.2, I 33.2, I 35, I 36, I 37.1 (2×), I 37.3 (2×), I 39.2 (2×), I 40.5, I 42, I 43, I 46 T, I 46, I 47.3, I 50 T, I 52.1, I 55.4, I 55.5, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 8.1, II 19.1, II 20 (2×), II 21.2, III 1.3, III 2, III 3 (2×), III 6.8, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1 (2×), III 11.2, III 12.1, III 12.2, III 15.2, III 16.3, III 21.4, III 22.4, III 24, III 30.1, III 38.1; **ambitious,** *ambizioso,* 1 Pr.2, I 5.4 (2×), I 6.2, I 7.3, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 30.1, I 30.2, I 45.2, I 47.3, I 55.5, II 20 (2×), II 22.1, III 8.1, III 12.2, III 46; **ambitiously,** *ambiziosamente,* I 9.2, I 46

ancestors, *antichi,* I 2.3. *See also* ancient; former

ancestral, *patrio,* I 1.4, II 5.2, II 8 T. *Cf* fatherland

ancient, *antiquo, antico,* 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2 (8×), I 6.1, I 7.2, I 9 T, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.2, I 10.5, I 12.2, I 13.2, I 14.1, I 15, I 16.1, I 19.2, I 25 T, I 25 (5×), I 31.2, I 37 T, I 37.1, I 39.1 (2×), I 40.4, I 49.2, I 53.2, I 55.2, I 55.4, I 56, I 58.2, 1 Pr.1 (3×), 1 Pr.2 (2×), 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 2.1 (2×), II 2.2 (4×), II 2.4, II 4.1 (3×), II 4.2, II 5.1 (2×), II 8.1 (2×), II 16 T, II 16.2 (2×), II 16.3 (2×), II 17.1, II 17.3, II 17.4, II 17.5 (2×), II 17.6, II 18 T, II 18.2, II 18.5, II 19.1, II 20, II 21.2, II 22.1, II 24.3, II 24.4, II 27.1, II 30.5, III 1.2, III 3, III 4, III 5 (2×), III 10.1 (3×), III 11.1, III 12.1, III 15.1, III 22.3, III 22.6, III 27.2, III 39.1, III 43 (3×). *See also* ancestors; former; *cf* antiquity

anger (v.), *irritare,* I 7.1, I 8.2 (2×), II 14 (2×), II 15.2, II 26 (2×); **anger** (n.), *ira,* I 7.1, I 14.2, II 2.1, II 28.1; **angered,** *irato,* III 35.1

animal,* *animale,* I 16.1, II 2.2

animate (v.), *animire,* I 11.2. *Cf* inspire; spirit

animus, *animo,* I 7.3, I 7.4. *See also* intent; mind; spirit; *cf* magnanimous; pusillanimous

antiquity, in antiquity, *antiquità, antichità, anticamente, antiquamente,* 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 1.4, I 58.2, 1 Pr.3, II 2.2, II 5.1 (2×), II 5.2, II 8.2, II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.3, II 17.4 (2×), II 17.5, II 30.5, III 27.2, III 43. *Cf* ancient

appearance, *apparenza,* I 46.1; *spezie,* I 53T. For *spezie, see also* species

appetite, *appetito,* I 5.2, I 5.4, I 7.4, I 8.3, I 37.3 (2×), I 42, I 44.2, 1 Pr.3 (3×), III 3, III 4, III 22.3

arbiter, *arbitro,* I 49.1, I 55.4, I 59, II 22.1, II 25.1. *Cf* judge

argument, *ragionamento,* III 32. *See also* discuss; reason

aristocrats, *ottimati,* I 2.2 (2×), I 2.3, I 2.5, I 2.6 (2×), I 2.7 (4×), I 16.5 (4×), I 28, I 52.3

arm (n.), *arma, armi, arme, arma* (L), I 7.3, I 11.2 (2×), I 16.5, I 18.4, I 19.2, I 19.4 (2×), I 21 T, I 21.1, I 21.2, I 21.3, I 21.3 (L), I 37.2 (2×), I 38.1, I 44.2 (2×), I 52.1, I 52.2, I 53.1, I 54, I 57, II 2.1 (2×), II 2.2, II 2.3, II 3 (2×), II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 8.4, II 9, II 10.1 (2×), II 10.3, II 12.1, II 12.4, II 13.2 (3×), II 14, II 15.1, II 16.1, II 17.1, II 20, II 21.2, II 21.2 (L), II 23.2, II 24.1 (L)(2×), II 25.1 (2×), II 26 (2×), II 27.3, II 27.4, II 29.1, II 30.1, II 32.1, III 6.15, III 6.17, III 6.20 (2×), III 11.2, III 12.2 (L)(2×), III 12.3, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 19.2, III 20 (2×), III 22.6, III 24, III 26.1, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 32, III 33.1 (L), III 36.2, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 43, III 44.1 (3×), III 44.3; **arms,** *armato,* I 7.5; **men-at-arms,** *genti d'arini,* I 29.2, I 56, II 18.4 (2×); **men-at-arms,** *uomini d'arme,* II 19.1 (2×); **arm,** *braccio,** I 47.1, II 17.2, II 23.2, II 25.1, III 6.15, III 14.1, III 28; **arm** (v.), **armed,** *armare, armato, armo* (L), I 2.3, I 6.3, I 6.4, I 19.4, I 38.2 (4×), I 40.6, I 43, I 44.1, I 54 (2×), II 2.1, II 2.2, II 3, II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2, II 12.4 (4×), II 18.3, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 26, II 30.2, II 30.3 (2×), II 30.4, III 6.2 (3×), III 6.17, III 6.19 (3×), III 12.3 (L)(2×), III 13.3 (2×), III 14.3, III 26.1, III 30.2 (4×), III 31.2, III 31.4, III 32, III 33.1; **disarm,** *disarmare,* II 23.4, II 24.1; **disarmed,** *disarmato,* II 2.2, II 30.2, II 30.3, III 41, III 42; **unarmed,** *disarmato,* I 6.3, I 27.1, I 38.2, II 4.2, II 12.4 (2×), II 18.3, II 30.3, III 12.3, III 21.4, III 31.4, III 37.4

army, *esercito, exercitus* (L), *passim*

arrogance, arrogant, *arroganza, arrogante,* I 47.2, II 14

art, *arte, ars* (L), 1 Pr.2, I 10.1 (2×), I 11.1, I 19.2 (2×), I 19.3, I 40.3, 1 Pr.1, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 3, II 8.3, II 25.1 (2×), II 31.1, III 6.19 (2×), III 6.20, III 22.4 (L), III 36.1

artillery, *artiglierie,* II 16.3 (2×), II 17 T, II 17.1 (12×), II 17.2 (9×), II 17.3 (3×), II 17.4 (4×), II 17.5 (10×), II 17.6, II 18.4, II 24.1, II 33

assault (v.), *assaltare,* I 1.1, I 1.4, I 6.3, I 9.4, I 12.2, I 21.2 (2×), I 23.2, I 31.2, I 32, I 38.1, I 40.6, I 53.1, I 53.4, II 1.2 (3×), II 2.3, II 8.1 (2×), II 9 (4×), II 10.2, II 11.1, II 12 T, II 12.1 (4×), II 12.2 (2×), II 12.3, II 12.4 (4×), II 13.2, II 14, II 17.3, II 17.4 (2×), II 18.3, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 22.1 (2×), II 22.2 (2×), II 24.2 (5×), II 24.4, II 25 T, II 25.1, II 27.4, II 28.1 (2×), II 29.1, II 30.4, II 31.2, II 32.1 (3×), III 10.2, III 10.4 (2×), III 11.2, III 12.2, III 18.3, III 30.2, III 37.4, III 39.1, III 44.3, III 45 T, III 45; **assault** (n.), *assalto,* II 17.1, II 17.4 (3×), II 25.1 (2×), II 27.4, II 32.1 (4×), III 45; **assault** (n.), *insulto,* I 13.2

assert, *causare,* III 43. *See also* cause

astonishment, *maraviglia,* I 40.3. *See also* marvel

astrologers, *astrologi,* III 6.11

astuteness, astutely, *astuzia, astutamente,* I 6.4, I 41, II 5.2, II 12.2, III 17

attack,* *offendere,* I 34.4, II 17.3, II 18.4. *See also* hurt; offend

augurs, *aruspici,* I 12.1, I 14.1; **augury,** *augurio,* I 14.1 (2×), III 33.1

auspices, *auspicii, auspizi, aruspicare, auspicium* (L), I 14 T, I 14.1 (3×), I 14.2 (4×), I 14.3 (4×), III 33.1 (3×), III 36.2 (L), III 38.1 (L), III 46

author, *autore,* I 25, I 45 T, I 58, III 12.2, III 32, III 35.1 (2×), III 49.2

authority, *autorità, autoritade,* I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.4, I 2.3 (2×), I 2.7 (4×), I 5.2 (2×), I 5.4 (2×), I 6.1, I 6.4 (2×), I 7.1 (3×), I 7.2 (2×), I 7.3, I 9.1 (2×), I 9.2 (3×), I 9.3, I 9.4, I 10.2, I 10.5, I 11.2 (2×), I 12.1, I 12.2, I 13.2, I 16.3, I 17.1, I 18.2, I 18.4, I 18.5, I 25, I 26, I 29.2, I 29.3, I 34 T (2×), I 34.1 (3×), I 34.2 (4×), I 34.3 (2×), I 34.4 (3×), I 35 (11×), I 36, I 39.2 (2×), I 40.2, I 40.3 (2×), I 40.4 (2×), I 40.5, I 41, I 44 T, I 44.1 (2×), I 44.2, I 47.1 (3×), I 49.2, I 49.3 (4×), I 50 (3×), I 52.1, I 53.2 (3×), I 53.3, I 53.5 (2×), I 54 T, I 54, I 55.2, I 55.5, I 58.1, II 4.1 (2×), II 12.4, II 18 T, II 18.2 (3×), II 19.2 (2×), II 20 (2×), II 24.3, II 33 (3×), III 3, III 5, III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.15, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1 (2×), III 15.2, III 24, III 26.2, III 30 T, III 30.1 (3×), III 32

avarice, *avarizia,* DL, I 2.3, I 29.1 (3×), I 29.3 (2×), I 40.5, II 4.2, III 6.20, III 43 (3×); **avaricious,** *avaro,* III 43. *Cf* greed

avenge, *vendicare, vendicarsi,* I 5.4, I 7.5 (3×), I 16.5 (2×), I 47.2, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 4.1, II 19.2, II 28 T, II 28.1 (3×), II 28.2 (4×), III 6.2 (3×), III 6.3, III 6.7, III 6.16 (2×), III 6.18 (3×), III 6.20, III 7 (2×), III 13.1, III 16.3, III 17; **avenger,** *vendicatrice,* I 28. *Cf* revenge; vindictive

bad, *cattivo,** I 5.2, I 7.5, I 8.3 (2×), I 9.1, I 10.4, I 18.3, I 18.4 (4×), I 20, I 24.1, I 49.2, I 49.3, 1 Pr.3, II 15.1, II 17.4, II 23.2 (2×), II 30.2, III 8.2 (2×), III 13.2, III 16.3, III 22.4, III 22.5, III 24, III 31.2, III 31.3, III 35.2, III 37.1, III 49.3; **bad, badly,** *malo,* *male,* *malus* (L), I 3.2, I 5.4, I 6.2, I 7.4 (2×), I 8.3 (2×), I 11.3, I 13.1, I 17.3, I 18.4, I 24.1, I 35, I 38.2 (3×), I 41, I 45 T, I 46 (L), I 47.2, I 47.3, I 50, I 53.1, I 57 (4×), II 18.4, II 19.1, II 23.4, II 24.1 (3×), II 24.2, II 30.3, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.14, III 6.20, III 8.2, III 10.1, III 13.2, III 14.1, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 31.1, III 31.3, III 31.4, III 34.4, III 46; **bad,** *reo,* I 2.2, I 2.3, I 2.5, I 3.1, I 12.2, I 35 (2×), I 38.2, III 36.2; **bad,** *tristo,* I 30.1, I 31 T, II 19.2, II 24.2, III 9.1, III 35. For *cattivo, reo, tristo, see also* wicked; for *male, see also* evil; ill; *cf* malevolent

barbarian, *barbaro,* I 1.2, I 7.5, I 12.2, II 2.4, III 43

battalion, *battaglia,* II 16.1, II 16.2. *See also* battle

battle, *battaglia,* II 11.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.2, III 37 T, III 37.3, III 38.2; **battle,** *giornata,* I 14.1 (2×), I 14.2, I 31.1, I 36, II 6.1 (3×), II 16.1 (3×), II 16.2 (3×), II 17.1, II 17.3 (4×), II 17.5, II 18.2, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 25.2, II 33, III 9.4, III 10 T, III 10.1 (8×), III 10.2 (2×), III 10.3, III 10.4, III 13.1, III 14.3 (2×), III 18.1, III 18.2, III 31.2 (2×), III 31.4, III 33 T, III 33.1 (2×), III 37 T, III 37.2, III 38.1, III 45 T, III 45; **battle, fortune of,** *fortuna della zuffa,* II 10.1, II 10.2 (2×), III 10.1; **battle, order of, ordering of,** *ordine della zuffa, ordinare la zuffa,* II 16.1, II 29.1, III 22.4. For *battaglia, see also* battalion; for *giornata, see also* day; for *zuffa, see also* fight

beast, *bestia,* I 2.3; *fiera,* III 39.1

beatify, *beatificare,* II 2.2

beautiful, *bello,* I 11.3, I 31.2, II 24.4, II 28.2 (2×), III 20

because, *per cagione,* III 14.1, III 26 T, III 26.1. *See also* cause

beginning (n.), *principio,* DL, I 1 T, I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.3, I 1.4, I 1.5, I 2.1 (5×), I 2.3 (4×), I 2.7, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 12.1, I 14.1, I 16.5, I 17.1, I 18.3, I 19.1, I 25, I 29.3, I 30.1, I 33.2, I 33.3, I 33.5, I 37.1, I 37.3, I 40.6, I 40.7, I 49 T, I 49.1, I 49.2 (5×), I 49.3, I 55.3 (2×), I 55.5, II 6.1, II 9, II 13.2 (3×), II 15, II 19.2, II 29.2, II 30.2, III 1 T, III 1.1, III 1.2 (3×), III 1.3 (3×), III 1.4, III 1.5, III 1.6, III 6.5, III 6.11, III 6.19, III 8.2, III 11.2, III 12.1, III 14.3, III 22.3, III 24, III 26.2, III 27.2, III 28 T, III 34.2 (2×), III 34.3, III 34.4, III 36 T, III 36.1 (2×), III 36.2, III 38.1

believe, *credere, credo* (L), *passim,* **lack of belief,** *incredulità,* I 53.1; **belief,** *opinione,* I 12.1. For *incredulità, cf* credulity; for *opinione, see also* opinion; reputation

belongings, *sustanza,* I 6.2, I 37.1, I 55.5. *Cf* property

benefit, *beneficio, benefizio, benificare, beneficium* (L), DL, 1 Pr.1, I 4.1, I 6.4, I 29.1 (L), I 32 T, I 32 (5×), I 51, I 52.1, I 59, II 23.2 (3×), II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, III 4 (2×), III 6.3, III 8.1 (2×), III 14.3 (L), III 28 (2×), III 30.1, III 47

betrothed, *maritata, marito,* I 22 (2×). *See also* husband; marry

Bible, *Bibbia,* III 30.1

bishop, *vescovo,* I 54, III 6.20. *Cf* episcopal

blame, *biasimo, biasimare,* DL, 1 Pr.1 (2×), I 2.3, I 4.1, I 4.2, I 9.5, I 10.1 (4×), I 10.3 (2×), I 10.4, I 21 T, I 24.1, I 28, I 38.3, I 44.2, I 49.1, I 53.5, 1 Pr.2 (2×), 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 15.2, II 19.2, II 29.1, III 27.4

blind (v.), **blinded,** *accecate, accecato,* DL, I 17.1, I 35, I 40.7, I 42, I 53.2, II 29 T, III 6.3 (2×), III 6.8, III 12.2, III 28, III 48.1, III 48.2; **blind** (n.), *cieco, caecus* (L), III 35.2, III 36.2, III 36.2 (L), III 39.2 (L); **blindness,** *cecità,* III 8.1

blood, bloodline, bloodshed, bloody, *sangue, sanguinosa, sanguis* (L), I 4.1, I 5.4, I 10.5, I 17.3, I 37.2 (2×), I 49.3, I 53.1, I 60 (2×), I 60 (L), II 2.2, II 4.1, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 29.1, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.20, III 7 T, III 7 (2×), III 12.3, III 19.1, III 27.1, III 27.2, III 46

body,* *corpo,* II 2.2, II 2.4 (2×), II 3, II 5.2 (3×), II 12.4, II 16.1 (3×), II 16.2, II 30.3, III 1.1 (3×), III 1.2 (3×), III 8.1, III 11.1

book, *libro,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.6, I 13.2, 1 Pr.3, II 29.2, III 1.6

boy, *fanciullo,* III 6.5 (2×), III 6.10; *giovinetto, giovanetto,* III 34.3, III 46. For *fanciullo, see also* child; for *giovanetto, cf* youth

brain, *cervello,* I 55.5, III 6.14

bridle, *freno,* I 58.2. *See also* check

bring up, *addurre,* I 7.1, I 7.5, I 8.3, I 9.4, I 13.1, I 13.2, I 14.3, I 17.2, I 23.4, I 31.1, I 33.3, I 47.2, I 53.3, I 55.1, I 56, I 59, II 1.1, II 3, II 8.2, II 12.1, II 12.3, II 21.2, II 23.2, II 29.3, II 31.1, III 3, III 6.6, III 11.1, III 12.2, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 15.1, III 15.2, III 16.1, III 36.2 (2×)

brother, *fratello,* I 9.1, I 9.2, I 18.5, I 36, I 54, II 21.2, III 6.5, III 6.11, III 6.14, III 6.18 (2×); **brother-in-law,** *cognato,* II 31.1

build, builder, building, *edificare, edificatore, edicazione, edificio,* I 1.1 (2×), I 1.2, I 1.3 (6×), I 1.4 (6×), I 1.5 (6×), I 26 (2×), I 28, I 53.1, I 56, II 1.1, II 4.1, II 24.1 (7×), II 24.2 (2×), II 24.4 (4×), III 25

calumny, calumniate, calumniator, *calunnia, calunniare, calunnatore,* I 5.4, I 7.5, I 8 T, I 8.2 (9×), I 8.3 (6×), I 8.4 (2×), I 10.5, II 21.2

campaign, *impresa,* I 8.3, II 4.2, II 6.2, II 10.1, II 10.2, III 12.2, III 35.1 (2×). *See also* enterprise

capital, *capitale,* I 10.2, I 10.5, I 31.2, II 19.1, II 26; **capital,** *capo,** I 1.3. For *capo, see also* head

captain (n.), *capitano,* 1 Pr.2, I 8.3, I 13.1, I 14.2, I 15, I 21.2 (2×), I 23.4, I 29.1 (4×), I 30 T, I 30.1 (2×), I 31 T, I 31.1 (3×), I 31.2, I 38.3, I 44.1, I 49.3 (2×), I 53.5, II 2.2, II 2.4, II 8.1, II 9, II 10.2 (3×), II 10.3, II 16.1, II 16.2 (3×), II 17.1, II 17.4 (2×), II 18.2, II 18.3, II 18.4, II 20, II 24.2, II 24.3 (2×), II 26 (3×), II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.4, II 33 T, II 33 (2×), III 6.9 (2×), III 9.1, III 9.4, III 10 T, III 10.1 (2×), III 10.2, III 12 T, III 12.1 (2×), III 12.2 (2×), III 12.3 (2×), III 13 T (2×), III 13.1 (5×), III 13.2 (2×), III 13.3 (5×), III 14.2 (2×), III 14.3 (2×), III 18 T, III 18.1, III 18.2, III 18.3, III 19.1, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.1, III 22.6, III 31.4 (2×), III 32, III 33 T, III 33.1 (3×), III 37.1, III 37.2 (2×), III 37.3, III 37.4 (3×), III 38 T, III 38.1 (4×), III 39 T, III 39.1 (2×), III 39.2, III 40.2, III 44.2, III 48.1; **captain** (v.), *capitanare,* I 38.3, II 20, III 13.2

capture, capturer, *espugnazione, espugnare, espugnatore,* I 6 4, I 8.3, I 13.1 (5×), I 13.2 (2×), I 53.1, I 53.5, I 59, II 17.4 (2×), II 24.2, II 27.2, III 12.1 (5×), III 12.2, III 20, III 37.3. *See also* storm

cardinal, *cardinale,* I 27.1, I 54, III 6.13 (2×)
care, *cura, curare,* I 5.2, I 9.2, I 14.1, I 31.1 (2×), I 55.4, II 1.2, II 4.1 (2×), II 16.2, II 18.3, II 27.4, III 2, III 6.18, III 10.1, III 18.2
caress, *carezzare, accarezzare,* II 23.4, III 6.11
case,* *causa,* I 5.4, I 40.3. *See also* cause
cathedral, *cattedrale,* III 6.13; *duomo,* I 56
cause (n.), *cagione, passim,* **caused,** *per cagione,* I 13.2; **cause** (n.), *causa,* I 7.1, I 45.1, II 15.2, III 8.1, III 21.1, III 26.2; **cause** (v.), *causare,* I 1.4, I 4.2, I 5.4, I 6.2, I 6.4, I 9.2, I 11.4, I 32, I 33.2, I 33.5, I 47.3, 1 Pr.2, III 1.6, III 4 (2×), III 7, III 16.2, III 17, III 26.2, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 31.3, III 34.2 (2×). For *cagione, see also* because; for *causa, see also* case; for *causare, see also* assert
cavalry, *cavalleria,* II 16.2 (3×), II 17.5 (2×), II 18.3 (2×), II 19.1; **cavalrymen,** *cavalieri,* II 18.2, II 18.3 (2×), II 19.1, III 1.3. *Cf* horse
censors, *Censori,* I 49.1 (2×), III 1.3, III 46 (2×), III 49.4; **censorship,** *Censura,* I 5.2
centurion, *centurione,* I 15 (2×), III 6.11, III 6.15, III 18.2
century, *secolo,* I 1.1, I 1.5, I 11.1, I 58.3, II 19.1, III 34.2. *See also* epoch
ceremony, *cerimonia,* I 10.5, I 12.1 (3×), II 2.2, II 5.1, III 1.2, III 48.1. *Cf* rites
chance (n.), *caso,** I 2.1, I 2.3, I 2.7, I 6.1, I 14.2, I 55.3, II 9 (4×), III 18.3, III 43; **chance** (v.), *sortire,* I 19.1, I 19.4. For *caso, see also* perchance; for *sortire, see also* lot
change (v.), *(ri)mutare,* I 18.2, I 25, I 41, I 42, I 49.3, II 6.2, II 8.2 (2×), II 8.4, II 23.2, II 25.1, II 26, II 27.4, III 3, III 6.14, III 7 T, III 7 (4×), III 9.1 (2×), III 9.2 (2×), III 9.3 (2×), III 12.1, III 18.3, III 25; **change** (n.), *mutazione,* I 2.4, I 49.3. *Cf* alter
chapter, *capitolo,* I 2.7, I 4.2, I 5.3, I 6.4, I 7.5, I 14.3, I 16.6, I 18.5, I 22, I 25, I 26, I 28, I 47.3, I 54, I 58.4, II 1.3, II 4.2, II 11.2, II 15.2, II 16.3, II 19.2, II 26, II 31.2, III 3, III 4, III 5 (2×), III 8.2, III 9.4, III 16.3, III 20, III 26.2, III 26.3, III 37.4. *See also* treaty
charity, *carità,* III 20, III 47
chastity, *castità,* III 20 (2×)
check (v.), *frenare,* I 8.1, I 18.1, I 18.2 (2×), I 18.5, I 37.3, I 42, I 50, I 53.1, I 54 T, I 54 (3×), I 55.4, I 57, II 23.3, II 24.2; **check** (n.), *freno,* I 3.2, I 6.1, I 49.3, I 55.4, II 19.1, II 24.1, II 24.2 (2×), II 33, III 11.1, III 16.1. *See also* bridle
child, *figliuolo,* I 16.3, I 32, II 2.3, III 6.18 (3×); *fanciullo,* II 29.1, III 20 (2×). For *figliuolo, see also* daughter; son; for *fanciullo, see also* boy
choose, *eleggere,* DL (2×), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 2.5, I 5.2, I 9.1, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 18.3, I 42, I 59, I 60 (2×), II 10.2, II 12.1, III 2 (2×), III 6.15, III 6.17, III 16.3; **choice,** *elezione,* I 1.4 (4×), I 1.5, I 2.3, I 3.2, I 5.2, I 10.1, I 34.4, I 38 T, I 38.2, I 58.3 (4×), II 1.2, II 6.1, II 13.2, II 21.2, III 8.2, III 9.1, III 16.3. *See also* elect; levy
Christian, *cristiano,* 1 Pr.2, I 12.1 (2×), I 26, II 5.1 (3×), II 16.2. *Cf* Gentile
church, *chiesa,* I 12.2 (5×), I 27.1 (2×), II 8.4, II 22.1 (3×), III 6.13 (3×), III 31.3; **Church, the Roman,** *Chiesa romana,* I 12 T, I 12.1, I 12.2
cite, cited before, *allegare, preallegare,* I 6.4, I 7.4, I 12.2, I 23.2, I 54, I 58.3 (2×), II 3, II 4.2 (2×), II 8.1, II 10.1, II 12.1 (5×), II 12.2 (3×), II 16.3, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 24.1, II 24.3, III 6.8, III 6.16 (2×), III 6.19, III 8.2, III 9.3, III 22.4, III 28, III 37.4
citizen, *cittadino, passim,* **citizenry,** *civiltà,* III 49.4; **citizenship,** *civilità, civiltà,* II 3, II 23.4, III 49.4; **citizenship,** *città, civitas* (L), II 23.2 (L), II 23.2. For *civilità* and *civiltà, see also* civility; civilization; for *città* and *civitas, see also* city
city, *città, cittade, passim,* **city,** *civitas* (L), III 8.1. *See also* citizenship

civil, civilly, *civile, civilmente,* 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 2.3, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 11.2, I 13.2, I 14.1, I 33.3, I 37.2 (2×), I 40.3, I 45.1, I 49.2, I 53.1, II 18.2, II 21.2, III 3, III 6.11, III 13.3; **civility,** *civilità,* I 2.3, I 24.1, I 28; **civilized,** *civile,* I 11.5; **civilization,** *civilità, civiltà,* I 11.1, I 11.3 (2×), I 55.4 (2×), II 2.4. For *civile, see also* life; life, way of; for *civilità* and *civiltà, see also* citizenship

collectivity, *universale,* I 2.6, I 16.4, I 17.3, I 25, I 32, I 39.2 (2×), I 40.6, I 52.2 (2×), II 22.1, III 3, III 6.2, III 29, III 34.1; **collectivity,** *universalità, università,* I 7.1, I 50 (2×), II 2.2, II 28.1, III 7 (2×). *See also* universal

colony, *colonia,* I 1.3, I 37.2 (4×), II 4.1, II 6.1 (2×), II 6.2 (3×), II 7 (4×), II 13.2, II 19.1, II 23.2, II 30.4 (2×), III 15.1, III 32; **colonist,** *colono,* II 6.1, II 7 T, II 7

color, *colore, colorire,* I 18.5, I 34.3, II 9, II 22.1, II 32.1, III 6.7, III 12.2, III 20, III 28

combat, *(ri)combattere,* I 14.1, I 14.2 (2×), I 23.3, I 31.2, I 37.1 (3×), I 38.3, I 43 T, I 43 (3×), II 1.1 (3×), II 1.2 (2×), II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1, II 2.4, II 8.1 (2×), II 9, II 10.1, II 10.2 (3×), II 12.1, II 12.2, II 12.3 (2×), II 12.4, II 16.1 (3×), II 16.2 (2×), II 17.3, II 17.5, II 18.3 (2×), II 18.4 (2×), II 19.1, II 22.2 (2×), II 26, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 28.1, II 29.1, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 10.1 (2×), III 10.2 (3×), III 12 T, III 12.1 (3×), III 12.2 (4×), III 14.2, III 17 (2×), III 18.1, III 22.4, III 31.3 (2×), III 33.1, III 34.2 (2×), III 36.1 (2×), III 36.2 (2×), III 45, III 49.1

coming,* *futuro,* III 26.3. *See also* future

command (v.), *commandare,* I 1.4, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 11.2, I 13.2, I 14.2 (2×), I 16.5 (2×), I 34.1, I 36, I 38.1, I 40.5, I 45.1, I 55.1, I 55.4, I 57, I 58.3, 1 Pr.2, II 4.1 (3×), II 8.1 (3×), II 11.2, II 16.2, III 5, III 12.3, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 16.3, III 19.1 (2×), III 21.2, III 22.1 (8×), III 22.3 (2×), III 23, III 29, III 30.1 (2×), III 30.2, III 31.4, III 38.1; **command** (n.), *commandamento,* I 31.2, II 16.1; **command** (n.), *imperio, imperium* (L), I 5.2, I 20 (2×), I 34.1, III 10.1, III 15.1 (L), III 19.1, III 22.1 (3×), III 22.1 (L), III 22.3 (3×), III 22.4, III 24 T, III 24 (7×), III 30.1; **commander,** *comandatori,* III 15 T, III 15.1 (2×), III 24; **commander,** *imperadore, imperator* (L), I 15, III 36.2 (L)(2×). For *imperio* and *imperadore, see also* emperor; empire; rule; *cf* imperial

commission,* *commissione,* II 15.1, II 33 T, III 6.7, III 6.8 (2×), III 6.11, III 6.15, III 6.20, III 10.1 (3×), III 14.2, III 31.2; **commissioner,** *commissario,* I 8.3, I 38.3, II 33, III 6.20 (2×), III 15.2 (2×), III 16.3 (2×), III 48.2

common benefit, *comune benefizio* or *beneficio,* 1 Pr.1, III 28; **common good,** *bene comune,* I 4.1, I 9.2 (2×), I 9.3, I 58.3, I 58.4, II 2.1 (2×), III 11.1, III 12.2, III 22.4, III 34.3; **common utility,** *comune utilità,* I 2.3, I 16.3, I 49.2, III 34.2. *See also* utility; *cf* life, way of

community, *communità,* II 4.2 (2×), II 19.2 (3×)

company, *compagnia,* III 15.2, III 34.2. *Cf* partner

compassion, *compassione,* I 2.3, I 56, I 58.2, III 31.3

conceal, concealed, *nascondere, nascoso, nascosto, ascoso,* I 3.2, I 53.2 (3×), 1 Pr.1 (2×), II 5.2, III 11.1, III 19.1, III 28 T, III 33.1, III 48.2. *Cf* covert; hidden

concubine, *concubina,* III 6.10

condition,* *grado,* I 40.6. *See also* degree; favor; rank

condottiere, *condottiere,* II 17.4, II 18.3

conduct (v.),* *governare,* I 38.2, I 40.3, I 40.5, III 44.3. *See also* govern

confederate, *confederato, foederatus* (L), II 8.3, II 14 (L), II 14, III 11.2 (2×), III 12.2; **confederation,** *confederazione,* I 58.4, I 59 T, I 59 (2×). *Cf* league

confess, *confessare,* I 16.3 (2×), I 22, II 1.1, II 2.3, III 1.4, III 6.5; **confession,** *confessione,* II 1.1, II 18.5, III 1.4

confident, confidently *confidente, confidentemente,* I 14.3, II 12.3, III 33 T, III 33.1 (6×), III 33.2, III 36.2, III 38 T, III 38.1, III 38.2 (2×); **confidence,** *confidenza, confidare,* I 14.3, I 15, I 24.1, I 29.3. *See also* trust

conform, *conformare,* I 2.7, I 49.1, I 52.3 (2×), III 22.4, III 22.5 (2×), III 34.3; **conformable,** *conformo,* I 9.2, III 9.3; **conformity,** *conformità, disformita, disformo,* I 59, III 9.2, III 39.2; **to not conform,** *disformare,* I 16.5, I 18.1, I 37.3, II 16 T, III 10.1

conjecture, *coniettura, conietturare,* I 12.1, I 18.4, I 28, I 31.2, I 52.3, I 55.2, I 58.4, II 1.1, III 6.4, III 6.5 (2×), III 16.3, III 18.1, III 43, III 48.2

conquer, conquered, *vincere,* vinto,* vinco* (L), I 9.4, I 15, I 15 (L), I 18.3, I 19.2, I 21.3, I 22, I 24.1, I 29.2 (2×), I 31.1, II 1.2, II 4.1, II 8.1 (3×), II 8.4, II 10.1 (6×), II 10.3, II 12.1 (3×), II 12.4 (3×), II 14 T, II 16.2, II 19.2, II 19.2 (L), II 20, II 22.1, II 22.2 (2×), II 23.2, II 23.2 (L) (2×), II 25.1, II 27 T, III 6.19, III 10.3 (2×), III 12.1, III 13.1 (3×), III 13.3 (2×), III 16.2, III 30.1 (3×), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3, III 33.1, III 36.2 (4×), III 37.1, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 38.1 (2×), III 44.3, III 48.1, III 48.2; **conqueror,** *vincitore,* II 19.2, III 31.2. For *vincere, see also* defeat

conscience, *conscienza,* I 27.1, I 55.2, III 6.16; **conscious,** *coscienza,* II 15.1; **consciousness,** *conscientia* (L), II 14

consent, *consentire, acconsentire, consentimento,* I 9.1, I 17.1, I 36, I 38.3, I 53, II 8.3, II 28.2, III 6.3, III 6.20, III 7, III 19.1, III 21.3, III 29, III 43

conspire, *congiurare,* I 16.4, I 16.5, I 33.1, II 1.1, II 4.1, II 13.2, II 26, III 6.1, III 6.2 (4×), III 6.3 (4×), III 6.4, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.15 (4×), III 6.16 (3×), III 6.20 (4×), III 11.2 (2×), III 49.1; **conspire,** *conspirare,* III 6.19 (2×); **conspiracy,** *congiura,* I 2.3, I 5.4, I 33.5, II 2.2, II 20, II 26, II 32.1 (2×), II 32.2, III 5, III 6 T, III 6.1, III 6.2 (5×), III 6.3 (5×), III 6.4, III 6.5 (3×), III 6.6 (4×), III 6.7, III 6.9 (2×), III 6.11, III 6.13, III 6.14, III 6.15, III 6.16 (5×), III 6.19 (5×), III 6.20 (10×), III 26.2, III 49.1. For *congiurare, cf* swear; for *conspirare, cf* plot; for *congiura, see also* league

constitute, *constituire,* I 2.3, I 4.2, I 5.1 (2×), I 9.2, I 11.1, I 49.3, I 55.6; **constitution,** *constituzione,* I 2.6 (2×), I 6.4, I 58.2. *See also* institute; place

consul, *Consolo, consul* (L), I 2.7 (3×), I 5.2, I 9.2, I 13.2 (8×), I 14.2 (5×), I 16.4, I 18.2, I 20, I 25, I 34.4 (3×), I 34.4 (L), I 35 (4×), I 36 (5×), I 37.2 (2×), I 39.2 (6×), I 40.2, I 40.3, I 40.4, I 40.4 (L), I 40.7, I 43, I 47.1, I 50 (4×), I 52.3, I 53.2, I 53.4, I 58.2, I 58.3, I 60, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 6.2 (2×), II 10.2, II 11.2 (2×), II 16.1 (2×), II 18.2, II 18.3, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 26, II 33 (6×), III 6.19, III 6.20 (2×), III 7, III 12.3, III 13.1, III 16.2, III 17 (2×), III 18.2 (3×), III 22.1, III 22.4 (3×), III 24, III 25 (2×), III 27.1, III 33.1 (4×), III 35.1, III 36.2, III 39.2 (5×), III 40.1, III 40.2, III 41 (2×), III 42 (2×), III 45 (2×), III 47 (3×), III 48.1; **consular,** *consolare, consularis* (L), I 13.1, I 14.1, I 39.2 (2×), I 40.5, I 47.1 (3×), I 48, II 2.4, II 24.3, II 28.1, III 1.2, III 15.1, III 15.1 (L), III 30.1; **consulate,** *consolato, consulatus* (L), I 5.4, I 18.3 (2×), I 35, I 37.2, I 47.1 (2×), I 60 T, I 60 (3×), II 16.1, III 16.2, III 24 (2×), III 25, III 34.4, III 38.1 (L)

contemplative, *contemplativo,* II 2.2

content, *contentare, contento,* I 1.4, I 2.3, I 5.2, I 8.3, I 13.1 (2×), I 16.3, I 16.5 (3×), I 22, I 39.2, I 43, I 47.1 (2×), I 55.3, II 19.2 (2×), II 21.2, III 4 (2×), III 6.1, III 6.4, III 6.10, III 25, III 30.1, III 42; **contentment,** *contentezza,* II 21.2, III 22.3; **discontent, discontented,** *male contento, mal contentezza,* I 37.1, 1 Pr.3, III 2, III 6.4 (3×), III 27.3

contention, *contenzione, contentio* (L), I 37.1, I 37.3, I 40.2, I 47.1 (L), III 12.1, III 24

contract (v.), *contrarre,* I 59, III 13.1

convenient, *conveniente,* I 9.4, I 16.5, I 50, III 35.1, III 49.4; **conveniently,** *commodamente,* I 23.2, III 48.1; **convenience,** *commodità,* II 17.3; **inconvenience,** *inconveniente,* I 6.3 (3×), I 6.4, I 12.2, I 16.4, I 18.3 (2×), I 18.4, I 23.2, I 33 T, I 33.2 (2×), I 40.5, I 45.3, I 46, I 50, II 26, II 30.3, III 6.12 (2×), III 6.14, III 10.1, III 10.3, III 11.1, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 24 (2×), III 27.3, III 28, III 29, III 37.1; **inconvenience,** *scommodo,* II 32.1. For *conveniente, see also* fitting; suitable; for *commodità* and *scommodo, see also* advantage; occasion

corrupt, *corrompere, corrotto, corrumpo* (L), I 1.5, I 2.1, I 2.2, I 6.2, I 8.3 (2×), I 10.3, I 10.5 (2×), I 10.6, I 11.3, I 16.2, I 16.6 (2×), I 17 T, I 17.1 (4×), I 17.2 (2×), I 17.3 (2×), I 18 T, I 18.1 (3×), I 18.2, I 18.3 (2×), I 18.5, I 29.3, I 30.1 (2×), I 33.2, I 35 (2×), I 37.1, I 40.4 (L), I 42 T, I 42, I 47.3, I 48, I 49.1, I 49.3, I 52.1, I 55 T, I 55.1, I 55.2, I 55.4, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 19.1 (2×), II 19.2, II 22.1, III 1.2, III 1.3 (3×), III 6.19, III 8.1 (3×), III 8.2 (4×), III 11.1 (2×), III 11.2, III 16.2, III 22.5, III 28, III 30.1, III 33.1, III 49.4; **corruption,** *(in)corruzione,* I 10.4, I 10.5, I 16.2 (2×), I 17.1 (3×), I 17.2 (2×), I 17.3 (2×), I 18.1 (2×), I 18.2, I 18.4, I 18.5, I 29.3, I 55.2, III 1.3, III 6.19, III 11.2, III 34.4; **corruption,** *corruttela,* I 55.3 (3×), I 55.4, III 27.3; **corruptible,** *corrottibile,* III 11.1; **noncorrupt,** *non corrotto,* I 34.2 (2×); **uncorrupt,** *incorrotto, incorruptus* (L), I 12.1 (2×), I 47.1 (L), I 55.3, I 58.2, III 17

council, *concilio, consiglio,* I 6.1, I 7.1, I 8.2, I 34.3, I 49 3 (2×), I 50 T, I 50 (4×), I 52.2, I 55.2, II 4.2, II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1 (2×), III 30.1. *See also* counsel

counsel (v.), *consigliare,* I 7.1, I 9.2, I 11.2 (2×), I 38.2 (2×), I 44.2, II 10.3, II 15.1, II 22.1, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.2, II 27.1, II 33 (5×), III 5, III 11.2, III 16.1 (3×), III 28, III 30.1, III 32, III 34.4 (2×), III 35 T, III 35.1, III 35.2 (6×), III 35.3, III 41; **counsel** (n.), *consiglio, consilium* (L), I 1.6 (2×), I 2.4, I 33.3, I 34.4, I 36, I 38.3, I 59, II 10.3, II 12.1 (2×), II 15.1 (L), II 23.2 (2×), II 26, II 33, III 6.18, III 6.20, III 9.3, III 15.2 (2×), III 18.3, III 28, III 34.4, III 35.1 (4×), III 35.2 (4×), III 35.3 (2×), III 40.2, III 41, III 48.2; **counselor,** *consigliere,* III 6.16; **counselors,** *consigliatori,* III 35.1. For *consiglio, see also* council

country, *paese,* I 1.3, I 1.4 (8×), I 1.5, I 23.2, I 38.1, I 55.3, II 2.3 (2×), II 2.4 (2×), II 4.1, II 6.1, II 7, II 8 T, II 8.2 (5×), II 8.4 (5×), II 10.1, II 12.3 (3×), II 12.4 (2×), II 16.2 (2×), II 17.3 (2×), II 18.2, II 18.3, II 19.1 (2×), II 20 (2×), II 22.2, II 24.4, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.15, III 10.1, III 10.2 (2×), III 10.4 (2×), III 33.2, III 35.1 (2×), III 37.4, III 39.1, III 39.2 (5×), III 43

cousins, *cugini,* I 27.1

covert, *coperto,** II 13.2. *Cf* conceal; hidden

cowardice, cowardly, *viltà, vile, invilire,* I 6.3, I 10.1, I 27.1, I 29.1, I 53.2 (3×), I 57, II 2.2, II 12.4, II 14 (2×), II 18.2 (2×), II 19.2, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 26, II 30.2, II 32.1, III 6.14 (2×), III 31.1, III 31.2, III 31.3 (4×), III 37.3, III 38.2, III 48.2. *See also* vile

crazy, *pazzo,* I 10.1, I 58.4, III 2; **craziness,** *pazzia,* I 58.4, II 25.1, III 2 T. *Cf* insane; mad

create, recreate, *creare, ricieare,* I 1.4, I 3 T, I 5.4, I 8.1, I 13.1 (2×), I 18.2, I 18.3, I 18.5 (2×), I 25 (2×), I 33.1, I 34.1, I 34.2, I 35 T, I 35 (2×), I 37.1, I 39.2 (3×), I 40.2 (2×), I 40.4, I 40.5 (4×), I 41 (2×), I 44.1 (2×), I 47.1 (3×), I 47.2, I 49.1 (4×), I 49.3, I 50 (3×), II 29.1 (2×), III 1.2 (2×), III 15.1, III 25 (2×), III 28, III 30.1, III 33.1, III 34.4 (3×); **creation,** *creazione,* I 2.7, I 3.2, I 4.1, I 4.2, I 7.1, I 13.1, I 17.1, I 33.5, I 34.4, I 35 T, I 35 (2×), I 37.1, I 40 T, I 40.1 (2×), I 40.2, I 40.3, I 40.7, I 47.1, I 49.1, I 49.2, III 15.1, III 34.4

credit, *credito,* I 52.1 (2×), III 1.4 (2×); **credit,** *fede,* I 12.1. For *fede, see also* faith; pledge; vouch; *cf* trust

credulity, *credulità,* I 12.1; **incredulous,** *incredulo,* I 12.1. *Cf* believe

criminal, *scelerato,* I 10.4 (2×), I 40.7, I 45.1, II 2.2, II 23.3, III 29; **criminal,** *criminalmente,* II 21.2; **criminality,** *sceleratezza,* III 32 (2×)

crucify, *crucifire,* I 31.1

cruel, cruelty, *crudele, crudeltade, crudelitas* (L), I 10.5 (2×), I 16.4, I 18.5, I 26, I 40.2, I 41 T, I 44.2 (L)(2×), I 47.2, I 58.4, II 2.1, II 8.1, II 23.2, III 5, III 6.20, III 19.1 (3×), III 20, III 21.1, III 21.4 (3×), III 22.3, III 28, III 32, III 41

crush, *opprimere,* I 1.4, I 6.4, I 7.1, I 7.2, I 27.1, I 30 T, I 30.1, I 34.4, I 38.1, I 39.2 (2×), I 40 T, I 52.2, I 52.3, I 58.2, II 2.1, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 6.1, II 9 (2×), II 20 (2×), II 24.2, II 25.1 (2×), II 25.2, III 2, III 3, III 6.3, III 6.5, III 6.13, III 6.19 (2×), III 6.20 (3×), III 8.1, III 8.2, III 10.2, III

12.2, III 17, III 28, III 31.1, III 31.3, III 35.1; **crushing,** *oppressione,* II 24.2, II 32.2. *See also* oppress

cult, *culto,* I 11.4, I 12.1. *Cf* hidden

custom, *costume,* I 10.4 (2×), I 12.2, I 18.1 (2×), I 31.2, I 36, I 37.2, I 40.3, I 42, I 49.1, I 55.3, I 58.3, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2, II 4.2, II 5.2, II 19.1, II 19.2 (3×), III 1.3, III 34.2, III 43 (2×), III 46 T; **custom,** *consuetudine,* I 3.2, I 36, I 37 T, I 43, 1 Pr.2, III 5, III 9.1, III 22.3, III 24; **customary,** *consueto,* I 23.4, I 34.3, II 9, III 22.3; **customary,** *usitato,* I 43; **customarily,** *solere,* II 24.2; **uncustomary,** *inusitato,* I 40.3. For *consueto, solere, usitato, see also* accustom

danger, *pericolo, periculo, periculum* (L), I 1.1, I 2.1 (2×), I 3.2, I 10.1, I 13.2 (2×), I 17.3, I 19.4, I 20, I 23 T, I 23.1, I 27.2, I 31.1, I 31.2, I 32 (3×), I 33.1 (2×), I 33.3, I 33.5, I 34.2, I 34.3, I 45.3, I 46 (2×), I 47.1, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 50, I 52.3, I 53.1, I 53.3, I 57 (2×), I 58.1 (L), I 59, I 60, II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.4 (4×), II 18.1, II 20 T, II 23.3, II 24.2, II 28.2 (2×), II 30.2, II 32.1, II 32.2, II 33, III 1.3 (2×), III 2 (2×), III 6.2 (8×), III 6.4 (4×), III 6.6 (2×), III 6.7, III 6.8, III 6.9 (3×), III 6.10, III 6.18 (2×), III 6.19 (7×), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 11.2 (2×), III 16.2, III 21.4, III 22.4, III 25, III 33.1 (2×), III 35 T (2×), III 35.1, III 35.2 (4×), III 35.3 (3×), III 36.2, III 37.4 (2×), III 39.2, III 47.1; **dangerous,** *pericoloso, periculoso,* 1 Pr.1, I 2.1, I 8.1, I 29.3, I 31.1, I 33.3 (2×), I 34.3, I 35, I 46, I 49.3, I 50, I 52.2 (2×), I 52.3, II 8.1 (3×), II 8.3, II 12.4, II 28 T, II 31 T, II 31.1, II 32.1 (2×), II 32.2, II 33, III 1.6, III 2, III 4, III 6.1 (3×), III 6.2 (2×), III 6.4 (2×), III 6.15, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 7 (2×), III 8.2, III 13.3, III 16.2 (2×), III 16.3, III 17 (2×), III 22.4, III 28 (3×), III 30.1, III 30.2, III 33.2, III 34.4, III 35.1, III 44.1, III 49.1

daughter, *figliuola,* I 11.1, II 6.2, II 28.2, III 4 (2×), III 6.17, III 6.19, III 28, III 34.3. *Cf* child; son

day,* *giornata,* II 17.1. *See also* battle

death, *morte, mors* (L), I 4.1, I 7.2, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 9.5, I 10.4 (2×), I 10.5, I 10.6 (2×), I 14.2, I 17.2, I 22, I 28, I 31.1, I 33.3, I 45.2, I 46, I 53.1 (2×), I 56, I 57, I 58.1 (3×), I 58.2, II 2.1 (2×), II 10.1 (2×), II 12.2 (2×), II 17.1, II 17.4 (2×), II 19.2, II 22.2, II 30.4, III 1.3 (4×), III 3 (3×), III 4 (2×), III 6.2 (L), III 6.2, III 6.4, III 6.15, III 6.18, III 6.20 (3×), III 7 (2×), III 8.1 (2×), III 13.1, III 13.3, III 15.1, III 18.1, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 22.6, III 30.1, III 45, III 49.1, III 49.2; **death,** *morire,* I 53.1. *See also* die; kill

deceive, deceived, *ingannare, ingannarsi, ingannato,* DL (2×), I 4.1, I 10.1, I 10.3, I 18.3, I 22, I 32, I 33.5, I 35, I 36, I 41, I 46, I 47 T (2×), I 47.1, I 47.2, I 47.3 (5×), I 48 (2×), I 53 T, I 53.1 (2×), I 58.3, 1 Pr.2 (3×), 1 Pr.3, II 1.2, II 10.1 (2×), II 13.1 (3×), II 14 T, II 17.5, II 20, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 23.4, II 25.1, II 25.2 (2×), II 27.1, III 3 (2×), III 4 (2×), III 6.4 (2×), III 6.8, III 8.2 (2×), III 10.1, III 12.2, III 22.1, III 34.4 (2×), III 43; **deception,** *inganno,* I 3.2, I 20, I 28, I 47.2 (2×), I 47.3 (2×), 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 4.1, II 13.1, II 13.2 (2×), II 18.3, II 22.1 (2×), II 23.4, II 28.2, III 6.7, III 6.19 (2×), III 14.3, III 48 T; **undeceived,** *sgannarsi,* I 50

decide, *deliberare, diliberare,* 1 Pr.1, I 9.2 (2×), I 15, I 16.5, I 18.3 (2×), I 21.1, I 31.1, I 33.1, I 34.2, I 34.3, I 38 T, I 38.1, I 38.4, I 40.3, I 40.4, I 51 (2×), I 53.5, I 59, II 2.1 (2×), II 4.2, II 15.1 (6×), II 15.2 (2×), II 16.1, II 22.1, II 23.4, II 26, II 27.2, II 28.2, II 33, III 6.10 (2×), III 6.13, III 6.17, III 10.1, III 10.2 (3×), III 13.3, III 18.1 (2×), III 18.3 (3×), III 20, III 34.3, III 44.1, III 44.2, III 44.3; **decision,** *deliberazione, diliberazione,* I 6.3, I 9.4, I 11.3, I 23.2, I 27.1, I 33.1, I 38.1 (2×), I 39.2, I 47.1, I 50, I 52.2, I 52.3, I 53.1, I 53.4 (2×), I 55.1 (3×), I 55.2, I 57, 1 Pr.3, II 4.2, II 8.1, II 15 T, II 15.1 (4×), II 22.1, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 33, III 6.2, III 10.1, III 11.1, III 18.1, III 24 (2×), III 32, III 35.1 (2×), III 41, III 44.1, III 44.3. *See also* deliberate

deed,* *opera,* I 5.2, I 24.1 (4×), I 24.2 (2×), I 33.2, I 53.5, II 11.2, III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 3, III 8.1, III 12.1 (2×), III 15.2, III 28, III 30 T, III 34.2 (3×). *See also* work; *cf* do

defeat (v.), **defeated,** *rompere,** *rotto,** I 31.2 (2×), I 47.2, I 53.2, I 53.3, I 53.5, I 59 (2×), II 4.1, II 10.1, II 12.3, II 12.4 (3×), II 15.2, II 16.2 (3×), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 27.1,

II 27.4, II 29.2, III 9.1, III 10.2, III 10.4 (2×), III 18.1 (2×), III 18.2 (2×), III 19.1, III 25, III 34.3, III 35.1, III 35.3, III 43, III 48.1; **defeat** (v.), *vincere,** 1 Pr.1, II 16.1, II 18.3, II 18.4, II 19.1, II 33, III 32; **defeat** (n.), *rotta,* I 11.1, I 15 (2×), I 47.2, I 53.2, II 1.1 (2×), II 2.3, II 6.2, II 10.3, II 12.4, II 13.2, II 30.4 (3×), II 32.2 (2×), III 17, III 31.2 (3×), III 31.3 (2×), III 37.4. For *vincere, see also* conquer

defend, *difendere,* I 1.1, I 1.4, I 2.3, I 5.2, I 6.2, I 7.1 (2×), I 7.3, I 10.4 (2×), I 10.5, I 12.2, I 29.2, I 29.3 (2×), I 34.4, I 37.2 (2×), I 37.3, I 38.1 (3×), I 38.2 (2×), I 39.2, I 40.6(2×), I 45.1, I 46 (2×), I 49.1, I 53.5, I 58.1 (2×), I 59, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1 (3×), II 2.2, II 2.4, II 4.2, II 8.2, II 9 (9×), II 10.1 (4×), II 11.1, II 11.2 (2×), II 12.1, II 12.4 (3×), II 13.2 (2×), II 17.1 (5×), II 17.2 (3×), II 17.3 (2×), II 17.4, II 17.5 (2×), II 18.3, II 19.1, II 20 (4×), II 22.1, II 24.1 (3×), II 24.2 (5×), II 24.4 (4×), II 29.1 (2×), II 29.2, II 30.2 (2×), II 32.1, III 6.8, III 8.1, III 11.1, III 12.1 (2×), III 12.2, III 12.3, III 15.1, III 16.2, III 16.3, III 20, III 28, III 30.1, III 30.2 (3×), III 31.1, III 32, III 34.2, III 34.3, III 35.2, III 37.3 (2×), III 37.4 (4×), III 41 T (2×), III 41 (3×), III 43; **defender,** *difensore,* I 23.1, I 45.1, II 10.1, II 14, II 32.1, III 8.1 (2×), III 12.2; **defense,** *difesa, difensione, defensivo, defensa* (L), I 1.1, I 1.3, I 6.4, I 7.2 (2×), I 15 (L), I 16.2, I 21.1, I 27.1, I 33.5, I 38.2, I 56, I 57, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 2.2 (2×), II 9 (2×), II 10.1, II 11.2 (2×), II 17.1, II 17.1, II 19.1, II 20 (2×), II 24.4, II 25.1, II 27.2, II 29.2, III 12.1 (2×), III 16.2, III 22.1, III 30 T, III 30.2, III 31.1, III 37.4; **undefended,** *indifeso,* III 37.3

degree,* *grado,* I 2.1 (2×), I 2.3 (2×), I 2.7, I 18.1. *See also* condition; favor; rank

deliberate, *diliberare,* I 6.1 III 6.7, III 41, III 44.1, III 44.3; **deliberation,** *diliberazione,* I 6.3, II 23.3. *See also* decide

delight, *dilettarsi, delizia, dilettazione, diletti,* 1 Pr.2, I 27.1, 1 Pr.3, II 19.2, II 20, III 2 (2×)

demonstrate, *dimostrare,* I 2.7, I 3.1, I 4.1, I 6.4, I 7.1, I 9.2, I 12.1, I 16.1, I 27.2, I 44.1, I 49.1, I 53.2, I 57, II 1.1, II 3 (2×), II 13.2, II 15.2, II 17.4, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 21.2, II 24.2, II 27.1 (2×), II 29.1 (2×), II 31.1, III 1.6, III 6.15, III 14.1, III 15.2 (3×), III 20, III 37.4; **demonstration,** *dimostrazione,* I 40.2, I 52.1

deserve, *meritare, mereor* (L), DL, I 2.6, I 4.2, I 8.1, I 9.2, I 9.5, I 10.1, I 10.4, I 10.6, I 34.3, I 47.1 (4×), 1 Pr.1 (2×), 1 Pr.3, II 19.2, II 23.2, II 23.4 (L), II 27.1, II 29.1, II 33 (3×), III 2, III 6.3, III 6.11, III 10.1, III 16.2 (2×), III 18.1, III 19.1 (2×), III 32, III 33.2, III 34.2, III 34.4, III 41, III 49.2, III 49.3, III 49.4; **deservedly,** *meritamente,* I 47.1; **undeservedly,** *immeritamente,* III 16.2. *See also* merit

desire (n.), *desiderio, desiderium* (L), 1 Pr.1, I 4.1, I 5.2 (2×), I 6.2, I 9.4, I 10.6, I 16.5 (2×), I 37.1 (2×), I 39.1, I 40.5 (3×), I 40.7 (2×), I 44.2, I 45.1, I 46, I 47.1, I 58.1 (L), I 58.2, II 3, II 10.1, II 15.1, II 32.2, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.3 (3×), III 7, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 22.3, III 48.1, III 48.2; **desire** (v.), **desired,** *desiderare, desiderato, desidero* (L), DL, I 5.2 (2×), I 5.4 (2×), I 6.1, I 6.2, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 9.4 (2×), I 10.6 (2×), I 16.5 (5×), I 25 (3×), I 37.1 (2×), I 37.2, I 40.4 (L), I 40.5, I 53 T, I 53.1, I 53.4, I 58.1 (2×), I 58.2 (3×), 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 9, II 14, II 19.2, II 22.1 (2×), II 23.2, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 2, III 6.1 (2×), III 6.2, III 6.10, III 8.2, III 12.1 (2×), III 12.2, III 16.3, III 20, III 21.2, III 21.3 (2×), III 22.1, III 44.1; **desired,** *desideroso,* I 37.2; **desirable,** *desiderabile,* II 2.3, III 22.4, III 25; **desirous,** *desideroso,* I 8.1, I 38.3, II 4.2, III 8.1, III 18.3, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 37.4

devices, *industrie,* II 1.2, II 32.1, III 6.19, III 27.4. *See also* industry

devotion, *divozione,* I 12.1, I 12.2, II 27.4

dictator, *Dittatore, dictator* (L), I 5.4 (3×), I 8.1 (4×), I 13.1, I 31.2, I 33.1, I 33.5, I 34.1 (4×), I 34.2, I 34.3, I 34 4 (2×), I 35 (4×), I 40.7, I 49.1, I 49.3, I 50 (2×), I 58.2, II 29.1, II 33, III 10.1 (L), III 14.3 (3×), III 15.1, III 25, III 28 (2×), III 30.1 (2×), III 33.1, III 47 (2×); **dictatorial,** *dittatorio,* I 34 T, I 34.1 (2×); **dictatorship,** *dittatura, dictatura* (L), I 5.4, I 30.2, I 34.2, III 25, III 31.1 (L)

die, dead, *morire, morto,* I 2.1, I 3.2, I 10.4 (2×), I 11.5 (2×), I 13.2, I 15, I 17.1 (4×), I 17.3, I 22.1, I 29.2 (2×), I 43, I 58.2, II 10.2, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.4 (4×), II 18.3 (2×), II 22.1, II 22.2 (2×), II 29.2, II 30.3, III 2, III 6.2, III 6.11 (2×), III 6.18 (2×), III 6.20 (2×), III 12.3, III 13.1 (2×), III 17, III 30.1 (2×), III 41.1, III 45.1. *See also* death; kill

dignity, *dignità, degnità, dignitas* (L), I 6.2, I 13.2, I 47.3, I 55.6, I 58.3, II 21.1, III 22.4 (L), III 31 T, III 31.4. *Cf* disdain; indignation; worthy

disciples, *discepoli,* III 6.16

discipline, *disciplina, disciplina* (L), II 16.2, II 19.2, II 29.1, III 22.3, III 36.2, III 38.1 (L)

discord, discordant, *discordare, discordia, discordo,* I 1.4, I 8.1, I 10.5, I 46, I 50 (2×), II 19.2, II 21.2, III 8.2

discourse (v.), *discorrere,* DL, I 1.1, I 1.6, I 2.2, I 2.7 (2×), I 4.1, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.1, I 6.4, I 7.5, I 12.2, I 14.1, I 16.2, I 16.6, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 31.1, I 33.5, I 35 (2×), I 37.3 (2×), I 40.1, I 47.3, I 56, I 58.3, II 1.3, II 4.2, II 6.1 (2×), II 8.1, II 10.3, II 13.2, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 20, II 21.1, II 22.1, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 25.1, II 26, II 29.2, II 31.2, II 32.2; **discourse** (n.), *discorso,* DL, 1 Pr.1, I 1.6, I 16.5, I 18.1, I 19.3, I 29.3, I 37.1, I 40.1, I 40.7 (2×), I 48, I 49.2, I 52.1, I 53.1, I 55.5, 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 1.1, II 17.6, II 20, II 23.4, II 25.1, II 30.5, II 31.1, III 1.6, III 3, III 6.4 (2×), III 6.11, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 9.3, III 9.4, III 10.1, III 11.1, III 11.2, III 12.1, III 12.2, III 16.3, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 22.6, III 27.3, III 28, III 33.1, III 34.4, III 35.1, III 37.1, III 37.4, III 38.1, III 40.1, III 40.2. For *discorrere, see also* discuss; review

discuss, *discorrere,* I 33.2, I 55.1; **discuss,** *ragionare,* I 13.2, II 4.2; **discussion,** *ragionamento,* III 6.5, III 6.16. For *discorrere, see also* discourse; review; for *ragionare, see also* reason; for *ragionamento, see also* argument; reason

disdain, *sdegno,* I 34.4, I 36 T. *See also* indignation; *cf* dignity; worthy

dispute (v.), *disputare,** I 5.4, I 11.2, I 29.1, I 40.1, I 40.3, I 46, I 58.4, I 60 (2×), II 1.3, II 12.1, II 16.3, II 17.1, II 17.5, II 24.2, II 27.1, III 6.18, III 16.1, III 27.2, III 42; **dispute** (n.), *disputa, disputazione,* I 22, I 37.2, I 40.2, I 53.1, II 15.1, II 15.2; **disputable,** *disputabile,* III 22.4

dissension, *dissensione,* I 5.2, I 6.4, I 7.5, III 21.4

divine, *divino,* I 11.4, I 12.1, II 29.1

diviner, *indovino,* I 12.1, I 56

do,* *operare,* 1 Pr.2, I 33.2, III 43.1. *See also* work; *cf* deed

doctor, *dottore,* III 1.2. *Cf* physician

dominate, *dominare, dominor* (L), I 5.2 (2×), I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2×), II 4.2, III 6.3 (2×), III 12.1

dominion, *dominio,* I 6.3, I 6.4, I 12.2, II 1.2, II 2.1 (2×), II 4.1, II 4.2 (2×), II 18.3, II 19.2, II 21.2, II 27.3 (2×), III 18.3, III 44.3 (3×)

doubt (v.), *dubitare, dubito* (L), I 5.1, I 11.2, I 22, I 57, II 5.2, II 14.1 (L), III 7; **doubt** (n.), *dubbio,* I 38.4 (2×), II 32.2, III 16.3; **doubt,** *dubitazione,* III 22.4; **doubtful,** *dubbio,* I 5.2, II 10.2, II 15.1, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.15, III 17, III 44.2; **without doubt,** *sanza* or *senza dubbio,* DL, I 1.4, I 5.2, I 6.4, I 7.1, I 10.6, I 11.3, I 12.1, I 19.2, I 30.1, I 45.3, I 58.3, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 12.4, II 15.1, II 19.2, II 21.2 (4×), II 24.3, III 1.5, III 4, III 8.2, III 11.2, III 27.2. For *dubitare, see also* fear; hesitate; suspect

duty,* *ufficio, offizio,* I 14.2, I 40.6, 1 Pr.3. *See also* office

earth, *terra,* II 12.2 (3×), II 32.1 (4×), III 2.1, III 12.3, III 25.1. *See also* ground; land; town

education, *educazione,* I 4.1 (2×), I 11.1, II 2.2 (2×), III 27.2, III 30.1, III 31.3, III 43.1, III 46.1

effect, *effetto,* I 3.2, I 4.1, I 4.2, I 5.2, I 6.1 (2×), I 7.1 (2×), I 9.2 (2×), I 14.2, I 19.4, I 20 T, I 35, I 37.1, I 43, I 58.2, I 58.3, I 60 (2×), II 4.2, II 5.2, II 17.4, II 17.5, II 24.2, II 24.3, III 1.2, III 1.3 (2×), III 1.5, III 1.6 (2×), III 2.1, III 5.1, III 6.11, III 6.15, III 13.1, III 14 T, III 14.1, III 18.3,

III 21 T, III 21.1 (2×), III 21.4, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.4 (2×), III 22.5, III 25.1 (2×), III 28.1, III 37.1, III 37.3, III 43.1, III 49.3

effeminate, *effeminato,* I 6.4, I 19.1, I 19.3, I 21.3, II 2.2, III 10.1, III 46.1

efficacious, *efficacio,* II 29.1, III 6.11, III 14.3; **efficacy,** *efficacia,* III 38.1

elect, *eleggere,* I 20, I 34.4 (2×), II 8.1, II 29.2; **election,** *elezione,* I 13.1, I 35, III 25.1, III 34.4. *See also* choose; levy

elephants, *elefanti,* II 17.5 (2×), II 18.4, III 14.3 (2×)

eliminate, *spegnere,* I 1.4 (2×), I 2.3 (3×), I 7.3 (2×), I 10.5, I 16.6, I 17.1 (3×), I 30.1, I 33.3, I 33.5, I 37.3, I 39.2, I 40.4, I 40.5 (3×), I 40.7 (2×), I 43, I 46, I 47.1, I 52.3, I 55.5, 1 Pr.1, II 1.1 (2×), II 1.2, II 2.2, II 4.2 (2×), II 5 T, II 5.1 (5×), II 5.2 (2×), II 8.1 (2×), II 19.2, II 23.2, II 23.3, II 23.4 (2×), II 24.1, III 1.3, III 1.4 (2×), III 3.1, III 24.1, III 29.1, III 30 T, III 30.1 (4×), III 33.1

emperor, *imperadore,* I 10.4 (4×), I 10.5, I 29.2, I 30.1, I 58.2, II 11.1, II 19.2 (5×), II 22.1, II 30.2 (2×), III 6.3, III 6.8, III 6.10, III 6.11 (2×), III 31.3, III 43.1 (2×). *See also* command

empire, *imperio,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.3 (2×), I 1.5, I 2.7, I 4.1, I 5.3, I 6.3 (2×), I 9.4, I 10.3, I 10.4 (3×), I 11.1, I 12.2, I 13.1, I 17.3, I 21.3, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 33.1 (2×), I 34.3, I 39.2 (2×), I 49.2, I 50, 1 Pr.2 (3×), 1 Pr.3, II 1 T, II 1.1 (2×), II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2.2 (3×), II 3 (3×), II 4.1 (5×), II 4.2 (2×), II 8.1 (3×), II 8.2, II 8.4, II 9, II 12.1, II 13.1 (3×), II 19.1, II 19.2 (5×), II 21.1, II 30.2 (2×), II 30.3 (2×), III 6.1, III 6.3, III 6.10, III 6.11. *See also* command; rule; *cf* imperial

enroll,* *scrivere,* III 30.1 (2×), III 30.2 (4×). *See also* write

enterprise, *impresa,* 1 Pr.2, I 11.1, I 11.4, I 13 T, I 13.1 (3×), I 14.1, I 18.5, I 23.4, I 27.2, I 43, I 53.5 (3×), II 13, II 4.1, II 9, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 22.1 (2×), II 25.1, II 31.1, II 31.2 (2×), II 32.1 (2×), III 6.1, III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.16, III 6.17, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 8.2 (4×), III 9.3, III 16.1 (2×), III 35.1, III 35.2, III 37.3. *See also* campaign

envy, envious, *invidia, invidiare, invido,* 1 Pr.1, I 8.1, I 24.2, I 40.4, I 52.2, I 53.3, 1 Pr.1 (2×), II 13.2 (2×), II 14, II 19.2, II 22.1, III 1.2, III 5.1, III 6.19, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 30 T, III 30.1 (10×)

ephors, *efori,* I 9.4 (2×), I 18.5

episcopal, *episcopale,* I 54. *Cf* bishop

epoch, *secolo,* 1 Pr.3. *See also* century

equal, equally, *equale, equalmente, agguagliare, aequus* (L), *aequalis* (L), I 6.1, I 6.2, I 17.3, I 40.4, I 58.2, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 12.1, II 13.2 (L), II 23.2, II 32.1 (2×), III 16.1 (2×), III 19.1, III 22.4 (L), III 23.1; **equality,** *equalità,* I 2.3, I 6.2 (2×), I 55 T, I 55.3, I 55.4, I 55.5 (2×), I 55.6, II 4.1, III 3.1; **inequality,** *inequalità,* I 17.3, I 55.6

err (v.), *errare,* I 24.2, I 29.3, I 36, I 42, I 58.2 (2×), I 58.3 (2×), 1 Pr.2, II 11.2, II 19.1, II 23.3 (2×), II 27.1, II 29.1, II 31.2, III 9.1 (2×), III 18.1, III 34.4, III 49.1 (2×), III 49.2 (3×); **error** (n.), *errore,* DL (3×), 1 Pr.2, I 28 (2×), I 29.1, I 29.3 (2×), I 31 T, I 31.1, I 31.2 (2×), I 33.1, I 33.2 (2×), I 33.3, I 36 (2×), I 39.2 (2×), I 40.1 (2×), I 40.3, I 40.4, I 40.5 (2×), I 40.7 (3×), I 49.1, I 52.2 (2×), I 53.2, I 58.2 (2×), I 58.4 (2×), I 59, II 1.2 (2×), II 11.1 (2×), II 18.3, II 18.5, II 19.2 (2×), II 27.4 (2×), II 31.2, II 32.1, II 33, III 1.4, III 5.1, III 6.8, III 6.12, III 6.13, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.18, III 10.1 (3×), III 16.2, III 18.1 (5×), III 18.2, III 21.3, III 27.2, III 29.1, III 32.1, III 33.1, III 34.4, III 35.3, III 48 T, III 48.1

eternal, *eterno,* I 27.2, I 29.1, II 5.1. *Cf.* sempiternal

evil, *male,** 1 Pr.2, I 2.3 (2×), I 8.3, I 9.2, I 10.3, I 18.4, I 26, I 29.3, I 33.2, I 33.5 (3×), I 37.1, I 37.3 (2×), I 44.2, I 45.3, I 46, I 58.4 (2×), II 2.1, II 12.2, II 15.2, II 20, II 24.1, II 24.3, II 28.1, II 29.1, III 1.3, III 1.4 (3×), III 3.1 (3×), III 6.14, III 11.1, III 37.1, III 37.3. *See also* bad; ill; *cf* malevolent

exalt, *esaltare,* I 10.5, III 21.3, III 31.1; **exaltation,** *esaltazione,* I 37.1, II 2.2, II 19 T, III 21.4

example, *esemplo, essemplum, exemplum* (L), *passim*
excellent, *eccellente,* I 1.4, I 19 T, I 19.2 (2×), I 20, I 21.1, I 28, I 34.3, 1 Pr.2, II 5.1, II 18.2 (2×), II 19.2, II 22.1 (2×), II 24.4, II 31.2, III 22.1, III 30.1, III 31 T, III 31.1
excess, excessive, *excesso, eccessivo,** I 19.4, I 40.7, I 55.4 (2×), II 2.1, II 4.1, III 1.3, III 19.1, III 21.3, III 22.3, III 26.2
excuse (n.), *scusa,* I 9.2, I 9.5, I 10.6 (2×), I 29.1 (2×), I 29.3, I 41, I 52.2, II 19.1, II 19.2, III 2.1, III 6.18 (2×), III 44.3; **excuse** (v.), *scusare* I 9.2 (2×), I 45.2 (2×), II 16.3
execute, *esequire,* I 33.1, I 49.3, II 2.1, II 15.1, III 1.3, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.7 (3×), III 6.11, III 6.12 (3×), III 6.14, III 6.19 (3×), III 6.20, III 30.1; **execution,** *esecuzione,* I 7.2, I 49.3, III 13 (5×), III 1.5, III 3.1, III 6.2 (3×), III 6.3 (3×), III 6.5, III 6.6, III 6.7 (2×), III 6.8, III 6.12, III 6.13, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.15, III 6.16 (2×), III 6.18 (2×), III 6.19 (2×), III 6.20, III 27.2, III 32.1, III 49.1, III 49.2
expand, *ampliare,* I 1.4, I 6.4 (5×), I 10.1, I 16.2, I 33.5, II 2.1 (2×), II 3, II 4 T, II 4.1 (3×), II 4.2 (2×), II 6.1, II 19.1 (2×), II 19.2 (3×), II 21.1; **expansion,** *ampliare,* I 6.3, I 6.4, II 23.2; **expansive,** *amplo,* I 49.2, 1 Pr.1
experience, *esperienza, isperienza,* 1 Pr.1, I 3.1, I 6.4, I 12.2 (2×), I 23.4, I 34.2, I 38.3, I 46, I 53.2, I 55.6, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 17.5, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 27.4, II 30.4, III 6.8, III 6.15, III 6.20, III 10.2, III 25.1, III 34.4, III 37.2; **experienced,** *isperimentato,* III 6.15. *See also* experiment
experiment, *esperienza, isperienza,* 1 Pr.2, III 6.4 (3×), III 31.4. *See also* experience
external,* *esterno, externis* (L), I 2.1, I 7.5, I 10.5, I 15 (L), II 4.1, II 24.4, III 6.19, III 26.2. *See also* foreign
extinguish, *estinguere,* I 17.1, I 33.2, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 25.1, III 3
extraordinary, *straordinario, istraordinario,* I 4.1, I 5.4 (3×), I 7.1 (2×), I 7.3 (2×), I 7.5, I 9.2, I 11.3, I 11.5, I 16.4, I 17.3, I 18.4, I 29.3, I 33.2, I 34.1, I 34.2, I 34.3 (3×), I 37.3 (2×), I 56, I 59, II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.4, II 29.1, III 3.1, III 5.1, III 6.8, III 6.16, III 8.1, III 21.4, III 22.3 (2×), III 34.1, III 34.2 (2×), III 35 T, III 38.1, III 49.1; **extraordinarily,** *straordinariamente, straordinario,* I 7.3, I 16.4, I 31 T, III 19.1, III 34.2
extreme (adj.),* *estremo,** I 15 T, I 16.5, I 17.3, 1 Pr.2, II 2.2, II 18.3, II 23.2, II 31.1, III 17.1; **extreme** (n.),* *termine,** II 18.1, II 23.2 (3×), III 27.2, III 38.1; **extremities,** *estremità,* II 30.3, II 30.4. For *termine, cf* middle
extrinsic, *estrinseco,* I 31.1, I 33.2 (2×), II 32.2, III 1.2 (2×), III 1.6. *See also* foreign

faction, *fazione,* I 7.1, I 37.2, I 54. *See also* struggle

faith, *fede, fides* (L), I 4.1, I 11.5, I 38.3 (2×), I 53.1 (2×), I 59 (10×), II 5.1, II 9, II 10.1, II 19.1 (2×), II 23.4 (L), II 24.3, II 31.1 (3×), III 6.3, III 6.4 (5×), III 6.9, III 6.18, III 16.1, III 21.4 (2×), III 40.1, III 43 (3×), III 48.1; **faithful,** *fedele, infede, fidelis* (L), *fidus* (L), I 43 T, I 43, II 10.1 (2×), II 17.2, II 23.4 (L)(2×), II 24.1, III 6.4, III 21.4, III 48.2; **faithlessness,** *infidelità, infideltà,* II 4.2, II 9, II 32.1, III 21.1, III 43. For *fede, see also* credit; pledge; vouch; *cf* trust

fame, *fama,* I 10.1, I 19.1, I 27.1, I 52.2, 1 Pr.1, II 11.1, III 20 (3×), III 34 T, III 34.2 (2×), III 34.3, III 34.4, III 37.2. *See also* rumor; *cf* infamy

family, *famiglia,* I 15, II 8.1, II 8.2, III 46 T, III 46 (3×)

fancy, *fantasia,* III 6.12. *Cf* image

fate, *sorte,* I 16.1, I 53.1, I 54, I 59 (2×), II 2.1, II 13.2, II 16.1, II 18.3, III 3, III 6.1, III 16.3, III 31.1, III 31.2, III 31.3. *See also* lot; luck; sort

father, *padre,* I 3.1, I 11.1 (3×), I 19.2 (4×), I 22, I 26, I 31.2, I 40.4, II 24.2, II 28.2, III 1.6, III 2, III 3, III 4, III 6.2, III 10.2, III 22.1 (2×), III 26.1, III 34.1 (2×), III 34.2 (3×), III 34.3 (2×), III 37.4, III 40.2, III 45; **Fathers** (of the Roman Senate), *Padri,* I 8.1, I 49.1, III 5, III 8.1. *Cf* parricide; patrimony

fatherland, *patria, patria* (L), 1 Pr.2, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.1, I 10.2 (2×), I 11.1 (3×), I 16.4, I 16.5, I 23.1, I 31.2, I 57, I 58.3, I 59, I 60, II 2.1 (2×), II 2.2, II 6.1, II 8.3, II 19.2 (L), II 20, II 24.2, II 24.3 (2×), II 27.4 (4×), II 29.2, II 31.1 (4×), III 2, III 3 (3×), III 5, III 6.1, III 6.2 (3×), III 6.7, III 6.16 (3×), III 6.19 (5×), III 8.1 (3×), III 9.3 (2×), III 11.2, III 13.3, III 22.1, III 22.6 (2×), III 23 (2×), III 24, III 30.1 (3×), III 41 T, III 41 (4×), III 46, III 47 T, III 47, III 48.2. *Cf* ancestral

fault, *colpa, incolpare,* I 8.3, I 14.2, I 21.1, I 22, I 52.8, III 6.14, III 42; **fault,** *fallo,* I 22, I 24.1

favor (n.), *favore,* I 2.7, I 4.1, I 12.1, I 13.2, I 14.2, I 18.3, I 29.3, I 33.2 (2×), I 33.3, I 33.4, I 35, I 37.3, I 40.3, I 40.5 (2×), I 40.6, I 41, I 49.3, I 52.2 (2×), I 52.3 (2×), I 55.5, II 1.2, II 14, II 15.1, II 22.1, II 25.1 (3×), II 27.3, III 6.20, III 8.1 (4×), III 8.2 (2×), III 14.1, III 14.3, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 26.1 (2×), III 28 (2×), III 34.4 (2×); **favor** (n.), *grade,* I 51 (3×), III 22.3, III 28; **favor** (n), *grazia,* I 18.3 (2×), III 6.19, III 16 T, III 16.2; **favors** (n.), *piaceri,* III 6.3; **favor** (v.), *favorire,* I 8.3, I 12.1 (2×), I 16.5, I 33.2, I 33.4, I 37.2, I 40.5 (2×), I 52.1, I 52.2 (2×), II 1.1, II 10.2, II 15.2, II 25.1, III 6.10, III 8.1 (2×), III 21.1, III 28, III 34 T; **favorable,** *favorevole,* I 2.7, III 2, III 42; **favorite,** *favorito,* III 6.10; **unfavorable,** *disfavore,* I 4.1, I 36, I 40.1 (2×); **disfavor,** *mal grado,* I 53.3. For *grado, see also* condition; degree; rank; for *grazia, see also* grace; grateful; for *piaceri, see also* pleasure

fear (v.), *avere paura,* I 3.2, I 46 (2×), I 58.4, II 1.2, II 24.1, III 12.2 (2×), III 49.2; **fear** (v.), *dubitare,* I 30.2, I 32, I 48, 1 Pr.3, II 2.3, II 10.1, II 25.1, II 33, III 6.8, III 36.2, III 47; **fear** (v.), *temere, timeo* (L), I 1.4, I 2.3 (2×), I 5.4, I 6.2 (2×), I 6.4, I 11.1, I 13.2 (2×), I 16.3, I 24.1, I 29.3 (2×), I 33.4, I 36, I 37.1, I 40.4 (L), I 46 (2×), I 55.1, I 58.4 (4×), II 10.2, II 12 T, II 21.2, III 1.4, III 5, III 6.3, III 6.11 (2×), III 6.18, III 12.1 (2×), III 13.2, III 16.2, III 19.1, III 21.2 (2×), III 21.3 (2×), III 21.4, III 30.1, III 32, III 33.1, III 48.2; **fear** (n.), *paura,* I 3.2 (3×), I 5.4, I 6.4, I 7.1, I 7.2 (2×), I 7.3, I 7.4, I 8.2, I 12.2, I 15 (2×), I 18.3 (3×), I 29.3, I 33.2, I 33.3, I 33.4 (2×), I 40.4 (2×), I 47.2, I 58.4 (2×), II 14 (2×), II 24.1, II 25.1, II 32.1, III 1.3 (2×), III 6.4, III 21.4, III 25, III 32, III 33.1, III 37.3, III 37.4; **fear** (n.), *tema,* II 31.2; **fear** (n.), *timore,* I 2.3, I 8.2, I 10.4, I 11.1 (2×), I 11.4 (2×), I 13.2, I 15, I 52.2, I 59 (2×), 1 Pr.1, II 13.2, II 19.2, II 24.3, III 6.6, III 21.2, III 22.6; **fearful,** *pauroso, impaurito,* I 15, I 45.3, III 11.1; **fearfully,** *trepidamente,* III 44.3. For *dubitare, see also* doubt; hesitate; suspect; for *paura* and *temere, see also* afraid

ferocious, *feroce, ferox* (L), I 11.1, I 16.1, I 46, I 57 (L), II 2.2 (2×), III 12.2, III 13.1, III 20, III 36.1 (2×), III 37.4, III 38.1 (L); **ferocity,** *ferocità* I 15, I 19.1, I 19.3, II 2.2, III 36.1, III 37.4, III 43

fever, *febbre,* I 39.2

fight (v.), *azzuffarsi, venire alla zuffa,* I 14.2, I 14.3 (2×), I 53.2 (2×), I 56, II 10.1, II 10.2 (4×), II 17.3 (2×), II 18.1, II 22.2, III 10.2 (2×), III 10.4, III 37.4, III 45; **fight** (n.), *zuffa,* I 14.1, I 14.2 (3×), I 14.3, I 15 (2×), I 31.2, I 53.2, II 10.1, II 16.1 (6×), II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.5 (3×), II 18.1 (2×), II 18.3, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 22.2 (2×), II 25.1, II 26, II 27.4, II 28.1, II 32.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.4, III 12.3, III 14 T, III 14.1 (2×), III 14.3 (3×), III 18.1, III 18.2, III 22.1 (2×), III 22.6, III 32, III 33.2, III 36 T, III 36.1 (2×), III 37.1 (2×), III 37.2, III 37.3 (2×), III 37.4 (3×), III 38.1, III 38.2, III 47. *See also* battle

fitting, *conveniente,* I 55.2, III 6.8. *See also* convenient; suitable

force (v.), *forzare, forzamente,* DL, I 11.1, I 14 T, I 16.3, I 32, I 38.2, I 38.3, 1 Pr.1 (2×), II 5.1, II 8.4, II 9, II 17.3, II 24.1, II 32.2, III 6.5, III 6.20, III 20 T, III 20, III 21.2, III 40 (2×); **force** (v.), *sforzare,* I 40.5 (2×), I 50, I 55.5 (2×), II 16.1 (2×), II 18.3, III 9.1, III 16.3, III 22.2 (2×), III 30.1; **force** (n.), *forza,* I 2.4, I 6.4, I 7.2 (3×), I 7.5 (3×), I 13.1, I 17.3, I 19.4, I 22, I 23 T, I 23.1 (2×), I 23.2 (3×), I 29.3, I 34.1 (2×), I 34.4, I 38.2 (2×), I 38.3, I 38.4, I 40.4, I 40.6 (3×), I 55.3, I 55.5, I 58.1, I 58.2, I 59, 1 Pr.3, II 1.1 (2×), II 1.2, II 2.3, II 3 (2×), II 4.1, II 6.1, II 9, II 10.1 (3×), II 10.3, II 11 T, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 12.1 (2×), II 12.2, II 12.3 (3×), II 12.4 (4×), II 13 T, II 13.1 (4×), II 13.2, II 14 (3×), II 15.1, II 15.2, II 16.1 (2×), II 17.1, II 18.1, II 19.2 (5×), II 21.2 (2×), II 22.1 (2×), II 22.2, II 23.2, II 23.3 (2×), II 23.4, II 24.1 (2×), II 24.2, II 24.3, II 25.1, II 26, II 27.2, II 28.2 (2×), II 32.1 (2×), II 32.2, III 1.6, III 2 (2×), III 6.9, III 6.14, III 6.19 (5×), III 6.20 (2×), III 10.3, III 16.3, III 18.3, III 22.6, III 27.1, III 27.4, III 33.1, III 37.1 (2×), III 37.3, III 37.4, III 40.1, III 42 T, III 42 (3×), III 43 (2×), III 44.2; **force** (n.), *sforzo,* III 45; **forcibly,** *forzato,* II 15.2, II 32.2. *See also* strength

foreign, *estrinseco,* I 15; **foreign,** *forestiero,* I 1.3, I 7.2, I 40.6, I 53.2, III 6.19, III 21.2; **foreign,** *peregrino,* II 19.2 (2×); **foreigner,** *esterno,* I 14.3; **foreigner,** *forestiero,* I 1.1, I 1.5, I 6.2, I 6.3, I 23.4, I 49.3 (2×), II 2.4, II 3 T, II 3 (2×), II 18.3, III 49.4. *See also* external; extrinsic

form (n.), *forma,* I 1.5, I 6.1, I 11.3, I 15, I 17.3, I 18.4, I 45.1, II 16.1 (2×), III 8.1, III 8.2 (2×), III 43; **form** (v.), *formare,** I 9.3, I 58.3

former,* *antico, anticamente,* I 12.2, I 17.1, I 40.4, I 43, I 45.1, I 55.2, II 16.2, II 23.3. *See also* ancestors; ancient

fortress, *fortezza,* I 29.2, I 30.1, II 17.1 (3×), II 17.3 (2×), II 17.5, II 24 T, II 24.1 (7×), II 24.2 (27×), II 24.3 (14×), II 24.4 (9×), III 6.18, III 10.2, III 27.2, III 27.3, III 37.4, III 43, III 44.3. *See also* strength

fortune, *fortuna, fortuna* (L), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 2.7 (2×), I 4.1 (3×), I 8.3, I 10.2, I 10.3, I 10.4, I 11.4 (2×), I 19.1, I 19.2, I 19.4, I 20, I 22, I 23 T, I 23.1 (3×), I 23.2, I 24.2, I 29.1 (2×), I 37.1, I 37.2, I 38.1, I 53.5, I 55.4, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3 (3×), II 1 T, II 1.1 (5×), II 1.2 (3×), II 1.3 (2×), II 10.1, II 10.2 (3×), II 10.3, II 12.3 (2×), II 13 T, II 13.1 (3×), II 16.2 (2×), II 22.2, II 23.2, II 24.3, II 27.4, II 29 T, II 29.1 (L), II 29.2 (2×), II 29.3 (2×), II 30.1, II 30.5, III 2, III 3, III 6.14, III 6.19, III 9 T, III 9.1 (5×), III 9.2, III 9.3, III 10.1, III 10.1 (L), III 10.2 (2×), III 10.2 (L), III 18.2, III 21.1, III 30.1 (3×), III 31 T, III 31.1 (4×), III 31.2, III 31.3 (3×), III 31.4 (2×), III 33.1, III 33.1 (L), III 37.1 (2×), III 38.1, III 41, III 42; **misfortune,** *infortunio,* I 10.5, I 55.4; **captains of fortune,** *capitani di ventura,* II 18.3; **fortuitous,** *fortuito,* II 32.1 (2×). For *ventura, see also* luck; for *fortuito, see also* haphazard

found (v.), *fondare,* 1 Pr.2, I 2.7, I 6.4, I 10.1, I 12.1 (2×), I 40.2, I 40.5, I 53.5, I 55.6 (2×), II 2.2, II 10.1, II 17.5 (2×), II 18.1, II 19.1, II 24.2 (2×), II 24.3, II 25.1, II 27.4, II 31.1, II 32.2, III 12.2, III 34.2 (2×), III 34.4 (3×); **founder,** *fondatore,* I 9.1, I 9.3, I 10 T, II 3

foundation, *fondamento,* I 6.4 (2×), I 12.1 (3×), I 14.1, I 23.4 (2×), I 26, II 18.2, II 30.4, III 31.4

fraud, *fraude,* I 55.2, II 13 T, II 13.1 (5×), II 13.2, II 24.2, II 32.1, III 6.7, III 40 T, III 40.1 (4×), III 40.2 (2×), III 48.1 (2×), III 48.2; **fraudulent,** *fraudolento,* II 32.1, III 43; **defraud, fraudare,** I

55.1

free (adj.), *libero, liber* (L), I 1.3 (2×), I 1.4, I 1.5, I 2.7 (3×), I 3.1, I 4 T, I 4.1 (2×), I 5.1, I 5.2, I 6.1 (2×), I 7.1, I 7.2, I 8.2, I 9.2 (2×), I 10.3, I 16 T, I 16.1, I 16.2, I 16.3 (3×), I 16.4, I 16.5 (2×), I 17 T, I 17.1 (4×), I 17.2, I 17.3, I 18 T, I 18.1, I 18.4, I 20, I 23.1, I 24.1, I 25 T, I 25 (2×), I 28, I 29.3 (5×), I 31.1, I 33.2, I 34 T, I 34.2, I 35 T, I 35 (2×), I 36, I 37.2, I 37.3, I 40.1, I 40.5, I 43, I 47.1, I 49 T, I 49.1 (3×), I 49.2 (3×), I 49.3, I 55.2, II 2.1 (8×), II 2.3 (3×), II 2.4 (2×), II 12.1, II 12.4, II 19.2, II 23.4, II 23.4 (L), II 33 T, III 1.2, III 3 (2×), III 6.5, III 6.6, III 7, III 8.1 (L), III 8.2 (2×), III 12.1 (3×), III 23, III 24, III 25 (2×), III 42, III 44.1, III 48.2 (2×), III 49 T; **free towns,** *terre franche,* II 19.2; **freely,** *liberamente,* I 10.3, I 16.3, I 53.1, I 58.4, II 9, III 40.2; **free** (v.), *liberare,* I 16.5, I 21.3, I 28, I 40.4, I 46, I 55.1, I 58.3, II 2.1 (2×), II 22.1, II 24.4, III 2, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.16 (2×), III 25, III 30.1, III 33.1; **freed,** *libero,* I 8.1, I 22, II 20. *See also* life; life, way of; live; *cf* liberators

freedom, *libertà, libertade, libertas* (L), I 2.6, I 2.7, I 4.1 (3×), I 4.2, I 5 T, I 5.1, I 5.2 (3×), I 6.4, I 7 T, I 7.1, I 13.2, I 15, I 16 T, I 16.1, I 16.4 (3×), I 16.5 (5×), I 16.6, I 17 T, I 17.1 (4×), I 17.2, I 18.3 (2×), I 23.1, I 28 (4×), I 31.2, I 35 T, I 35, I 37.2, I 37.3, I 40.1, I 40.2, I 40.4, I 40.4 (L), I 40.5, I 40.7 (2×), I 46 (3×), I 47.1, I 47.3, I 49.1, I 49.3, I 52.2 (2×), I 55.4, I 57, I 58.4, II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1 (8×), II 2.2 (3×), II 12.2, II 19.1, II 21.2 (2×), II 22.1, II 23.4 (L)(2×), II 24.3, III 1.6, III 2, III 3 T, III 3, III 5 (2×), III 6.13, III 7 T (2×), III 8.1, III 8.2, III 11.1, III 12.2, III 17, III 22.4, III 22.4 (L), III 28, III 41 (2×); **freedom,** *libero,* I 52.3

fright, frightful, *spavento,* I 15, I 45.3, II 8.1, II 17.5, III 37.4; **frightful,** *formidolo,* II 8.2; **frighten,** *spaventare,* I 4.1, III 6.14 (2×), III 25; **frightening,** *spaventevole,* III 49.2

future, *avvenire,** II 25.2, III 2, III 32; **future,** *futuro,* I 12.1 (2×), I 39.1, I 40.3, I 56, I 58.4, 1 Pr.3, III 43. *See also* coming

general, *generale,* I 9.2, I 47.1, III 39.1; **generally,** *generalmente,* I 47.1, I 47.2, I 47.3, II 24 T, III 1.1; **generality,** *generale,* I 47 T, I 47.3, I 48

generate, *generare,* I 5.4, I 7.2, I 10.4, I 30.2 (2×), I 45.3, II 13.2, II 26 T, II 26.1, III 6.20, III 22.6, III 46; **generation,** *generazione,* I 2.3 (2×), III 8.2 (2×). *See also* kind; race

generous, *generoso,* I 27.1, II 23.4 (2×), III 27.2; **generosity,** *generosità,* I 2.3, I 38.1, II 23.4, II 28.1, II 30.2, III 25

Gentile, *Gentile,* I 12.1, I 14.1, II 2.2, II 5.1 (3×). *Cf* Christian

gentleman, *gentiluomo,* I 6.1 (3×), I 55.3 (2×), I 55.4 (3×), I 55.5 (2×), I 55.6 (6×), III 22.6

glory, *gloria, gloria* (L), I 1.3, I 1.5, I 8.1 (2×), I 10.1 (2×), I 10.3, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 10.6 (2×), I 19.2, I 24.2, I 29.1 (2×), I 30.1 (3×), I 30.2, I 36, I 43 T, I 43.1, I 52.3, I 58.3 (4×), 1 Pr.1 (3×), II 1.1, II 2.2, II 4.2 (2×), II 9.1, II 22.1, II 23.2 (L), II 27.2, II 33.1 (2×), III 8.1, III 10.3 (2×), III 12.1, III 13.3, III 17, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 34.3, III 34.4, III 35.2 (3×), III 40.1, III 41 T, III 41, III 42, III 45; **glorify,** *gloriare,* II 2.2, II 8.4; **glorious,** *glorioso,* I 10.6, I 36, I 60, 1 Pr.1, II 24.2, II 27.4, III 9.1, III 30.1, III 40 T, III 40.1 (2×), III 40.2, III 42; **gloriously,** *gloriosamente,* II 27.4, III 31.3, III 41

God, god, *Dio, Iddio, Deus* (L), I 11.1 (2×), I 11.2, I 11.3 (2×), I 11.4, I 11.5, I 12.1, I 13.1 (2×), I 13.2 (L), I 14.1, I 14.2, I 15 (2×), I 58.3, II 1.1, II 23.2 (L), III 1.4, III 2, III 33.1, III 36.2

gold, *oro, aurum* (L), II 6.2, II 10.1 (3×), II 10.2 (5×), II 25.1, II 30.1 (2×), II 30.1 (L), II 30.2, III 34.2; **golden,** *aureo,* I 10.5, III 6.1, III 25

goodness, *bontà,* I 11.3, I 17.1, I 27.1, I 28, I 55.1, I 55.2 (6×), I 58.2, I 58.3, III 1.2 (3×), III 3 (2×), III 8.1 (2×), III 24 (2×), III 30.1 (4×), III 46. *Cf* common benefit

govern, *governare,* DL, 1 Pr.2, I 2.1, I 2.3 (2×), I 2.4 (2×), I 6.1 (4×), I 6.2 (3×), I 7.2 (2×), I 10.5, I 11.5, I 12.2, I 16.4, I 27.1, I 30.2, I 31.1, I 32, I 34.3 (2×), I 36 (2×), I 38.2, I 39.1, I 40.4, I 45 T, I 47.2, I 53.5, I 58.2, II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2, II 10.1, II 19.2, II 21.2 (3×), II 24.1, II 25.1, II

28.2, II 30.1, II 32.2, II 33.1, III 1.3, III 5 (3×), III 6.6, III 6.12, III 11.2, III 15.2, III 19.1, III 22.4 (2×), III 26.2, III 27.2, III 27.3 (5×), III 28, III 29 (2×), III 31.1, III 31.3, III 34.4, III 39.1; **governance,** *governo,* I 8.3, III 17 T; **government,** *governo,* I 2.2, I 2.3 (5×), I 2.4 (2×), I 2.5, I 2.7 (3×), I 4.2, I 6.1 (5×), I 16.2, I 18.2, I 21.1, I 26, I 30.2, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 49.2, I 58.3, II 18.3, II 23.2, II 24.4, II 28.2, II 32.2, III 3, III 6.19, III 22.5, III 27.3, III 49.4; **governor,** *governatore,* I 2.3, I 27.1, I 53.5 (2×), II 4.1, II 21.2 (2×), II 24.2, II 26.1, III 26.2. For *governare, see also* conduct

grace, *grazia,* I 54. *See also* favor; grateful

grateful, *grato,* I 2.3, I 58.3; **ungrateful,** *ingrato,* I 2.3, I 28 T, I 29 T, I 29.3 (2×), I 30.1 (2×), I 30.2 (3×), I 31.1, I 58.3 (3×); **ungratefully,** *ingratamente,* III 17; **gratitude,** *gratitudine,* DL, I 29.2; **gratitude,** *gratia* (L), I 29.1; **ingratitude,** *ingratitudine,* I 24.1, I 28 (3×), I 29.1 (3×), I 29.3 (4×), I 30 T, I 30.1 (2×), I 30.2, I 58.3, I 59, III 6.3. For *grato, see also* gratify

gratify, gratifying, *grato,* DL, I 40.4, III 6.14, III 34.1; **gratify,** *gratificare,* III 20. For *grato, see also* grateful

grave, *gravo,** I 13.2, I 17.2, I 31.1, I 34.3, I 38.1, I 53.4, I 54 T, I 54 (3×), I 56, II 1.1, II 31.2, III 6.8, III 31.2, III 32, III 34.2, III 35.1, III 37.3

greed, *cupidità,* I 29.1, III 6.3, III 8.1, III 29; **greedy,** *cupido,* III 12.2. *Cf* avarice

greetings,* *salute,* DL. *See also* health; safety; salvation; *cf* salutary

ground, *terra,* II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.5. *See also* earth; land; town

guard, *guardare, guardia,* I 2.5, I 4.2, I 5 T, I 5.1 (2×), I 5.2 (4×), I 6.4, I 7.1, I 23 T, I 23.2 (2×), I 23.4, I 27.1 (2×), I 30.1, I 30.2, I 35 (2×), I 40.6, I 40.7, I 49.3, I 52.2, II 6.1 (3×), II 7.1, II 17.5, II 19.1, II 20.1, II 22.1, II 23.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 32.1, III 6.1, III 6.2 (3×), III 6.3 (2×), III 6.6, III 6.8 (2×), III 6.9, III 6.11, III 6.19 (2×), III 6.20, III 10.1, III 15.1, III 16.3, III 22.3, III 23, III 27.3, III 30.1, III 30.2 (3×), III 37.1, III 37.3 (5×), III 37.4, III 39.2, III 44.1, III 44.3, III 48.2, III 49.2; **guardians,** *guardie,* II 17.5; **vanguard,** *antiguardo,* II 16.2; **rearguard,** *retroguardo,* II 16.2

habit, *abito,* I 17.3

hand,* *mano, manus* (L), I 5.1 (3×), I 5.2 (3×), I 7.5, I 8.3, I 11.1, I 15, I 24.2, I 27.1, I 30.1, I 38.3 (2×), I 44.2, I 49.3, I 52.1, I 52.2, I 55.1, I 55.3, I 55.4, I 57, II 2.1, II 15.1, II 19.1, II 21.2, II 23.2, II 23.2 (L), II 27.4, II 30.3, III 6.8 (3×), III 6.10, III 6.11, III 6.15, III 6.19, III 12.1, III 14.3 (2×), III 20 (3×), III 23, III 24, III 25, III 35.3, III 40.1, III 42, III 44.3; **hand-to-hand,** *alli mani, di mano,* II 17.2, II 17.5, III 13.3

haphazard, *fortuito, fortuitus* (L), III 36.2, III 36.2 (L). *See also* fortune

happy, *felice,* I 2.1, I 11.4, I 12.1, I 12.2, I 43, II 30.2, II 32.1 (2×), III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.6, III 6.16, III 22.3, III 25, III 45; **happiness,** *felicità,* I 11.4, I 17.2, II 32.1; **happily,** *felicemente,* I 1.2, I 19.2, I 32.1, III 6.4, III 6.7 (2×), III 6.11, III 6.19; **unhappy,** *infelice, infeliciter* (L), I 2.1, I 15 (L), I 16.4, II 23.2 (2×), III 6.4, III 35.2; **unhappiness,** *infelicità,* I 2.1, II 18.5, III 31.3; **unhappily,** *infelicemente, infelice,* III 8.2, III 49.1

hate, *odiare, odi* (L), I 2.3, I 8.2, I 52.2, 1 Pr.1, II 2.1, III 6.2, III 19.1, III 23, III 23 (L); **hatred,** *odio,* I 2.3 (3×), I 8.3, I 11.1, I 37.2, I 39.2, I 40.5, I 47.2 (2×), I 58.3, 1 Pr.1, II 2.1, II 14.1, II 21.2, II 24.1 (3×), II 26 T, II 26.1, III 6.2, III 6.4, III 6.9, III 12.1, III 19.1, III 22.3, III 22.6, III 23 (3×), III 47; **hateful,** *odioso,* I 52.2, II 24.2, III 5, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 23 (2×), III 31.1

head, *capo,** 12.3 (2×), I 10.1, I 12.1, I 12.2, I 15 (2×), I 17.1 (2×), I 18.3, I 25, I 29.1, I 34.4, I 37.2 (4×), I 40.1, I 44 T, I 44.1 (3×), I 57 (3×), II 5.1, II 16.1 (2×), II 16.2, II 27.4, II 18.3 (2×), II 24.1 (2×), III 1.4, III 6.10, III 6.15 (2×), III 6.16, III 6.20 (2×), III 7, III 12.3, III 13.3 (3×), III 15.2, III 16.1, III 16.3 (2×), III 18.3, III 21.2, III 24, III 26.1, III 27.1, III 27.2, III 30.1 (2×),

III 31.4, III 32, III 35 T, III 35.1 (3×), III 48.2; **head,** *testa,** II 18.4, III 32. For *capo, see also* capital

heading, *soprascritto,* I 16.5. *See also* write

health, *salute,* II 5.2. *See also* greetings; safety; salvation; *cf* salutary

heart, *cuore,* I 2.3, II 30.3 (2×), II 30.4 (2×), III 6.8

heaven, *cielo,* 1 Pr.2, I 6.4, I 10.6 (2×), I 11.1, I 19.1, II 29.1 (2×), 1 Pr.3, II 2.2, II 5.1, II 5.2, II 29.1 (2×), III 1.1; **heavenly,** *celeste,* I 56 (2×)

heir, *erede,* I 2.3, I 2.6, I 10.4, I 19.2, I 52.3, II 24.2, III 5; **heir,** *ereditario,* III 5 T. *See also* inheritance

hesitate, *dubitare,* I 21.2, I 21.3, I 40.3, III 49.1; **hesitation,** *rispetto,* I 31.1, I 33.2, I 33.5, I 35, I 40.2, I 40.7, I 52.2, I 58.4, II 12.3, II 24 (2×), III 6.20 (3×), III 91 (2×); **hesitant,** *rispettivo,* I 30.2, I 31.1, I 45.3, II 24.2. For *dubitare, see also* doubt; fear; suspect; for *rispetto, see also* respect; thank

hidden, *occulto,* I 3.1 (2×), I 58.3, II 32.1. *Cf* conceal; covert; cult

history, *istoria, storia,* DL, 1 Pr.2 (3×), I 3.1, I 7.5, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 10.2, I 10.4 (2×), I 11.2, I 16.1, I 16.4, I 23.4, I 24.2 (2×), I 29.2, I 49.1, I 60, II 2.1 (2×), II 4.1 (2×), II 5.1, II 5.2, II 10.3, II 19.1 (2×), II 24.4, II 29.3, II 30.2, II 31.1, II 33.1, III 1.2, III 1.6, III 6.3, III 7 (2×), III 8.1, III 13.1, III 20, III 26.2, III 31.4, III 33.1, III 36.2, III 42; **historian,** *istorico,* I 49.1, I 58.1, I 58.2, I 58.3, II 5.1, II 14.1, II 30.1, III 6.15, III 8.2, III 16.1, III 29, III 30.2, III 31.1, III 33.1

holy, *santo,** I 29.3

homicide, *omicidio, omicida,* I 9.1, I 24.1, I 40.3, III 6.13. *Cf* kill; slay

honest, *onesto,* I 2.3, I 16.3, I 46, I 52.2 (2×), II 24.2, III 34.2, III 44.3; **honest,** *adonestare,* I 34.1; **honestly,** *onestamente,* I 52.2; **dishonest,** *inonesto, disonesto,* I 2.3, I 59, III 29. *See also* honorable; indecently

honor (n.), *onore, honor* (L), DL, 1 Pr.2, I 5.2, I 5.4 (3×), I 8.1, I 10.1 (3×), I 10.5 (2×), I 11.1, 116.3 (3×), I 16.5, I 36 T, I 37.1, I 37.3 (2×), I 38.3, I 40.3, I 40.5, I 47.1 (L), I 50 (2×), I 55.6, II 2.2, II 3 T, II 23.3 (3×), II 27.4, III 2, III 6.2 (3×), III 6.3, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 16.3, III 20, III 25 (3×), III 25 (L), III 28 (2×), III 34.3, III 35.1, III 45; **honor** (n.), *onorevoli,* II 27.1; **honor** (v.), *onorare,* 1 Pr.2, I 2.3, I 14.3, I 16.3, I 31.1, I 31.2, I 33.2, I 38.1, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 9, II 23.4, II 28.1 (2×), II 28.2, III 6.1, III 22.3, III 25 (2×), III 28; **honorable,** *onorevole,* I 6.4, I 24.2, I 27.1, I 30.1, I 36, I 38.2, I 54, II 10.2, III 2, III 31.1, III 39.2; **honorably,** *onorevolmente, onorato,* I 54, I 58.2, II 14.1, II 23.4, III 22.4, III 34.2; **dishonor** (n.), *disonore,* I 31.2, III 10.2, III 15.1 (2×), III 17, III 48.2; **dishonor** (v.), *disonorare,* I 29.1, III 6.2; **dishonored,** *inonorato,* I 29.2; **dishonorable,** *disonorevole,* I 36

honorable, *oneste,* II 27.1. *See also* honest

hope (v.), **to put hope in,** *sperare, spero* (L), I 5.2, I 37.2, I 55.1 (2×), I 55.2 (2×), I 58.4, I 59, II 2.4, II 15.2, II 19.1, II 23.4 (L) (2×), II 27.1, II 29.3 (2×), III 11.1, III 32, III 33.2, III 36.2, III 43; **hope** (n.), *speranza, spes* (L), I 13.1, I 15, I 36, I 42, I 53 T, I 60 (4×), II 4.2, II 27.1 (4×), II 27.3, II 27.4, II 28.2, II 31.1 (4×), III 6.3 (2×), III 12.2 (2×), III 12.2 (L), III 32 (2×), III 36.2, III 37.3 (2×), III 39.2 (L)

horse, *cavallo, cavagli,* II 16.1 (3×), II 17.5, II 18 T, II 18.1, II 18.2 (8×), II 18.3 (9×), II 18.4 (6×), II 19.1 (2×), III 6.7, III 14.1, III 23; **on horseback,** *a cavallo,* II 18.1 (3×), II 18.3 (3×), III 14.3, III 18.3, III 31.3. *See also* master; *cf* cavalry

human, *umano, humanus* (L), I 1.5, I 6.3, I 10.1, I 11.4, I 26, I 37.1, I 42, I 56, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 2.2, II 2.4, II 5.2 (3×), II 29.1 (3×), III 12.1 (2×), III 20, III 25 (L); **inhuman,** *inumano,* III 27.2. *See also* humane

humane, *umano,* I 41.1, II 21.2, III 19.1 (2×), III 20 (2×), III 22.1 (2×); **humanely,** *umanamente,* 1 Pr.1, I 3.2, I 31.1, III 22.3; **humanity,** *umanità,* I 40.3, I 47.2, I 53.5, I 59, II 18.4, II 22.1, III 6.14, III 9.3, III 19.2, III 20 T, III 20 (2×), III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22.3 (2×), III 22.4 (2×), III 22.5, III 46. *See also* human

humble, humbly, to humble, *umile, umilmente, umiliarsi, raumiliare,* humiliter* (L), I 46, I 47.2, I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2×), II 2.2, III 25, III 31.2; **humiliate,** *umiliare,* I 31.2, III 6.14; **humility,** *umiltà,* I 41 T, II 2.2 (2×), II 14 T, II 14.1, III 9.3

humor, *omore, umore,* I 4.1, I 5.2, I 7.1 (3×), I 7.5, I 37.2, I 39.1, I 39.2, I 45.3, II 15.1, III 3, III 5, III 6.2, III 9.1, III 27.3

hurt,* *offendere,* I 35, I 52.2, II 17.5 (2×), II 24.1, II 24.2 (2×), III 6.14, III 12.3, III 18 T. *See also* attack; offend

husband, *marito,* III 2, III 4, III 6.18, III 20, III 34.3, III 49.1. *See also* betrothed

idle, idly, *ozioso,* I 1.4, I 10.1, I 30.1, I 55.4, III 10.1; **idleness,** *ozio,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.2, I 1.4 (4×), I 6.4, II 2.2, II 20, II 25.1

ignominy, *ignominia,* I 31.1, II 23.4, II 28.1, II 28.2, II 29.2, II 30.2, III 41 T, III 41 (2×), III 42; **ignominious,** *ignominioso,* I 18.3, I 40.3, II 2.1, III 41 (3×)

ignorance, *ignoranza, ignoranzia,* I 31 T, I 31.1, I 31.2 (3×), I 33.3, I 53.5, II 4.2, II 16.3, II 18.3; **ignorant,** *ignorante,* I 4.1, I 10.1, I 11.5, II 23.3; **ignorantly,** *ignorantemente,* I 10.1

ill, *male,** DL, I 7.2 (2×), I 12.1, I 34.3 (2×), I 34.4, I 37.3, I 39.2, I 43.1, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 49.1, I 53.3, I 58.3, I 58.4, II 32.2, III 1.3, III 3, III 6.4, III 8.1, III 16.3, III 21.2, III 27.3, III 29, III 35.1, III 35.2 (2×), III 46. *See also* bad; evil

image, *imagine, immagine,* I 12.1, I 53.1, II 5.1, III 39.2; **imagine,** *immaginare,* II 30.2; **imagination,** *immaginazione,* III 6.16 (2×); *immagine,* II 32.1. *Cf* fancy

imitate, *imitare,* 1 Pr.2 (3×), I 1.4, I 5.3, 1 Pr.3, II 3, II 4.2 (3×), II 16.2, II 23.2, II 23.3, III 1.3, III 5, III 6.7, III 6.20, III 10.1, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 30.2, III 33.2, III 37.4, III 41, III 45; **imitation,** *imitazione,* 1 Pr.2, I 10.6, II 4.2, III 45

imperial, *imperiale,* II 19.2. *Cf* command; empire

impetuosity, *impeto, empitc,* I 8.1, III 9.1 (2×), III 9.3, III 36.2, III 44 T. *See also* thrust; vehemence

incident, *accidente,* I 7.1, I 7.4, I 44.1, I 58.1. *See also* accident

indecently, *inonestamente,* III 17.1. *Cf* honest

indignation, *sdegno, isdegno,* I 8.3, I 50, I 53.3, II 23.4, II 26, II 28.1 (4×), II 28.2, III 4, III 6.17, III 16.3, III 17.1; **indignant,** *sdegnato,* II 27.2 (2×); **indignation,** *indegnazione,* I 7.1, I 55.1, II 26, III 44.1, III 44.2. For *sdegno, see also* disdain; *cf* dignity; worthy

industry, *industria,* 1 Pr.2, I 29.1, I 29.2, I 37.2, II 3.1, II 10.3 (2×), II 24.2, II 26, III 2, III 6.20, III 11.1, III 12.1, III 15.2, III 38.1; **industrious,** *industriarsi, industrioso,* I 1.4, I 3.2. *See also* devices

infamy, *infamia,* I 10.1, I 10.6, I 27.2, I 29.1, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2, II 21.2, III 6.20, III 35.2; **infamous,** *infame,* I 10.1, I 58.3. *Cf* fame; rumor

infantry, *fanteria,* II 16.2 (2×), II 17.5 (5×), II 18 T, II 18.2 (3×), II 18.3 (9×), II 18.4 (4×), II 19.1 (2×), III 18.3; **infantrymen,** *fanti,* II 18.3 (2×), II 18.4 (6×), II 19.1 (3×), II 24.2, III 6.7

infinite, *infinito,* DL, 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 2.4, I 5.2, I 6.3, I 8.3, I 9.3, I 10.1, I 11.1, I 11.5, I 12.2 (2×), I 16.1, I 16.5 (2×), I 17.2, I 20, I 33.5, I 36, I 39.2, I 53.2, I 53.5 (2×), I 59, II 2.1, II 20, II 33, III 7, III 11.1, III 12.2, III 16.1, III 30.1, III 39.1, III 46, III 49

inhabit, *abitare,* I 1.1, I 1.3 (2×), I 1.4 (2×), I 6.1 (4×), I 6.2, I 12.2 (2×), I 53.1, I 57 (2×), II 2.1, II 3 (4×), II 4.2, II 8.2, II 24.4 (2×), III 6.15, III 25, III 43; **inhabitants,** *abitatori,* I 1.1, I 1.2, I

1.3, I 1.5 (2×), I 2.3, I 6.1 (2×), I 6.2 (2×), I 26, I 55.2, II 3 (4×), II 5.2 (2×), II 8.1 (2×), II 8.2 (2×), II 19.1, II 20, III 12.1; **uninhabited,** *disabitato,* III 2.3

inheritance, *credità, ereditaria,* I 9.2, I 10.4, I 20, II 13.1, III 6.2. *See also* heir

injure, *ingiuriare,* I 28, I 32, I 46, II 24.1, II 26, II 28.2, III 6.19, III 7 (2×), III 26.2, III 27.1; **injury,** *ingiuria, iniuria* (L), I 2.3 (3×), I 6.2, I 7.5, I 11.1, I 28, I 29.1 (L), I 29.3, I 33.3, I 45 T, I 45.3, I 46, I 47.2, I 59, II 4.1, II 26 (4×), II 28 T, II 28.1 (2×), II 28.2 (4×), III 4 (2×), III 6.2 (2×), III 6.3 (2×), III 7, III 16.3, III 17, III 27.1, III 47 T; **injuriously,** *ingiuria,* II 26

innovate, *innovare,* I 9.2, I 18.4; **innovation,** *innovazione,* I 18.2, III 21.2; **innovation,** *novità,* I 7.3, I 8.3. *See also* newness; *cf* renew

insane, *insano,* III 6.3. *Cf* crazy; mad

insolent, insolently, *insolente, insolentemente, insolesco* (L), I 2.7, I 24.1, I 29.1, I 30.1, I 35, II 14, III 11.1, III 13.3 (2×), III 19.1, III 31.2 (2×), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3; **insolence,** *insolenzia,* I 2.6, I 3.2, I 16.5, I 18.5, I 52 T, I 53.1, II 1.1, II 25.1, II 27.1, III 1.3, III 31.3, III 33.1, III 46

inspire, *inanimare,* III 6.8. *See also* spirit

institute (v.), *costituire,* I 24 T; **institution,** *constituzione,* I 45.2, I 57, II 2.2, II 24.1, II 26, III 1.2; **institution,** *instituto,* III 46. *See also* constitute; place

intent, *animo,* I 9.2, I 27.1, I 38.3, I 44.2, I 59, III 2 (2×), III 6.4, III 6.20, III 28, III 48.2. *See also* animus; mind; spirit; *cf* magnanimous; pusillanimous

intention, *intenzione, intento,* DL, 1 Pr.1, I 9.4, I 23.2, I 37.3, II 6.1, II 9 (2×), II 10.2, II 20, II 27.1, II 27.4, III 3, III 6.3

internal, *intrinseca,* I 40.6 (2×). *See also* intrinsic

interpret, *interpretare, interpretor* (L), I 13.2 (L), I 14 T, I 56, II 2.2, III 2; **interpretations,** *interpretazioni,* II 2.2

intrinsic, *intrinsica,* I 33.2 (2×), III 1.2 (2×). *See also* internal

inure, *avvezzare,* I 17.3 (2×), I 38.2

joke, *beffa,* I 57, II 18.2, II 26

judge (v.), *giudicare, iudicare, passim,* **judge** (v.), *arbitror* (L), II 15.1; **judge** (n.), *giudice,* I 7.4 (2×), I 7.5, I 40.3, I 49.3, I 50, II 21.2, III 8.1; **judgment,** *giudicio, giudizio, iudicio, indizio,* DL, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 5.4, I 11.1, I 19.2, I 22, I 45.1, I 47.1 (2×), I 47.3, I 58.2, I 58.3, 1 Pr.3 (4×), II 12.2, II 18.3, II 19.1, II 23 T, II 23.2 (3×), II 23.3, II 23.4 (3×), II 24.1, II 24.4, III 8.1, III 11.2, III 27.2, III 40.1; **judgment,** *sentenza, sentenzia,* I 7.1, I 52.3, I 53.4, II 21.2, II 23.4, III 19.1 (2×), III 29, III 44.2; **judgment,** *arbitrio,* II 33 (2×). For *arbitror, cf* arbiter; for *sentenza, see also* sentence; verdict; for *arbitrio, see also* liberty; will

judiciously, *sensatamente,* I 23.4, III 30.1

just, *giusto, iustus* (L), I 2.3, I 9 4, I 27.2, III 12.2 (L), III 34.3, III 41; **unjust,** *ingiusto,* I 30.1, III 41; **justice,** *giustizia,* I 2.3, I 10.5, II 28.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 49.1; **justice,** *ragione,* I 27.1, II 21.2; **justify,** *giustificare,* I 8.3 (2×); **justification,** *giustificazione,* II 9. For *giusto, see also* real; for *ragione, see also* account; reason; type

kill, *ammazzare,* I 4.1, I 9.4 (2×), I 10.4, I 11.1, I 14.2, I 15, I 16.4, I 18.5 (2×), I 22, I 24.2, I 40.4, I 40.7, I 44.2, I 45.1, I 47.2 (2×), I 53.5, I 55.3, II 2.2, II 8.1 (2×), II 8.2, II 16.1 (2×), II 17.4, II 18.1, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 27.2 (2×), II 28.2, II 29.2, II 31.1, III 1.2, III 3 T, III 3.1 (2×), III 6.2 (3×), III 6 5, III 6.7 (2×), III 6.8, III 6.10, III 6.11 (2×), III 6.12, III 6.13 (2×), III 6.14 (2×), III 6.15 (4×), III 6.16 (6×), III 6.17 (2×), III 6.18 (2×), III 6.20 (3×), III 12.2, III 22.1, III 27.1 (2×), III 30.1, III 32 (2×), III 34.2, III 35.1, III 35.3, III 40.2, III 49.1, III 49.2; **kill,** *morire,* I 7.1, I 7.2, I 9.1, I 10.4 (2×), I 10.5, I 13.2, I 15 (2×), I 16.6, I 22, I 24.1, I 27.1, I

29.1, I 31.1, I 31.2, I 36.1, I 47.2, I 53.3 (2×), I 58.2, I 59, II 2.1 (2×), II 31.1, III 5, III 6.10 (2×), III 6.11 (2×), III 6.18 (2×), III 6.19, III 6.20 (2×), III 15.1, III 18.1, III 21.4, III 26.1, III 28, III 34.2. For *morire, see also* die; *cf* homicide; slay

kind,* *generazione,* I 55.4, II 8.1 (2×), II 24.2, III 22.4. *See also* generation; race

king, *re, passim,* **kingdom,** *regno,* 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 1.3, I 1.4 (2×), I 2.7, I 9.1, I 9.2 (2×), I 9.3, I 9.4, I 10 T, I 10.1 (4×), I 10.4, I 11.4 (3×), I 11.5, I 12.1, I 16.5, I 19 T, I 19.1, I 19.2 (5×), I 21.1, I 21.2 (4×), I 25, I 26, I 29.2 (2×), I 36, I 42, I 43, I 55.2, I 55.4 (2×), I 55.5 (3×), I 58.2 (2×), I 59 (2×), 1 Pr.2 (3×), II 3, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 12.1 (3×), II 12.2 (2×), II 12.4 (2×), II 13.1 (2×), II 21.1, II 22.1 (2×), II 24.3, II 24.4, II 27.4, II 30.2 (2×), II 30.4 (3×), II 32.2, III 1.2, III 1.5 (5×), III 1.6, III 4 (5×), III 5 T, III 5 (3×), III 6.3, III 6.7 (3×), III 40.1, III 41; **kingly,** *regio,* I 2.7 (2×), I 18.5 (2×), I 34.4, I 55.4, I 58.3 (2×), III 28. *See also* royal; *cf* queen; reign

kiss, *baciare,* III 2

knowledge, *cognizione,* 1 Pr.2 (3×), I 2.3 (2×), I 47.3 (2×), I 55.4, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3, III 18.1, III 39.1 (4×), III 39.2 (4×); **knowledge,** *conoscenza,* III 34.4; **knowledge,** *notizia,* 1 Pr.1, I 56, I 58.2, 1 Pr.2, II 4.1, II 5.1, II 5.2 (2×), II 12.3, II 24.2, II 33.1, III 18.3, III 27.2

land, *terra,* 1 Pr.1, I 1.3, I 24.2, I 37.2, I 50, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2 (2×), II 19.2, II 24.3, II 30.1, II 30.2, II 30.4; **land,** *terrene,** II 6.1 (2×), II 7 T, II 7 (2×). *See also* earth; ground; town

language, *lingua,* II 5 T, II 5.1 (5×), II 5.2, II 16.1. *See also* tongue

lasciviousness, *lascivia,* I 2.3

laugh, *ridere,* I 1.5, I 47.2, II 11.2

law, *legge,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.2, I 1.4 (4×), I 1.5 (2×), I 2.1 (4×), I 2.3 (2×), I 2.5, I 2.6 (2×), I 2.7, I 3.1, I 3.2 (4×), I 4.1 (5×), I 6.1 (2×), I 6.2 (2×), I 6.4, I 7.1 (2×), I 9.3, I 9.4 (3×), I 10.4, I 11.1 (2×), I 11.3, I 13.2 (5×), I 16.5 (4×), I 17.3, I 18.1 (6×), I 18.2 (6×), I 18.3 (3×), I 18.4, I 18.5, I 32, I 33.2, I 34.2, I 34.3, I 35 (3×), I 37 T (2×), I 37.1 (3×), I 37.2 (5×), I 37.3 (6×), I 39.2, I 40.2 (5×), I 40.3, I 40.4, I 40.5, I 45 T, I 45.1 (2×), I 45.2 (4×), I 46, I 49 T, I 49.1 (4×), I 49.2, I 50, I 55.2, I 55.4, I 58.2 (5×), I 58.3 (3×), I 58.4 (2×), 1 Pr.2, II 3 (2×), II 4.1, II 5.1, II 8.1, II 19.1, II 21.1, II 21.2, III 1.2, III 1.3 (4×), III 1.5 (3×), III 3, III 5 (3×), III 6.19 (2×), III 8.1, III 8.2, III 22.3 (2×), III 22.4, III 22.5 III 24, III 25, III 28, III 29 (2×), III 30.1, III 31.4, III 34.2 (2×), III 46 (3×); **law,** *ius* (L), II 21.2, II 28.1; **law of nations,** *ius gentium* (L), II 28.1, III 1.2 (2×); **lawfully,** *giuridicamente,* III 4. For *ius gentium, cf* nation; race

lawgiver, *latore delle leggi,* II 1.1. *See also* legislator

league, *lega,* I 59 T, I 59.1, II 1.1, II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2 (4×), II 9, II 11.1, II 19.2, III 44.3; **league of princes,** *congiura de' principi,* I 53.1. For *lega, cf* confederate; for *congiura, see also* conspire

learning (n.), *dottrina,* I 11.5, I 19.2, I 45.2

legates, *legati,* I 14.2, II 33, III 6.5, III 25 (2×), III 29 (2×), III 41, III 48.1 (2×), III 48.2

legion, *legione,* I 10.4, I 17.1, II 2.4 (2×), II 17.5, II 20 (3×), II 26, III 6.20 (3×), III 34.1, III 45, III 49.1

legislator, *legislatore,* I 6.3; **legislator,** *latore di leggi,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 42. *See also* lawgiver

levity, *leggerezza,* III 6.5, III 6.6

levy of soldiers, *elezione de' soldati,* II 29.1. *See also* choose; elect

liberal, *liberale,* DL, I 32, II 6.2, III 23, III 34.3; **liberality,** *liberalità,* I 51 T, II 20, II 21.2, III 20 (2×), III 28, III 49.4

liberators, *liberatori,* I 2. 3. *Cf* free

liberty, *arbitrio,* III 6.14. *See also* judge; will

license, *luenza, licentia* (L), I 2.3 (4×), I 2.6, I 3.2, I 10.5, I 38.2, I 40.4, I 47.3, II 13.2, III 25, III 34.2, III 36.2; **licentious,** *licenzioso,* I 2.2, I 58.4

lies, *bugie,* I 14.2, III 6.9; **liar,** *bugiardo,* I 14.2

life, *vita,* I 2.3, I 2.4, I 2.5, I 2.6, I 5.2, I 6.3 (2×), I 10.4, I 11.4 (2×), I 11.5, I 12.1 (2×), I 16.4, I 17.1, I 17.3 (2×), I 19.1, I 24.1, I 29.3, I 33.2, I 40.5, I 45.1, I 53.1, I 56, I 58.2, I 58.4, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3, II 12.1, II 12.2, II 13.1 (2×), II 18.5 (2×), II 19.2, II 20, III 1.1 (2×), III 1.2, III 1.3, III 1.4, III 3 (2×), III 4, III 5 (2×), III 6.1, III 6.3 (2×), III 6.20, III 8.2, III 9.2, III 12.2, III 20 (2×), III 21.1, III 29, III 34.2, III 35.2, III 39.1, III 40.1, III 41 (3×), III 46; **life,** *vivere,* I 18.4, I 53.1, III 1.3; **civil life,** *vita civile,* I 26, I 34 T, I 58.3, II 2.2; **free life,** *vita libera,* I 17.3, III 7. *See also* civil; free; life, way of; live

life, mode of, *modo di vivere,* I 8.2, I 18.4, I 38.1, II 2.2, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 30.2, III 1.3, III 8.1, III 21.3, III 21.4 (2×), III 25, III 31.1, III 31.3, III 43. *See also* live

life, way of, *vivere,* I 26, I 29.3, II 19.2; **ancient way of life,** *vivere antico,* I 25; **civil way of life,** *vivere civile,* I 3.1, I 7.3, I 9.1, I 19.1, I 55.4, II 2.2, II 19.1; **civil and free way of life,** *vivere civile e libero,* I 9.2; **common way of life,** *vivere commune,* III 1.6; **free way of life,** *vivere libero,* I 2.7, I 5.1, I 6.1, I 7.2, I 16.3 (2×), I 25, I 33.2, I 36, I 49.1, I 49.3, II 2.1 (4×), II 2.3, III 1.2, III 24, III 25; **new and free way of life,** *vivere nuovo e libero,* I 25; **political way of life,** *vivere politico,* I 6.1, I 6.4, I 18.4, I 25, I 55.4, 1 Pr.2; **political and uncorrupt way of life,** *vivere politico e incorrotto,* I 55.3; **servile way of life,** *vivere servo,* II 2.3; **tumultuous way of life,** *vivere tumultuoso,* II 25.1. *See also* ancient; civil; common benefit; corrupt; free; life, mode of; live; politically; serve; tumult

live, *vivere, vivo* (L), *passim,* **live freely,** *vivere libero,* II 2.3, II 4.1, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 21.2, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 24.3, II 30.2. *See also* free; life; life, mode of; life, way of

lively, *vivo,* II 11.1. *See also* alive

lord, *signore,* I 12.2, I 17.1, I 19.2, I 22.1, I 29.1 (2×), I 30.1, I 55.3, I 55.4, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 21.2, II 22.1, II 30.3, III 6.18, III 18.3, III 27.4, III 29 (3×), III 34.3; **to make oneself lord,** *insignorirsi,* II 20; **lordling,** *signorotto,* II 30.2. *See also* master; *cf* signoria

lot, *sorte,* III 49.2 (3×); *sortire,** I 2.1. *See also* chance; fate; luck; sort

love (n.), *amore,* I 10.4, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 29.3, I 43, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 3 (2×), II 33, III 6.4 (2×), III 8.1, III 21.2, III 21.4, III 22.5 (2×), III 22.6, III 47 T; **love** (v.), *amare,* I 57, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 2.4, II 24.2, II 30.2, III 5, III 6.5 (2×), III 19.1, III 21.2 (2×), III 21.3 (2×), III 22.4; **to be or fall in love,** *innamorarsi,* I 28.2, I 40.4; **lover,** *amatore,* I 19.1, I 19.2, I 36, I 52.2, I 58.3, II 2.2, II 30.5, III 8.1, III 11.1, III 46; **loving,** *amorevole,* I 13.2

luck, *sorte,* III 6.4, III 31.3; *ventura,* III 30.1. For *sorte, see also* fate; lot; sort; for *ventura, see also* fortune, captains of; *cf* perchance; perhaps

mad, *motto,* I 38.3, III 2, III 6.3, III 10.2. *Cf crazy;* insane

magistracy, *magistrato, magistratus* (L), I 18.3, I 39.2 (3×), I 40.2, I 40.4 (3×), I 40.7, I 43, I 44.1 (2×), I 47.2, I 47.3 (2×), I 48 T, I 49.1 (2×), I 49.2, I 50.3, I 60 T, III 22.4 (L), III 24 (3×), III 34 T, III 46; **magistrate,** *magistrato,* I 7.1, I 8.2, I 10.5, I 18.2 (2×), I 18.3, I 25, I 29.3 (2×), I 34.1, I 34.3, I 37.2, I 40.2, I 40.7 (2×), I 46 (3×), I 50 T, I 50 (2×), I 55.2, I 56, I 58.2, I 58.3, II 21.2, III 22.5, III 22.6, III 25, III 28, III 34.4

magnanimous, *magnanimo,* III 34.3. *Cf* animus; intent; mind; pusillanimous; spirit

magnificent, *magnifico, magnificus* (L), I 15, 1 Pr.1, II 2.2, III 31.1, III 38.1 (L); **magnificence,** *magnificenza,* II 2.2 (2×)

maintain, *mantenere,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.3, I 1.5, I 2.3, I 2.6, I 5 T, I 5.2, I 5.3, I 5.4, I 6.1 (2×), I 6.2, I 6.4 (3×), I 7 T, I 11.1, I 11.5, I 12.1 (5×), I 16 T, I 16.6 (2×), I 17 T, I 17.1 (3×), I 17.2, I 18 T, I 18.1 (2×), I 18.5 (2×), I 19 T (2×), I 19.1, I 19.2 (3×), I 19.3, I 25, I 26, I 29.3 (2×), I 31.2, I 40.1, I 40.5, I 41, I 43, I 49 T, I 49.1, I 49.2, I 49.3, I 50, I 52.1, I 55.3 (2×), I 55.4 (2×), I 55.5 (2×), I 57, I 58.3, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 5.1, II 6.1 (2×), II 8.3 (2×), II 15.2, II 18.3

(3×), II 19.1 (3×), III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 1.4 (2×), III 1.5, III 2 (2×), III 3 T, III 3 (3×), III 5, III 6.4, III 16.2, III 27.3, III 31.4, III 33.1, III 34.2, III 34.3, III 35.1, III 36.1, III 41; **maintain,** *mantenitori,* III 1.5; **maintenance,** *mantenere,* I 9.2

majesty, *maesta, maiestas* (L), I 13.1, I 39.2, III 6.14 (2×), III 30.1 (2×), III 33.1, III 41 (L)

malevolent, malevolence, *malvagio, malvagità,* I 10.4, I 19.4, I 24.2, I 31.2, I 53.2, I 53.5. *Cf* bad; evil

malice, *malizia,* I 27.1, I 31.1, I 31.2, III 6.6; **malignity,** *malignità,* 1 Pr.2, I 2.5, I 3.1 (2×), I 23.3, I 42, 1 Pr.3, II 5.2, II 15.1, II 18.3, II 20, III 3, III 30.1

man,* *uomo, passim See also* arm; *cf* men, new

manage, management, *maneggiare, maneggio,* I 6.3 (2×), I 49.1, I 49.2, 1 Pr.1, II 2.2, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 17.2, II 24.2, II 25.1, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 6.3, III 6.4, III 6.5, III 6.6, III 6.7, III 6.15, III 6.19 (3×), III 9.3, III 14.1, III 19.1 (2×), III 37.2, III 40 T, III 40.1 (2×)

marry, *maritare,* II 28.2, III 26.1, III 28; **marriages,** *matrimonii,* II 3, III 26.2, III 46; **marriages,** *connubi,* II 2.3. For *maritare, see also* betrothed

marvel (v.), *maravigliare,* 1 Pr.2, I 1.1, I 11.3, I 47.1, [I Pr.1, II 2.4, III 12.1, III 21.1, III 48.1; **marvel** (v.), *miror* (L), III 23; **marvel** (n.), **marvelous,** *maraviglia, maraviglioso,* I 1.4, I 1.5, I 40.2, I 49.2, I 49.3, I 58.3, 1 Pr.2, II 2.1 (4×), II 29.1, III 6.16, III 13.1, III 23; **marvelously,** *maravigliosamente,* II 2.3. *See also* astonishment

master, *maestro,* II 16.2, II 18.3, III 1.3, III 10.2, III 20 (2×), III 25, III 33.1; **master of the horse,** *maestro dei cavagli,* I 5.4, I 53.2, II 18.3, III 25, III 33.1, III 36.2; **master, to become master,** *signore, insignorire,* I 6.4, I 10.5, III 6.18. For *signore, see also* lord; *cf.* signoria

maternal, *materno,* II 13.1. *Cf* mother

matter, *materia,* I 15, I 16.2, I 16.5, I 17.3 (3×), I 18 4, I 28, I 29.1, I 34.4, I 35 (2×), I 42.1, I 44.1, I 55.4, I 55.5, I 58.3, I 58.4 (2×), II 1.3, II 4.2, II 5.2, II 8.1, II 15.1, II 15.2, II 16.3, II 23.2, II 24.2, III 5, III 6.2, III 6.4, III 8.1, III 8.2 (2×), III 12.2, III 19.1, III 25, III 35.1

medicine, *medicina,* 1 Pr.2, III 1.2. *Cf* physician

memory, *memoria, memoria* (L), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 10.2, I 27.2, I 29.3, I 32, I 49.2, I 58.2, 1 Pr.1, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 5 T, II 5.1 (5×), II 5.2, II 19.2, II 26 (L), III 1.3 (2×), III 3, III 6.14; **memorable,** *memorabili, memorabilis* (L), I 29.3, II 17.1, II 31.1, III 3 (2×), III 8.1 (L), III 8.2. *See also* remembrances

men, new, *genti nuove,* III 49.4 (2×). *See also* arms, men-at-; people; race; troops

mercenary, *mercenario,* I 43, II 19.2, II 20 T, II 20

mercy, *piatà,* I 41 T, III 20, III 21.1, III 22.5; **merciful,** *pio,* I 28, I 31.1, III 28 T, III 28; **merciful,** *pietoso, piatoso,* III 19.1, III 41. *See also* piety

merit (v.), *meritare, mereor* (L), I 1.4, I 10.6, I 16.3, I 29.1, I 29.3 (2×), I 31.2, I 45.1, I 52.2, I 54 (L), III 6.18; **merit** (n.), *merito,* I 21 T, I 22 (2×), I 24.1 (3×), I 24.2, I 53.2, III 8.1, III 49 T; **without merit,** *immeritamente,* III 43. *See also* deserve

middle, *mezzo, medius* (L), I 6.2, I 56, II 17.1, II 17.5, II 28.2, III 6.3, III 14 T, III 33.1 (L). *See also* way; *cf* extreme

military, *militare, milizia, militarius* (L), *militia* (L), 1 Pr.2, I 1.4, I 4.1 (3×), I 9.1, I 11.2, I 12.2, I 14.1, I 21.1 (2×), I 21.3, I 44.1, I 53.3, 1 Pr.2, II 18 T, II 18.1 (2×), II 18.3 (3×), II 18.5, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 20 T, II 20, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 13.3, III 22.3, III 22.4 (L), III 31.4 (2×), III 36.2 (5×), III 36.2 (L), III 37.4, III 38.1 (L), III 38.2; **to serve in the military,** *militare,* I 21.2, I 29.2, I 43, I 51 (2×), II 4.2 (2×), II 16.1, II 16.2, III 25. *Cf* serve

mind,* *animo*, I 9.1, I 10.1, I 18.4, I 47.3 (2×), III 3, III 6.19; **mind,*** *mente*, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 25, 1 Pr.3, III 1.4, III 8.1; **mindful,*** *mente*, III 28. For *animo, see also* animus; intent; spirit; *cf* magnanimous; pusillanimous

minister (n.), *ministro*, I 2.3, I 49.3, II 21.2, III 6.13, III 22.6; **minister** (v.), *ministrare*, I 25
miracle, *miracolo*, I 12.1 (2×), I 29.3; **miraculous,** *miracoloso*, II 30.5 (2×), III 6.5
mix, *mescolare*, I 2.6, I 48, I 49.2, II 1.2, II 17.6, II 18.3, II 32.1, III 19.1, III 21.4; **mixed,** *misto*, I 2.7 (2×), II 5.2, III 1.1; **mixed,** *accozzati*, I 33.2
moderate (v.), *moderare*, I 36, I 58.2, III 19.1; **moderately,** *moderatamente*, III 35.2
modern, *moderno*, 1 Pr.2, I 6.1, I 21.1, I 34.3, I 36, I 53.2, I 56, 1 Pr.2, II 12.2, II 16.2 (2×), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 18.5 (2×), II 24.3, II 27.1, II 29.3, III 11.1, III 15.1, III 18.3, III 27.2
monarchy, *monarchia*, I 53.1, III 31.3
money, *danaio, danari, denari*, I 4.1, I 6.4, I 8.3, I 16.5, I 31.2 (2×), I 46, I 55.2, II 4.2, II 10 T, II 10.1 (8×), II 10.2 (5×), II 10.3 (7×), II 12.3, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 27.4, II 30 T, II 30.1 (3×), II 30.2, III 6.5, III 8.1, III 10.2, III 23, III 28, III 43 (5×); **money**, *moneta*, II 3
moral, *morale*, III 12.1
mortal, *mortale*, III 6.2; **immortal,** *immortalis* (L), II 23.2
mother, *madre*, II 12.2, III 13.1, III 26.1. *Cf* maternal
multitude, *moltitudine, multitude* (L), I 2.3 (3×), I 7.3, I 10.4, I 13.2, I 16.4 (2×), I 17.1, I 44 T, I 44.1, I 53.2, I 53.3, I 54 T, I 54 (2×), I 55 T, I 57 (4×), I 58 T, I 58.1 (3×), I 58.2 (7×), I 58.4, I 60, II 2.2, II 4.2, II 10.1, III 14.2, III 19 T, III 19.1, III 19.1 (L), III 29 (L), III 30.2, III 32, III 37.4 (2×), III 49.1, III 49.2 (2×)

name (v.), *nominare, sopranominare, prenominare*, I 6.1, I 40.3 (2×), I 47.2 (2×), II 8.2 (2×), II 10.1, II 30.2, III 5, III 6.20, III 47 (3×); **name** (n.), *nome, nomen* (L), I 1.4, I 2.3, I 2.7, I 4.1, I 6.1, I 10.3, I 13.2, I 25, I 26, I 28, I 34.1 (4×), I 37.2, I 39.2 (3×), I 40.5, I 47.1, I 47.2 (3×), I 52.3 (3×), I 55.4, I 55.5, I 55.6 (4×), I 58.3 (3×), II 2.1 (3×), II 4.1 (2×), II 5.2 (2×), II 8.2 (3×), II 11.1 (L)(3×), II 13.2 (3×), II 16.1, II 17.1, II 21.2, II 22.2, II 24.3, II 25.1 (2×), II 28.1, II 30.4 (2×), III 6.14, III 34.2 (4×)
narrate, *narrare*, I 40.1, I 47.2, I 56, I 58.1, II 1.1, II 10.1, II 19.1, II 26, III 29; **narration,** *narrazione*, DL, III 1.6
nation, *nazione*, I 55.3, 1 Pr.2, II 16.1, III 43. *Cf* law; race
nature, *natura, natura* (L), 1 Pr.1, I 16.1, I 19.3, I 21.1, I 24.2, I 29.1, I 33.2, I 37.1, I 40.2, I 40.7, I 41 (2×), I 42, I 57, I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (3×), I 58.3, 1 Pr.3, II 3, II 5.2, II 17.5, III 6.19, III 9.1 (2×), III 9.3, III 21.3, III 22.1, III 22.3 (2×), III 27.3, III 29 (2×), III 36.1 (2×), III 39.2, III 43 T; **natural,** *naturale*, 1 Pr.1, I 12.1, I 29.2, I 33.2, I 56 (2×), II 3, II 6.2, III 6.19, III 8.2, III 12.1, III 22.3, III 30.1, III 36.2, III 37.1; **naturally,** *naturalmente*, I 1.4, II 31.1, II 32.1. *Cf* supernatural
necessary, necessarily, *necessario, necessitato, passim*, **necessitate,** *necessitare*, II 1.2, II 8.1, II 8.4, II 10.1, II 10.2 (2×), II 12.3, II 13.2 (2×), II 16.1, II 23 T, II 27.4, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 19.1, III 22.3, III 29, III 37.2, III 44.3; **necessity,** *necessità, necessitade, necessitato, passim*
nephew, *nipote*, I 14.2, I 27.1, I 52.3, II 10.1
neutral, neutrality, *neutrale*, II 15.2, II 22.1, II 23.2, III 44.2 (3×)
new, newly, anew, *nuovo, di nuovo, passim See also* news
newness, *novità*, I 36, III 14.3, III 21.2, III 37.4. *See also* innovate
news, *nuova*, II 10.1, II 15.2, III 17, III 18.1, III 18.2, III 18.3; **news,** *novelle*, II 2.1
noble, *nobile*, I 3.2 (3×), I 4.1, I 5.1, I 5.2 (2×), I 5.4 (2×), I 6.2, I 7.3, I 7.5, I 8.1, I 13.1 (2×), I 30.2, I 33.2, I 37.1, I 37.2 (3×), I 37.3, I 39.2, I 40.3, I 40.4 (2×), I 40.5 (4×), I 40.6, I 45.1, I 46, I 47.1 (2×), I 48 T, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 27.2, II 28.2 (2×), III 6.2 (2×), III 8.1 (2×), III 12.1, III 19.1, III 20, III 24, III 26.1 (4×); **ignoble,** *ignobile*, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 30.2, I 48, III 6.2

nobility, *nobilità*, I 2.3, I 2.7, I 3.2 (3×), I 5.2 (2×), I 5.4, I 6.2 (2×), I 7.1 (2×), I 10.5 (2×), I 13.1, I 13.2, I 37.1, I 37.2 (2×), I 37.3, I 39.2 (2×), I 40.2, I 40.3 (2×), I 40.4, I 40.5 (3×), I 40.6, I 41, I 45.3 (3×), I 46 (2×), I 47.1, I 47.2 (2×), I 51, I 52.1 (2×), II 2.1, II 25.1, III 1.5, III 6.19, III 8.1 (2×), III 11.1 (2×), III 19.1, III 26.1

noise, *romore*,* I 3.2, I 4.1, I 47.2, I 54, II 2.1, II 17.5, II 32.1, III 6.17, III 14.2. *See also* rumor

oath, *giuramento*, I 11.1 (4×), I 13.2 (2×), I 15 (2×), I 55.2; **to take an oath,** *congiurare*, I 27.1. *See also* conspire; *cf* swear

obey, *ubbidire, ubedire*, I 2.3 (2×), I 11.1, I 13.2 (2×), I 36, I 50, I 55.4, I 57 (3×), I 58.2, 1 Pr.1, II 4.1, II 23.2, III 5, III 6.1, III 6.8, III 19.1, III 21.2, III 22.1 (2×), III 22.5, III 30.1 (2×), III 30.2, III 46; **obedient,** *ubbidiente, obediens* (L), I 57 (L), II 16.1, III 19.1, III 22.4, III 25; **obedience,** *ubbidienza, obedienza*, I 11.1, I 12 2, I 13.2, I 18.3, I 22, I 29.2 (2×), I 34.4, II 8.1, II 23.4, II 27.2, III 1.4, III 6.7, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.5 (2×), III 22.6, III 30.1, III 38.2; **disobey,** *disubbidire*, I 38.2 (2×)

oblige, *obligare*, II 21.1, II 33, III 10.4, III 32 (2×), III 43; **obligated,** *obligato*, DL, I 11.2, I 13.2, I 16.5, I 58.4, I 59, III 42 (2×); **obligation,** *obligo*, DL, I 10.5, I 12.2 (2×), I 16.3 (2×), I 32, I 58.3, III 27.1, III 42

observe, observance, *osservare, servare, osservanza, observo* (L), I 2.1, I 6.2, I 8.2, I 11.4, I 12.1, I 14 T (2×), I 15, I 17.3, I 18.1, I 22, I 24.1, I 24.2, I 25 (2×), I 30.2 (2×), I 33.3, I 34.2, I 34.3, I 35, I 40.3, I 40.6, I 45.1 (2×), I 45.2 (2×), I 55.2, I 59 (2×), 1 Pr.2, II 1.3, II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1 (4×), II 4.2, II 8.1, II 9, II 12.2, II 16.2, II 18.2, II 18.3, II 21.1 (2×), II 23.2, II 24.3, II 30.2, III 1.2 (2×), III 2 (2×), III 4, III 5, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 12.3, III 14.2, III 19.1, III 22.1 (2×), III 22.3 (5×), III 23, III 33.1 (2×), III 35.3, III 36.2 (L), III 37.3, III 41, III 42 T, III 42 (5×), III 43, III 49.1; **observant,** *osservante*, I 59; **observer,** *osservatore*, II 1.3, III 22.5

obstinate, obstinately, *ostinato, ostinatamente*, I 19.4, II 1.3, II 2 T, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 16.1, II 32.2, III 1.5, III 6.2, III 12.1 (5×), III 12.2, III 32, III 36.2, III 46; **obstinacy,** *ostinazione*, I 15 (2×), I 31.2, I 37.3, I 39.2, I 50, I 54, II 5.1, II 16.1 (2×), III 12.1, III 12.2, III 42

occasion, *commodità*, I 6.1 (2×), I 50, I 52.2, II 11.1, II 12.4, III 2 (2×), III 6.2 (2×), III 6.3 (3×), III 6.6, III 6.20, III 13.3. *See also* advantage; convenient

offend, take the offensive, *offendere*, I 2.3, I 3.2, I 9.1, I 16.3, I 28, I 29.1 (2×), I 29.3, I 30.1, I 30.2, I 33.3, I 34.2, I 45.1, I 45.3 (2×), I 46 T (2×), I 46 (5×), I 49.1, I 57, 1 Pr.1, II 2.1 (2×), II 9, II 17.1 (2×), II 18.4, II 19.2, II 20, II 23.2 (2×), II 24.2, II 25.1, II 28.1, III 5, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.11, III 7 (2×), III 12.1 (2×), III 17 T, III 17, III 22.1, III 22.6, III 27.1, III 33.1, III 43; **offense,** *offesa, offensione*, I 2.3, I 7.2 (2×), I 16.2, I 21.1, I 37.2 (2×), I 45.3 (2×), II 26, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.11, III 7, III 17, III 30.1. *See also* attack; hurt

office, *ufficio, uffizio*, I 49.3 (2×), III 6.13, III 35.2. *See also* duty

old, *vecchio*, I 9.2, I 34.2, I 41, I 47.2 (2×), I 53.1, I 60 (2×), 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 23.4 (2×), II 27.1, II 29.1, III 4, III 6.5, III 31.2, III 38.1; **to grow old,** *invecchiare*, I 60, 1 Pr.3 (2×); **old age,** *vecchiezza*, 1 Pr.3 (2×), III 18.3

opinion, *opinione*,* DL, I 2.2 (2×), I 4.1 (2×), I 7.2, I 8.1, I 8.3, I 9.1, I 9.2 (2×), I 10.5, I 11.5, I 12.1, I 12.2, I 14.2, I 15, I 18.3, I 21.3, I 23.4, I 29.3, I 34.1, I 36, I 37.3, I 40.3, I 41, I 47.2, I 53.1, I 53.2 (2×), I 53.5, I 55.6, I 58.1, I 58.3 (5×), I 58.4, 1 Pr.1, II 1.1 (2×), II 2.1, II 10 T, II 10.1, II 10.2, II 10.3, II 12.1 II 15.2, II 16.1, II 17 T, II 17.1 (3×), II 17.5, II 18.2 (3×), II 19.1, II 22 T, II 22.1 (2×), II 22.2 (3×), II 23.3, II 24.3, II 25.2, III 3, III 13.1, III 13.2, III 19.1, III 27 T, III 27.2, III 27.4, III 31.4, III 34 T, III 34.2 (2×), III 34.3, III 34.4 (2×), III 35.2, III 35.3. *See also* believe; reputation

opportunity, *occasione, occasio* (L), I 3.1, I 6.2, I 6.3, I 9.4, I 10.6 (2×), I 13.1, I 14.2, I 16.5 (2×), I 27.2, I 40.3 (2×), I 40.4, I 41, I 47.2, I 49.2, I 50, I 59 (2×), 1 Pr.3, II 9, II 15.2, II 17.1, II

19.2, II 20, II 22.1, II 23.2, II 27.1 (2×), II 29.1, II 29.2, III 2, III 3, III 5, III 6.20, III 15.1 (L), III 17, III 44.1

oppress, *opprimere*, I 4.1 (2×), I 10.5, I 46; **oppression,** *oppressione*, I 8.1, I 40.5, II 8.2. *See also* crush

oracle, *oracolo*, I 12.1 (3×), III 2

oration, to orate, *orazione, orare*, I 4.1, II 15.2, III 12.2, III 34.4, III 46. *Cf* spokesmen

order (n.), *ordine, passim*, **order** (v.), **ordered,** *ordinare, ordinato, passim*, **orderer,** *ordinatore*, I 2.1, I 2.2, I 2.7, I 8.2, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 9.4, I 10.1, I 11.1, I 11.3, I 19.1, I 49.3, 1 Pr.2, II 5.1, III 34.4; **ordering,** *ordinazione*, I 1.4, I 9.2; **orderly,** *ordinato, ordinamente*, III 13.1, III 14.2; **disorder** (n.), *disordine*, I 3.2, I 7.2, I 8.2, I 8.3, I 12.2 (2×), I 16.4, I 17.3, I 37.2, I 37.3 (3×), I 39.2, I 40.7, I 44.1, I 47.3 (3×), I 49.2, I 50, I 55.2, I 55.6, I 57, I 58.3 (2×), II 2.3, II 11.1, II 16.1, II 16.2 (5×), II 17.1, II 18.2, II 18.3 (4×), II 29.1, II 30.2 (2×), II 30.4, III 1.5, III 6.12, III 8.2 (2×), III 14.2, III 15.1 (2×), III 16.2 (4×), III 17, III 18.2 (2×), III 18.3, III 26.2, III 33.1, III 49.4; **disorder** (v.), *disordinare*, I 2.1, I 49.3, II 16.1, II 17.5, II 24.1, II 32.1, III 1.1, III 14.2, III 15.1; **disordered,** *inordinato*, I 4.1, I 53.3, III 37.4; **reorder,** *riordinare*, I 2.1 (2×), I 10.6, I 13 T, I 13.1, I 18.4, I 45.2, I 49.3, I 55.4, II 2.2, II 18.2, II 21.1, III 6.12, III 15.1

ordinary, *ordinario*, I 7.1, I 7.3, I 18.4 (2×), I 34.1, I 59, II 2.4, III 6.19, III 22.3 (2×), III 30.2, III 37.1, III 44 T; **ordinarily,** *ordinariamente, per l'ordinario*, I 7.1, I 7.2, I 7.3 (2×), I 10.4 (2×), I 48, I 49.3, I 50, II 17.3, II 29.1, III 6.8, III 19.1, III 30.1, III 42

pact, *patto*, I 38.3, I 59, II 20, III 31.2, III 40.1, III 43
paradise, *paradiso*, II 2.2
pardon (n.), *perdono*, II 23.4, III 12.2; **pardon** (v.), *perdonare*, I 29.3, III 21.4. *See also* spare
parricide, *parricida*, I 27.2, II 23.3
partisan, *partigiano*, I 7.2 (2×), I 16.3 (4×), I 16.4 (2×), I 34.2, I 35, I 43, I 45.2, I 59, 1 Pr.1, III 6.19, III 22.4 (2×), III 22.5 (2×), III 24, III 28
partner, *compagno*, I 9.1, I 9.2, I 15, I 40.2, I 40.3 (2×), I 41, II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2 (9×), II 13.2, II 19.1, II 21.1, II 24.3, II 30.4, III 6.17, III 16.2, III 19.1 (2×). *Cf* company
party, *parte*,* I 7.2 (2×), I 7.5, I 17.1, I 33.3, I 37.2 (3×), I 40.5 (2×), I 49.2, I 52.3 (2×), I 59 (3×), II 2.1, II 2.2, II 14, II 15.2 (2×), II 22.1, II 25.1 (3×), III 6.6, III 14.1 (2×), III 27.2 (2×), III 27.3 (4×), III 27.4 (3×), III 35.1
passion, *passione*, I 37.1, I 58.3, II 12.4, II 15.1, II 17, II 31.2, III 8.2, III 35.2 (2×), III 43 (2×), III 46
past, *addietro*,* I 53.1, I 53.5, I 59, III 6.9, III 13.1, III 17, III 30.1, III 32, III 37.3, III 39.2; **past,** *passato*,* I 2.3, I 10.5, I 15, I 25, I 28, I 39.1, I 53.5, 1 Pr.1 (2×), 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 20, II 30.2, III 1.3, III 6.1, III 8.9, III 35.3, III 43 (2×)
path, *via*, 1 Pr.1 (2×), I 2.7, I 5.4. *See also* way
patrimony, *patrimonio*, II 2.3, III 2. *Cf* father
patron, *padrone*, I 10.5, III 12.1
peace, *pace, pax* (L), I 1.3, I 10.5 (2×), I 11.1, I 19.1, I 19.2 (3×), I 19.3 (3×), I 21.1 (2×), I 33.5, II 1.2, II 10.1, II 11.2 (2×), II 12.1, II 23.1 (L), II 23.2 (2×), II 23.2 (L), II 23.4 (L)(2×), II 24.1, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 25.1 (2×), II 27.1, II 27.4 (2×), II 30.1, II 30.4, II 33, III 11.2, III 12.2 (4×), III 16.1, III 27.1 (2×), III 31.2 (2×), III 31.4 (2×), III 32 T, III 32 (3×), III 42 (3×), III 44.1 (L); **peaceful,** *pacifico*, I 19.2, III 16.1; **peaceful,** *pacatus* (L), III 36.2
penalty, *pena*, I 31.1 (2×), I 31.2, I 45.3, I 57 (2×), I 58.3, III 5, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.18, III 29.1, III 32 (2×), III 35.3, III 49.1. *See also* punish
people, *popolo, populus* (L), *passim*, **people,** *popolare*, I 16.5 (2×), I 41, I 55.6; **people,** *gente*, III 14.3, III 27.4. For *popolare, see also* populace; for *gente, see also* arms, men-at-; men, new; race; troops
perchance, *a caso*, I 1.3; *per avventura*, III 10.2, III 11.2. For *caso*, see also chance; for *avventura, see also* perhaps; *cf* fortune; luck
perfect, *perfetto*, I 2.1 (3×), I 2.7, I 3 T, I 34.3, 1 Pr.3, III 39.2; **perfectly,** *perfettamente*, I 27.1, III 12.1, III 39.1; **perfection,** *perfezione*, I 2.1, I 2.2, I 2.7 (2×), I 40.3, III 6.3, III 6.12, III 6.15 (2×), III 8.1, III 31.3, III 37.1; **imperfect,** *imperfetto*, I 9.4
perhaps,, *forse*, I 9.1, II 24.1, III 7; **perhaps,** *per avventura*, I 9.1, I 12.1, I 15, I 28, I 37.3, II 24.3, III 24. For *per avventura, see also* perchance; *cf* fortune, captains of; luck
permit, *permettere*, I 5.2, I 10.3, I 12.2, I 33.3, I 37.2, II 2.2, II 24.4, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 37.3; **permitted,** *lecito, licet* (L), I 45.3, II 17.1, II 32.1, III 6.2 (3×), III 33.1 (L), III 34.4
perpetual, *perpetuo, perpetuus* (L), *in perpetuum* (L), I 9.2, I 10.1, I 13.2, I 27.1, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4 (L), III 6.18, III 17, III 22.3, III 30.1; **perpetually,** *in perpetuo*, I 34.2, II 30.2
philosopher, *filosofo* I 56, II 5.1, III 12.1
physician, *medico*, 1 Pr.1 (2×), I 39.2, III 49.1 (2×). *Cf* doctor; medicine
piety, *piatà, pietate*, I 54, III 4, III 13.1, III 34.1; **pious,** *pietoso, piatoso, pius* (L), I 27.1, III 12.2 (L), III 22.1; **impious,** *impio*, I 10.1, I 44.2, III 21.4 (2×), III 29. *See also* mercy
pity, *misericordia*, III 8.1
place,* *costituire*, I 14.2, III 6.3. *See also* constitute; institute

plan (v.), *disegnare*, I 2.3, I 7.5, I 11.1, I 21.1, I 23.2, I 23.4, I 33.5, I 40.1, I 47.2, I 52.1, I 55.2, II 3 (2×), II 6.2, II 9 (2×), II 12.1, II 32.1, II 33, III 6.12, III 16.1 (2×), III 37.3 (2×), III 39.2; **plan** (n.), *disegno*, I 6.4, I 9.4, I 11.3, I 14.2, I 18.5, II 9, II 12.3, II 18.1, II 18.4, II 24.4, II 29 T, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 6.7, III 6.19, III 6.20, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 30.1, III 37.3, III 45, III 48.1

pleasure, *piacere*, 1 Pr.2; **pleasures,** *piàciti*, III 2; **pleasure,** *voluptas* (L), II 19.2. *See also* favor

plebs, *plebe*, 12.7 (3×), I 3 T, I 3.2 (6×), I 4 T, I 4.1 (2×), I 5.1, I 5.2 (2×), I 6.2 (4×), I 6.3 (2×), I 7.1 (3×), I 7.5 (2×), I 8.1 (5×), I 11.1, I 11.2, I 13.1, I 13.2 (6×), I 29.3, I 32 (2×), I 37.1, I 37.2 (5×), I 37.3 (4×), I 39.2, I 40.1, I 40.2 (2×), I 40.3, I 40.4 (5×), I 40.5, I 40.6, I 40.7, I 41 (2×), I 44.1 (4×), I 46 (2×), I 47.1 (3×), I 47.2 (2×), I 48, I 49.1, I 50, I 51 (3×), I 52.1 (2×), I 53.1 (2×), I 54, I 55.1 (3×), I 55.2, I 57 T, I 57, I 60 (3×), II 25.1, III 1.3, III 5 (2×), III 8.1 (2×), III 11.1, III 19.1 (2×), III 24 (3×), III 26.1 (2×), III 28, III 33.1, III 34.1, III 46 (2×); **plebeian,** *plebeio*, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.2, I 13.1, I 47.1 (3×), I 48 (3×), I 56, III 26.1 (4×), III 35.1

pledge, *fede*, I 38.3. *See also* credit; faith; vouch

plot, *conspirazione*, I 2.3. *Cf* conspire

poet, *poeta*, II 5.1; **poetic,** *poetico*, II 12.2

poison (v.), *avvelenare*, II 31.2, III 6.19, III 20, III 21.4, III 49.1 (2×); **poison** (n.), *veleno*, I 3.2, I 6.4, III 6.19, III 6.20 (4×), III 49.1

policy, *partito*, I 6.3, I 10.1, I 14.2, I 22 (2×), I 23.1 (2×), I 23.2 (2×), I 31 T, I 31.1, I 32, I 33 T, I 33.2 (2×), I 33.5, I 37.3, I 38 T, I 38.1, I 38.2 (3×), I 38.3 (3×), I 38.4, I 40.3, I 40.4, I 52.1, I 52.3, I 53.1 (2×), I 53.2 (3×), I 53.3, I 54, I 59 (2×), II 10.2 (3×), II 10.3, II 11 T, II 11.2, II 12.1 (2×), II 14, II 15.1, II 15.2 (4×), II 18.2, II 18.4, II 20 (2×), II 22.1, II 23.2, II 23.4, II 25 T, II 25.1, II 27.1, II 33, III 10.1 (3×), III 10.2, III 11.2, III 17 (3×), III 18 T, III 18.1, III 23, III 32, III 33.1, III 37.4 (4×), III 41 (2×), III 44.3, III 45 T

politically, *politicamente*, III 8.1. *Cf* life, way of

pontificate, *pontificato*, III 9. 3. *Cf* pope

poor, *povero*, DL, 1 Pr.1, I 24.2, I 26 (2×), I 32, I 35, I 37.1, II 8.4, II 19.1, II 19.2, III 6.2, III 16.2, III 25 (2×), III 29; **poorly,** *povero*, II 7; **poverty,** *povertà*, DL, I 1.4, I 3.2, I 6.2, III 1.4, III 18.3, III 25 T, III 25 (9×); **poverty,** *poveraminte*, III 1.4

pope, *papa*, I 27.1 (4×), II 10.1 (2×), II 11.1, II 22.1 (6×), II 24.2 (3×), III 9.3, III 11.2, III 18.1, III 29, III 31.3 (2×), III 44.2 (3×), III 44.3 (2×). *Cf* pontificate

populace, *Popolani*, I 6.1; **populace,** *popolari*, II 21.2; **popular,** *popolare, popularius* (L), I 2.2 (2×), I 2.3 (2×), I 2.5, I 2.6 (2×), I 2.7, I 3.2, I 4.2, I 5.1, I 5.2, I 7.1, I 16.5 (2×), I 18.5, I 24.1, I 40.2, I 40.5, I 47.3 (2×), I 53.5, I 58.1, II 21, II 15.1, III 14.2, III 22.4 (L), III 34.4. *See also* people

populations, *populazioni*, II 8.1

power, *potenza*, 1 Pr.2, I 1.4, I 2.6, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.4 (2×), I 7.5, I 9.4, I 10.3, I 11.1, I 12.2 (2×), I 16.5, I 18.3 (3×), I 23.1, I 33.2, I 33.5 (2×), I 37.1, I 37.2, I 39.2, I 46, I 52 T, I 55.4, I 55.5, II 1.1, II 1.2 (2×), II 2.1, II 2.4, II 4.1, II 4.2 (4×), II 5.2, II 8.1, II 10.1 (2×), II 10.3, II 17.2, II 19.2, II 24.1, II 29.1 (2×), II 30.1, II 30.5, III 1.3, III 6.2, III 6.3, III 6.14, III 6.19, III 11.1, III 22.4, III 24, III 31.1, III 31.4, III 41, III 43, III 49.1; **power,** *potestà, potestas* (L), I 2.7, I 13.1, I 18.5, I 25, I 33.1, I 34.4, I 39.2 (3×), I 44.2, I 47.1, I 47.2, I 48, II 9, II 28.1, II 33, III 1.2, III 15.1, III 15.1 (L), III 30.1; **power,** *potente*, I 12.2 (2×), I 40.6, II 1.2 (3×), II 2.1, II 9 T, II 22.1, III 4, III 11.1 (2×); **powerful,** *potente, potens* (L), I 2.3 (2×), I 4 T, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.4, I 7.4 (2×), I 8.3, I 12.1, I 12.2 (4×), I 18.3, I 23.2, I 37.1, I 37.2, I 39.2, I 40.5, I 46, I 47.1, I 47.3, I 49.1, I 49.3 (4×), I 50, I 52 T, I 55.4, I 58.2, I 59, 1 Pr.1, II 1.1 (3×), II 1.2, II 2.3, II 3, II 4.1 (2×), II 5.2, II 6.2, II 9 (2×), II 10.1, II 12.4, II 13.2, II 17.2, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, II

27.2, II 27.4, II 30 T, II 30.1, II 30.4, III 1.4, III 2, III 6.20, III 11.1, III 12.1, III 15.2, III 18.3, III 29, III 34.2

praetor, *Pretore*, I 5.2, II 4.2 (2×), II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1, II 15.2, II 21 T, II 21.2 (2×), II 22.1, II 22.2; **praetorian,** *pretoriant*, I 10.4, III 6.10

praise (v.), *laudare, lodare*, DL (2×), 1 Pr.1, I 10.1 (4×), I 10.2, I 10.3, I 28, I 37.3, I 44.2, I 58.2, 1 Pr.1 (2×), 1 Pr.2 (5×), 1 Pr.3 (2×), III 2, III 6.3, III 20, III 22.4 (2×), III 40.1 (2×); **praise** (n.), *laude, laus* (L), 1 Pr.1, I 1.4, I 2.6 (2×), I 4.2, I 8.1, I 10.1 (2×), I 10.3, I 10.4, 1 Pr.2, II 4.2, II 29.1, II 33, III 10.1, III 13.3, III 18.1, III 19.1, III 38.1 (L); **praiseworthy,** *laudabile*, I 9.4, I 10 T, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 21.4 (2×), III 22.4 (2×), III 40.1, III 41, III 42

prayers, *prieghi*, I 22

precept, *precetto*, I 30.1

prelates, *prelati*, I 27.2, III 1.4

pride, *orgoglio*, II 24.2, III 16.1; **pride,** *superbia, superbia* (L), I 3.2, I 40.3, I 40.3 (L), I 40.4, I 41 T, I 47.2, II 14 T, III 23 (2×), III 43; **proud,** *superbo*, I 41, I 47.2, III 4 (2×), III 5 (2×), III 19.1, III 20, III 23; **to become proud,** *insuperbito*, I 46, II 26, II 27.2, II 27.3; **proudly,** *superbamente, superbe* (L), I 58.1 (L), I 58.2 (2×)

priest, *prete*, I 12.2, III 6.14; **priest,** *sacerdote*, I 15, I 25, III 6.2

prince, *principe, passim*, **principality**, *principato*, DL, I 2.1, I 2.2 (2×), I 2.3, I 2.5, I 2.6, I 2.7, I 6.2, I 16.4 (2×), I 26, I 55 T, I 55.5, I 55.6, I 59, II 1.3, II 9, III 4 T, III 4, III 5, III 6.18, III 6.19 (2×), III 9.2, III 34.3; **principate,** *principato*, I 10.6 (2×), I 27.1, I 52.3, III 6.3

private, *privato*, DL, I 1.6, I 2.3 (2×), I 7.2 (4×), I 8.1 (2×), I 10.2 (2×), I 26, I 36, I 37.2, I 46 (2×), I 47.3, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 6.1, II 19.1, II 28 T, II 28.1, III 1.6, III 5 (2×), III 6.1 (3×), III 6.2, III 22.4 (2×), III 25, III 28 (7×), III 34.2, III 47 T, III 47; **privately,** *privatamente*, III 8.1, III 28

prodigies, *prodigi*, I 13.1, I 56

profit, *profitto, profittare*, I 43, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 4.2, II 33, III 11.2, III 23

progress, *progressi*, III 21.2

property, *roba*, I 37.3 (2×), III 6.2 (2×), III 6.3, III 6.20, III 19.1, III 27.2. *Cf* belongings

proportion, *proporzione*, I 55.5, I 55.6, III 22.1, III 22.2 (2×); **disproportion,** *disproporzione*, I 6.1; *sproporzione*, III 22.1

proverb, *proverbio*, I 47.3, II 16.1, III 34.3

province, *provincia, provincale*, 1 Pr.2, I 12.1, I 12.2 (4×), I 26 T, I 26 (3×), I 37.1, I 53.3, I 53.4, I 55.2 (4×), I 55.3, I 55.4 (5×), I 55.5, I 56 T, I 56 (2×), I 58.2, I 59, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2 (5×), II 1.3 (3×), II 2.1 (6×), II 2.3, II 4.1 (5×), II 4.2, II 5.2, II 8.1 (3×), II 8.2 (3×), II 12.1, II 12.4, II 17.1, II 18.3, II 18.5, II 19.2 (5×), II 20, II 21.1, II 21.2, II 24.1, II 24.2, II 28.2, II 29.1, II 30.4, II 31.1, III 10.2, III 13.1, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.2 (2×), III 25, III 43 T, III 43

prudence, *prudenza, prudenzia*, I 6.1, I 11.3, I 14 T, I 19.4, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 30.1, I 33.3, I 37.3, I 38.1, I 38.2, I 39.2, I 44.2, I 45.2, I 49.1, I 51, I 53.2, I 58.3, I 60, 1 Pr.3, II 1.2, II 6.1, II 10.1, II 11.2, II 15.2 (2×), II 19.2 (2×), II 24.1, II 24.2 (2×), II 26, III 1.2, III 2, III 3, III 6.3 (2×), III 6.4, III 6.5, III 6.9, III 6.12, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.16, III 6.18 (2×), III 10.1, III 11.2, III 12.2, III 15.2, III 23, III 24, III 33.1 (2×), III 34 T, III 38.1, III 38.2; **prudent,** *prudente*, I 1.5, I 2.1 (2×), I 2.3, I 9.2 (2×), I 11.3, I 12.1 (2×), I 18.4, I 21.1, I 21.2, I 27.1, I 38.2, I 47.3, I 49.3, I 50, I 51, I 53.4, I 55.4, I 58.3 (2×), II 10.1, II 10.3, ii 11 T, II 14, II 23.4, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 26 (2×), II 27 T, II 27.1, II 27.4, III 1.2, III 2, III 4, III 5, III 6.4, III 6.6, III 6.8, III 6.15, III 12 T, III 12.1, III 12.2, III 12.3, III 22.2, III 23, III 37.4 (2×), III 43, III 49.3; **prudently,** *prudentemente*, I 2.5, I 5.1, I 11.4, I 11.5, I 14.3, I 46, II 33; **imprudence,** *imprudenza*, III 6.6; **imprudent,** *imprudente*, I 41 T, I 58.3; **imprudently,** *imprudemente*, I 35, I 40.5

public, *publico*, I 1.6 (2×), I 2.3 (2×), I 4.1, I 7.2, I 8.1 (2×), I 16.2 (2×), I 18.3, I 24.2, I 27.2, I 32, I 34.1 (2×), I 35 T, I 36 (3×), I 37.1, I 37.2 (2×), I 40.3, I 47.3, I 49.2, I 50, I 51, I 52.2, I 53.2, I 55.1, I 55.2, I 57, I 58.2, II 2.3, II 6.1 (2×), II 6.2, II 7, II 15.1, II 19.1, II 28 T, II 28.1, I II 5, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 22.4 (3×), III 23, III 24 (2×), III 25, III 28 (6×), III 30.1 (2×), III 31.4, III 34.2 (2×), III 42, III 47; **to make public**, *publicare*, I 40.4, III 6.20, III 34.4; **publicly,** *publicamente*, III 8.1

punish, *gastigare*, I 7.1, I 8.2, I 31.2 (2×), I 39.2, I 47.2, I 47.3, I 49.3, II 23.3 (2×), II 28.1 (2×), II 28.2, III 1.4, III 23, III 27.4, III 49.1 III 49.2; **punish,** *punire*, I 8.2 (2×), I 8.3, I 8.4 (4×), I 14 T, I 24.1, I 30.1, I 31 T (2×), I 31.1 (2×), I 31.2 (2×), I 34.2, I 40.3, I 49.3 (2×), II 28.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 6.20, III 22.3, III 28, III 29, III 33.1 (3×), III 36.2, III 49.2 (5×), III 49.3; **unpunished,** *impunito*, III 1.5, III 28, III 49.2 (2×); **punishment,** *pena, poena* (L), I 24 T, I 24.1 (2×), I 24.2, II 23.2 (L), II 26 (3×), III 1.3, III 6.4, III 6.9, III 12.1 (2×), III 12.2, III 19 T, III 19.1 (2×), III 19.1 (L), III 19.2, III 22.1; **punishment,** *punizione*, I 2.3, I 29.3, I 31.1, I 31.2, III 1.4, III 22.3 (2×), III 29, III 49.2. For *pena, see also* penalty

purge, *purgarsi, purgazione*, I 14.2, II 5.2 (2×)

pusillanimous, *pusillanimo*, II 32.1. *Cf* animus; intent; magnanimous; mind; spirit

queen, *regina*, II 12.1, III 4

race, *generazione*, I 10.1, II 5.2 (2×); *gente*, I 1.3, II 1.1, II 8.1. For *generazione, see also* generation; kind; *for gente, see also* arms, men-at-; men, new; people; troops; *cf* law; nation

rank, *grado*, DL, I 2.7, I 5.2, I 5.4, I 6.2 (3×), I 8.1 I 10.1 (2×), I 10.6, I 11.2, I 16.5, I 18.3 (2×), I 26, I 29.2, I 33.3, I 34.1, I 36 (2×), I 37.1, I 38.2, I 39.2, I 46 (2×), I 47.1, I 47.2 (2×), I 47.3, I 52.1, I 53.3, I 54, I 55.6, I 56, I 58.2, I 60 (2×), II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2, II 12.4, II 13.1 (2×), II 13.2, II 14, II 23.3, III 6.3, III 14.1 (2×), III 16.2 (2×), III 16.3, III 22.1, III 25 (2×), III 30.1, III 33.1, III 34.4 (4×), III 38.1 (2×); **rank,** *ordino*, II 16.1 (7×), II 17.5, II 18.3, II 18.4, II 29.1. *See also* condition; degree; favor

read, *leggere*, DL, 1 Pr.2 (2×), I 1.1, I 4.1, I 8.3, I 10.2, I 16.1, I 23.4, I 28, I 29.1, I 39.1, I 40.3, I 52.1, 1 Pr.3, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 5.1, II 8.2, II 13.1, II 18.3, II 20, II 29.1 (2×), II 30.2, II 33, III 3, III 6.10, III 6.19, III 7, III 12.2, III 22.6, III 30.1, III 31.4, III 35.1, III 40.1, III 42, III 43 (2×), III 46 (2×); **reading,** *lezione*, DL, I 10.4, II 2.1. *Cf* write

real, *giusto*, III 10.2. *See also* just

reason (n.), *ragione*, I 4.1, I 5.2 (2×), I 6.4 (2×), I 11.3, I 12.2 (2×), I 18.1, I 23.4, I 24.1, I 28, I 31.2, I 34.1, I 34.2, I 38.2, I 40.5, I 46 (2×), I 49.3, I 53.2, I 55.4 (2×), I 55.6, I 58.1, 1 Pr.2, II 1.1, II 2.1 (2×), II 12.1, II 12.3, II 16.1, II 17.1, II 17.5 (2×), II 18.1, II 18.2, II 22.2, II 23.3 (2×), II 24.1, II 27.1, II 32.1, III 5, III 8.1, III 10.2, III 16.1, III 21.2, III 33.1, III 33.2; **reason** (v.), *ragionare*, I 2.1, I 3.1, I 5.3, I 14.1, I 16.2, I 18.5, I 31.2, I 58.4 (2×), 1 Pr.1, II 8.1 (2×), II 8.3, II 11.2, II 31.1, III 5, III 6.1, III 6.2, III 6.20, III 19.1 (2×), III 25; **reasonable, reasonably,** *ragionevole, ragionevolmente*, I 5.2, I 16.1, I 33.2, I 36, I 46, I 47.1, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.3, II 5.1, II 5.2, II 7, II 9, II 22.1, II 23.2, III 1.2, III 6.2, III 6.15, III 28, III 35.2, III 48.1 (2×), III 48.2; **reasoning,** *ragionamento*, I 6.4, I 16.2, 1 Pr.3, III 6.6. For *ragione, see also* account; just; type; for *ragionamento, see also* argument; discuss

rebel (v.), *ribellarsi, ribello, rebello* (L), I 6.4, I 38.3, II 1.1, II 3 (2×), II 17.1, II 19.2, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.2 (3×), II 24.3, II 30.4, III 11.2, III 12.1, III 15.1, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22.1, III 32, III 44.1 (L); **rebel** (n.), *ribello*, II 31.2, III 6.16; **rebellion,** *ribellione, rebellion*, I 6.4, II 1.1, II 16.2, II 23.4, II 24.1, II 24.3 (3×), III 5, III 12.1, III 31.3, III 32, III 44.3

reborn, *rinascere*, I 17.3, II 24.1, III 1.2 (2×)

reform, *riformare*, I 9 T, I 9.2, I 17.1, I 25 T, I 25, I 49.2

reign, *regnare*, I 7.5, I 17.1, I 27.1, I 27.2, I 29.2, I 55.2, I 58.4, 1 Pr.3 (2×), II 2.1, III 2, III 4, III 14.1. *See also* rule; *cf* king

relative,* *parente*, I 35, III 2, III 6.7, III 6.17, III 8.1, III 34.2

religion, *religione, religio* (L), 1 Pr.2, I 9.1, I 10.1 (2×), I 11 T, I 11.1 (2×), I 11.2 (3×), I 11.3, I 11.4 (2×), I 12 T, I 12.1 (11×), I 12.2 (4×), I 13 T, I 13.1 (4×), I 13.2 (4×), I 1.4 T, I 14.1 (2×), I 14.2, I 15 T, I 15 (3×), I 55.1, I 55.2 (2×), 1 Pr.2, II 2.2 (6×), II 4.2, II 5.1 (2×), II 5.2, II 29.1, III 1.2 (3×), III 1.4 (3×), III 29 (L), III 33.1 (2×), III 33.1 (L); **religious,** *religiosa*, I 12.1, I 19.1, III 1.2. *Cf* sect

remedy (n.), *rimedio*, 1 Pr.2, I 2.2, I 4.1, I 6.2, I 7.5, I 13.1, I 13.2, I 15 T, I 15, I 16.4 (2×), I 16.6, I 26, I 30.2 (2×), I 32, I 33.1 (2×), I 33.2, I 33.4 (2×), I 33.5, I 34.2, I 34.3 (2×), I 37.2 (2×), I 39.1, I 46 (2×), I 49.1, I 49.3, I 50, I 53.5 (2×), I 54, I 57, I 58.4 (2×), II 1.2, II 9, II 12.4 (2×), II 16.2, II 17.3 (2×), II 17.5, II 18.1, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 23.3, II 26, II 27.4 (2×), II 29.1 (2×), II 30.3, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 1.6, III 6.6, III 6.8 (2×), III 6.9, III 6.17, III 6.18 (2×), III 6.19, III 10.1 (2×), III 11.1, III 11.2 (3×), III 16.2, III 17, III 24, III 25, III 26.2, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 32, III 35.3, III 46, III 49.4; **remedy** (n.), *rimediare*, II 29.1; **remedy** (v.), *rimediare*, I 16.4, I 33.1 (2×), I 33.2, I 34.3, I 37.2, I 47.3, I 53.2, I 57, II 4.1, III 6.17, III 15.1, III 21.4, III 26.2

remembrances, *memorie*, I 16.1. *See also* memory

renew, *rinnovare*, I 9.4, I 18.2, I 18.4 (2×), I 25, II 16.1, II 18.1, III 1.1 (2×), III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 1.5 (2×), III 22.3, III 34.2; **renewal,** *rinnovazione*, III 1.1, III 1.4 (2×). *Cf* innovate

repent, *ravvedersi*, II 18.5; **repent,** *pentirsi*, I 16.5, I 58.3, III 6.7

republic, *republica, respublica* (L), *passim*, **republic**, *res** (L), II 23.2

reputation, *riputazione*, I 3.2, I 6.1, I 7.5, I 8.1, I 9.4, I 19.3, I 19.4, I 24.1, I 29.1 (2×), I 29.3, I 33.1, I 33.3 (2×), I 40.5, I 45.2 (2×), I 46, I 52.2 (3×), I 52.3, I 55.6, II 1.2, II 5.1, II 5.2, II 6.1, II 9, II 13.2 (2×), II 18.3 (4×), II 18.5 (3×), II 19.2, II 22.2, II 29.2, II 30 T, II 30.2, II 32.2, III 1.2, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 3, III 6.19, III 15.2, III 16.1 (2×), III 16.2, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.4, III 22.6, III 24, III 28 (5×), III 30.1, III 33.1, III 34.2 (4×), III 34.3 (2×), III 37.2 (2×), III 37.3, III 37.4, III 38.1, III 43; **reputation,** *reputato*, II 18.3, III 6.3; **reputation,** *opinion*,* II 11 T; **repute,** *reputazione*, I 6.2; **reputed,** *riputato*, I 29.3, I 48, I 54, II 5.1, II 24.2, III 6.8, III 13.3, III 16.1, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 28 (2×), III 30.1 (2×), III 34.2, III 37.2. For *opinione, see also* believe; opinion

respect, *rispetto*, 1 Pr.1, I 2.3 (2×), I 2.6, I 7.1, I 8.2, I 24.2, I 27.1, I 46, I 58.2, I 58.3, I 60 T, I 60 (2×), II 1.2, II 9, II 17.2, II 24.1, II 24.2, III 3 (2×), III 6.16, III 6.19 (3×), III 8.1 (2×), III 35.2; **respectfully,** *rispetttvamente, III* 9.1. *See also* hesitate; thank

reveal, *rivelare*, III 6.5, III 6.16; **revelations,** *revelazioni*, I 56

revenge, *vendetta*, II 2.1 (2×), II 26, III 6.18. *See also* vengeance; *cf* avenge

reverence, *reverenza, riverenzia*, I 2.3, I 10.5, I 11.5, I 12.1, I 36, I 53.1, I 54 (2×), II 20, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.15, III 22.6; **reverent,** *reverente,* III 22.1, III 25; **reverend,** *riverendo*, I 54 (2×)

review (v.), *discorrere*, I 11.1, I 58.3, II 20, III 13.1, III 29. *See also* discourse; discuss

reward (n.), *premio, praemium* (L), 1 Pr.1, I 16.3, I 24 T, I 24.1, I 24.2 (2×), I 29.1, I 29.2 (2×), I 60 (2×), I 60 (L), II 30.2, III 3, III 28 (2×), III 35.1; **reward** (v.), *premiare*, I 8.4, I 10.5, I 24.1, I 29.1 (2×), I 29.3, I 30.1, I 31.1; **reward** (v.), *rimunerare*, I 16.3, III 23

rich, *ricco*, I 10.5, I 26 (2×), I 34.2, I 37.1, I 53.1, II 6.2 (2×), II 19.1, III 26.1, III 28, III 29; **to become rich,** *arricchire*, I 37.2, II 6.2, III 25; **enrich,** *arricchire*, I 27.1, I 53.1, II 6.1, III 25; **riches,** *ruchezze*, DL, I 2.3, I 5.4, I 10.5 (2×), I 16.3, I 29.1, I 35, I 55.6, II 2.1 (2×), II 2.3, II 12.1, III 16 T, III 16.2, III 25 (2×). *See also* wealth

right,* rightly, *diritto,* dirittamente*, DL, I 2.1, I 2.7, I 35

rites, *riti*, I 12.1. *Cf* ceremony

royal, *regio*, III 3. *See also* king

rule (v.), *imperare*, II 21.2; **rule** (n.), *imperio, imperium* (L), I 6.2 (2×), II 21.2 (3×), II 23.2 (L), II 23.3; **rule** (v.), *reggere, rego* (L), I 6.1, I 10.3, I 19.3, II 4.1, II 25.1, III 5 (2×), III 19 T, III 19.1, III 19.1 (L); **rule** (n.), *regola*, I 9.2, I 18.1, II 18.2, II 33, III 22.1; **rule** (v.), *regnare*, III 8.1. For *imperare* and *imperio, see also* command; empire; for *regnare, see also* reign; *cf* king

rumor, *romore*,* I 40.3; *fama*, II 12.2. *See also* fame; noise; *cf* infamy

sacrifice (n.), *sacrificio*, I 12.1 (2×), I 15.1 (2×), I 25 (3×), II 22.2 (2×); **sacrifice** (v.), *sacrificare,* III 45; **sacrificing,** *Sacrificulo*, I 25

safety, *salute*, I 8.1, I 11.5, I 53.2, I 57, I 58.2, III 1.1 (2×), III 3, III 11.2, III 18.1 (2×), III 30.1, III 30.2, III 41. *See also* greetings; health; salvation; *cf* salutary

salutary, *salutifero*, I 33 T, I 33.5. *Cf* safety; salvation

salvation, *salute, salus* (L), II 8.1, III 6.15, III 39.2 (L). *See also* greetings; health; safety; *cf* salutary

satisfy, *soddisfare, sodisfare, satisfare*, DL, I 4.1, I 5.2, I 16.5 (4×), I 25, I 29.1, I 40.5, I 44.2 (2×), I 50, I 55.1, II 23.4, II 29.3, III 2, III 23, III 28, III 30.1, III 32; **satisfaction,** *soddisfazione, sodisfazione, satisfazione*, DL, I 10.1, I 16.5, I 25, I 37.1, I 55.1, II 27.4, II 28.1 (2×), III 5 (2×)

scandal, *scandolo*, I 3.2, I 5.2, I 7.4, I 8.3, I 16.4, I 17.3 I 37 T, I 37.2, I 37.3, I 39.1, I 54, I 55.3, II 19.2, III 27.2, III 30.1 (2×); **scandalous,** *scandoloso*, I 37 T, I 37.1, I 52 T, I 52.1, II 23.3

science, *scienza*, III 39.1, III 39.2

secret, *secreto, segreto*, I 52.2, III 6.2, III 6.5 (2×), III 6.7

sect, *setta*, I 7.3, I 8.3 (2×), I 12.1, 1 Pr.2 (2×), II 5 T, II 5.1 (7×), III 1 T, III 1.1, III 1.2, III 1.4, III 1.6, III 25. *Cf* religion

secure (v.), *assicurare*, I 1.4, I 16.4 (4×), I 16.5 (3×), I 29.1, I 30.1, I 32 (2×), I 37.1, I 40.6, I 45.2, I 45.3, II 23.2 (2×), II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.4, II 30.2, III 4, III 6.4, III 6.10, III 6.11, III 6.18, III 22.6 (2×), III 37.3, III 38.1; **secure** (adj.), *sicuro, securo*, I 10.5 (2×), I 10.6, I 16.4, I 16.5 (4×), I 18.3, I 33.2, I 40.6, I 52 T, II 3, II 4.2, II 6.1, II 17.2 (2×), II 17.3, III 2, III 4 T, III 4, III 6.18, III 6.19, III 10.1, III 10.3, III 18.2, III 18.3, III 27.2, III 45; **securely,** *sicuramente, sicuro*, I 1.1, I 1.3, I 2.1, I 5 T, I 5.4, II 2.2, II 4.2, II 24.2, III 2, III 5; **security,** *sicurtà*, I 3.2, I 10.1, I 10.2, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 16.5 (2×), I 18.3, II 21.2, II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.2, III 5, III 33.1

sedition, *sedizione*, I 10.5, I 13.2, I 24.2, II 26 (2×), III 26.1 (2×)

sempiternal, *sempiterno*, I 10.6. *Cf* eternal

Senate, *Senato*, I 2.7 (4×), I 3.2 (2×), I 4 T, I 4.1 (2×), I 6 T, I 6.1 (2×), I 6.2, I 6.3 (2×), I 6.4, I 7.1 (2×), I 7.5 (2×), I 8.1 (2×), I 9.2 (2×), I 10.4, I 10.5, I 11.1 (2×), I 11.2, I 13.2 (2×), I 18.2, I 32 (2×), I 34.2, I 35 (3×), I 37.2, I 37.3, I 38.1, I 38.2 (2×), I 40.1, I 40.3, I 40.4 (4×), I 40.7 (2×), I 44.1 (3×), I 47.2 (4×), I 47.3 (2×), I 48, I 49.1, I 50 (3×), I 51 (3×), I 52.3 (3×), I 53.1 (3×), I 53.3 (2×), I 53.4, I 54, I 55.1 (4×), I 55.2, I 56, I 57, II 20, II 23.2 (3×), II 23.4 (3×), II 25.1, II 27.1 (2×), II 28.1, II 29.1, II 33 (8×), III 1.2. Ill 4, III 5 (3×), III 6.15, III 6.16, III 6.19 (4×), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 11.1, III 11.2, III 17, III 22.6, III 24 (5×), III 25 (2×), III 28, III 30.1 (2×), III 31.2, III 32, III 42 (2×), III 46, III 47; **senator,** *Senatore*, I 40.4 (2×), I 47.2 (5×), II 23.4, III 47; **senatorial,** *senatorio*, I 31.2, I 35, I 47.2, I 53.3. *Cf* father

sentence, *sentenza, sentenzia*, I 29.1, I 40.4, I 45.2, I 46, II 10.1 (2×). *See also* judge; verdict

sermons, *predicazione*, I 45.2, III 1.4; *prediche*, III 30.1

serve, *servire, servio* (L), I 11.2, I 13 T, I 13.1, I 13.2, I 21.3, I 36, I 58.1 (L), I 58.2, II 2.4 (2×), II 15.2, II 16.2, III 12.1, III 23; **servile, servilely,** *servo*, I 16.5, I 22, I 34.1, I 37.3, I 40.5, I 49 T, I 49.2, I 49.3, I 55.4, II 2.3, II 13.2 (2×), II 16.1 (2×), II 18.3, II 27.4, III 8.2 (2×), III 12.2, III 24 T, III 24; **servitude,** *servitù, servitus* (L), I 2.1, I 16.1, I 16.4, I 21.3, I 28, I 37.3, I 40.4 (L), I 46,

II 2.1, II 2.4 (3×), II 13.2 (L), II 21.2, II 22.1, II 23.4 (L), II 26, III 7 T (2×), III 13.3, III 24, III 26.2. *See also* slave; *cf* military

shade, *ombra*, II 30.2; **shadow,** *ombra, umbra* (L), I 25 T, I 25, I 28, I 30.2, I 46, II 13.2 (L)

shame, *vergogna, vergognare*, I 11.2, I 34.4, I 38.3, I 58.1, II 9, II 15.1, II 23.3, II 31.2 (2×), III 10.2, III 14.3, III 41, III 42; **shameful,** *vergognoso*, II 24.2, II 26, III 30.1, III 42; **to be ashamed,** *vergognarsi*, I 21.1, I 36, I 38.1, I 47.1, I 48 (2×), II 4.2, II 27.4, III 1.3

shepherd, *pastore*, III 40.2, III 48.1

signoria, *Signoria*, I 39.2, I 45.2 (2×). *Cf* lord; master

silent, to keep or **to be,** *tacere*, III 10.1, III 15.2, III 35.2 (2×), III 42, III 47; **silence,** *tacere*, III 6.6

silver, *argento, ariento*, II 6.2, II 10.1, III 25 (2×)

sin, *peccare, peccato*, I 7.1, I 10.5, I 29.1, I 31.2, I 58.3, II 18.3, II 23.3, II 28.1, III 29 T, III 29 (3×), III 49.3

sister, *sorella*, I 7.5, I 22, I 24.1, I 27.1, III 6.15

site, *sito*, I 1.1, I 1.2, I 1.4 (5×), I 1.5, I 21.1, I 23.3, I 53.1, II 3, II 10.1, II 11.1, II 17.3, II 17.5, II 24.2, II 32.1, III 39 T, III 39.1

slave, *schiavo*, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 27.2; **slave,** *servo, serviens* (L), I 10.5, I 13.2, II 26, III 6.5 (3×), III 6.7, III 6.14, III 13.3, III 31.2, III 44.1 (L). *See also* serve

slay, slayer, *uccidere, ucciditore*, II 2.1, III 6.14, III 32. *Cf* kill

son, *figliuolo, filius* (L), I 2.3, I 11.1, I 16.4, I 16.6, I 19.2 (3×), II 2.3, II 8.2 (L), II 12.2, II 16.1 (2×), II 24.2 (3×), II 28.2, III 1.3 (2×), III 3 T, III 3 (3×), III 4 (4×), III 5 (3×), III 6.2, III 6.5, III 6.8, III 6.18 (2×), III 6.20, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 31.3, III 34.2 (2×), III 44.3; **son-in-law,** *genero, gener* (L), II 28.2, III 4, III 6.2 (L), III 6.2, III 25. *See also* child; daughter

sort,* *sorte, sorta*, I 37.2, I 40.6, II 6.2, II 19.1, II 32.1, III 6.2, III 7 (2×). *See also* fate; lot; luck

spare, *perdonare*, I 8.2, II 24.2, II 26. *See also* pardon

species, *spezie*, I 2 T, I 28, I 55.4, III 28. *See also* appearance

spirit, *animo, animus* (L), I 2.3, I 3.1, I 3.2, I 5.2, I 15, I 27.2, I 29.3, I 31.1, I 41, I 43, I 45.2 (2×), I 45.3 (3×), I 47.1 (2×)(L), I 55.4, I 55.5, I 57, I 60, 1 Pr.3, II 2.1, II 2.2, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 15.1 (3×), II 16.1 (2×), II 18.2, II 19.2 (L), II 21.2, II 23.2 (L), II 23.4, II 23.4 (L), II 24.1, II 26, II 29 T, II 29.1 (L), II 32.1, III 1.3, III 5, III 6.2 (6×), III 6.6 (3×), III 6.8, III 6.12 (2×), III 6.13, III 6.14 (2×), III 6.15 (2×), III 6.15 (L), III 6.16, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.3, III 12.1, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 20, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.5, III 23, III 25 (3×), III 28, III 30.1, III 31 T, III 31.1, III 31.1 (L), III 31.2 (L), III 31.3 (4×), III 31.4, III 32, III 33.1 (L), III 36.2 (3×), III 37.2, III 37.3 (2×), III 38.1, III 48.1, III 49.2; **spirit,** *spirito*, II 29.2, III 31.4; **to give spirit,** *inanimare*, III 31.4; **spirited,** *animoso*, I 53.2 (2×), 1 Pr.3, II 14, II 18.2 (2×), III 6.15, III 6.19, III 33.1; **spiritedly,** *animosamente*, I 30.1, II 24.2, III 1.3, III 34.3; **spiritedness,** *animosita*, I 7.3. For *animo, see also* animus; intent; mind; *cf* magnanimous; pusillanimous; for *inanimare, see also* inspire; *cf* animate

spokesmen, *oratori*, I 38.3, II 2.4, II 10.1, II 15.2, II 27.1, II 27.2, II 28.1 (2×), II 29.1, II 30.4, III 31.2, III 32. *Cf* oration

stable, *stabile*, I 2.5, I 7.1, I 58.3 (2×), I 59, III 32; **stability,** *stabilita*, I 58.3, I 59; **stabilize,** *stabilire,* I 2.7, I 40.1, I 40.2

state, *stato, status* (L), *passim*

steel, *ferro*, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 58.4 (2×), II 10.1 (2×), II 10.2 (2×), II 17.4, II 30.2, III 6.15, III 6.20, III 12.3, III 14.1

storm, storming, *espugnazione, espugnare*, I 38.3, II 17.1, II 32.1 (4×), II 32.2. *See also* capture

strength, *fortezza*, I 15, II 2.2 (2×), II 10.1, III 6.6, III 22.3 (2×); **strength,** *forze*, I 6.3, I 9.4 (2×), I 33.1, I 33.2 (2×), I 33.5 (2×), II 2.1, II 4.1, II 12.2, II 30 T, III 6.20, III 13.1, III 22.4, III 28.

For *fortezza, see also* fortress; for *forze, see also* force
stroke, *tratto*, I 2.1, I 16.5, I 18.3, I 18.4 (2×), I 21.1, I 27.1, I 45.3, I 50, I 52.2, II 4.1, III 6.19, III 12.3, III 31.3, III 43, III 44.3
strong, strongly, *forte*,* I 1.4, I 1.5, I 6.4, I 17.1, I 33.3, II 2.2 (3×), II 6.1, II 10.1, II 16.2, II 17.4, II 19.1, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 30.1, III 6.6, III 18.3, III 22.1 (3×), III 22.2, III 22.3 (2×), III 30.1, III 31 T; **strongholds,*** *luoght forti*,* III 10.1, III 10.3
struggle, *fazione* I 29.1, II 18.3, II 32.1, III 33.1, III 39.1, III 45. *See also* faction
stupidity, *stultizia*, I 44.2, III 2
succession, *successione*, I 2.3, I 9.2, I 11.4, I 17.1, I 17.3, I 20 T (2×), I 20 (3×)
suitable, *conveniente*, III 9.1 (2×), III 11.2. *See also* convenient; fitting
sun, *Sole*, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 30.2, II 30.5, III 23
superintendents, *provveditori*, II 33, III 31.3
supernatural, *soprannaturale*, I 56. *Cf* nature
suspect (v.), *dubitare*, I 45.3, III 6.16, III 6.19, III 22 2; **suspect** (v.), *sospettare*, I 28 (2×), I 29.3, I 33.2, III 22.6; **suspect** (adj.), **suspicion,** *sospetto, suspizione*, I 4.1, I 6.3, I 16.3, I 28, I 29.1 (3×), I 29.2, I 29.3 (5×), I 30.1 (2×), I 30.2, I 31.1, I 40.3, I 52.2 (2×), II 2.1, II 13.2, III 6.9, III 6.20 (2×), III 8.1, III 22.4, III 22.6 (2×), III 35.3; **suspicious,** *sospettoso*, I 28, I 29.1. For *dubitare, see also* doubt; fear; hesitate
swear, *giurare*, I 11.1 (3×), I 13.2, I 15 (4×), I 17.1, III 2, III 6.7 (2×), III 34.3. *Cf* conspire; oath

tax (v.), *taglieggiare*, II 27.3; **taxes,** *tributi*, I 8.1, I 51 (2×), I 52.1, II 6.2; **tax,** *gabelle*, I 32; **tax,** *gravezze,* I 39.2 (2×)
teach, *insegnare*, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, II 18.2, III 38.1, III 39.1
temple, *tempio, templo*, I 10.5, I 12.1 (4×), II 1.1, II 28.2, III 6.2
temporal, *temporale*,* I 12.2 (2×)
temporize, *temporeggiarsi*, I 33 T, I 33.2, I 33.5 (2×), I 37.2, I 37.3, III 11.2 (3×) terror, *terrore*, I 13.2, I 23.2, II 22.2, III 1.3, III 14.3, III 21.4, III 37.2 (2×), III 37.4, III 38.1; **terrible,** *terribile*, II 2.2, III 49.2; **terrify, terrified,** *sbigottire, dare sbigottimento, sbigottito*, I 10.6, I 11.1, I 11.5, I 13.1, I 15, I 23.4, I 31.1, I 40.3, I 55.5, II 10.1, III 3, III 6.14 (2×), III 7, III 9.1, III 14.1, III 14.3 (3×), III 25, III 31.2, III 31.4, III 33.1, III 37.3
testimony, *testimonio, tesiimone, testimonanza*, I 3.2, I 58.3, I 60, 1 Pr.1, II 18.4, III 34.4, III 36.2. *See also* witness
text, *testo*, I 8.2, I 40.5, I 54 (2×), I 57, I 58.3, II 11.1, II 14, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 20, II 23.4, II 29.2, III 26.2, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 36.2, III 39.2
thank, *ringraziare*, I 31.2 (2×); thanks to, *rispetto a*, II 17.2, II 19.2. *See also* hesitate; respect
theology, *teologia*, II 5.1
think, *pensare, passim*
thrift, *parsimonia*, II 19.2
thrust, *impeto, empito*, I 1.1, I 33.5, I 53.2, I 57, II 12.4, II 17.1 (4×), II 17.5, II 19.1, II 24.2, II 24.4, II 29.1, III 11 T, III 11.2, III 31.4 (2×), III 36.2, III 43, III 45 T, III 45 (3×). *See also* impetuosity; vehemence
title, *titolo*,* I 34.1 (2×), II 4.1 (3×), II 19.2, III 10.1, III 38.1 (2×)
tongue, *lingua*, III 12.1. *See also* language
town, *terra*, I 12.2, I 13.1, I 27.1, I 37.2, I 38.3, I 39.2, I 51, I 55.2, I 55.4, I 55.6, II 2.1, II 2.3 (2×), II 12.3, II 17.1 (7×), II 17.2 (5×), II 17.3, II 17.4 (3×), II 18.3, II 19.2, II 20 (2×), II 21.1, II 23.2 (4×), II 24.3 (5×), II 26, II 27.2 (2×), II 29.1, II 30.4, II 31.2, II 32 T, II 32.1 (4×), II 32.2, II 33, III 6.2, III 6.20 (2×), III 10.2, III 10.3, III 10.4 (2×), III 11.2, III 12.1 (3×), III 12.2

(2×), III 14.1, III 15.1, III 20 (4×), III 21.4, III 26.1, III 27.3 (2×), III 27.4 (3×), III 29, III 32, III 37.3, III 44.1, III 49.1; **fortified town,** *castello*,* III 27.4. *See also* earth; ground; land

traitor, *traditore*, III 6.15, III 35.3

treasure, *tesoro*, I 8.1 (2×), II 10.1 (4×), II 10.2; **treasury,** *erario*, II 6.2 (2×), II 10.1

treatise, *trattato*, II 1.3, II 2.1, III 19.1, III 42. *See also* treatment; treaty

treatment,* *trattato*, I 43. *See also* treatise; treaty

treaty, *capitolo*, II 9; *trattato*, II 32.1. *See also* chapter; treatise; treatment

tribunals, *tribunali*, 1 Pr.2, III 3

tribune, *tribune, tnbunus* (L), I 2.7, I 3 T, I 3.2, I 4.1, I 4.2, I 5.2, I 6.4, I 7.1 (2×), I 11.1 (2×), I 13.1 (4×), I 13.2 (6×), I 18.2, I 18.3, I 35 (4×), I 37.1, I 37.2 (2×), I 39.2 (3×), I 40.2, I 40.3, I 40.4 (2×), I 40.7, I 44.1 (2×), I 45.3, I 46, I 47.1 (2×), I 48, I 50 (2×), I 51, I 52.1, I 57, I 58.3, II 28.1, II 29.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 6.8 (2×), III 8.1 (2×), III 11.1 (2×), III 11.2, III 12.2, III 15.1, III 15.1 (L), III 22.1, III 24, III 30.1 (4×), III 33.1, III 34.1 (2×), III 39.2, III 39.2 (L), III 46; **tribunate** (n.), *Tribunate*, I 13.1, I 50; **tribunate** (adj.), *tribunizio*, I 6.4, I 39.2, I 40.5, III 11.1

triumph (n.), *trionfo*, II 6.2, III 22.1, III 23, III 25, III 28, III 34.2, III 34.3 (2×); **triumph** (v.), *trionfare*, I 10.5, I 60, II 6.2 (2×); **triumphal,** *trionfale*, III 23

troops, *genti, gente*, I 23.2, I 23.4, I 27.1, I 38.3 (3×), I 53.5, I 59, II 15.2, II 16.2 (3×), II 18.4 (2×), II 19.1, II 20, II 22.1 (2×), II 24.2, II 27.2, II 31.1, III 10.2, III 14.1, III 14.3, III 15.2, III 18.3 (3×), III 35.1, III 43, III 44.2, III 44.3, III 47, III 48.2. *See also* arms, men-at; men, new; people; race

trouble,* *guerra*, III 6. 2. *See also* war

trust (v.), *confidare, confidarsi*, I 1.3, I 5.4, I 23.2, I 32, I 38.3, I 55.1, I 59 T, II 11.1, II 18.1, II 18.4, III 6.6, III 6.8, III 6.20, III 13 T, III 13.3, III 33.1 (4×); **trusted,** *confidente*, II 25.1, III 6.16; trust (v.), *fidarsi*, I 38.3, I 57, I 59 T, I 59, II 11.1 (2×), II 17.1, II 17.5, II 20, III 6.4 (2×), III 31.4, III 40.1, III 43; **entrust oneself,** *fidarst*, III 10.1; **trust** (n.), *fidanza*, III 33.2; **distrust,** *diffidare*, I 38.3. For *confidare* and *confidente, see also* confident; for *fidarsi, cf* faith; vouch

truth, *vero,** *verum* (L), I 4.1, I 58.3, II 6.1, II 23.4, II 26 (L), III 6.5, III 6.14; **truth,** *verità*, I 3.1, I 4.1, I 8.2, I 12.2, I 21.1, I 56, I 58.3, 1 Pr.1 (2×), 1 Pr.2, II 2.2, II 7, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 22.2, III 27.4, III 34.4

tumult, *tumultuare, tumulto, tumultuartamente*, I 2.1, I 4.1 (6×), I 4.2, I 5 T, I 5.4, I 6.1 (3×), I 6.2 (2×), I 6.3 (2×), I 6.4, I 7.1, I 7.2, I 8.1, I 12.1, I 13 T, I 13.2, I 17.2, I 17.3, I 40.4, I 46, I 47.2 (2×), I 52.1 (2×), I 53.3, I 54 (3×), II 2.1, III 1.3, III 8.1, III 12.2, III 22.6, III 24, III 26.1, III 27.1, III 27.2, III 30.1, III 46; **tumultuous, tumultuously,** *tumultuouso, tumultuario, tumultuosamente, tumultuariamente*, I 4.1 (2×), I 58.4, II 3, II 25.1, II 29.1, III 13.3, III 14.1, III 30.2 (2×)

type, *ragione*, I 2.2, I 10.1, 1 Pr.2, II 17.3, III 21.1, III 36.2. *See also* account; just; reason

tyrant, *tiranno, tirannus* (L), I 2.3, I 16.5 (2×), I 27.1 (2×), I 34.1, I 35, I 37.2, I 40.5 (3×), I 40.6 (2×), I 58.2, I 58.4, II 2.1 (3×), II 15.2, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.2 (L), III 6.7 (2×), III 6.16 (6×), III 6.19 (3×), III 6.20, III 26.2; **tyranny,** *tirannide*, I 2.3 (2×), I 2.6, I 9.4, I 10 T, I 10.1, I 12.2, I 16.3, I 17.1, I 25, I 29.3, I 34.1 (2×), I 40.1, I 40.5 (7×), I 40.7, I 41, I 42, II 2.1 (3×), III 3 (3×), III 6.2, III 6.7 (2×), III 6.19 (3×), III 8.1, III 8.2 (2×), III 22.6, III 28 T, III 28; **tyrannical, tyrannically,** *tirannico, tirannicamente*, I 2.2, I 9.2, I 16.3, III 3.1, III 5, III 7; **tyrannize,** *tiranneggiare*, I 40.5, II 2.1; **tyrannicides,** *tirannicidi*, II 2.1

uncle, *zio*, II 13.1 (2×), II 31.1. *Cf* cousins; nephew

union, *unione*, I 3.2, I 6.2, I 6.3, I 47.2, II 25.1 (2×); **disunion,** *disunione*, I 2.7 (2×), I 4 T, I 4.1, I 12.2, II 25 T, II 25.1 (4×)

unite, united, *unire, unito*, I 1.1, I 1.4, I 6.1, I 6.2 (2×), I 12.1 (2×), I 12.2, I 33.5, I 47.2, I 55.2, I 57, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 16.1, II 19.2, II 25.1 (2×), III 8.1, III 11.1, III 21.4, III 27 T, III 27.4, III 33.1; **disunite,** *disunire*, I 50, II 25 T, II 25.1 (4×), III 11.1, III 15.1; **disunite,** *disgiungere*, II 2.1, II 4.2, II 24.1, III 11.2

universal, universally, *universale, universalmente, universus* (L), I 1 T, I 6.4, I 16.5, I 18.1, I 47.1 (L), I 53.5, I 58.3, II 5.2, II 6.1, II 17 T, II 17.1, III 6.2 (3×). *See also* collectivity

upset (v.), *alterare*, I 39.2, II 23.4, III 14.2. *See also* alter

usage, *uso,** DL, I 12.1, I 55.3, II 3, II 6.1, II 6.2, II 16.1; **usage,** *usanza*, I 34.3, II 18.3

useful, *utile*, I 1.4, I 7.1 (3×), I 7.5, I 8 T, I 9.4, I 16.3, I 33.1 (2×), I 45.2 (2×), I 50 (3×), I 52.3, I 53.1, I 53.2, I 54, I 58.3, I 59, II 6.1 (3×), II 17.1, II 17.2, II 17.6, II 18.2, II 19.1, II 20, II 23.4, II 24 T, II 24.1 (3×), II 24.2 (3×), II 24.4, II 32.1, III 2, III 3, III 10.2 (2×), III 12.1, III 18.1, III 22.1, III 22.3, III 22.4, III 22.6 (2×), III 23, III 25, III 30.1, III 35.2, III 39.2 (2×), III 45; **usefulness,** *utile*, II 4.2 (2×), II 6.2, III 30.1; **usefully,** *utile, utilmente*, I 7.5, I 38.3; **useless,** *disutile*, II 24.1, III 14.2; **useless,** *inutile, inutilis* (L), I 7.5, I 36, I 41 T, I 44 T, I 53.1, II 4.1 (2×), II 4.2 (3×), II 17.2, II 17.5 (2×), II 17.6, II 20, II 24.1, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 24.4 (3×), II 29.1 (2×), II 32.2, III 14.3, III 15.1 (L), III 27.1, III 27.2, III 30.2, III 35.3, III 36.2, III 37.4; **uselessly,** *inutilmente*, II 25.1; **uselessness,** *inutilità*, I 18.4, I 43, I 44.1 II 18.2, II 24.2, III 15.1, III 27.3. *See also* utility

usurp, *usurpare*, I 5.2 (2×), I 8.1, III 4, III 11.2; **usurpation,** *usurpazione*, I 2.3

utility, *utile*, I 59 (3×), II 12.4, II 30.2, III 25; **utility,** *utilità*, 1 Pr.1, 1 Pr.2, I 8.1, I 10.1, I 42, I 50, I 53.2, I 59 (2×), II 2.1, II 6.1, II 17.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 26 T, II 32.1, III 8.1, III 22.4, III 23, III 24, III 30.1. *See also* common benefit; useful

vehemence, *impeto*, II 2.1. *See also* impetuosity; thrust

venerate, *venerare*, I 12.1; **veneration,** *venerazione*, I 12.1

vengeance, *vendetta*, III 5, III 6.2 (2×), III 6.3, III 6.18, III 7. *See also* revenge; *cf* avenge

vent, *sfogare, isfogare*, I 4.1, I 7.1 (4×), I 7.3, I 7.4, I 7.5, I 14.2, I 37.3, II 28.2, III 6.2, III 6.20

verdict, *sentenza, sentenzia*, 1 Pr.2, I 37.1, I 58.2, III 1.5, III 6.1. *See also* judge; sentence

vice, *vizio*, I 2.2, I 29.1, I 29.3, I 30 T, I 30.2, 1 Pr.2, 1 Pr.3, III 20, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 43

victor, *vincitore*, I 22, 1 Pr.1, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 22.1 (3×), II 22.2 (3×), III 18.2; **victory,** *vittoria, victoria* (L), I 1.5, I 14.1, I 14.2, I 14.3, I 15 (L), I 22, I 29.1 (3×), I 29.2 (2×), I 29.3, I 30.1 (2×), I 30.2, I 31.2, I 53.5 (2×), 1 Pr.1, II 1.1 (2×), II 1.2, II 13.2, II 15.2, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.5, II 18.1, II 18.3, II 22.1 (2×), II 22.2 (3×), II 26, II 27.1 (5×), II 27.4 (4×), II 33 (3×), III 12.2, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 18.2, III 18.3, III 19.1, III 20 (2×), III 21.1, III 22.1 (L), III 22.4 (3×), III 24, III 31.2, III 33.1 (2×), III 33.2 (2×), III 34.2 (2×), III 36.2, III 37.3, III 40.2, III 42, III 45 (2×) **victorious,** *vittorioso*, I 43, 1 Pr.1, II 19.2, III 14.1, III 18.1, III 18.2. *See also* conquer

vindictive, *vendicativo*, III 16.2. *Cf* avenge

vile, *vile*, I 48 T (2×), I 48, I 53.3, III 14.3. *See also* cowardice

violate, *violare*, I 7.5, I 45.1 (2×), I 46, III 26.2

violence, *violenza*, I 4.1, I 18.4 (2×), I 28, I 35, I 38.4, I 40.4, I 40.5, I 40.6, I 52.1, II 4.1, II 8.2, II 8.3, II 16.3, II 24.1, II 24.2 (2×), II 24.3 II 32.1 (3×), III 7 (2×), III 21.1, III 22.2 (3×), III 30.1 (2×); **to do violence,** *violentare*, III 22.2 (2×); **violent,** *violento*, I 9.2 (2×), I 10.1, I 17.2, I 20, I 30.1, II 24.1, III 20, III 34.1

virtue, *virtù, virtute, virtus* (L), *passim*, **virtuous,** *virtuoso*, DL, 1 Pr.2, I 1.4 (2×), I 2.3, I 9.2, I 17.3, I 18.3, I 20 T (2×), I 20 (3×), I 23.4, I 30.1, I 30.2, I 43, I 46, II 2.1, II 16.1, II 17.6, II 22.1, II 24.1, II 24.4, II 27.4, III 1.2, III 1.3, III 10.1, III 11.2, III 16 T, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 22.5, III 30.1, III 42, III 43; **virtuously,** *virtuosamente*, I 9.2, I 29.1, I 29.2, I 31.1, II Pr.1, II Pr.2, II 17.1, II 18.3 (2×), II 18.4, II 29.1, III 34.2

voice, *voce*, vox* (L), I 56, I 58.3, II 23.4 (L), III 14 T, III 14.1 (2×), III 14.2 (2×), III 41. *See also* word

vote, *suffragio*, I 20, I 34 T, I 34.2, I 35 T, I 35 (2×), I 49.2, III 49.4

vouch, *fare fede*, I 2.1, II 2.4, II 14 (2×), II 19.2, II 23.2, III 3, III 6.8, III 27.3. *See also* credit; faith; pledge; *cf* trust

vow, *voto*, I 55.1, III 23 (2×)

war, *guerra, passim*, **war,** *bellum* (L), I 15, II 23.1, III 10.1, III 12.2, III 15.1, III 37.1, III 37.3, III 44.1; **war machines,** *machine belliche*, II 32.1. *See also* trouble

way,* *via*,* I 6.1, I 6.2, I 6.3 (3×), I 7.1, I 7.3 (3×), I 10.4, I 10.6, I 16.4 (3×), I 16.5, I 18.4, I 18.5, I 19.3, I 19.4, I 23.4 (2×), I 25 (3×), I 26 (2×), I 29.1, I 30.1, I 34.1 (2×), I 35, I 37.2, I 37.3, I 46, I 52 T, I 52.1, I 52.2 (4×), I 53.5, I 55.1, I 55.4, I 55.5, I 58.3, I 58.4, II 3 (2×), II 4.1, II 6.1, II 8.3, II 9, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 18.1, II 19.1 (3×), II 19.2, II 21.2 (2×), II 23.2 (2×), II 25.2, II 29.2, II 29.3, III 2 (2×), III 6.19 (3×), III 6.20, III 8.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 12.1, III 12.2 (3×), III 12.3, III 17, III 21.3, III 22.6, III 25, III 28 (8×), III 29, III 30.1, III 32, III 33.1 (2×), III 34.2, III 35.2, III 39.2 (3×), III 40.2, III 44.3 (3×), III 49.1; **middle way,** *via del mezzo*, I 6.4, I 26, I 47.1, II 23 T, II 23.2, II 23.3, II 23.4 (2×), III 2, III 21.3, III 40.2; **true way,** *vera via*, II 2.2, II 19.1, III 9.1, III 16.2, III 21.3, III 28. *See also* middle; path; *cf* life, way of

weak, *debole, debile*, I Pr.1, I 2.3, I 6.4 (2×), I 12.2, I 14.2, I 17.1, I 19 T (3×), I 19.2 (4×), I 19.4, I 20, I 26, I 38 T, I 38.2 (2×), I 57 T, I 57

wealth, *ricchezza*, I 26, I 40.5, III 6.3. *See also* rich

wedding, *parentado*, III 26.1; *le nozze*, II 28.2, III 6.19 (2×)

well-being, *bene essere*, I 12.2, I 14.1, II 27.4

wicked, *cattivo*,* I 10.6, I 12.2, I 24.2, I 26, I 27 T, I 27.1, I 35, I 41, I 45.1, I 48 T (2×), I 58.4 (3×), II Pr.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 5, III 6.19, III 27.3; **wickedness,** *cattività*, III 6.3, III 6.14; **wicked,** *reo*,* I 10.4, I 11.2, I 12.2, I 18.1, I 18.4; **wicked,** *tristo*, I 10.1, III 8.1 (2×), III 8.2 (2×), III 29; **wickedness,** *tristitia*, III 29. *See also* bad

wife, *moglie*, III 4, III 6.2, III 6.17, III 6.18, III 20, III 34.3; **wife,** *donna*, I 16.3. *See also* woman

will,,* *arbitrio*, I 2.1, III 31.2; **will,*** *voglia*,* I 9.4, I 13.2, I 23.4, I 44.1, I 53.4, I 59, II 14 (2×), II 15.1, II 19.1, III 5, III 6.20, III 22.1, III 35.2, III 46; **will,*** *volontà*,* I 5.2, I 38.2, I 53.5, II 24.2, II 32.2, III 6.3, III 11.1, III 46. For *arbitrio, see also* judge; liberty

wine, vino, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 28.2

wise, *savio*, I 1.4, I 2.2, I 9.2, I 10.1, I 11.3, I 12.1, I 22, I 23.1, I 29.3, I 33.5, I 40.5, I 53.1, I 53.4, I 53.5, I 58 T, I 58.2 (2×), I 58.3, I 58.4, II 6.2, II 12.2, II 23.3, II 23.4, II 24.1 (2×), II 24.2 (3×), II 24.4 (2×), II 25.1, II 27.1, III 2, III 3, III 10.1, III 11.2, III 24, III 27.2, III 30.1 (2×), III 30.2, III 33.1, III 34.2, III 37.2, III 49.1; **wise,** *sapiente*, III 2 T; **wisely,** *saviamente*, I 34.4, II 27.1, III 5, III 30.1, III 33.2, III 37.4; **to have wisdom,** *savio*, I 1.4

witness, *testimone*, I 8.2, I 33.4, I 55.2, II 4.2, II 10.3, II 22.1, III 14.3. *See also* testimony

woman, *donna*, I 2.3, II 24.4, II 29.1, III 6.2, III 6.5, III 18.3, III 26.2 (2×), III 49.1 (2×) **woman,** *femina*, III 6.9, III 26 T, III 26.1, III 36 T, III 36.1. *See also* wife

word, *parola*, I 8.1, I 13.2 (2×), I 15, I 21.3, I 34.4, I 46, I 47 (2×), I 54, I 57 (2×), I 58.1, I 58.4, II 3, II 4.2, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1 (4×), II 17.1, II 19.2, II 23.2 (3×), II 23.4, II

26 (4×), II 27.1, II 29.1, III 6.7, III 6.8, III 6.15 (2×), III 6.16, III 8.2, III 12.2, III 12.3, III 14.1, III 15.1, III 15.2, III 22.1, III 22.4, III 25 (2×), III 29, III 30.1 (2×), III 31.1, III 31.2, III 31.4, III 33.1 (3×), III 35.3, III 36.2, III 37.4, III 38.1 (3×), III 39.2 (2×); **word,** *voce*,* III 27.4, III 34 T, III 34.2. For *voce, see also* voice

work (n.), *opera*, DL, I Pr.2, I 2.3, I 5.2, I 24.1 (4×), I 24.2 (2×), I 33.2, I 49.1, I 53.5, II 5.1, II 11.2, II 20, II 29.1, III 1.2 (2×), III 1.3, III 3, III 8.1 (2×), III 9.1, III 12.1 (2×), III 15.2, III 28 T (2×), III 28 (2×), III 30 T, III 34.2 (3×), III 34.4, III 36.2, III 43; **work** (n.), *operazione*, I Pr.2, III 2, III 34.2; **work** (v.), *operare*, I Pr.1, I 1.4, I 1.6, I 3.2 (2×), I 7.4, I 14.2, I 18.3, I 18.4, I 24.1 (2×), I 31.1, I 32, I 33.2, I 34.3, II Pr.1, II Pr.3 (2×), II 12.4, II 17.1, II 17.3, II 17.5, II 27.1, II 29.1, II 29.2, II 33, III 1.3, III 1.6, III 6.11, III 6.20, III 8.1, III 8.2, III 12.1, III 22.3, III 28 (2×), III 30.1, III 34.2, III 37.1 (3×), III 37.4, III 39.1, III 43; **to put to work,** *adoperare*, I 6.1, I 6.3, I 8.3, I 30.2, I 60, II 16.1, II 16.2, II 17.5 (3×), II 20, II 21.2, III 5, III 6.15, III 18.1, III 23, III 32, III 37.3, III 38.2. For *opera, see also* deed; for *operare, see also* do

world, *mondo*, I Pr.2, I 1.3, I 2.3, I 10.5 (3×), I 10.6, I 12.1, I 20, I 55.3, II Pr.2 (4×), II 1.1, II 2.2 (5×), II 5.1, II 5.2 (2×), II 10.2, II 12.2, II 27.2, II 30.4, III 6.8, III 11.2, III 30.1, III 31.3, III 36.2, III 39.1; **worldly,** *mondano*, II 2 2; **worldly things,** *cose del mondo*, DL, I 38.3, III 1.1, III 43

worthy,,* *degno, dignus* (L), I 1.5, I 1.6, I 4.1, I 6.1, I 18.3 (2×), I 29.3, I 31.2, I 45.1, II 11.2, II 20, II 23.4 (L)(2×), II 29.1 (2×), III 5, III 12.2, III 18 T; **unworthy,** *indegno*, I 47.2, III 16.2. *Cf* dignity; disdain; indignation

write, *scrivere*, DL (4×), I Pr.2, I 2.2, I 21.3, I 26, I 40.3, II 5.1 (2×), II 5.2, II 8.2 (2×), III 6.8 (3×), III 6.10, III 6.11 (2×), III 6.20, III 15.1, III 18.3, III 22.4, III 22.5, III 31.3, III 40.1; **written above,** *soprascritto*, I 2.2, I 2.7, I 7.4, I 7.5, I 9.3, I 16.3, I 16.4, I 18.1, I 18.5, I 22, I 29.1, I 43, I 46, I 52.1, I 57, II Pr.2, II 4.1, II 6.2, II 7, II 16.2 (2×), II 17.1, II 25.1, II 26, II 28.1, III 1.3, III 2, III 6.3, III 6.9, III 6.19, III 12.1, III 17, III 21.1 (2×), III 34.4, III 35.3; **writing,** *scrittura*, III 6.8; **writings,** *scritti*, I 9.4, I 45.2, II Pr.3; **writer,** *scrittore*, DL, I 10.3 (3×), I 28, I 34.1, I 37.1, I 58.1, I 58.2 (2×), II Pr.1 (2×), II 1.1, III 6.16, III 19.1, III 20, III 21.4, III 22.4 (2×), III 39.1. *See also* enroll; heading; *cf* read

young, *giovane*, I 16.4, I 46, I 60 (2×), III 4, III 6.16, III 9.1, III 20, III 34.3; **young,** *fresco*,* III 30.1; **youth,** *giovane*, I 33.2 (2×), I 60 (2×), II Pr.3, II 28.2; **youth,** *giovanezza*, II Pr.1; **youth,** *gioventù, juventus* (L) I 29.3, I 40.4, I 40.4 (L), I 42, I 46, II Pr.3 (3×), III 34.2. *Cf* boy

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Francesco Petrarca, *Opere Latine*, 2 vols., ed. A. Bufano (Turin: UTET, 1975), II 1046, 1106–42.
2. Baruch Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, V 7; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Social Contract*, III 6.
3. Livy, II 18, 30; III 20.8; IV 17.8, 26.6, 56.8; V 46; VI 38.3; VIII 32.3; XXII 31. Cicero, *Republic*, I 40; II 32; *Laws*, III 39. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, V 70–74. Polybius, VI 18.4.
4. Aristotle, *Politics*, VI 1321b41–22a2.
5. Aristotle, *Physics*, II 197a1–8, 197b33–37.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), 41.

Niccolò Machiavelli to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai, Greetings:

1. Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai were friends of NM and participants in discussions held in a garden in Florence, the *Orti Oricellari* One of these discussions is reported in NM's dialogue *AW*, published in 1521, in which both men appear as interlocutors. At the beginning of the dialogue NM tells of the subsequent death of Cosimo in 1519. NM also dedicated his *Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca* (1520; published 1531) to Zanobi and to Luigi Alamanni, another friend in the circle.
2. *Modo* will be translated "mode," as distinct from *via*, "way" or "path," and *mezzo*, "means," except for *in modo chè*, "so that."
3. For Hiero, see *P* 6, 13, and Livy, XXII 37; XXIII 30; XXIV 4–5, 22; XXV 24. For "the writers," see Justin, XXIII.4; Polybius, VII 8.
4. For Perseus, see Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus*, 8.

FIRST BOOK

Preface

1. *Terre*, sometimes "lands," sometimes "towns."
2. This first paragraph of the proemium does not appear in the first two editions of the *Discourses* but can be found in polished form in Machiavelli's hand, the only surviving autograph fragment of the *Discourses* Opinion is divided as to whether it is provisional or definitive; see Carlo Pincin, "La prefazione alla prima parte dei *Discorsi*," *Atti dell' Accademica delle Scienze di Torino* 94 (1959–60): II, 506–18, and "Le prefazione la dedicatoria dei *Discorsi* di Machiavelli," *Giornale storica della letteratura, italiana* 143 (1966): 72–83, and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 25n.
3. Lit.: "worked."
4. Lit.: "bearers of laws."
5. One version adds "nor captain" here.
6. "The present education" is another version.
7. *Accidenti* will usually be translated "accidents," occasionally "incidents."
8. One could say that only the first ten books of Livy were not "intercepted by the malignity of the times," as the first interception occurs at the end of book X. But other books and fragments do exist, and NM both uses and cites them.

1
What Have Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and What Was That of Rome

1. Lit.: "bearers of laws"; "givers of laws" is an alternate reading.
2. Or "chance."
3. See *P* 6, 26; Plutarch, *Theseus*, 24–25; Thucydides, II 15.
4. On the beginnings of Venice, see *FH* I 29 and Livy, I 1.
5. Lit.: "heads."
6. On the beginnings of Florence, see *FH* II 2.
7. A city founded as Rausa (or Ragusium) in the seventh century by Roman refugees fleeing the sack of Epidaurus; now Dubrovnik.
8. The Mamelukes were a military order that dominated Egypt from 1250 to 1517.
9. The story of Deinocrates and Alexander is told in Vitruvius, preface and II 1–4, and repeated by Thomas Aquinas in *On Kingship*, II 7; see also Plutarch, *Alexander*, 26.
10. Livy, I 1–3.
11. Livy, I 4–6; Plutarch, *Romulus*, 4, 6–9.
12. Livy, I 18–21; Plutarch, *Numa*, 3, 5–8.

2
Of How Many Species Are Republics, and Which Was the Roman Republic

1. Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 5–6; Polybius, VI 10.
2. Plutarch says that Lycurgus's laws were kept for five hundred years (*Lycurgus*, 29), to which NM adds the three centuries until Sparta was absorbed by Rome under Augustus. For the same total of eight hundred years, see *AW* I. See also Thucydides, I 18.
3. A reference to two outside events that began and ended the tenure of NM's employer, Piero Soderini, as gonfalonier for life in the Florentine republic.
4. Here begins a discussion of Rome's regime in which NM closely follows Polybius, VI, yet introduces significant differences. Of the considerable literature, see Gennaro Sasso, *Studi su Machiavelli* (Naples: Morano, 1967), chs. 4, 5; and Mansfield, *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders*, 34–40.
5. *Stato* for NM means both "status" and "state," as today, but the meanings are more closely connected: *stato* is the status of a person or a group while dominating someone else.
6. See Plato, *Statesman*, 302e; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1279a25-b10.

7. NM uses two words for conspiracy, *conspirazioni* and *congiure*, the latter, used for the title of III 6, the chapter on conspiracies, means literally "swearing together."
8. *Ammo* refers to the "spirit" with which human beings defend themselves, never to a capacity for self-detachment (*anima*, "soul," does not occur in the *Discourses*). It can also mean "mind" in the sense of "intent," but not in the sense of "intellect."
9. Plutarch, *Lycurgus;* Polybius, VI 10–11; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1273b33.
10. Plutarch, *Solon*, 18–25, 32; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1273b34–74a21.
11. Lit.: "the universality."

3
What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be Created in Rome, Which Made the Republic More Perfect

1. Livy, I 58–60.
2. Livy, II 5, 9.
3. Livy, II 21.
4. Livy, II 33.

4
That the Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made That Republic Free and Powerful

1. Livy, II 23–24, 27–33.
2. Among the "many" who condemn the tumults in Rome were Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 10–12; *Bellum Jugurthinum*, 5; *Histories*, I 55, 77; III 48. Also Cicero, *Republic*, II 33, and *In Catilinam*, II 13, III 10; St. Augustine, *City of God*, III 16–17.
3. See *P* 9; *FH* II 12, III 1.
4. Lit.: "man of (or from) good."
5. Cicero, *De amicitia*, XXV 95.

5
Where the Guard of Freedom May Be Settled More Securely, in the People or in the Great; and Which Has Greater Cause for Tumult, He Who Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain

1. See Plutarch, *Marius*, 7, 9.
2. Livy, IX 26. Livy says C. Maenius and M. Folius.

6
Whether a State Could Have Been Ordered in Rome That Would Have Taken Away the Enmities between the People and the Senate

1. Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus*, 10–21; *Gaius Gracchus*, 4–6, 9–17.
2. *D* I 5.1.
3. *D* I 1.2.
4. See *FH* I 29.
5. Lit.: "substances."
6. Lit.: "empire."
7. Thucydides, I 144; Aristotle, *Politics*, II 9; Plutarch, *Lycurgus, 27;* Polybius, VI 48.
8. Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 24.
9. *P* 12; *FH* I 29.
10. *Uno*
ll. *Uno*
12. *FH* V 1.

7
How Far Accusations May Be Necessary in a Republic to Maintain It in Freedom

1. Livy, II 34–40; *AW* VI.
2. Lit.: "transcend."
3. Lit.: "transcend."
4. Apparently a reference to the downfall and expulsion of NM's employer, Piero Soderini, in 1512.
5. A reference to the magistracy of Eight *(Otto di Guardia)*, responsible for the administration of justice in Florence.
6. Lit.: "circle."
7. Livy, V 33, where it is Arruns's wife—not his sister—who is involved.

8
As Much As Accusations Are Useful to Republics, So Much Are Calumnies Pernicious

1. Livy, V 44–46, 49.
2. Or "salvation."
3. Livy, V 47; VI 11, 14–20.
4. The captain of the people, the chief executive officer in Florence.
5. *FH* IV 25.

9
That It Is Necessary to Be Alone If One Wishes to Order a Republic Anew or to Reform It Altogether outside Its Ancient Orders

1. Remus. Livy, I 7; cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, III 6; XV 5.
2. Livy, I 14.
3. Or "talent" *(ingegno)*.
4. Cf. Livy, I 8, 15–16; Plutarch, *Romulus*, 27.
5. Livy, I 58–60.
6. Plutarch, *Agis*, 7–20.
7. Plutarch, *Cleomenes*, 1–10, 26–29.

10
As Much As the Founders of a Republic and of a Kingdom Are Praiseworthy, So Much Those of a Tyranny Are Worthy of Reproach

1. Tacitus, *Histories*, I 1.
2. For blame of Catiline, see above all Cicero, *In Catilinam;* Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 15 (but also the report of exaggeration, 22); Plutarch, *Cicero*, 10.
3. This usage follows the British Museum manuscript (not in Machiavelli's hand) rather than the printed versions, which have "blameworthy."
4. Plutarch, *Marcus Brutus*, I, but cf. *Dion and Brutus*
5. *P* 19; NM appears to count Julius Caesar as an emperor.
6. Tacitus, *Histories*, I 2.
7. Or "principality."

11
Of the Religion of the Romans

1. Livy, I 8.
2. Livy, I 18–20.
3. Lit.: "discourses of."
4. Polybius, VI 56; *AW* IV.
5. Livy, XXII 53.
6. Livy, VII 4–5.
7. Livy, I 8; cf. 7, 10, 12, 15–16.
8. Livy, I 19, where the nymph is named Egeria.
9. Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 5.
10. Plutarch, *Solon*, 14.
11. Dante, *Purgatorio*, VII 121–23. Dante's text says that human probity rarely rises *(risurge)* by the branches.
12. See *P* 6 and NM's letters to Ricciardo Bechi of 9 March 1498, to Francesco Vettori of 26 August 1513, and to Francesco Guicciardini of 17 May 1521.

12
Of How Much Importance It Is to Take Account of Religion, and How Italy, for Lacking It by Means of the Roman Church, Has Been Ruined

1. Lit.: "opinion."
2. Lit.: "faith."
3. Quoted in Latin inexactly from Livy, V 22.
4. An alternative reading accepted by Casella is "the rest of Italy."
5. *FH* I 9–1 I.
6. A reference to the formation of the League of Cambrai and its defeat of Venice at Agnadello in 1509.
7. In 1512, after the defeat of the Holy League in the Battle of Ravenna, which was fought without the Swiss.

13
How the Romans Made Religion Serve to Reorder the City and to Carry Out Their Enterprises and to Stop Tumults

1. Lit.: "new."
2. Livy, V 14.
3. Livy, V 15–16.
4. *D* I 39.2.
5. Livy, III 9–10.
6. Livy, III 15–21.
7. There is no such person in Livy. See Livy, III 17–18, for mention of Publius Valerius in this regard.
8. In Livy it is Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who was then (460 B.C.) made consul for the first time.
9. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 20.
10. Lit.: "reason about."

14
The Romans Interpreted the Auspices according to Necessity, and with Prudence Made a Show of

Observing Religion When Forced Not to Observe It; and If Anyone Rashly Disdained It, They Punished Him

1. Livy, X 40–41.
2. In Livy it is Publius Claudius Pulcher.
3. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, II 3; Valerius Maximus, 1.5.3.

15
The Samnites, as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting Them, Had Recourse to Religion

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 31.
2. Livy, X 38.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 39.
4. Livy, X 38–39.
5. Lit.: “extrinsic.”

16
A People Used to Living under a Prince Maintains Its Freedom with Difficulty, If by Some Accident It Becomes Free

1. Livy, II 3–5.
2. Lit.: “the above-written.”
3. Justin, XVI 4.
4. Lit.: “of the popular.”
5. Lit.: “of the popular.”

17
Having Come to Freedom, a Corrupt People Can with the Greatest Difficulty Maintain Itself Free

1. Marcus Junius Brutus, Caesar’s assassin.
2. Lucius Junius Brutus, founder of the Roman republic.
3. *FH* VI 13, 20–24.
4. Polybius, IV 32–33; VI 43.
5. *D* I 55.3–5.

18
In What Mode a Free State, If There Is One, Can Be Maintained in Corrupt Cities; or, If There Is Not, in What Mode to Order It

1. The *lex Julia de adulteriis* of Emperor Augustus of 18 B.C.
2. Laws regulating luxuries were passed first in 215 B.C. (Livy, XXXIV 4), then at various dates until the *lex Julia sumptuaria* of Julius Caesar in 46 B.C..
3. A series of laws “on ambition”—from the *lex Poetelia* in 358 B.C. (Livy, VII 15) through *lex Cornelia Baebia de ambita* in 81 B.C. and the *lex Calpurnia* of 67 B.C. to the *lex Julia* of 18 B.C.—controlled electoral corruption.
4. *D* I 9.4.

19
After an Excellent Prince a Weak Prince Can Maintain Himself, but after a Weak One No Kingdom Can Be Maintained by Another Weak One

1. 1 Kings 12:17; cf. 12:21; 2 Chronicles 10:17, where it is said that Rehoboam inherited only a twelfth of David’s kingdom.
2. Livy, I 22–31.
3. Livy, I 32–35.

20
Two Virtuous Princes in Succession Produce Great Effects; and That Well-Ordered Republics Have of Necessity Virtuous Successions, and So Their Acquisitions and Increases Are Great

1. Livy, I 60.
2. *D* I 19.
3. Lit.: “empire.”

21
How Much Blame That Prince and That Republic Merit That Lack Their Own Arms

1. Livy, I 22–31.
2. King Henry VIII invaded France in June 1513 and defeated the French at the Battle of the Spurs on 16 August. England had, however, fought to defend the independence of the dukedom of Brittany in 1492, less than thirty years earlier.
3. Apparently Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 17.
4. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI 813–814. NM substitutes *desides* for Virgil’s *resides* without changing the meaning.

22
What Is to Be Noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the Three Alban Curiatii

1. Livy, I 23–26, where Mettius was dictator, not king, of the Albans.
2. Livy, I 27–30.

23
That One Should Not Put All One's Fortune in Danger, and Not All One's Forces; and Because of This, the Guarding of Passes Is Often Harmful

1. Livy, XXI 32–38.
2. Livy, XXI 58.
3. Livy, XXI 45–46.
4. Livy, XXII 2–5.
5. Francis I, king of France (1515–47), invaded Lombardy in 1515 through an unexpected route, bypassing the Swiss, who were waiting for him in the mountains, and then defeating them near Milan at the Battle of Marignano.

24
Well-Ordered Republics Institute Rewards and Punishments for Their Citizens and Never Counterbalance One with the Other

1. Lit.: "to dispute."
2. Livy, II 10–11.
3. Livy, II 12–13.
4. Cf. Livy, II 10.12, where it is said that a statue of Horatius was put up, and he was given as much land as could be plowed around in one day; and Livy, II 13.5, which says that Mucius received a field across the Tiber that came to be known as the Mucian Fields. NM's *staio* is a Tuscan measure of uncertain extent, perhaps equivalent to one Roman *jugerum*, the amount two oxen could plow (not plow *around*) in one day.
5. Livy, V 47. NM omits the small measure of wine also given to Manlius.
6. Livy, VI 20.

25
He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated State in a Free City May Retain at Least the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes

1. Livy, I 8.
2. Livy, II 2.
3. See Plato, *Republic*, 565e-66a, and *Statesman*, 276e; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1279b16, 1285b29–32; Polybius, V 11; Cicero, *Republic*, I 33; Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, I 1.11.

26
A New Prince Should Make Everything New in a City or Province Taken by Him

1. Luke 1:53. Said of God, not of David.
2. Justin, VIII 5. Cf. Polybius, VIII 8–11.

27
Very Rarely Do Men Know How to Be Altogether Wicked or Altogether Good

1. Or "principality."
2. Or "conspired."
3. Lit.: "reason."
4. Including NM himself, who in an official dispatch attributed Baglioni's restraint to "his good nature and humanity"; see letter of 13 September 1506, *Legazioni e commisari*, ed. Sergio Bertelli, (Milan, 1964), II 980.

28
For What Cause the Romans Were Less Ungrateful toward Their Citizens Than the Athenians

1. See NM's poem, "Of Ingratitude," 130–32.
2. See Cicero, *De officiis*, II 7.24, and cf. *FH* II 37.
3. Livy, II 2.
4. Livy, II 7.

29
Which Is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince

1. See NM's poem, "Of Ingratitude," 25.
2. Quoted in Latin from Tacitus, *Histories*, IV 3.
3. Lit.: "mode."
4. Tacitus, *Histories*, II 6, 8; III 2–3, 8, 15–26, 46–49, 52–53, 58–65, 78; IV 39, 80.
5. Guicciardini rightly protests that Gonsalvo Ferrante died rich and honored; Francesco Guicciardini, *Considerazioni interno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli* in NM, *Discoursi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio,* ed. C. Vivanti (Turin: Eunaudi, 1983), 557. See also NM's poem, "Of Ingratitude," 163–65.

6. *D* I 30.2.
7. Plutarch, *Julius Caesar*, 29, 46–47.
8. *D* I 28.
9. Livy, XXXVIII 50–60.
10. Livy, II 33–35.
11. Livy, V 32, 46, 49.
12. Hannibal.

30
Which Modes a Prince or a Republic Should Use So As to Avoid the Vice of Ingratitude; and Which a Captain or a Citizen Should Use So As Not to Be Crushed by It

1. *D* I 27.

31
That the Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for an Error Committed; nor Were They Ever Punished When Harm Resulted to the Republic through Their Ignorance or through Bad Policies Adopted by Them

1. Cf. *D* I 24, 28, 29.3, 30.2.
2. Crucifixion of unsatisfactory generals was not a Roman practice. Polybius notes instances of such punishment by the Carthaginians (I II, 24) but none of its use by the Romans. The crucifixion of a Carthaginian general named Hannibal by his own soldiers after the defeat of the fleet he commanded is mentioned in the *Summary* of Livy, XVII.
3. Livy, V 8–12.
4. Livy, XXII 61.
5. Livy, VIII 30–35.

32
A Republic or a Prince Should Not Defer Benefiting Men in Their Necessities

1. Livy, II 9.

33
When an Inconvenience Has Grown Either in a State or against a State, the More Salutary Policy Is to Temporize with It Rather Than to Strike at It

1. Livy, II 18, where the first is said to have probably been Titus Largius.
2. Lit.: “worked.”
3. See *FH* IV 26–33.
4. Cicero, *Letters to His Friends*, XVI 11.

34
The Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and That the Authorities Citizens Take for Themselves, Not Those Given Them by Free Votes, Are Pernicious to Civil Life

1. Livy, II 18.
2. The writer or writers have not been clearly identified.
3. Presumably Sulla.
4. Livy, III 29; IX 34.
5. Presumably the Council of Ten, instituted in 1310 as an extraordinary measure to deal with a revolt, then regularized in 1355.
6. Quoted in Latin. Cf. Livy, III 4; VI 19.

35
The Cause Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome Was Hurtful to the Freedom of That Republic, Notwithstanding That It Was Created by Public and Free Votes

1. Livy, III 31–55.
2. *D* I 34.
3. Lit.: “offends.”

36
Citizens Who Have Had Greater Honors Should Not Disdain Lesser Ones

1. Livy, II 43–47, where some editions have Manlius, not Manilius.

37
What Scandals the Agrarian Law Gave Birth to in Rome; and That to Make a Law in a Republic That Looks Very Far Back and Is against an Ancient Custom of the City Is Most Scandalous

1. These words have not been identified in the ancient writers, but their "verdict" refers to their cyclical, pessimistic outlook, as opposed to modern progressivism; see Plato, *Laws*, 687c; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1316aI–b26; Polybius, VI 9.
2. Lit.: "substances."
3. Livy, II 41. The first Agrarian law was promulgated by the consul Spurius Cassius in 486 B.C. after a war with the Hernici. It gave land taken from the enemy to the Roman plebs.
4. On the danger of "looking back," see *FH* III 3.
5. Livy, II 41–43.
6. Livy, VI 35. On the *jugerum*, see *D* I 24 n. 4.
7. Livy, IV 47; VI 16.
8. Livy, III 1.
9. Livy, II 65.
10. Lit.: "humor."
11. Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus*, 8–19.
12. Plutarch, *Sulla*, 6; *Marius*, 10.
13. Plutarch, *Caesar*, 6. Aquinas, *On Kingship*, IV 1.
14. *D* I 4.
15. *D* I 4.1.
16. *D* I 33.

38
Weak Republics Are Hardly Resolute and Do Not Know How to Decide; and If They Ever Take Up Any Policy, It Arises More from Necessity Than from Choice

1. Livy, III 6.
2. Lit.: "its own" *(i suoi)*.
3. Livy, II 30.
4. See *P* 21.
5. In 1501 Cesare Borgia was becoming master of the Romagna. On this incident see NM's *Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio* (March 1503) in *Tutte le opere di Niccolò Machiavelli*, ed. Mario Martelli (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), 11–13. See also *P* 7.
6. On this incident see NM's *Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati* (*Mode of treating the rebel peoples of the Valdichiana*), in *Tutte le opere*, ed. Martelli, 13–16. The king of France was still Louis XII.
7. Lit.: "faith."

39
In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be Seen

1. "'94" refers to the invasion of Italy by the French King Charles VIII in 1494.
2. *Potestà*
3. *Potestà*
4. Livy, III 9.
5. Livy, IV 6.
6. *Potestà*
7. Livy, VI 35.

40
The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and What Is to Be Noted in It; Where It Is Considered, among Many Other Things, How through Such an Accident One Can Either Save or Crush a Republic

1. Livy, III 31–33, according to which the two other citizens sent with Spurius Postumius were Aulus Manlius and Sulpitius Camerinus.
2. Livy, III 33. The kings were accompanied by twelve lictors who carried the rods that symbolized their authority and that were employed together with axes in capital punishment; the consuls had only twelve lictors between them so as not to double their terror (Livy, II 1).
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 35; NM adds "they believed."
4. Quoted in Latin with variations from Livy, III 35.
5. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 36.
6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 37.
7. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 37.
8. Quoted inexactly in Latin from Livy, III 37.
9. Not the Volsci but the Aequi in Livy, III 38.
10. Livy, III 38–54.
11. Giorgio Inglese changes "enemy" to "friend" against all the manuscripts, saying that the sense requires it; *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1984), 260. But does it? Appius could perhaps have sought to make friends of the nobility without succeeding, since the part of the nobility outside the tyranny (NM says) is always enemy to the tyrant.
12. Lit.: "intrinsic."
13. On Nabis, see *P* 9.
14. Lit.: "intrinsic."
15. *D* I 34.
16. The saying is otherwise unknown. Inglese thinks that the king may be Ferdinand I of Aragon, king of Naples from 1458 to 1494 (see *D* II 12), but most others agree that it is Ferdinand the Catholic (Ferdinand II of Aragon).

41
To Leap from Humility to Pride, from Mercy to Cruelty, without Due Degrees Is Something Imprudent and Useless

1. Livy, III 567.

42
How Easily Men Can Be Corrupted

1. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1308b 14.
2. Livy, III 41.

43
Those Who Engage in Combat for Their Own Glory Are Good and Faithful Soldiers

1. Livy, III 40.
2. See *P* 12; *AW* 1.
3. Livy, III 61–63, 69–70.

44
A Multitude without a Head Is Useless; and That One Should Not First Threaten and Then Request Authority

1. Livy, III 44–53.
2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, III 53, but Livy's Valerius and Horatius say by way of excuse that from hatred of cruelty the plebs rush into cruelty.
3. *Uno*

45
Nonobservance of a Law That Has Been Made, and Especially by Its Author, Is a Thing That Sets a Bad Example; and to Freshen New Injuries Every Day in a City Is Most Harmful to Whoever Governs It

1. Livy, III 54–56.
2. In 1494 the Medici were expelled from Florence and the republic dominated by Savonarola established.
3. In 1497 Bernardo del Nero, Niccolò Ridolfi, Lorenzo Tornabuoni, Giannozzo Pucci, and Giovanni Cambi, five of the most prominent *ottimati* in Florence, were exposed in a plot to restore Piero de' Medici to power. At the urging of Francesco Valori, leader of Savonarola's party (*D* I 7.3.), they were summarily executed. Savonarola himself, as NM says, did not intervene to secure their right of appeal under the law that had been passed at his own instance. See Girolamo Savonarola. *Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze*, in *Prediche sopra Aggeo*, ed. Luigi Firpo, (Rome, 1965), III 1–2.
4. Or "damned" both times in this sentence.
5. Livy, III 59.
6. *P* 8.

46
Men Ascend from One Ambition to Another; First One Seeks Not to Be Offended, and Then One Offends Others

1. Livy, III 54.
2. Livy, III 65.
3. Lit.: "mode."
4. In Latin, though, Sallust says that "all bad examples have arisen from good things" (*De coniuratione Catilinae*, 51.27).
5. *D* I 33.
6. *D* III 28.

47
However Deceived in Generalities, Men Are Not Deceived in Particulars

1. *D* I 39.
2. Livy, IV 6, where Livy says three tribunes.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IV 6, though NM changes "dignity" to "honor."
4. Upper limbs, not weapons.
5. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IV 6.
6. Livy, XXIII 2–4.
7. Pacuvius Calavus in Livy.
8. This speech is NM's invention.
9. Piero di Lorenzo de' Medici was expelled from Florence on 9 November 1494 because of popular indignation provoked by his cession of the Florentine territories of Sanzana, Pietrasanta, and Livorno to Charles VIII, the French king who was invading Italy.

48
He Who Wishes That a Magistracy Not Be Given to Someone Vile or Someone Wicked Should Have It Asked for Either by Someone Too Vile and Too Wicked or by Someone Too Noble and Too Good

1. Livy, IV 56–57.

49

If Those Cities That Have Had a Free Beginning, Such as Rome, Have Difficulty in Finding Laws That Will Maintain Them, Those That Have Had One Immediately Servile Have Almost an Impossibility

1. Livy, IV 8.
2. Livy, IV 23–24.
3. *FH* II 5.
4. *FH* IV 29; V 4.
5. The Council of Ten, instituted in Venice in 1310.

50

One Council or One Magistrate Should Not Be Able to Stop the Actions of Cities

1. Livy, IV 26.

51

A Republic or a Prince Should Make a Show of Doing through Liberality What Necessity Constrains Him to Do

1. Livy, IV 59–60.

52

To Repress the Insolence of One Individual Who Rises Up in a Powerful Republic, There Is No More Secure and Less Scandalous Mode Than to Anticipate the Ways by Which He Comes to That Power

1. Livy, V 4, 12.
2. *FH* IV 27–33.
3. Marcus Tullius Cicero.
4. Cicero, *Philippics*, V 18; X 8.

53

Many Times the People Desires Its Own Ruin, Deceived by a False Appearance[1] of Good; and That Great Hopes and Mighty Promises Easily Move It

1. Lit.: "species."
2. Livy, V 24–25.
3. The quotation is not from Dante's *On Monarchy* (now known as *Monarchia*) but from his *Convivio*, I 11.
4. See *D* I 6. NM could also have referred to what he says "below" in *D* III 31.
5. Lit.: "conspiracy."
6. The League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 to oppose the Venetians by Pope Julius II, the Emperor Maximilian, King Louis XII of France, King Ferdinand of Spain, Margaret of Austria, regent for the duke of Savoy, Duke Alfonso d'Este of Ferrara, and Francesco Gonzaga IV, marquis of Mantua.
7. Livy, XXII 25–30.
8. Livy, XXII 34–35, 38–39.
9. Livy, XXII 46–49.
10. Livy, XXV 19.
11. Thucydides, VI 8–9; Plutarch, *Nicias*, 12.
12. Livy, XXVIII 40–45.
13. The Florentine attack on Pisa in 1505 after the victory at San Vincenzo was ordered by the Council of Eight and the Great Council and favored by the gonfalonier Piero Soderini. NM was sent to Bentivoglio and Giacomini with instructions for executing the siege, which failed.

54

How Much Authority a Grave Man May Have to Check an Excited Multitude

1. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, *Aeneid*, I 151–52.
2. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola (the *frate*, or friar) in the period 1494–98, when he was a powerful political force in Florence; their opponents were called Arrabbiati ("the rabid").
3. Livy, V 51–55.

55

How Easily Things May Be Conducted in Those Cities in Which the Multitude Is Not Corrupt; and That Where There Is Equality, a Principality Cannot Be Made, and Where There Is Not, a Republic Cannot Be Made

1. *D* I 16–18.
2. Livy, V 23–25.
3. See *P* 10. NM wrote three short reports on the free German cities. In December 1507 he was sent on a mission to the Emperor Maximilian, after which he wrote his *Rapporto delle cose della Magna* in 1508. The following year he wrote a *Discorso sopra le cose della Magna e sopra l'imperatore* for the use of the Florentine ambassadors. In 1509 a second legation took NM to the camp of Maximilian at Mantua, and on his return he wrote *Ritratto delle cose della Magna* For these three works, see *Tutte le opere*, ed. Martelli, 63–71.
4. Lit.: "conversations."

5. Lit.: “conversation.”
6. In *Ritratto delle cose della Magna*, NM speaks of commerce between the Venetians and German cities. See *Tutte le opere*, ed. Martelli, 70.
7. Lit.: “been beaten by.”
8. See NM’s *Discursus Florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices* written in 1520 in *Tutti le opere*, ed. Martelli, 24–31. “Belongings” is literally “substances.”
9. Lit.: “populars.”
10. *D* I 6.1.

56
Before Great Accidents Occur in a City or in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast Them, or Men Who Predict[1] Them

1. Or “preach.”
2. In his sermons during Advent of 1492 and thereafter, Savonarola predicted the coming of a new Cyrus from beyond the mountains who would be the “sword of God” to punish Florence and whom nobody would oppose. Charles VIII, invading from France in 1494, met no opposition and reached Tuscany in October.
3. On such signs at the time of Charles VIII’s invasion, see Francesco Guicciardini, *History of Italy* I 9.
4. *FH* VIII 36.
5. The Palazzo della Signoria, struck by lightning in 1511; Piero Soderini was expelled in 1512.
6. Livy, V 32, who says the voice was “clearer” *(clarior)* than human.
7. Cicero, *De divinatione*, I 30.64; Pietro Pomponazzi, *Tractatus de immortalitate animae*, 14.

57
The Plebs Together Is Mighty, by Itself Weak

1. Quoted in Latin with variations from Livy, VI 4.
2. Livy, III 50–51.

58
The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince

1. Livy, VI 7.
2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 20, omitting the phrase “remembering only his virtues.”
3. Livy, XXIV 4–7, 21.
4. Quoted in Latin with minor variation from Livy, XXIV 25.
5. Lit.: “province.”
6. Diodorus Siculus, I 70–71.
7. Livy, VI 14–20.
8. Plutarch, *Alexander*, 16, 50–52; Clitus had saved Alexander’s life in battle, but when drunk at a banquet he disparaged Alexander and was immediately killed by him. Afterward Alexander repented and tried to kill himself. See Diodorus Siculus, XVII.21.57.
9. Josephus, *The Jewish War*, I 22.1–5; III 5–9; VII 2–7. Marianne, the granddaughter of Aristobulus II, king of Judea, was married to Herod the Great in 38 B.C. Out of jealousy Herod had her killed, then desperately regretted doing so. See Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, XV 7.4–7.
10. *D* I 29.
11. *D* I 53.
12. Lit.: “discoursed on.”
13. You plural.

59
Which Confederation or Other League Can Be More Trusted, That Made with a Republic or That Made with a Prince

1. Plutarch, *Demetrius*, 30
2. Plutarch, *Pompey*, 77–79. Pompey was killed by Ptolemy’s son.
3. “Party” in this vicinity is literally in the plural.
4. In the war between the French king and the Spanish over Naples in 1503–4, a number of barons on the French side were imprisoned by Gonsalvo da Cortona, the Spanish captain. In the truce that followed Gonsalvo’s victory they were left to their fate.
5. Saguntum, ally of Rome, was conquered and destroyed by Hannibal in 218 B.C. See Livy, XXI 5–16.
6. Florence, ally of the French, was attacked after the battle of Ravenna by Spanish forces, who restored the Medici to power in 1512.
7. Or “the useful” here and in the previous sentence, though not later in this sentence.
8. Lit.: “armed might.”
9. Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 20; Cicero, *De officiis*, III 11.
10. Or “the useful.”

60
That the Consulate and Any Other Magistracy Whatever in Rome Was Given without Respect to Age

1. Livy, VII 26.
2. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 32, though NM substitutes “blood” for “birth.”
3. *D* I 6.
4. *D* I 6.
5. Livy, XXV 2.
6. Plutarch, *Pompey*, 13–14.

Second Book

Preface

1. Cf. Plutarch, *Moralia, de fortuna Romanorum*, 317f–18a.
2. A supporter of powers beyond the mountains, such as the French.
3. Lit.: “every filthy reason.”

1
Which Was More the Cause of the Empire the Romans Acquired, Virtue or Fortune

1. Plutarch, *Moralia, de fortuna Romanorum*, 318d–19b.
2. Lit.: “giver of laws.” See Inglese, 40–41.
3. Plutarch, *Moralia, de fortuna Romanorum*, 321f.
4. Livy, VII 32–37; VIII 1–6.
5. The Romans subjugated the Latins (Livy, VIII 13–14) and defeated the Samnites before combating the Etruscans (IX 27–29, 31–32) but had to continue to fight the Samnites along with the Etruscans (IX 38–41, 43–44). They fought the Etruscans again after making peace with the Samnites (IX 45; X 3–5) but then had to fight both (X 12, 14, 19–21). The Samnites were not yet entirely worn out (X 31–45).
6. Cf. Livy, X 27, 45.
7. The Romans repeatedly fought the Volsci and Aequi while also fighting the Etruscans, the Latins, and the Hernici (Livy, VI 2, 7–9, 11–12, 32; VII 19). Note the explanation of the wars with the Volsci, the Latins, and the Hernici offered by Manlius Capitolinus (VI 15).
8. Livy, VII 27, 29–31.
9. Livy, VIII 6, 10–11.
10. Livy, VIII 14, 23.
11. Polybius, I 6.
12. Polybius, I 7–12.
13. Polybius, I 62; II 21–31.
14. In 225 B.C.
15. Polybius, II 32–34.
16. From 218 to 202 B.C. (Livy, XXI–XXX).
17. Livy, XXXI 1; XXXIII 24–25; XXXV–XXXVII.
18. Philip V of Macedon.
19. *P* 3.
20. Livy, VII 29–32.
21. Livy, IX 36.
22. Polybius, I 7–12.
23. Livy, XXI 6.
24. Livy, XXVIII 16.
25. Livy, XXVI 24.
26. Livy, XXXV 13.
27. Livy, *Summaries*, LX, LXI.

2
What Peoples the Romans Had to Combat, and That They Obstinately Defended Their Freedom

1. Presumably Germany; cf. *D* I 55.2–3; II 19.
2. Lit.: “alps,” though here referring to the Apennines.
3. Calabria, the toe.
4. Lit.: “reasoned.”
5. Livy, II 9–14.
6. Livy, V I.
7. Herodotus, V 78.
8. Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 7.
9. Xenophon, *Hiero or Tyrannicus*, II 12–17; IV 3–5; V 1–3; XI.
10. Livy, XXIV 7, 21–22.
11. Thucydides, III 70–85; IV 46–48.
12. John 8:32, 14:6.
13. Livy, X 31, 38–42.
14. In this chapter.
15. Earlier in this chapter, or in *D* I 28–30.
16. Lit.: “gives faith.”
17. Or “pray.”
18. Livy, XXIII 41–42.

3
Rome Became a Great City through Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Easily Admitting Foreigners to Its Honors

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, I 30, with some alteration.
2. Servius Tullius; Livy, I 44.
3. Inglese emends to eighty thousand.
4. Lit.: “converse.”
5. Lit.: “conversations.”
6. Seneca, *De beneficiis*, V 14; Xenophon, *Lacedaemonian Constitution*, VII 5–6; Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 9, 27; Polybius, VI 49.

7. Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 24; Polybius, VI 50.
8. Quoted in five words of Latin from Livy, I 30, with the same alteration as at the opening of this chapter.

4
Republics Have Taken Three Modes of Expanding

1. Livy, V 33–35, for this and much of the following about the Etruscans and the Gauls, called respectively Tuscans and French by NM.
2. Lit.: "alps," here referring to the Alps.
3. Livy, IV 23; V 1.
4. Lit.: "circle."
5. Lit.: "reasoned."
6. Livy, XXXII 32–34.

5
That the Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates the Memories of Things

1. Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII; *Metaphysics*, XII 6–7; *On the Heavens*, I 9 279a12–28. Also Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, I 28.
2. Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, V 324–44.
3. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, VIII 19 (*The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury*, trans. John Dickinson [New York: Russell & Russell, 1963], 364).
4. The Romans were far from doing so to the language, writings, and religion of the Etruscans according to Livy, I 35, 55; V 21–22; VII 3; IX 36.
5. Lit.: "generation."
6. Plato, *Timaeus*, 22a–23c, and *Laws*, 676b–78a; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1269a4–8, and *Metaphysics*, XII 8 1074b1–14; Polybius, VI 5.
7. Lit.: "generation."
8. *D* II 4.

6
How the Romans Proceeded in Making War

1. The siege of Veii look ten years (Livy, V 22); for examples of such short wars, see Livy, II 26–27; III 26–29; IV 31–34, 45–47. For examples of longer wars, see III 2, 23. Livy does not specify the lengths of most Roman wars, though his narration often gives the impression that they were short.
2. Lit.: "uncovered."
3. Livy, II 31; III 1; X 1. Also *P* 3.
4. Lit.: "from hand to hand."
5. Livy, IV 59–60.

7
How Much Land the Romans Gave per Colonist

1. A blank is left in the text; the Latin *jugerum* was equal to about twenty-eight thousand square feet, or two-thirds of an acre.
2. Livy, V 30.

8
The Cause Why Peoples Leave Their Ancestral Places and Inundate the Country of Others

1. *D* II 4, 6.
2. Lit.: "particularly."
3. Sallust, *Bellum Jugurthinum*, 114. Cf. Polybius, II 21.
4. *D* II 4.
5. Livy, V 33–34.
6. *D* II 4.
7. Polybius, II 21–31.
8. Livy, *Summaries*, LXIII, LXV, LXVII–LXVIII; Plutarch, *Marius*, 16–27.
9. Quoting in Latin from Procopius's Greek, *De bello Vandalico*, IV 10; the Latin word used for Joshua is *Iesu*, used also for Jesus.

9
What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise among Powers

1. Livy, VII 29–32.
2. Livy, *Summaries*, XVI; Polybius, 18–12.
3. Livy, XXI 5–19.
4. Livy, IV 37–40.
5. *FH* II 24–31.

10
Money Is Not the Sinew of War, As It Is according to the Common Opinion

1. Plutarch, *Agis and Cleomenes*, 27.
2. Quintus Curtius does not make this statement in his account (VI 1) of the war between Antipater and the Spartan king Agis III, which took place eight years before the death of Alexander the Great, nor does he say Agis was compelled to do battle from lack of money.

3. In August 1516 the Medici Pope Leo X deprived Francesco Maria della Rovere, nephew of the preceding pope, Julius II, of the duchy of Urbino on the grounds that while in the pay of the church he had conspired with its enemies and was complicit in the murder of the cardinal of Pavia; instead, Leo gave the duchy to his own nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici (to whom *The Prince* is dedicated). Francesco, however, returned and recaptured Urbino from the pope and the Florentines in February 1517 and held it until September 1517.
4. Lucian, *Charon*, 12.
5. Justin, XXV 1–2. The king of Macedon was Antigonus.
6. *P* 12.
7. Livy, XXVII 48. The other consul was Marcus Livius.
8. Thucydides, I 141–43.
9. Livy, IX 17–19.
10. Livy, VII 29–31.

11
It Is Not a Prudent Policy to Make a Friendship with a Prince Who Has More Reputation Than Force

1. Quoted in Latin with alterations from Livy, VII 29.
2. NM shifts from the plural to the singular.
3. Pope Sixtus IV; Ferdinand of Aragon, king of Naples; King Louis XI of France. See *FH* VIII 10–18.
4. Here and in the next sentence quotes again in Latin adapted from Livy, VII 29.
5. *P* 23.
6. Lit.: "find."
7. In Livy, IX 14, the consul Papirius Cursor does not laugh but says that the chicken-man announced favorable auspices and the sacrifice was propitious so the Tarentines could see that the authority of the gods supported the Roman action.

12
Whether, When Fearing to Be Assaulted, It Is Better to Bring On or Await War

1. Herodotus, I 205–15.
2. Livy, XXXIV 60.
3. Justin, XXII 4–7; Livy, XXVIII 43.
4. Livy, XXVIII 43–44.
5. Thucydides, VI–VII.
6. See Pindar, *Isthmian Ode*, 4; Lucan, *Pharsalia*, IV 609–53; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, IX 183–84. Also Dante, *Convivio*, III 3.7, *Monarchia*, II 7.10.
7. Lit.: "honest."
8. NM switches from plural to singular and back.
9. Or "intend."
10. Or "sold out."
11. *FH* II 29–30.
12. Following the printed text rather than the manuscript not in NM's hand, which has "hope."
13. The Florentines waged war "caused by the ambition of the archbishop," Giovanni Visconti of Milan, around 1353, about twenty-five years after Castruccio's death in 1328 (*FH* II 42); they conducted a "spirited and admirable" defense from 1390 to 1402 against the efforts to seize Tuscany by Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti, called the "Count of Virtue" and the first to have the title of duke, who also aspired to be king of Italy (*FH* I 27, 33; III 25, 29).
14. Presumably Ticinus, Lake Trasumennus, and Cannae; see Livy, XXI 45–46; XXII 4–7, 43–50.
15. Inglese suggests emendation to eight hundred thousand on the basis of Polybius, II 24. Livy, Summaries, XX, as amended by Mommsen, gives eight hundred thousand as the number the Romans had under arms against the Gauls at this time.
16. Plutarch, *Marius*, 16–27.

13
That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More through Fraud Than through Force

1. Philip II of Macedon; Justin, VII–IX.
2. Justin, XXII–XXIII; *P* 8.
3. Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus*, I 6; II 4–III 1; IV I, 5; V 5.
4. *FH* I 27.
5. *D* II 4.1.
6. Or "felt."
7. Livy, VII 38, 42; VIII 1–6.
8. *D*II 9.
9. Quoted precisely in Latin, except for "etc.," from Livy, VIII 4.

14
Often Men Deceive Themselves Believing That through Humility They Will Conquer Pride

1. Lit.: "makes faith."
2. Livy, VIII 2.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 4, with two substantial omissions.
4. Or "uncovered."

15
Weak States Will Always Be Ambiguous in Their Resolutions; and Slow Decisions Are Always Hurtful

1. Lit.: "individual."

2. Livy, VIII 3–4; Livy says the Romans summoned ten of the leading Latins.
3. Lit.: “having conscience.”
4. Quoted in Latin (with the addition of “for you to consider”) from Livy, VIII 4.
5. Livy, XXIV 28.
6. Quoted in Italian from Livy, VIII 11.
7. Ludovico Storza in 1499.
8. Or “damned.”
9. *D* I 38.2–4.

16
How Much the Soldiers of Our Times Do Not Conform to the Ancient Orders

1. Livy, VIII 6–11.
2. Lit.: “wills” or “wishes.”
3. *D* I 14–15.
4. Livy, VIII 7.
5. Livy, VIII 9.
6. That is, “lines.”
7. The Italian means “princes.”
8. In Latin adapted from Livy, VIII 8.

17
How Much Artillery Should Be Esteemed by Armies in the Present Times; and Whether the Opinion Universally Held of It Is True

1. Not literally a French word but a gallicism, the Italian word *giornate* used on the model of the French *journées*, which elsewhere we translate along with *battaglie* as “battles.”
2. The terms translated as “embankments” and “barricades” in this chapter are rendered as “dikes” and “dams” in *P* 25.
3. Upper limbs (*braccia*), not weapons (*arme*).
4. Lit.: “respect.”
5. Presumably counting from the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII in September 1494 to I5I7or 1518.
6. In 1509; *AW* VII.
7. In 1503; *AW* IV. This duke of Nemours is Louis d’Armagnac, not Gaston de Foix, whose death is mentioned later in the sentence.
8. Guiccardini, *History of Italy*, X 13.
9. Lit.: “offend.”
10. Lit.: “offends.”
11. Lit.: “shoulders.”
12. Selim I defeated Ismail I, the shah of Persia, at Chaldiran in 1514 and the Mameluke sultans of Egypt at Aleppo in 1516 and near Cairo in 1517. The term Sophy derives from the family name of the dynasty ruling Persia from 1500 to 1736.

18
How by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of the Ancient Military Infantry Should Be Esteemed More Than Horse

1. Livy, II 20.
2. Quoted from Livy, XXII 49, except that whereas Livy’s Latin means “How I would prefer that he give them to me bound,” NM’s Latin means, “How I would prefer that they give the cavalry to me bound.”
3. *Ventura*, not *fortuna*
4. Livy, IX 22.
5. Plutarch, *Antony*, 37–50; *Crassus*, 19–31. Crassus has four thousand cavalry according to Plutarch (20) and Antony at least sixteen thousand (37).
6. Lit.: “persuading.”
7. At the Battle of Marignano.
8. Polybius, I 33–34.
9. Gilbert gives Carmignuola another three thousand cavalry on the basis of the 1531 Florentine edition and because “one thousand seems too few for sixteen thousand enemies.”
10. At the Battle of Arbedo in 1422.
11. NM shifts from plural to singular.

19
That Acquisitions by Republics That Are Not Well Ordered and That Do Not Proceed according to Roman Virtue Are for Their Ruin, Not Their Exaltation

1. *D* II 17.5, 18.4.
2. Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 24–28.
3. Following Inglese, we detach the first clause of this sentence from the previous sentence and attach it here.
4. *D* 16.
5. Lit.: “respect.”
6. Or “luxuries.”
7. Lit.: “conversation.”
8. Livy, VII 38–41; XXIII 18.
9. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 38.
10. Quoted in Latin from Juvenal, *Satires*, VI 293, except that NM adds “gluttony.”

20
What Danger That Prince or Republic Runs That Avails Itself of Auxiliary or Mercenary Military

1. *P* 12–13.
2. Livy, VII 32–33, 37.
3. Livy, VII 38–41.
4. *D* III 6.20.
5. The inhabitants of Rhegium. Polybius, I 7; Livy, XXVIII 28, and XXXI 31.
6. NM shifts from singular to plural.

21
The First Praetor the Romans Sent Anyplace Was to Capua, Four Hundred Years after They Began to Make War

1. *D* II 4.
2. Livy, IX 20.
3. Quoted in Latin with some alterations from Livy, IX 20.
4. Lit.: "reason."
5. Lit.: "sentence."
6. The French king is Francis I, the Genoese governor Ottaviano Fregoso.
7. Since 1328; *FH* II 30.

22
How False the Opinions of Men Often Are in Judging Great Things

1. *D* III 16.
2. Livy, VIII 11.
3. In 1515.
4. In 1512.
5. In 1513.
6. In two letters of 20 December 1514 to Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassador to Rome, NM recommended that the pope ally himself with France.
7. The Battle of Marignano.
8. Livy, VIII 11.

23
How Much the Romans, in Judging Subjects for Some Accidents That Necessitated Such Judgment, Fled from the Middle Way

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 13, except that "war" and "peace" are reversed.
2. *D* II 10.
3. Lit.: "broke" (both times in this sentence).
4. Upper limbs (*braccia*), not weapons (*arme*).
5. Livy, VIII 11–13.
6. Lit.: "thing" or "affair."
7. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 13, with substantial omissions. Our translation makes use of NM's in his *Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati* (*Mode of treating the rebel peoples of the Valdichiana*), Martelli, *Opere*, 14.
8. Livy, VIII 14.
9. Lit.: "the city."
10. In the title of this chapter.
11. See NM's *Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati*
12. Livy, VIII 19–21.
13. This quotation is given in Latin precisely, and the next two quotations are given with the omission of "he said," from Livy, VIII 21.
14. This and the next quotation are quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VIII 21.
15. Quoted in Latin precisely from Livy, VIII 21, where these words are said by the consul Gaius Plautius.
16. *P* 3.
17. Livy, IX 2–3.
18. *D* III 41–42.

24
Fortresses Are Generally Much More Harmful Than Useful

1. Livy, VIII 20.
2. Lit.: "in faith."
3. *P* 20.
4. Inglese suggests a possible emendation: "it never saved"; but note the word "generally" in the chapter title.
5. Quoted in Latin from Juvenal, *Satires*, VIII 124.
6. Quoted in Latin from Virgil, *Aeneid*, I 150.
7. Inglese proposes an emendation of "useless" rather than "useful," but he may forget NM's willingness to advise those who would do evil.
8. *D* II 17.I.
9. Lit.: "pardon."
10. Lit.: "mode."
11. The French took Milan away from the Sforzas in 1500 and again in 1515.

12. Lit.: “assassinated.”
13. Francesco Alidosi, papal legate to Bologna.
14. Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli; *P* 8, 12.
15. Charles VIII of France, who invaded Italy in 1494.
16. Or “power” *(potere)*
17. Livy, XXV 7–11; XXVI 39; XXVII 15–16, 20, 25.
18. Lit.: “head.”
19. Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartans*, 215DE (said by Agis about Corinth), 190A, and 212E (said by Theopompus and Agesilaus about unspecified cities).
20. Francesco Maria della Rovere.

25
To Assault a Disunited City So As to Seize It by Means of Its Disunion Is a Contradictory Policy

1. Livy, II 44–47, where some editions have Gnaeus Manlius, not Gaius Manilius.
2. *D* II 22.
3. *D* II 21.2.
4. Upper limbs *(braccia)*, not weapons *(arme)*.

26
Vilification and Abuse Generate Hatred against Those Who Use Them, without Any Utility to Them

1. Lit.: “pardon.”
2. Procopius, *De bello Persico*, I 7.
3. Livy, II 43–45.
4. *D* III 6.20.
5. Livy, VII 38–42.
6. Livy, XXIII 35; see also XXII 57; XXIV 14–16.
7. In Latin adapted from Tacitus, *Annals*, XV 68.

27
For Prudent Princes and Republics It Should Be Enough to Conquer, for Most Often When It Is Not Enough, One Loses

1. Livy, XXIII 11–13.
2. Quintus Curtius, IV 2–4.
3. The Florentine republic, of which Piero Soderini was gonfalonier for life and NM secretary of the chancery.
4. Livy, XXX 9, 19–20, 29–31.

28
How Dangerous It Is for a Republic or a Prince Not to Avenge an Injury Done against the Public or against a Private Person[1]

1. Lit.: “the private.”
2. Livy, V 35–38.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.
4. Lit.: “the private.”
5. Lit.: “solemn.”
6. Lit.: “solemn.”
7. Justin, IX 6.

29
Fortune Blinds the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans

1. Livy, V 32–33.
2. Livy, V 37–40, for this and the next six sentences.
3. Lit.: “orders.”
4. Quoted in Latin almost exactly from Livy, V 37.
5. *D* III 1.2.
6. Lit.: “head.”
7. Lit.: “abandon themselves” (also later in this sentence).

30
Truly Powerful Republics and Princes Buy Friendships Not with Money but with Virtue and the Reputation of Strength

1. Livy, V 48.
2. In Latin adapted freely from Livy, V 49, where it is attributed to gods and men rather than to Fortune.
3. Plural.
4. Livy, XXI 26.
5. Livy, *Summaries*, LXI.
6. Livy, XXXVII 22–24; XXXVIII 39; XLIV 15.
7. Livy, *Summaries*, XVI.

8. Livy, XXXV 13.
9. Livy, XXVIII 16.
10. The English king was Henry VIII, the French Louis XII.
11. Cannae, Ticinus, and Lake Trasumennus.
12. Livy, XXIII 11–13.
13. Quoted in Italian from Livy, XXIII 13.

31
How Dangerous It Is to Believe the Banished

1. Lit.: "presupposition" (not the same Italian word used near the start of this sentence and near the end of the chapter). Livy, VIII 24.
2. Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 27–31; Thucydides, I 137–38. According to these sources, it was not Darius but Xerxes or Artaxerxes.
3. A different word from that used in the title and earlier in this chapter, related to the term we have translated as "borders."

32
In How Many Modes the Romans Seized Towns

1. In Latin.
2. Livy, XXVI 42–46.
3. Livy, V 19.
4. Livy, XXIX 34–35; XXX 8.
5. Livy, VIII 25–26.
6. NM's "either" is followed in the next sentence with "But," not "Or."
7. Plutarch, *Aratus*, 7–10, 21–23.
8. *D* II 1, 4, 6.

33
How the Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies

1. Livy, I 49.
2. Livy, IX 35–36.
3. Lit.: "from hand to hand."

Third Book

1
If One Wishes a Sect or a Republic to Live Long, It Is Necessary to Draw It Back Often toward Its Beginning

1. Quoted in Latin; the source has not been found.
2. Livy, V 38.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.
4. Livy, V 37.
5. Lit.: "extrinsic."
6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.
7. Livy, V 39–41, 46.
8. Livy, V 32–50.
9. Livy, II 3–5.
10. According to Livy, III 56–58, two killed themselves in prison and eight were exiled.
11. Livy, IV 13–16.
12. Livy, VI 11–20.
13. Livy, VIII 7–8.
14. Livy, VIII 30–36.
15. Livy, XXXVIII 50–60: Scipio Africanus and his brother Scipio Asiaticus.
16. See *FH* V I, 4. The Medici governed Florence during this period.
17. Livy, II 10.
18. Livy, II 11–13.
19. Plutarch, *Pyrrbus*, 20.
20. Livy, VIII 9–10; X 26–29.
21. Livy, *Summaries*, XVIII.
22. Plutarch, *Cato the Younger*, 4, 18, 21, 78.
23. On the corruption of the Franciscans and the Dominicans, cf. Dante, *Paradiso*, XI-XII.
24. See *P* 19.
25. Lucius Junius Brutus.

2
That It Is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Craziness at the Right Time[1]

1. Lit.: "in time."
2. Livy, I 56.
3. Livy, I 58–59.

3
That It Is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus If One Wishes to Maintain a Newly Acquired Freedom

1. See Savonarola, *Sermons on the Psalms*, 11 October 1495.
2. *D* I 16.4–5
3. In August 1502, the Florentines extended the term of the office of gonfalonier (head of the Signoria) from two months to life and gave it to Piero Soderini, NM's employer. See also NM's *Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio* (1503; see end of text) and *Decennale primo* (1504; see 370–79) for further, enigmatic comment.

4
A Prince Does Not Live Secure in a Principality While Those Who Have Been Despoiled of It Are Living

1. Lit.: "merit."
2. Lit.: "merits."
3. Cf. *P* 7
4. Livy, I 35, 40–42, 46–49.

5
What Makes a King Who Is Heir to a Kingdom Lose It

1. Livy, I 58.
2. Livy, I 56, 59.
3. Livy, I 59–60.
4. Plutarch, *Timoleon*, 4–5, 36–39.
5. See Plutarch, *Aratus*, especially 53; also Polybius, IV 8.
6. Or "deprived individuals."

6
Of Conspiracies

1. NM translates into Italian, with divergences, a passage from Tacitus, *Histories*, IV 8.
2. *D* II 32.1.
3. Some manuscripts say "public charges," but Casella's choice of "private" fits the sense better.
4. *D* II 24.1–2, 28; *P* 19.
5. Lit.: "war."
6. See *P* 3.
7. Some manuscripts have "to the dead."
8. Justin, IX 6.
9. Casella has Luzio and Giulio Belanti later in the chapter (see *D* III 6 n. 57). Guicciardini does not mention the Belanti conspiracy in his histories; Pandolfo was "tyrant" or "prince" of Siena from 1498 to 1512 (see *FH* VIII 35; *P* 20, 22).
10. See *FH* VIII 1–3.
11 See Plutarch, *Brutus*, 8–10.
12. See Cicero, *De officus*, II 7, according to whom Phalaris was slain by the "general multitude" of Agrigentum
13. See Cicero, *De officus*, II 7; Plutarch, *Dion*, 6; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1312a4–6. There were in fact two Dionysiuses, both tyrants of Syracuse
14. Juvenal, *Satires*, X 112–13; quoted in Latin.
15. Earlier in the paragraph and in *D* II 28.
16. The incident occurred on 7 December 1492. See *P* 21 for NM's assurance that Ferdinand was alert to possible conspiracies.
17. Bajazet II, sultan from 1481 to 1512 and father of "the present Turk," Selim I, suffered this attack in 1492.
18. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1311a8–21.
19. See Herodian, I 9. The year was 185.
20. See Herodian, III 11–12. This happened in 205.
21. See Tacitus, *Annals*, V 6–8; Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 65. The year was 31.
22. Jacopo killed Piero Gambacorti in October 1392.
23. Coppola was executed by Ferdinand in 1487; see *FH* VIII 32.
24. Lit.: "pleasures."
25. See *P* 17.
26. See Tacitus, *Annals*, XV 48–54, for the conspiracy of Gaius Piso against Emperor Nero in 65.
27. See *FH* VIII 2–7.
28. See Livy, II 4.
29. See Quintus Curtius, VI 7–11.
30. Lit.: "reasoning."
31. See Tacitus, *Annals*, XV 48, 54–56.
32. See Livy, XXIV 5, where the conspirator's name is given as Theodotus. The year was 215B.C.
33. See Justin, XXVI I, where the conspirator's name is given as Hellanicus. The year was 272 B.C.
34. See Herodotus, III 61–79.
35. See Livy, XXXV 35.
36 See Tacitus, *Annals*, XV 48, 52.
37. See Herodian, III 10–12. This happened in 205.
38. See Tacitus, *Annals*, XV 51, 57.
39. See Herodian, I 16–17. This took place in 192.
40. See Herodian, IV 12–13. The year was 217.
41. See *P* 3.
42. See *FH* VIII 5. The Pazzi conspiracy was in 1478.
43. Plutarch, *Caius Marius*, 37–39. This took place in 88 B.C.

44. Lit.: “offend.”
45. Sitalces was king of Thrace from 440 to 424 B.C., but NM appears to have invented this conspiracy against him.
46. The two brothers, Ferdinando and Giulio, conspired against Duke Alfonso in 1506; the priest was Jean d’Artiganova. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy* VII 4.
47. In this chapter and in *D* I 10.2, 40.6.
48. Quoted in Latin with a slight variation from Livy, XXXV 35.
49. See Herodian, I 8.
50. The Pazzi conspiracy in 1478.
51. Some manuscripts say “places” rather than “countries.” See Herodian, III 11–12, where Severus and Antoninus are said to have been in separate rooms of the same palace.
52. See Thucydides, VI 54–59, where Hipparchus, not Diocles, is given as the victim of the conspiracy against these sons of Pisistratus in 514 B.C.; for the error see Justin, II 9.
53. See Justin, XVI 5; the year was 352.
54. See *FH* VIII 6.
55. See Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 7–13.
56. See Plutarch, *Brutus*, 16.
57. See *D* III 6 n. 9.
58. See *FH* VII 34; the conspiracy took place in 1476.
59. See *FH* VIII 34; *P* 20.
60. See Plutarch, *Caesar*, 68–69.
61. See Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 31, and Cicero, *In Catilinam*, I 1; the year was 63 B.C.
62. See Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 46–47; Plutarch, *Cicero*, 16–19.
63. See Hanno’s conspiracy of 350 B.C. narrated by Justin, XXI 4.
64. See Plutarch, *Caesar*, 32.
65. See Justin, XXII 1; Plutarch, *Pyrrhus*, 14; *P* 8.
66. See Plutarch, *Cleomenes*, 4.
67. See Plutarch, *Solon*, 30; Herodotus, I 59.
68. Pandolfo returned to Siena from exile in 1487. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, IV 3.
69. See Plutarch, *Cicero*, 22; Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 60.
70. See Justin, XXI 4.
71. See Justin, III 6; Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 5. The conspiracy occurred in 382 B.C.
72. In this chapter and in *D* III 4, 5.
73. See Herodian, 117.
74. *D* II 20, 26.
75. Livy, VII 38–41.
76. Walter de Brienne, duke of Athens, was invited to Florence as captain in 1342 and overthrown by conspiracy in 1343; see *FH* II 30, 33–37.
77. For a contemporary account see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, V 8. The bishop was Cosimo de’ Pazzi.
78. See *FH* II 36.
79. See Plutarch, *Dion*, 54–57.

7
Whence It Arises That Changes from Freedom to Servitude and from Servitude to Freedom Are Some of Them without Blood, Some of Them Full of It

1. Livy, I 59–60.
2. Piero, Giovanni, and Giuliano de’ Medici were banished from Florence when the French King Charles VIII entered the city in November 1494.

8
Whoever Wishes to Alter a Republic Should Consider Its Subject

1. See *D* I 18, 55; III 6.19.
2. Livy, II 41.
3. Livy, VI 14–20.
4. Quoted precisely in Latin from Livy, VI 20.
5. *D* III 1.

9
How One Must Vary with the Times If One Wishes Always to Have Good Fortune

1. Livy, XXII 12, 18; XXVIII 40–42.
2. Lit.: “temporal [things].”
3. *D*I 7.14, 52.2, 56; III 3.
4. For a similar view of the events of 1512 in Florence, see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, XI 4.
5. See *P* 25 for a fuller treatment of Pope Julius II on this point.
6. *D* I 18.

10
That a Captain Cannot Flee Battle When the Adversary Wishes Him to Engage in It in Any Mode

1. Quoted in Latin and freely adapted from Livy, VII 12.
2. *D* I pr.2; II pr.3, 4.2, 16, 18.1–3, 19.
3. See *P* 3 for the remark of the cardinal of Rouen, quoted by NM, that “the Italians do not understand war.”
4. A possible reference to NM’s dialogue, *AW*, or to *D* II 16–18.

5. The manuscripts say *alcuno modo* (“some mode”) rather than *nessuno modo* (“not in any mode”), as the sense seems to demand.
6. See *AW* IV.
7. Philip V. Livy, XXXIII 7–10.
8. Livy, VII 12–15.
9. Quoted in Latin and adapted from Livy, VII 11.

11
That Whoever Has to Deal with Very Many, Even Though He Is Inferior, Wins If Only He Can Sustain the First Thrusts

1. *D* I 3–6, 50; III 1.3, 8.1.
2. The following is not said exactly elsewhere, but see *D* I 3, 6.3–4, 18, 34.3, 37.1, 49; III 1.2.
3. Appius Claudius Crassus; Livy, VI 37–42.
4. Ludovico Sforza
5. “All Italy”—consisting of Pope Sixtus IV, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan (for whom “Signor Ludovico” the Moor was regent), the Florentines, and the duke of Ferrara—formed a league against the Venetians. But the Venetians made the Peace of Bagnolo separately with Ludovico in 1484, to which the others were forced to accede.
6. In 1495, after the French King Charles VIII conquered the kingdom of Naples, the “whole world”—consisting of the duke of Milan, the Emperor Maximilian, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, Pope Alexander VI, and Venice—combined against him in the League of Venice. But the king of Spain made a separate peace with France in 1497, dividing the kingdom of Naples. Or the possible reference may be to the Holy League formed in 1511, which also ended with a separate peace between Spain and France; see NM’s letter of 10 December 1514.
7. *Uno*
8. *Uno*
9. The League of Cambrai was formed against the Venetians in 1508 and defeated them in 1509 at the Battle of Agnadello.

12
That a Prudent Captain Ought to Impose Every Necessity to Engage in Combat on His Soldiers and Take It Away from Those of Enemies

1. *D* I 1.4–5, 3.2; II 12.3.
2. The reference has not been found. For opposing views see Plato, *Laws*, 628c—d; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a 10–19; Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, I 1.
3. An apparent reference to the return of the Medici in 1512.
4. See Plutarch, *Marcus Crassus*, 26–31.
5. Quoted with slight variation in Latin from Livy, IX I.
6. Livy, II 47, where it is Gnaeus Manlius, not Gaius Manilius.
7. Quoted in Latin with slight variation from Livy, IV 28.
8. Livy, V 21.

13
Which Is More to Be Trusted, a Good Captain Who Has a Weak Army or a Good Army That Has a Weak Captain

1. Livy, II 35, 39–40.
2 Livy, XXV 36–39.
3. Lit.: “discoursing.”
4. Quoted in Latin with omission and variation from Suetonius, *Julius Caesar*, 34
5 See Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 7.
6 Livy, XXII 57; XXIV 14–16
7 *D* I 21.3.
8. See Diodorus Siculus, XVIII.9; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 68; Justin, XIII.2.
9 Livy, *Summaries*, CXXXI

14
What Effects New Inventions That Appear in the Middle of the Fight and New Voices That Are Heard May Produce

1. Livy, II 64.
2. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, III 2, for an account of the incident, which occurred in 1495.
3. Livy VII 14; see also *AW* IV.
4. Lit.: “formed.”
5. See Diodorus Siculus, II 16–19.
6. Quoted in Latin without change from Livy, IV 33.

15
That One Individual and Not Many Should Be Put over an Army; and That Several Commanders Hurt

1. Aemilius Mamercus; see *D* III 14.3.
2. Quoted in Latin with alteration from Livy, IV 31.
3. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, VI. NM accompanied the Florentine mission to Pisa personally as secretary of the republic.
4. Quoted in Latin and freely adapted from Livy, III 70.

16
That in Difficult Times One Goes to Find True Virtue; and in Easy Times Not Virtuous Men but Those with Riches or Kinship Have More Favor

1. Thucydides, VI 8–24.
2. Lit.: "sufficiency."
3. *D* I 18.3; II 1.1.
4. Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus*, 6, 9–11. This was the Third Macedonian War, 172–167 B.C.
5. For NM's opinion of Giacomini's virtue, see his *Decennale secundo*, V 32–36, and his *Nature di uomim fiorentim* Giacomini resigned the office of commissioner in 1506 after an unsuccessful assault of Pisa; the three commissioners were in office in 1508–9; Pisa surrendered on 6 June 1509. As Florentine secretary, NM was present at these events.

17
That One Individual Should Not Be Offended and Then That Same One Sent to an Administration and Governance of Importance

1. Livy, XXVI 17. The other consul was Marcus Livius.
2. Livy, XXVII 44–51.

18
Nothing Is More Worthy of a Captain Than to Foretell the Policies of the Enemy

1. In Plutarch's *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*, 187D, this remark is attributed to Chabrias, not to Epaminondas.
2. See Plutarch, *Brutus*, 42–43.
3. NM describes the Battle of Marignano on 13–14 September 1515. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, XII 15. The pope was Leo X.
4. Livy, IV 37–41, according to which it was the Volsci, not the Aequi.
5. This particular is missing from Guicciardini's account, *History of Italy*, IV 3–4.

19
Whether to Rule a Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment

1. Livy, II 55–60.
2. "He says" is written in Latin.
3. The passage quoted in Latin does not occur in Tacitus; cf. *Annals*, III 55.5.
4. See *P* 17; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1315a26–31.

20
One Example of Humanity Was Able to Do More with the Falisci Than Any Roman Force

1. Livy, V 27.
2. Plutarch, *Pyrrhus*, 21; Cicero, *De officiis*, I 13; Livy, *Summaries*, XIII.
3. Livy, XXVI 46, 50.
4. Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus*, I 1.3; III 1.41–2.0, 3.2; IV 2.34; V 1.19, 3.46, 4.24; VI 1.46; VIII 2.23, 6.23; cf. I 1.5. See also *P* 14.

21
Whence It Arises That with a Different Mode of Proceeding Hannibal Produced Those Same Effects in Italy as Scipio Did in Spain

1. Livy, XXVII 20. On the comparison between Hannibal and Scipio, see *P* 17.
2. Livy, XXII 54, 61.
3. *D* I 37.1.
4. See *P* 17, 19.
5. Lit.: "offense."
6. Livy, XXVIII 24–29, 32–34.
7. Livy, XXI 1.
8. Livy, XXXIX 51.

22
That the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Kindness of Valerius Corvinus Acquired for Each the Same Glory

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VIII 7.
2. Livy, VII 4, 9–10; quoted in Latin with changes from 10. According to Livy, it was not the consul but the dictator, Titus Quintius Poenus.
3. The prudent man has not been identified. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1286b27–31, cited by Walker, does not refer to a proportion. On "proportion," see *D* I 55 and *P* 14; see also *D* I 40.
4. *D* III 1.3; cf. Ill 17.
5. *D* III 20, esp. n. 4.
6. Quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VII 33.
7. Livy, VIII 7–10.
8. See *D* I 16.3, 34.2, 43.
9. Livy, II 2, 6–8.

10. See *D* III 20.
11. This episode or practice is otherwise unknown.

23
For What Cause Camillus Was Expelled from Rome

1. Quoted in Latin with some alteration from Livy, V 26.
2. Livy, V 22–23, 32; see Plutarch, *Camillus*, 7.
3. Or "someone useful" (*uno utile*)
4. See *P* 17, 19; cf. Sallust, *Bellum Jugurthinum*, 3.

24
The Prolongation of Commands Made Rome Servile

1. Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus is not given his family name in this chapter, unlike the next.
2. Livy, III 21.
3. Publilius according to Livy, VIII 26.

25
Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of Many Roman Citizens

1. See *D* I 37.1; II 6, 19.I; III 16.2.
2. Quoted in Latin with some changes from Livy, III 26.
3. Three and one-third acres. See *D* I 24.2 n. 4.
4. Quoted in Italian from Livy, III 29.
5. Quoted in Italian from Livy, III 29, where Cincinnatus says, "Until you begin to have the spirit *[animum]* of a consul, lead these legions as a legate."
6. Livy, *Summaries*, XVIII. See *AW* I.
7. Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus*, 28.
8. Valerius Maximus, IV 4. See also Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor pacts*, II 11–14; cf. Plato, *Laws*, 737d, and Aristotle, *Politics*, 1265a28–33, 1267a21–28.

26
How a State Is Ruined Because of Women

1. Livy, IV 9–10.
2. See *D* III 2, 5. Livy, 1 58–59.
3. See *D* I 40.4, 44, 57. Livy, III 44–58.
4. See *D* III 6. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1314b27; see also 1303b17–4a18.

27
How One Has to Unite a Divided City; and How That Opinion Is Not True That to Hold Cities One Needs to Hold Them Divided

1. Livy, IV 10.
2. Lit.: "conversation."
3. The reference is to events from August 1500 to April 1502 in Pistoia, a city subject to Florence The Panciatichi were allied to the Medici, then in exile, and the Cancellieri were supporters of the Florentine republic. NM was present in Pistoia on several occasions in 1501 and wrote his brief article *De rebus pistoriensibus* in 1502. See also *P* 17, 20. For another contemporary account, see Guicciardini, *Storia Fiorentina*, 22, 24.
4. See *D* I pr.2.
5. See *P* 20.
6. See *D* II 24.
7. Flavio Biondo, *Historiae decades tres*, II 9; quoted by NM in Italian, loosely based on Biondo's Latin.
8. NM would have heard this remark himself while accompanying "Monsieur de Lant" (Antoine de Langres); it is not otherwise recorded.

28
That One Should Be Mindful of the Works of Citizens Because Many Times underneath a Merciful Work a Beginning of Tyranny Is Concealed

1. Livy, IV 13–14; the dictator was Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus.
2. Or "damned."
3. Lit.: "favors."

29
That the Sins of Peoples Arise from Princes

1. Lit.: "will discourse of."
2. See *P* 7, 17.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 28, but changing the word order and omitting "almost" before "always" and "just" before "religion."
4. Lorenzo de' Medici, *La rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paulo*, in *Opere*, ed. A. Simioni, (Bari: G. Laterza & Figli, 1914), II 100.

30

For One Citizen Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by His Authority, It Is Necessary First to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City

1. Or "he."
2. Quoted in Latin with slight changes from Livy, VI 6, 10–15. Livy also mentions that Camillus shared the command of his army with Publius Valerius and that Cornelius was also to guard over religion.
3. Lit.: "written" or "inscribed," as elsewhere in the chapter.
4 Exodus 32.25–28

31

Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Spirit and Their Same Dignity in Every Fortune

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 7, with a slight alteration.
2. The third defeat after those at Ticinus in 218 B.C. and at Lake Trasumennus in 217. Livy, XXI 45–46; XXII 4–7, 43–50.
3. Livy, XXII 57–61.
4. *D* II 30.
5. Livy, XXIII 12–13.
6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, XXXVII 34–45, and adapted loosely from 45, where Scipio also invokes fortune and distinguishes our spirits subject to our own minds from the things under the power of the immortal gods.
7. For a contemporary account, see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, VIII 4–7.
8. See *D* I 4.1, 21; also *P* 12.
9. *D* III 30.1.
10. Quoted in Latin with a slight variation from Livy, VI 7.
11. *Spirito*, not the *animo* translated elsewhere in the chapter as "spirit."

32

What Modes Some Have Held to for Disturbing a Peace

1. Livy, VI 21
2. Livy, VI 13.
3. Lit.: "reasoning."
4. Actually Gesco.
5. See *P* 12; Polybius, I 65–88.

33

If One Wishes to Win a Battle, It Is Necessary to Make the Army Confident Both among Themselves and in the Captain

1. Publius Claudius Pulcher; Cicero, *De natura deorum*, II 3.
2. Quoted in Latin with slight change from Livy, VI 41, where the speaker is Appius Claudius Pulcher, grandson of the decemvir.
3. Quoted in Latin from Livy, VI 29, where the dictator is Titus Quintius Cincinnatus and the master of the horse is Aulus Sempronius Atratinus. NM omits the dictator's statement, "Nor have they been given by the immortal gods any surer trust or greater help."
4. Quoted precisely in Latin from Livy, VI 30. The Manlii were Publius and Gaius.
5. Livy, IX 37. Fabius is Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

34

What Fame or Word or Opinion Makes the People Begin to Favor a Citizen; and Whether It Distributes Magistracies with Greater Prudence Than a Prince

1. See *D* I 11.1; III 22.1. Livy, VII 4–5.
2. See *D* I 47.3, 58.
3. Livy, VI 42; VII 9–11; VIII 7–8.
4. Livy, XXI 46.
5. Livy, XXII 53.
6. Livy, XXVI 49–50.
7. Livy, XXIV 7–9.
8. Lit.: "countersigns."
9. Lit.: "favors."

35

What Dangers Are Borne in Making Oneself Head in Counseling a Thing; and the More It Has of the Extraordinary, the Greater Are the Dangers Incurred in It

1. Apparently NM never found the more convenient place, unless it is *P* 6.
2. See Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, XIII 9.
3. Livy, VI 35–42; VII 1.
4. Livy, VII 6; the defeated plebeian consul was Lucius Genucius.
5. Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus*, 23; the words quoted appear to be NM's invention.

36
The Causes Why the French Have Been and Are Still Judged in Fights at the Beginning As More Than Men and Later As Less Than Women

1. Livy, VII 9–10.
2. Livy, X 28; he says it only once.
3. See Polybius, II 35.2–4.
4. Quoted in Latin with a slight change from Livy, VIII 34. Fabius is Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

37
Whether Small Battles Are Necessary before the Main Battle;[1] and If One Wishes to Avoid Them, What One Ought to Do to Know a New Enemy

1. In this chapter *giornata* is translated as "main battle" to distinguish it from *battaglie*
2. See *D* I 6.3.
3. Quoted in Latin with some omissions from Livy, VII 32.
4. See *D* I 23.2–4.
5. Quoted in Latin with slight alteration from Livy, VII 32, where Valerius after some light fighting exhorts his soldiers with remarks quoted by NM in the next chapter.
6. Philip V. Livy, XXXI 14, 26; XXXII 13.
7. Livy, XXIII 5.
8. See Plutarch, *Marius*, 13–16.
9. Quoted in Latin adapted from Livy, VII 11, with the addition of "by a thing of small importance."

38
How a Captain in Whom His Army Can Have Confidence Ought to Be Made

1 In the preceding chapter, see also *D* I 60; II 26; III 22, 23.
2 Quoted in Latin from Livy, VII 32, omitting "not by faction or by the intrigues used by the nobility, but" before "with this right hand." The passage shifts from indirect to direct discourse.
3. See *D* I 21; II 26; III 13.
4. See *P* 14.

39
That a Captain Ought to Be a Knower of Sites

1. Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus*, II 4, 22–29. Xenophon's work is not called the "Life of Cyrus." See *P* 14.
2. The three quotations are in Latin from Livy, VII 34, omitting "with his centurions dressed as privates" after "cloak." Only the first sentence of the last one, of course, is actually put in the mouth of Publius Decius by Livy.

40
That to Use Fraud in Managing War Is a Glorious Thing

1. See *D* II 13; *P* 18.
2. Lake Trasumennus.
3. Livy, XXII 4, 16–17. See also Plutarch, *Fabius Maximus*, 6; Polybius, III 83–84, 93. Hannibal did not simulate flight according to Livy or Polybius.
4. Livy, IX 2–3.
5. Actually Lucera.
6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, IX 3. The consuls were Titus Veturius Calvinus and Spurius Postumius.
7. See *D* II 23.4.

41
That the Fatherland Ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with Glory; and It Is Well Defended in Any Mode Whatever

1. In the preceding chapter.
2. Livy, IX 4.
3. Lit.: "respect."

42
That Promises Made through Force Ought Not to Be Observed

1. Livy, IX 8–12.
2. *P* 18; the title is given in Latin.

43
That Men Who Are Born in One Province Observe Almost the Same Nature for All Times

1. In 1494 Piero de' Medici ceded by treaty the fortress of Pisa to the king of France on the condition that it be returned to Florence after Charles had conquered the kingdom of Naples. The king instead left it in the hands of the Pisans, an act that led to the downfall of Piero in Florence.
2. Lit.: "working."

3. Lit.: “causing.”
4. See *FH* III 25.
5. Livy, X 10.

44
One Often Obtains with Impetuosity and Audacity What One Would Never Have Obtained through Ordinary Modes

1. Quoted in Latin from Livy, X 16.
2. On these events in 1506, see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, VII 3. The king of France was Louis XII.
3. On this episode in 1512, see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, X 10. The king of France was Louis XII, the marquis Francesco Gonzaga, the pope Julius II.

45
What the Better Policy Is in Battles, to Resist the Thrust of Enemies and, Having Resisted It, to Charge Them; or Indeed to Assault Them with Fury from the First

1. Livy, X 27–29. The consuls were Publius Decius Mus the Younger and Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus.

46
Whence It Arises That One Family in One City Keeps the Same Customs for a Time

1. Livy, IX 33–34. This is said by Publius Sempronius in his oration against Appius Claudius, descendant of the decemvir.

47
That a Good Citizen Ought to Forget Private Injuries for Love of His Fatherland

1. Livy, IX 38.

48
When One Sees a Great Error Made by an Enemy, One Ought to Believe That There Is a Deception Underneath

1. Livy, X 4.
2. Livy, V 39.
3. For these events see Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, VIII 8.

49
A Republic Has Need of New Acts of Foresight Every Day If One Wishes to Maintain It Free; and for What Merits Quintus Fabius Was Called Maximus

1. See *D* I 33–34, 49.
2. Livy, VIII 18.
3. Livy, XXXIX 8–18.
4. Livy, XXIII 25; XXV 5–7. Livy does not mention their not lodging in town or their eating standing up.
5. Livy, II 59. See also Polybius, VI 38.
6. Lit.: “civility.”
7. Lit.: “civility.”
8. Livy, IX 46.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Names in italics are referred to but not used by NM; portions of names in italics are omitted by NM; locations in italics indicate a reference without actual use of a name used elsewhere. All names have only one explanatory entry listing instances, with variants referring to it. Roman names are generally given according to the practice followed by the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, except for those of very famous persons, such as Mark Antony, which have become sufficiently anglicized. Multiple references within paragraphs are not indicated, except in the entry for Livy. In that entry a locator for every instance is given. Writers are referred to (1) when named (I 1.1); (2) when named and quoted (I 1.1 (Q)); (3) when unnamed and unquoted *(I 1 1);* and (4) when unnamed and quoted *(I 1 1 (Q))*. DL refers to the dedicatory letter, Pr to the prefaces, and T to a chapter title.

Achaeans, ancient Greek league: II 4.1–2
Adria, Etruscan colony at the head of the Adriatic Sea: II 4.1
Adriatic Sea I 1.2, II 4.1
Aedui, ancient people who invaded Gaul: II 1.3, II 30.2
Aeneas, hero of Virgil's *Aeneid*, one of two alternative founders of Rome: I 1.4–5, II 8.3
Aequi, central Italian tribe, crushed by Rome c. 304 B.C.: I 13.2, I 38.1, *I* 40 4, II 1.1, II 1.2, III 12.3, III 15.2, III 18.2, III 25
Aetolia, Aetolians, region of Greece: II 1.3, II 4.1, II 4.2, III 6.7
Afranius, *Lucius*, Roman general who lost to Julius Caesar at Ilerda in Spain in 49 B.C.: III 13.2
Africa: I 18.3, I 53.4, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 8.2, II 12.1, II 32.1, III 9.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 25, III 32, III 34.3
Agathocles (361–289 B.C.), tyrant of Syracuse: II 12.1, II 12.4, II 13.1, III 6.19
Agesilaus, nineteenth king of Sparta (398–360 B.C.): I 10.2, *II 24 4*
Agis III, king of Sparta who lost war with Antipater (331 B.C.): II 10.1, II 24.4
Agis IV, king and unsuccessful refounder of Sparta (244–240 B.C.): I 9.4
Agnadello, site of Venetian loss (1509) to the League of Cambrai: I 12.2
Agrarian law, initially 5th century B.C. Roman law limiting land ownership: I 37 T, I 37.1, III 24, III 25
Agrippa, Furius, consul and colleague of Titus Quintius Capitolinus in 446 B.C.: III 15.2
Alamanni, Luigi, see Buondelmonti, Zanobi, and Rucellai, Cosimo
Alba, Albans, city in Latium: I 22 T, I 22, *I 23 1*, II 3
Albanus, Lake, lake in Latium, overflowed banks when Camillus took Veii in 392 B.C.: I 13.1
Albizzi, Luca di Antonio degli, Florentine counselor in 1500: III 15.2
Alcibiades (c. 450–404 B.C.), Athenian, sponsored disastrous Sicilian expedition in 415 B.C.: III 16.1
Alexamenus, Aetolian, killed Nabis in 192 B.C.: III 6.7, III 6.15
Alexander VI *(Rodrigo Cardinal Borgia)* (1431–1503), pope (1492–1503), father of Cesare Borgia, eliminated lords of Romagna. II 24.2, *III 11 2*, III 29
Alexander of Epirus, king of Epirus (336–326 B.C.), uncle of Alexander the Great: II 28.2, II 31.1, II 31.2, *III 6 2*
Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.), king of Macedon, took throne in 336 B.C., conquered Greece and Asia: I 1.3, I 1.4, I 1.5, I 20, I 26.1, I 58.2, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 10.3, II 27.2, II 27.4, II 28.2, II 31.1, *III 6 2*, III 6.5, III 13.3
Alexandria, Egyptian city built by Alexander the Great: I 1.3, I 1.5
Alfonso *I d'Este* (1476–1534), duke of Ferrara: *I 53 1*, III 6.14, *III 11 2*
Alfonso *II* (1448–95), king of Aragon and Naples, lost his army and his state in Romagna: II 12 2

Alidosi, Francesco, papal legate of Julius II to Bologna: II 24.2
Allia, river in Latium, site of Gauls' victory over Rome (386 B.C.): II 29.1, II 29.2, III 33.1, III 48.2
Allucius, Celtiberian chieftain whose beloved was returned by Scipio Africanus: III 20, III 34.3
Alps, mountains dividing Italy from the rest of Europe: *II 4 1*, III 43
Alviano, Bartolommeo d' (c. 1455–1515), Venetian commander, invaded Florence (1515), defeated by Bentivoglio and Giacomini: I 53.5
Amida, Asian site of siege by Gabades: II 26
Ancus *(Marcius)*, fourth king of Rome (640–616 B.C.): I 19.3, III 4
Anio, river in Latium, site of exemplary duel in 361 B.C.. III 36.1
Annius; *see* Setinus, Annius Lucius
Antaeus, fabulous Libyan giant, son of Poseidon and Gaia (Earth), combatant of Hercules: II 12.2
Antigonus (382–301 B.C.), general of Alexander the Great, who became king of Macedon after his death: II 10.1
Antiochus *the Great*, king of Syria (223–187 B.C.): II 1.1, II 12.1, II 12.4, III 16.2, III 31.2
Antipater, Macedonian general (397–319 B.C.), defeated Agis III of Sparta: II 10.1
Antoninus Caracalla, son of Severus, Roman emperor (211–17), murdered by Macrinus: III 6.8, III 6.11, III 6.15
Antonius *Pius*, Roman emperor (138–61), lived as a good prince: I 10 4
Antonius Primus, Marcus, Roman general, fought under Vespasian, defeated Vitellius in 69, died almost in despair in Asia. I 29.2
Antony, Mark (c. 83–32 B.C.), part of triumvirate that ruled (43–38 B.C) after Julius Caesar's assassination I 52.3, II 18.3
Anzio, Anzianti *(Antium)*, on the coast of Latium, where Rome attempted to establish a colony: I 37.2, II 21.2
Apollo, Greek and Roman god, identified with youth, music, and medicine: I 13.1, I 55.1, III 2, III 23, III 29
Apollonides, prudent Syracusan during Second Punic War (214 B.C.): II 15.2
Apennines, mountains in Italy: II 2.1
Appiano, Jacopo I d' (1322–98), lord of Piombino, ungrateful but successful conspirator against Piero Gambacorti: III 6.3
Appiano, Jacopo IV d', head of a Florentine army that defeated the Venetians in 1498 near Marradi through knowledge: III 18.3
Appii: III 46
Appius Claudius, consul, colleague of Titus Quintius Capitolinus (472 B.C.): III 19.1
Appius Claudius, head of Decemvirate in 451–450 b.c., known for his harshness and ambition, killed himself (449 B.C.): I 35, I 40.1–7, I 41, I 42, I 45.1. *See also* Decemvirate, decemvirs
Appius *Claudius Caecus*, Roman censor who refused to resign (310 B.C.): III 46
Appius Claudius *Crassus*, grandson of the decemvir, dictator and opponent of the tribunes (368 B.C.): III 11.1, III 33.1
Appius *Claudius* Pulcher; *see* Claudius Pulcher, Publius
Appius Erdonius, Sabine who seized the Capitol in 460 B.C.: I 13.2
Aquilonia, between Apulia and Lucana, site of battle between Romans and Samnites: I 15
Aragon, Spanish kingdom: I 29.2
Aratus (271–213 B.C.), Sicyonian man of hidden virtue: II 32.1, III 5
Arbedo, battle of, between Milan and the Swiss (1422): II 18.4
Ardea, Ardeans, coastal town in Latium, temporary home of Camillus (386 B.C.) and site of a plebeian/patrician dispute over marriage (443 B.C.): II 29.1, II 29.2, III 26.1, III 26.2, III 27.1
Arezzo, Aretines (*Arretium*), town in Tuscany, part of the ancient Etruscan league, site of portents of the death of Lorenzo de' Medici, rebelled against Florence in 1502, decisive for Soderini: I 2.1, I 23.3, I 38.3, I 39.2, I 56, II 4.1, II 23.3, III 6.20, III 27.4

Aristides the Just (?–c. 467 B.C.), Athenian: I 59
Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus: III 6.7
Aristotle, Greek philosopher: *II 5 1*, III 26.2
Armagnac, Louis d', duke of Nemours, killed by artillery during battle with Spaniards at Cirignuola in 1503: II 17.4
Armenia, king of, attacked by Cyrus: II 13.1, III 39.1
Arno, river in Tuscany flowing through Florence: I 1.3
Arrabbiata, Arrabiati ("the rabid"), Florentine faction that defeated the Frateschi in 1498: I 54
Arruns, of Chiusi, avenged the seduction of his sister (according to NM) or his wife (according to Livy) by Lucumo (c. 390 B.C.): I 7.5
Artaxerxes, king of Persia (464–424 B.C.), NM calls him Darius: II 31.2
Artiganova, Jean d',, priest who in 1506 unsuccessfully conspired against Alfonso d'Este, duke of Ferrara: III 6.14
Asia: I 18.3, II 1.1, II 1 3, II 10.1, II 26, II 31.1, II 31.2
Assyria, ancient Middle Eastern empire: II Pr.2
Athens, Athenians: I 1.2, I 2.6, I 28 T, I 28, I 40.2, I 53.4, I 53.5, I 58.3, I 59, II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1, II 10.1, II 10.3, II 12.2, II 24.4, II 31.2, III 6.16, III 6.19, III 16.1
Athens, *Walter de Brienne*, duke of, ruled Florence (1344–45): III 6.20
Athos, Mount, in northeast Greece: I 1.5
Attalus, adviser to King Philip II of Macedon: II 28.2
Augustus, Gaius Octavius (Octavian) (63 B.C.–A. D. 14), the first Roman emperor (27 B. C.–A.D.. 14): I 1.3, I 52.3
Aulius Cerretanus, Quintus, master of the horse at Sora (316 B.C.): II 18.3
Austria: II 19.2
Austria, duke of: II 19.2

Bacchanals, conspiracy at Rome during the Third Macedonian War (193–188 B.C.): III 49.1, III 49.3
Baglioni, family party in Perugia: III 14.1
Baglioni, Giovampagolo, tyrant of Perugia, expelled in 1505 by Pope Julius II: I 27.1
Bagnolo, Peace of; peace between Venice and Ludovico Sforza in 1484: III 11.2
Bajazet *II*, peaceful Turkish sultan (1481–1512), son of the warlike Mahomet, father of the warlike Selim, survived a conspiracy: I 19.2, III 6.2
Beaumont, Jean de, French captain trusted by the Florentines: I 38.3
Belanti, Giulio, plotter against Pandolfo Petrucci: III 6.2, III 6.17
Belisarius (c. 505–c. 565), captain for Emperor Justinian: II 8.2
Bellovesus, led Gauls into Italy (616–579 B.C.): II 4.1, II 8.1
Bentivogli, family, powers in Bologna: I 27.1, II 24.2, III 44.2
Bentivoglio, Ercole, Bolognese commander of Florentine forces, helped defeat d'Alviano's attack in 1515: I 53.5
Bernabo, Messer; *see* Visconti, Bernabo
Bersighella (Brisighella), town near Faenza: III 18.3
Bible: III 30.1
Biondo, *Flavio* (1388–1463), papal secretary of state and historian, III 27.3 (Q)
Bologna: I 27.1, I 38.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, III 44.2, III 44.3
Bonromei, Giovanni, Florentine whose patrimony was taken from the Pazzi: III 6.2
Borgia, Cesare, Duke Valentino (1476–1507), illegitimate son of Pope Alexander VI, made cardinal in 1493 and duke of Romagna in 1501, after conquering it: I 38.2, II 24.2, III 27.4
Brescia, town in Lombardy: II 17.1, II 24.3, III 44.3
Britannia, ancient name for England: II 8.2

Brutus, *Lucius Junius*, one of Rome's first consuls (509 B.C.), founder of republic: I 16.4, I 17.1, III 1.6, III 2, III 3, III 5
Brutus, *Lucius Junius*, sons of: I 16.4, I 16.6, III 1.3, III 3 T, III 3, III 5, III 6.5
Brutus, *Marcus Junius* (85–42 B.C.), one of Julius Caesar's assassins (44 B.C.), later defeated at Philippi (42 B.C.) by Antony and Octavian, committed suicide: I 10.3, I 17.1, III 6.2, III 6.16, *III 6 18*, III 18.1
Buondelmonti, Zanobi (1491–1527), friend of NM in the *Orti Oricellari* DL

Caelian Hill, in Rome: I 28
Caesar, *Gaius Julius* (100–44 B.C.), ruled Rome after defeating Pompey, assassinated 44 B.C. by Marcus Brutus, called by NM the first Roman emperor: I 10.2, I 10.3, I 10.4, I 10.5, I 10.6, I 17.1, I 29.3, I 33.4, I 34.1, I 37.2, I 46, I 52.3, I 59, III 6.2, III 6.16, III 6.18, III 6.19, III 13.2, III 24
Calabria, region at the toe of Italy: II 2.1
Caligula, Gaius, Roman emperor (37–41), assassinated by his own troops: I 10.4, I 17 1
Callippus (d. 351 B.C.), tyrant of Syracuse after having assassinated Dion in 353 B.C.: III 6.20
Calvinus, Titus Veturius, one of the consuls at the Caudine Forks (321 B.C.): III 41, III 42
Cambrai, League of, formed in 1508 among Pope Julius II, the Emperor Maximilian, the king of France, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, the duke of Ferrara, and the marquis of Mantua to defeat Venice in 1509: I 12.2, I 53.1, III 11.2
Camerinum, Camertines, ancient Umbrian city that helped Romans invade Etruria: II 1.3
Camillus, *Lucius Furius*, grandson of Marcus Furius Camillus: II 23.2
Camillus, *Marcus Furius*, Roman general and dictator (396–365 B.C.), defeated the Gauls after the sack of Rome: I 8.1, I 12.1, I 13.1, I 29.3, I 55.1, II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.1, III 1.2, III 8.1, *III 12 3,* III 20, III 22.6, III 23 T, III 23, III 30.1, III 30.2, III 31.1, III 31.4
Campania, Campanians, Italian region around Naples: II 9, II 11.1, II 13.2, III 37.1, III 37.4
Cancellieri, a faction in Pistoia: III 27.2
Cannae, town in Apulia, where Hannibal won a great victory in 216 B.C.: I 11.1, I 31.2, I 47.2, I 53.2, *II 12 4*, II 18.2, II 27.1, II 30.4, III 31.2, III 34.3, III 37.4, III 49.1
Capitol, hill and building in Rome: I 8.1, I 10.5, I 13.2, I 24.2, II 28.1, II 29.1, II 29.2, II 30.1, II 32.1
Captain *of the people*, chief executive officer in Florence: I 8.3, I 49.3
Capua, Capuans, luxurious Campanian city: I 5.4, I 47.2, I 47.3, II 1.3, II 9, II 10.3, II 11.1, II 11.2, II 19.2, II 20, II 21 T, II 21.2, II 24.3, II 26, II 32.1, II 32.2, III 6.20
Caracalla, Antoninus; *see* Antoninus Caracalla
Carmignuola, *Francesco Bussone* (1390–1432), captain for Filippo Visconti: II 18.4
Carthage, Carthaginians: I 14.3, *I 31 1*, I 53.4, I 53.5, II 1.1, II 1.2, II 2.4, II 8.1 *II 8 3*, II 9, II 12.1, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 30.4, II 32.1, III 6.19, *III 10 3*, III 16.2, III 20, III 31.2, III 32
Casaglia, town in the Apennines: III 18.3
Cascina, Tuscan town near Pisa: I 38.3
Cassius *Longinus, Gaius*, helped murder Caesar, committed suicide after Phillipi (42 B.C.): III 6.2, *III 6 18*, III 18.1
Cassius *Vecellinus*, Spurius, proposed Agrarian law in 486 B.C.: III 8.1
Castello, città di, Castellans, Italian town: *II 24 2*, II 30.2
Castello, Niccolò Vitelli da (1414–86), condottiere, father of the Vitelli: II 24.2
Castiglione, town besieged by Venetians: III 18.3
Castruccio *Castracani* (1281–1328), lord of Pisa and Lucca, defeated Florence in 1316: II 9, II 12.4
Catiline *(Lucius Sergius Catalina)* (109–62 B.C.), Roman conspirator: I 10.3, III 6.19
Cato, *Marcus Porcius, the Younger* (95–46 B.C.): III 1.3

Cato, Priscus, NM's name for *Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Elder* (234–149 B.C.), the censor: I 29.3, III 1.3
Caudine Forks, Caudium, valley in Campania, site of Roman defeat by Samnites (321 B.C.): II 23.4, III 40.2, *III 41*, III 42
Cebalinus, Nicomachus's brother: III 6.5
Cedicius, Marcus, plebeian, heard a superhuman voice: I 56
Ceres, Roman goddess of agriculture: III 6.2
Charlemagne (742–814): I 12.2
Charles VIII, king of France (1470–98), invaded Italy in 1494: *I 39 2*, I 56, *II 11, 1*, II 12.2, II 16.2, *II 17* 4, II 24.3, *III 11 2*, III 43
Charles *the Bold* (1433–77), duke of Burgundy: II 10.1, III 10.4
Charon, counselor of Theban tyrants who assisted Pelopidas's conspiracy in 379 B.C.: III 6.16
Chion, disciple of Plato, conspired with Leonides against Clearchus of Heraclea in 353 B.C.: III 6.16
Chiusi *(Clusium)*, town in Tuscany: I 7.5, II 4.1, II 28.1
Christ: III 1.4
Cicero, *Marcus Tullius* (Tully) (106–43 B.C.), Roman writer and politician, opponent of the caesars: I 4.1, *I* 28, I 33.4, I 52.3, *156, II 5 1*
Cimbri, ancient people who invaded Italy, defeated by Marius: II 8.1, II 12.4, III 37.4
Ciminian forest, forest between Latium and Tuscany: II 33
Cincinnatus; *see* Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (1)
Circeu, a rebellious Roman colony: III 32
Ciriaco del Borgo *Sansepolcro*, Florentine head of infantry: II 16.2
Cirignuola, town in Apulia, where Louis d'Armagnac, duke of Nemours, was killed in a battle (1503): II 17.4
Claudius Nero, *Gaius*, consul (207 B.C.), fought in Second Punic War and defeated Hasdrubal: II 10.2, III 17
Claudius Pulcher, *Publius*, consul (249 B.C.) who mocked portents and lost naval battle against Carthaginians; called by NM Appius Pulcher and Claudius Pulcher: I 14.3, III 33.1
Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, assassinated 353 B.C.: I 16.5, III 6.16
Cleomenes *III*, king of Sparta (236–221 B.C.): I 9.4, I 18.5, III 6.19
Clitus *Melas*, killed by Alexander the Great in 328 B.C.; had saved Alexander in 334 B.C. at the Battle of Granicus: I 58.2
Codefa, fortress built in 1507 by Louis XII, king of France, at Genoa: II 24.2
Collatinus, *Lucius Tarquinius*, one of Rome's first consuls (509 B.C.), led revolt against his relative Tarquin the Proud: I 28, III 5
Commodus, Roman emperor (180–92), wrote death list and was assassinated: III 6.3, III 6.10, III 6.15, III 6.20
Coppola, *Francesco* (1420–87), count of Sarno, executed 1487 by Ferdinand of Aragon: III 6.3
Corcyra (modern Corfu), Greek island, site of bitter factional fighting during Peloponnesian War (425–424 B.C.): II 2.1
Corinth, Greek city: II 24.4
Coriolanus, *Gnaeus Marcius*, Roman general accused for actions against the plebs, led Volsci against Rome in 491 B.C.: I 7.1, I 7.2, I 29.3
Cornelius *Cossus*, Aulus, consul during First Samnite War (343 B.C.), advised by Publius Decius Mus the Elder: III 39.2
Cornelius *Maluginensis, Servius*, consular colleague of Camillus (386 B.C.): III 30.1
Corvinus, Valerius; *see* Valerius Corvinus Publicola, Marcus
Ciassus, *Marcus Lucinius* (115–53 B.C.), consul, deceived by Parthians and defeated in 53 B.C.: II 18.3, III 12.2

Croesus, last king of the Lydians (560–546 B.C.), fabled for wealth, overthrown by Cyrus: II 10.1, II 12.1
Curiatii, Alban triplet brothers, fought Roman Horatii triplets and were defeated (670 B.C.): I 22 T, I 22, I 24.1
Curtius *Rufus*, Quintus (first century A.D.), historian: II 10.1
Cyaxares, king of the Medes (625–585 B.C.), deceived by his nephew Cyrus: II 13.1
Cyrus, king of Persia (559–529 B.C.) and founder of the Persian Empire: II 12.1, II 13.1, III 20, III 22.4, III 22.5, III 39.1

Dante: I 11.4 (Q), I 53.1 (Q)
Darius *I*, king of Persia (521–485 B.C.): II 31.2 (actually referring to Artaxerxes), III 6.7
Darius *III*, last king of Persia (336–330 B.C.), defeated by Alexander the Great: II 10.1
David, king of Israel (1012–972 B.C.), succeeded Saul, captured Jerusalem: I 19.2, I 26
Decemvirate, decemvirs (the Ten), extraordinary council, headed by Appius Claudius, ruled Rome in 451–450 B.C.: I 35 T, I 35, I 40 T, I 40.1–7, I 41, I 42, I 43, I 44.1–2, I 45.3, *I 49 1*, I 58.2, *III 1 3*, III 26.2
Decii: III 1.3
Decius *Mus, Publius, the Elder*, tribune under Cornelius (343 B.C.), sacrificed himself when coconsul with Torquatus (340 B.C.): II 16.1, III 1.3, III 39.2
Decius *Mus, Publius, the Younger*, sacrificed his life at Sentinum in 295 B.C.: III 1.3, III 45
Deinocrates, architect of Alexandria: I 1.5
Delos, Greek island in the Aegean, site of an oracle: I 12.1
Demetrius I (336–283 B.C.), king of Macedon: I 59
Dido, Phoenician princess and founder of Carthage: II 8.3
Diocles, NM following Justin calls Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens (6th century B.C.), assassinated, avenged by Hippias: III 6.16
Diodorus Siculus (80–21 B.C.), historian: II 5.1
Dion (410–353 B.C.), friend of Plato, freed Syracuse from tyranny of Dionysus the Younger, murdered by Callippus in 353 B.C.: I 10.2, I 17.1, III 6.20
Dionysius, the name of two tyrants of Syracuse, both hosts to Plato, the Elder (405–367 B.C.) and the Younger, his son (346–344 B.C.): I 10.2, III 6.2
Dominick, Saint (1170–1221), established Dominican order in 1218: III 1.4
Duellius, Marcus, tribune (449 B.C.): I 45.3
Dymnus, lover of Nicomachus, failed in plot to kill Alexander the Great: III 6.5

Egeria, nymph consulted by Numa: I 11.2
Egypt, Egyptians: I 1.4, I 58.2, I 59, II 12.2, *II 17 5*, III 35.1
Eight, the, Florentine judicial institution: I 7.4, I 45.2, I 49.3
Elettus, conspired with Letus and Marcia against Commodus (192): III 6.10, *III 6 20*
England, English: I 21.2, II 8.2, II 30.4
England, king of: I 21.2, II 30.2. *See also* Henry VIII
Epaminondas, put an end to Spartan tyranny over Thebes in 379 B.C., killed in battle in 362 B.C.: I 17.3, I 21.3, III 13.3, III 18.1, III 38.1
Ephors, Spartan council of elders, disputed Agis and Cleomenes: I 9.4, I 18.5
Epicharis, plotted to kill Nero: III 6.9
Etruria, Etruscans: I 36, II 25.1. *See also* Tuscany, Tuscans
Eumenes, king of Pergamum (197–159 B.C.), ally of Rome: II 1.3, II 30.2

Fabii, three sons of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, sent as ambassadors to the Gauls: II 28.1, II 29.1, III 1.2
Fabius, Quintus, brother of Marcus Fabius Vibulanus, former consul, killed in 480 b.c.: I 36

Fabius Maximus *Cunctator* (the Delayer), *Quintus* (275–203 B.C.), consul five times (233–209 B.C.), appointed dictator (217 B.C.) during Second Punic War: I 53.2, I 53.4, II 24.3, III 9.1, III 9.4, III 10.1–3, III 34.4, III 40.1
Fabius Maximus *Rullianus*, Quintus, master of the horse under Papirius Cursor in 325 B.C., dictator in 315 B.C., consul in 310 B.C.: I 31.2, II 33, III 1.3, III 33.2, III 36.2, III 45, III 47, III 49 T, III 49.4
Fabius *Vibulanus*, Marcus, consul twice (483, 480 B.C.): I 36, II 25.1
Fabius *Vibulanus*, Quintus, consul (459 B.C.), son of Marcus Fabius, member of Decemvirate (450 B.C.), exiled: I 42
Fabricius, *Gaius Luscinus*, consul three times (282–275 B.C.): III 1.3, III 20
Faenza, town in Romagna: I 38.2, III 18.3
Faliscians, inhabitants of Falerii, Etruscan community that attacked Rome in 401 B.C.: I 31.2, III 19.2, III 20 T, III 20
Federico *da Montefeltro*, father of Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino: II 24.2
Ferdinand *I*, very wise king of Naples (1458–94): *II 11 1*, II 12.2
Ferdinand *the Catholic*, king II of Aragon and V of Castile (1474–1516), married Queen Isabella I of Castile, drove the Moors (1492) and Marranos (1501–2) out of Spain, the French (1504) out of Naples, of which he became king (Ferdinand III) in 1505: I 29.2, I 40.7, *I 53 1, I 59, II 22 1*, III 6.2, III 6.3, *III 112, III 31 3*
Ferrante *(Fernandez de Corduba)*, Gonsalvo, (1453–1515), captain for Ferdinand the Catholic: I 29.2
Ferrara, town in Romagna: II 17.4, III 11.2
Ferrara, duke of; *see* Alfonso I d'Este
Fidenae, Fidenates, town in Latium, conquered by Romulus (c. 750 B.C.), later a Roman colony quieted by Mamercus (437 B.C.): III 14.3, III 15.1
Fiesole, town above Florence: I 1.3, II 4.1
Flaminius, Gaius, consul enclosed by Hannibal at Lake Trasumennus (217 B.C.): III 40.1
Flaminius, Titus Quintius, consul (198 B.C.), defeated Philip V of Macedon in the Second Macedonian War: II 4.2
Florence, Florentines: I 1.3, I 2.1, I 7.3, I 7.4, I 8.3, I 11.5, I 33.3, I 38.2, I 38.3, I 39.2, I 45.2, I 47.3, I 49.2, I 49.3, I 52.1, I 52.2, I 53.5, I 54, I 55.4, I 56, I 59, II 9, II 10.1, II 11.1, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 19.2, II 21.2, II 22.1, II 23.3, II 24.1, II 24.3, II 25.1, II 27.3, II 27.4, II 30.2, II 30.4, II 33, III 1.3, III 3, III 6.16, III 6.20, III 7, *III 9 3*, III 12.1, III 12.2, III 15.2, III 16.3, III 18.3, III 27.2, III 27.3, III 27.4, III 43, III 48.2
Foix, *Gaston* de, duke of Nemours (1489–1512), French captain, recovered Brescia, won and was killed at Ravenna: II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.4, II 24.3, III 44.2, III 44.3
Forlì: III 6.18
Forty, the, judicial council in Venice: I 49.3
France, French (as ancient Gaul, Gauls): I 7.5, I 8.1, I 15, I 23.3, I 24.2, I 29.2, I 56, I 57, II 1.1, II 1.3, II 4.1, II 4.2, II 8.1, II 10.1, II 12.4, II 19.2, II 28.1, II 29.1, *II 29 2*, II 30.1, III 1.2, *III 10 1*, III 10.3, III 14.3, III 18.1, III 22.1, III 33.1, III 36 T, III 36.1, III 36.2, III 37.1, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 43, III 48.2
France, French (modern): I 12.2, I 16.5, I 19.2, I 21.2, I 23.4, I 38.3, *I 39 2, I 53 1*, I 55.2, I 55.3, I I 56, I 58.2, I 59, II Pr.2, II 8.2, II 11.1, II 12.2, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.3, II 17.5, II 18.4, *II 19 1*, 19.2, II 21.2, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 27.4, II 30.4, III 1.5, III 10.3, III 10.4, III 11.2, III 15.2, III 27.4, III 36 T, III 36.1, III 36.2, III 37.3, III 41, III 43, III 44.2
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Francesco Maria; *see* Rovere, Francesco Maria della

Francis (of Angoulême) I, king of France (1515–47), succeeded Louis XII, invaded Lombardy and fought the Swiss (1515): I 23.4, II 18.4, *II 21 2*, II 22.1, III 18.1
Francis, Saint (1181–1226), established Franciscan order (c. 1218): III 1.4
Franks, the, rulers of France: II Pr.2, II 8.2
Fratesca, Frateschi, faction in Florence, followers of Friar (Frate) Girolamo Savonarola: I 54
Fregoso, Ottaviano, doge of Genoa (1513–15), governor of Genoa under France (1515–22): II 21.2, II 24.2
French (language): II 17.1
Fribourg, German town north of Lake Geneva: II 19.2
Fulvius, *Gaius*, shrewd Roman legate (302 B.C.) in Tuscany: III 48.1
Fulvius, Marcus, identified by NM as plebeian master of horse, though Livy calls him Marcus Folius: I 5.4

Gabades, king of Persia (488–531), ended the siege of Amida in 503: II 26
Galba *Servius Sulpitius* (4–69), Roman emperor, assassinated: I 10.4
Galeazzo, Giovan; *see* Visconti, Giovanni Galeazzo
Gallia Cisalpina, ancient name for modern Lombardy: II 8.2
Gallia Transalpina, ancient name for part of modern France: II 8.2
Gambacorti, Piero, Messer, lord of Pisa, assassinated by Jacopo d'Appiano in 1392: III 6.3
Gascony, Gascons, part of France: II 18.4
Gaul, Gauls: II 4.1, III 10.1, III 37.1. *See also* France, French (as ancient Gaul, Gauls)
Geganius Macerinus, Marcus, consul (443 B.C.) who reconciled the Ardeans: III 27.1
Genoa, city in Liguria, repeated target of French kings: II 21.2, II 24.2, II 24.3
Genucius, Lucius, first plebeian consul to lead an army in Rome, defeated (362 B.C.): III 35.1
Germany, Germans, province east of the Rhine and north of the Danube: I 55.2, *I 55 3*, II Pr.2, *II 2 1*, II 8.1, II 8.4, II 12.4, II 19.1, II 19.2, II 30.2, III 43
Gesco, Carthaginian envoy (whom NM calls Hasdrubal) to rebels after First Punic War, killed by them: III 32
Giacomini, Antonio, Florentine captain in charge of failed siege of Pisa in 1505: I 53.5, III 16.3
Giannes; *see* Artiganova, Jean d'
Gonzaga, Francesco, marquis of Mantua (1481–1519): I 53.1, III 44.2, III 44.3
Goths, ancient people who seized Western Roman Empire: II 8.1, *II 8 2*
Gracchi, late 2d-century B.C. reformers in Rome. I 4 1, I 6.1, I 37.2, I 37.3
Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, consul (215, 213 B.C.), led successful Roman army composed of slaves: II 26, III 13.3, *III 18 2*, III 38.1
Great Council, Venetian council I 50
Greece, Greeks, I 6.4, I 9 4, I 18.3, I 26, I 31 1, I 40.6, I 53.4, I 59, II Pr.2, II 1.1, II 1.3, II 2.1, II 3, II 4.1, II 10.1, II 28.2, II 31.2, III 16.1
Gregory *the Great*, Saint, pope (590–604), extinguished ancient sects: II 5.1
Guicciardini, Giovanni (1385–1435), blamed for defeat of Florence at Lucca in 1430: I 8.3
Guidobaldo *da Montefeltro*, duke of Urbino (1482–1508), lost and regained his state: II 24.2

Hadrian, popular Roman emperor (117–138): I 10.4
Hannibal (247–182 B.C.), Carthaginian general (became commander 221 B.C.), fought in Italy against Rome in Second Punic War (218–201 B.C.), defeated in Africa, later poisoned himself to escape capture: I 11.1, I 23.3, *I 29 3*, I 31.1, I 31.2, I 47.2, I 53.2, I 53.3, II 2.4, II 9, II 12.1, II 12.3, II 12.4, II 18.2, II 19.2, II 26, II 27.1, II 27.4, II 30.4, III 9.1, III 9.4, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 17, III 20, III 21 T, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 31.4, III 40.1
Hanno, unsuccessful Carthaginian poisoner in 350 B.C.: III 6.19
Hanno (270–190 B.C.), leader of aristocratic party in Carthage during Second Punic War (218–201 B.C.): II 27.1, II 30.4, III 31.2

Hasdrubal (1); *see* Gesco
Hasdrubal (2) (245–207 B.C.), brother of Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, fought Claudius Nero in Second Punic War: II 10.2, II 27.4, III 17
Hebrews, ancient Middle Eastern people: II 8.2
Hellanicus, see Nelematus
Henry VIII, king of England (1509–47), attacked France: I 21.2, II 30.4
Heraclea, Greek city on the Black Sea: I 16.5, III 6.16
Hercules, fabulous Egyptian who defeated Antaeus: II 12.2
Hernici, the: I 38.1, *I 38 2*, III 8.1
Herod, *the Great*, king of Judea (31 B.C.–A.D. 4), executed his wife, Marianne. I 58.2
Herodian (170–255), historian: III 6.15
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Hiero II (306–215 B.C.), king of Syracuse, grandfather of Hieronymus: DL, I 58.1, II 2.1, II 30.2
Hieronymus, king of Syracuse, assassinated in 214 B.C.: I 58.1, II 2.1, II 15.2, III 6.6
Hipparchus, see Diocles
Hippias, tyrant of Athens (527–510 B.C.), exiled in 510 B.C.: III 6.16
Hirtius, *Aulus*, consul (43 B.C.), fought against Mark Antony in 43 B.C.: I 52.3
Horatii, Roman triplet brothers, fought the Alban Curiatii triplets, one Horatius survived and killed one of the Curiatii's Roman fiancées (670 B.C.): I 22 T, I 22, I 24.1
Horatius, one of the Horatii: I 22, I 24.1
Horatius *Barbatus, Marcus*, consul (449 B.C.), spoke against decemvirs: I 40.4, I 44.1, I 44.2
Horatius Coclus, Roman hero, defended bridge over Tiber against Etruscan army: I 24.2, III 1.3
Horatius *Pulvillus, Lucius*, consular colleague under Camillus (386 B.C.): III 30.1
Hungary: II 8.2, II 8.4
Hydra, mythical creature who grows two heads for every one cut off: II 24.1

Illyria, Balkan region, ancient name for Slavonia: I 29.2, II 8.2
Imbault *de la Batie*, French captain sent to help Florence recover Arezzo in 1502: 1 38.3
India, king of: III 14.3
Ismail I, the Sophy, shah of Persia (1501–24), defeated by Selim I at Chaldiran (1514): II 17.5, III 35.1
Italy, Italians: I 6.4, I 10.5, I 11.1, I 12.2, I 21.2, I 23.4, I 29.2, I 31.1, I 37.2, I 47.2, I 53.3, I 55.2, I 55.3, I 56, II Pr.2, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 8.4, II 9, II 10.3, II 12.1, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 16.2, II 17.1, II 17.4, II 18.3, II 19.1, II 22.1, II 24.2, II 24.3, II 27.4, II 30.4, II 31.1, III 9.1, III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 11.2, III 15.2, III 20, III 21.1, III 31.3, III 34.3, III 36.2, III 37.4, III 43

Jerusalem: II 32.1
John, gospel writer: II 2 2
Joshua (c. 1250 B.C.), son of Nun, succeeded Moses: II 8.2
Judea, Roman-supported kingdom in Israel: I 29.2, II 8.2
Jugurtha, king of Numidia (118–103 B.C.), lost war with Rome: II 8.1
Julius II *(Giuliano della Rovere)* (1443–1513), pope (1503–13): *I 12 2*, I 27.1, *I 27 2, I 53 1*, II 10.1, II 22.1, II 24.2, III 9.3, *III 11 2, III 31 3*, III 44.2, *III 44 3*
Juno, Roman goddess, wife and sister of Jupiter: I 12.1
Jupiter Ammon, oracle in Africa: I 12.1
Justin, writer: I 26 (Q), III 6.7 (Q)
Juvenal (c. 55–140), satirist: II 19.2 (Q), *II 24 1 (Q)*, III 6.2 (Q)

Lacedemon, Lacedemonians, region around Sparta: I 5.1, I 21.3. *See also* Sparta

Lampagnano, Giovanni Andrea da, conspired against the duke of Milan (1476), succeeded but killed: III 6.18
Lant, Monsieur de, NM's name for Antoine de Langres, French general sent to replace Imbault (1502) and restore several towns to Florence: III 27.4
Largius, Titus (c. 500 B.C.), identified by Livy as the first dictator: *I 33 1*
Latin (language): II 5.1
Latium, Latins: I 38.1, *I 38 2*, II 1.1, II 4.1, II 6.1, II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1, II 16.1, II 18.1, II 22.1, II 22.2, II 23.2, II 24.1, II 24.4, II 30.4, II 33, III 22.4, III 30.1, III 32
Lavinium, Lavinians, Latin city, supposedly founded by Aeneas, failed to aid other Latin cities: II 15.2
Lenatus, Gnaeus Popilius, conspired against Julius Caesar (44 B.C.): III 6.16
Lentulus, Lucius, Roman legate at Caudine Forks (321 B.C.): III 41
Lentulus *Sura, Publius Cornelius*, consul (71 B.C.), participated in Catiline's conspiracy (63 B.C.): III 6.19
Leo X (Giovanni de' Medici) (1475–1521), pope (1513–21): *II 10 1*, II 22.1, *III 18 1*
Leonidas, conspired successfully against Clearchus (353 B.C.) but killed by Satirus: III 6.16
Letus *Quintus Aelmilius*, conspired with Marcia and Elettus against Commodus: III 6.10, *III 6 20*
Libya: II 12.2
Liguria, Ligurians, Italian region: II 1.1
Lipari, island off Sicily: III 29
Livius, Marcus, consul with Claudius Nero (207 B.C.): II 10.2, III 17
Livy, Titus: I Pr.2, I 1.6, I 7.1, I 7.5, I 12.1 (Q), I 13.1, I 13.2 (Q), *I 15 (Q), I 15 (Q), I 34 4 (Q),* I 37.2 (Q), *I 40 3 (Q), I 40 3 (Q), I 40 3 (Q), I 40 4 (Q), I 40 4 (Q), I 40 4 (Q),* I 44.1, *I 44 2 (Q),* I 46 (Q), I 47.1 (Q), I 47.1 (Q), *I 49 1,* I 56, I 57 (Q), I 57, I 58.1 (Q), *I 58 1 (Q), I 58 3, I 59 (Q),* II 2.3, II 2.4, *II 3 (Q),* II 3 (Q), II 4.2, II 7, II 8.1, II 10.3, II 11.1 (Q), II 13.2 (Q), *II 15 1 (Q),* II 15.2 (Q), II 16.1, II 16.1, II 16.1, *II 18 2 (Q),* II 19.2 (Q), II 20, II 21.2 (Q), *II 23 1 (Q),* II 23.2 (Q), II 23.4 (Q), *II 23 4 (Q), II 23 4 (Q), II 28 1 (Q),* II 29.1, II 29.1 (Q), *II 30 1 (Q), II 30 4 (Q),* II 31.1, II 33, III 1.2 (Q), III 2, III 6.6, III 6.15 (Q), III 8.1 (Q), *III 8 2, III 10 1 (Q),* III 10.2 (Q), *III 12 2 (Q), III 12 2, III 12 3 (Q),* III 12.3, III 13.1, III 15.1 (Q), III 15.2 (Q), III 22.1 (Q), III 22.4 (Q), III 22.4 (Q), III 23 (Q), III 23, III 25 (Q), *III 25 (Q), III 28,* III 29 (Q), III 30.1 (Q), III 30.1 (Q), *III 31 1 (Q), III 31 2 (Q), III 31 4, III 31 4 (Q), III 33 1 (Q), III 33 1 (Q),* III 33.1 (Q), III 36.1 (Q), III 36.2 (Q), III 37.1 (Q), III 37.3 (Q), III 38.1 (Q), III 39.2 (Q), *III 40 1, III 40 2 (Q), III 44 1 (Q),* III 46
Lombardy, region of northern Italy formerly known as Gallia Cisalpania: I 7.5, I 23.3, I 23.4, I 55.4, II 1.1, II 2.1, II 4.1, II 8.1, II 8.2, II 12.4, II 13.1, II 18.4, II 19.2, II 22.1, II 24.3, III 11.2, III 18.1, III 43
Longobards, rulers of northern (and other parts of) Italy: I 12.2
Louis XII, king of France (1498–1515): I 38.3, *I 53 1, I 59,* II 15.2, *II 17 1,* II 22.1, II 24.2, *II 24 3, II 30 4,* III 15.2, *III 27 4, III 31 3, III 44 2, III 44 3*
Lucanians, Italian people who invited Alexander of Epirus into Italy: II 31.1
Lucca, Lucchese, one of three republics in Tuscany: I 8.3, I 55.4, II 9, II 12.4, II 21.2, III 48.2
Lucilla, sister of Commodus, unsuccessfully conspired against him: III 6.15
Lucretia, committed suicide after rape by Sextus Tarquinius (510 B.C.): III 2, III 5, III 26.2
Lucretius, Spurius, father of Lucretia: *III 2*
Lucullus, *Lucius Licinius* (115–49 B.C.), Roman general, defeated Mithridates VI (king of Pontus) in 74 B.C. and Tigranes (king of Armenia) in 69 B.C.: II 19.1, III 13.3
Lucumo, seduced Arruns's sister/wife: I 7.5
Ludovico, Signor; *see* Sforza, Ludovico
Luke, gospel writer: I 26 (Q)
Lycurgus (9th century B.C.), founder of Sparta: I 2.1, I 2.6, I 2.7, I 6.2, I 9.3, I 9.4, I 11.3, II 3

Lydia, Lydians, people of Asia Minor: II 10.1

Macedon, Macedonians, region north of Greece, under Alexander the Great ruled much of the known world, later an enemy of Rome: I 9.4, I 20, *II 1 1,* II 4.2, III 13.3
Macedonia, king of: II 4.2, II 10.1, II 28.2. *See also* Alexander the Great; Antigonus; Antipater; Demetrius; Perseus; Phillip II; Phillip V
Macedonian War, *Second* (200–196 B.C.), won by Rome over Macedon: II 1.1, *II 4 2, III 10 2,* III 49.1
Macedonian War, Third (172–167 B.C.): *III 16 2*
Macrinus, *Marcus Apellius* (164–218), conspired against Caracalla; Roman emperor (217–18), assassinated by Heliogabalus in 218: III 6.11
Madonna Caterina; *see* Sforza-Riario, Madonna Caterina
Maelius, Spurius, tried to make himself king at Rome in 439 b.c., executed: *III 1 3,* III 28
Maenius, Gaius, plebeian dictator (314 B.C.), called Marcus Menenius by NM: I 5.4
Magus, Magians, Persian priestly caste, one of whom seized the kingdom: III 6.7
Mahomet II, Ottoman sultan (1451–81), conquered Constantinople (1453): I 19.2
Mamelukes, military order dominant in Egypt from 1250 to 1517: I 1.4, *II 17 5*
Mamercus, *Manlius Aemilius,* dictator (433 B.C.), opposed censors and fought the Fidenates: I 49.1, III 14.3
Mamertines, invaded Sicily: II 1.3
Manilius, Gaius, or perhaps Gnaeus Manlius, consul (480 B.C.), killed in war with Veientes: I 36, II 25.1, III 12.2
Manlii (1), brothers Publius and Gnaeus Manlius sent as consuls (379 B.C.) against the Volsci: III 33.1
Manlii (2), Roman family: III 46
Manlius, Aulus, sent to Athens with Spurius Postumius (1): I 40.2
Manlius, Titus, son of Titus Manlius Torquatus: II 16.1, III 1.3, III 22.4, III 34.2
Manlius Capitolinus, *Marcus,* consul (390 B.C.), saved Capitol during attack by Gauls (386 B.C.), executed in 384 B.C.: I 8.1, I 8.4, I 24.2, I 58.1–2, III 1.3, III 8.1–2
Manlius *Imperiosus,* Lucius, dictator (363 B.C.): I 11.1, *III 22 1,* III 34.1, *III 34 2*
Manlius Torquatus, *Titus,* dictator (353 B.C.), son of Lucius Imperiosus Manlius, fought an exemplary duel with a Gaul: I 11.1, II 16.1, II 23.2, III 1.3, III 19.1, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 22.3–6, III 23, III 34.1–2, III 34.4, III 36.1, III 37.1
Mantua, marquis of: III 44.2. *See also* Gonzaga, Francesco
Marches, region of Italy on central east coast: II 10.2, III 17
Marcia, concubine, conspired with Letus and Elettus against Commodus: III 6.10, *III 6 20*
Marciano, Rinuccio da, count, head of a Florentine army that defeated the Venetians near Marradi through knowledge in 1498: III 18.3
Marcius Rutulus, Gaius (1), called Rutilius by NM, consul (342 B.C.), quelled conspiracy at Capua: III 6.20
Marcius *Rutulus, Gaius* (2), consul (310 B.C.), son of preceding, wounded in battle with the Samnites, replaced by Papirius Cursor: III 47
Marcus *Aurelius,* Roman emperor (161–180) and philosopher: I 10.4, I 10.5
Marianne, wife of King Herod of Judea, executed in 29 B.C.: I 58.2
Marignano, Battle of (1515), near Milan, battle in which France defeated the Swiss: *I 23 4, II 18 4, II 22 1, III 18 1*
Marius, *Gaius* (c. 157–86 B.C.), consul seven times (first in 107 B.C., last in 86 B.C.), head of Marian party: I 5.2, I 17.1, I 28, I 37.2, II 8.1, III 6.14, III 8.2, III 24, III 37.4
Mark, Saint (San Marco), patron saint of Venice: III 31.3

Marradi, village in Romagna, seized in 1498 by the Venetians from the Florentines, who then recaptured it in an odd victory: III 18.3
Martial, centurion, assassinated Antoninus Caracalla (217): III 6.11
Matzocco, the Florentine lion: III 27.4
Massageti, Asian people menaced by Cyrus: II 12.1
Massilians, invaded ancient Gaul: II 1.3, II 8.3, II 30.2, II 32.2
Massinissa, king of Numidia (213–206 B.C.), ally of Rome during Second Punic War (218–201 B.C.) II 1.3, II 30.2
Maternianus, *Flavius,* warned Antoninus Caracalla in writing of a conspiracy: III 6.11
Matho, Libyan, led revolt against Carthage after First Punic War, killed Hasdrubal: III 32
Maurusians, ancient people who fled Syria, eventually for Mauritania: II 8.2
Maximilian *I* (1459–1519), *Holy Roman* emperor (1493–1519), king of the Romans (1486–1519): *I 53 1,* II 11.1, *II 22 1, III 11 2, III 43*
Maximinus, Roman emperor (235–38), killed by his own troops: I 10.4
Maximus; *see* Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Quintus
Media, ancient Middle Eastern kingdom: II Pr.2
Medici, family: I 33.3, *I 45 2, I 47 3,* I 52.2, *I 59,* II 27.3, *III 1 3, III 3,* III 6.2, III 7
Medici, Cosimo de' (1389–1464), Florentine prince (1434–64), banished from Florence in 1431, restored 1434: I 33.3, I 52.1
Medici, Giuliano de' (1453–78), brother of Lorenzo, murdered in Pazzi conspiracy: III 6.5, III 6.13, III 6.16
Medici, Lorenzo de' (1449–92), the Magnificent, the elder, survived Pazzi conspiracy: I 56, III 6.5, III 6.13, III 6.15, *III 6 16,* III 29 (Q)
Medici, Piero (1471–1503), expelled from Florence in 1494: I 47.3
Megaria, Megarians, city in Greece, near Attica: III 6.19
Menenius, Marcus, *see* Maenius, Gaius
Mentus, Gnaeus Julius, consul (431 B.C.): I 50
Mesopotamia, ancient kingdom between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers: III 6.11
Messina, Messinians, Sicilian city: II 9
Messius, Vettius, Volscian general at Algidus (431 B.C.): III 12.3
Mettius, dictator (NM says king) of Alba (670 B.C.), sent the Curiatii against the Roman King Tullus Hostilius: I 22, I 23.1
Milan: I 17.2, I 23.4, I 38.3, II 12.4, II 15.2, II 18.4, II 22.1, II 24.2, III 11.2, III 15.2
Milan, duke of: II 12.4, II 15.2, II 18.4, II 24.2, II 25.1, III 6.18, III 43. *See also* Francesco Sforza; Galeazzo Maria Sforza; Ludvico Sforza; Visconti; Filippo Maria Visconti; Giavanni Galeazzo Visconti
Milichus, revealed Scaevinus's conspiracy to Nero: III 6.5
Milonius, Latin praetor: II 15.2
Minturnae, Minturnans, city in central Italy, seized Marius: III 6.14
Minucius *Esquilinus Augurinus, Lucius,* consul (458 B.C.), relieved by Cincinnatus: III 25
Mirandola, Lodovico della, count, killed by artillery at Ferrara in 1509: II 17.4
Mithridates (132–63 B.C.), king of Pontus: III 13.3
Montesecco, Giovambatista da, in Pazzi conspiracy, beheaded in 1478: III 6.13
Morat, Swiss town where Charles of Burgundy was defeated in 1476 by the Swiss: III 10.4
Moses (c. 1300 B.C.), led Israel out of Egypt: I 1.4, I 9.3, II 8.2, III 30.1
Mucianus, *Gaius Lucinius,* deputy to Emperor Vespasian (68–69): I 29.2
Mucius Scaevola, *Gaius,* attempted to kill Porsenna, failed and burnt his hand in 506 B.C.: I 24.2, III 1.3
Mugello, town in the Apennines: III 18.3
Mutolo, Alfonso del, offered to betray Pisa to Florence in 1508: III 48.2

Nabis, tyrant of Sparta (207–192 B.C.), killed by Alexamenus: I 10.2, I 40.6, III 6.7, III 6.15
Naples: I 17.2, I 29.2, I 55.4, I 59, II 24.3, *III 11 2,* III 21.4. *See also* Palaepolis
Naples, king of: II 11.1, II 12.2. *See also* Ferdinand I
Natalis, arrested in conspiracy against Nero: III 6.5
Nelematus, NM's name for Justin's Hellanicus, led successful conspiracy against Aristotimus of Epirus (272 B.C.): III 6.7, III 6.11
Nemours, duke of: II 17.4. *See also* Foix, Gaston de; Armagnac, Louis d'
Nero, Roman emperor (54–68): I 10.4, I 17.1, III 6.5, III 6.8, III 6.9
Nerva, Nervus, Roman emperor (96–98): I 10.4, I 10.5
New Carthage, Carthaginian colony on the southwest coast of Spain, captured by Scipio Africanus in 209 B.C.: II 32.1, III 20
Nicias (c. 470–413 B.C.), Athenian general, opposed Sicilian expedition in 415 B.C.: I 53.4, III 16 1
Nicomachus, told Cebalinus about plot to kill Alexander the Great in 330 B.C.: III 6.5
Nile, river in Egypt, on which Alexandria was built: I 1.5
Nocera *(Lucera),* town in Campania near Caudine Forks: III 40.2
Nola, town in Campania. II 2.4
Novara, town in Piedmont, site of battle between victorious Swiss and France in 1513: II 17.5, II 18.4, II 19.1, III 10.4
Numa, Rome's second king (715–673 B.C.): I 1.5, I 11.1, I 11.2, *I 11 3,* I 11.4, I 19.1, I 19.3, I 19.4, I 49.1
Numa Pompilius; *see* Numa
Numidia, North African kingdom: II 27.4
Numisius, Lucius, Latin praetor sent to Rome in 340 B.C.: II 22.1, II 22.2
Nun (c. 1300 B.C.), father of Joshua: II 8.2

Octavian; *see* Augustus, Gaius Octavius
Oddi, faction in Perugia, failed to remove Baglioni in 1495: III 14.1
Ortanes, initiated effort to recover Persia from the Magus: III 6.7
Orti Oricellari, see Buondelrnonti, Zanobi, and Rucellai, Cosimo
Ottacilius, Titus, consular candidate (214 B.C.), criticized by Fabius Maximus: III 34.4

Paccius, Ovius, Samnite priest at Samnite defeat at Aquilonia in 293 b.c.: I 15.
Pacuvius Calanus, NM's name for Livy's Pacuvius Calavus, reconciled factions in Capua (216 B.C.): I 47.2
Palaepolis, city in Campania taken by Rome in 326 B.C.: II 32.1, III 24. *See also* Naples
Panciatichi, a faction in Pistoia: III 27.2
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Pontius, Claudius, NM's name for Livy's Gaius Pontius, Samnite general, defeated Romans at the Caudine Forks in 321 B.C.: III 12.2, III 40.2, III 42
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Porsenna (6th century B.C.), Etruscan king of Clusium, attempted to restore Tarquins to Rome in 506 B.C.: I 24.2, I 32, II 2.1
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Quintius Cincinnatus, Lucius (1) (c. 519–439 B.C.), consul in 460 B.C., called to the dictatorship from his plough in 458 b.c., again in 439 B.C.: *I 13 2*, III 24, III 25 T, III 25, *III 28*
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Riario, Girolamo, count of Forlì, killed in 1488, avenged by wife: III 6.18
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Ronco, river near Ravenna (in Romagna): II 17.3
Rovere, Francesco Maria della, nephew of Pope Julius II, expelled by Pope Leo X from duchy of Urbino in 1516: *II 10 1*, II 24.4
Ruberius, Publius, credited by NM with decisive speech (made according to Livy by Publius Valerius Publicola) about the controversy over the Terentillan law during the capture of the Capitol by Appius Erdonius (460 B.C.): I 13.2
Rucellai, Cosimo (1495–1519), friend of NM in the *Orti Oricellari* DL
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Sabines, ancient people of Latium: I 9.1, I 18.5, I 40.4,
Sacred Mount (Mons Sacer), hill near Rome to which plebs retired while protesting Decemvirate in 449 b.c.: I 40.4, I 44.1
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Samnium, Samnites, east central region of Italy, conquered by Rome: I 14.2, I 15 T, I 15, I 21.1, I 31.2, II 1.1, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 2.1, II 2.3, II 2.4, II 6.1, II 9, II 10.3, II 11.2, II 13.2, II 14, II 20, II 23.4, III 6.20, III 12.2, III 22.4, III 37.3, III 38.1, III 39.2, III 40.2, III 41, III 42, III 44.1, III 44.3, III 45, III 47
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Saturninus, tribune, exposed Plautianus's conspiracy against Severus: III 6.8, III 6.15
Savonarola, Girolamo (1452–98), Dominican friar, came to Florence in 1481, led party of Frateschi, excommunicated and burned at stake: I 11.5, I 45.2, I 56, III 30.1
Scaevinus, plotted to kill Nero: III 6.5
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Scipio, Publius Cornelius, father of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, brother of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, died fighting the Carthaginians in 211 B.C.: III 13.1, *III 34 3*
Scipio *Africanus Major, Publius Cornelius* (236–182 B.C.), the Elder, consul, defeated Hannibal in 202 B.C.: I 10.2, I 11.1, I 29.3, I 53.4, I 58.3, I 60, II 12.1, II 32.1, III 1.3, III 9.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 20, III 21.1, III 21.1, III 21.3, III 21.4, III 22.3, III 31.2, III 34.3
Scipio Asiaticus, Lucius Cornelius, brother of Scipio Africanus Major: III 1.3
Scipio Calvus, Gnaeus Cornelius, brother of Publius Cornelius Scipio, uncle of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, died fighting the Carthaginians in 211 B.C.: III 13.1
Scythia, region of Asia: II 8.4
Sejanus, *Lucius Aelius* (d. 31), conspired against Tiberius, failed and executed: III 6.3
Selim I, sultan of Turkey (1512–20), the "Grand Turk," son of Bajazet II, successfully invaded Syria and Egypt in 1515–16: I 1.4, I 19.2, I 30.1, *II 17.5, III 6 2*, III 35.1
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Sergius *Fidenas, Manlius*, consul, defeated by the Veientes in 402 B.C.: I 31.2
Servilius *Fidenas*, Quintus, Camillus's consular colleague in 386 B.C.: III 30.1
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Setinus, Annius *Lucius*, Latin praetor (341 B.C.): II 13.2, II 14, II 15.1
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Sforza, Ludovico (1450–1510), duke of Milan (1494–1500), fought Louis XII in 1499–1500: II 15.2, *II 24 2*, III 11.2
Sforza-Riario, Madonna Caterina (1463–1509), countess of Forlì, avenged husband Girolamo Riario: III 6.18
Sicily, Sicilians: I 7.1, I 11.1, I 53.4, II 1.2, II 1.3, II 9, *II 12 1*, II 12.2, III 8.1, III 16.1, III 29, III 32, III 49.1
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Siena, Sienese, republic in Tuscany, controlled by Pandolfo Petrucci in 1500–1512: I 55.4, II 21.2, II 25.1, III 6.2, III 6.17, III 6.19, *III 12 1*
Signoria, Florentine magistracy: I 39.2, I 45.2
Sigovesus, Gallic chieftain, invaded Spain (6th century B.C.): II 8.1
Sitalces, king of Thrace (440–424 B.C.), unharmed by conspiracy: III 6.14
Sixtus IV (*Francesco della Rovere*) (1414–84), pope (1471–84), attacked Florence in 1479: *II 11 1*, II 24.2, *III 11 2*
Slavonia, modern name for Illyria: II 8.2
Soderini, Francesco (1453–1524), bishop of Volterra: I 54
Soderini, Pagolantonio, one of the Frateschi in Florence: I 54
Soderini, Piero (1452–1522), gonfalonier of justice in Florence from 1502 to 1512, NM's employer: I 7.4, I 52.2, I 56, *I 59*, *II 27 3*, III 3, III 9.3, III 30.1
Solomon (c. 950 B.C.), peaceful king of Israel, son of David, father of Rehoboam: I 19.2
Solon (c. 640–560 B.C.), founder of Athenian constitution in 595 B.C.: I 2.6, I 9.3, I 11.3, I 40.2, II 10.1
Sophy, the, family dynasty in Persia (1500–1736); *see* Ismail I
Sora, town in Samnium, site of Roman victory in 315 B.C.: II 18.3
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Spendius, led revolt against Carthage after First Punic War, killed Hasdrubal: III 32
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Sulla, *Lucius Cornelius Felix* (c. 138–78 B.C.), dictator (81–79 B.C.): I 1.3, I 28, *I 34.1*, 137.2, III 8.2, III 24
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Sulpitius, Gaius, Livy's name and one of NM's names for NM's Gnaeus Sulpitius, dictator in 358 B.C., refused to fight Gauls: III 10.1, III 10.2, III 10.3, III 14.3
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Syphax (fl. c. 210 B.C.), king of the Maesulu, defeated by Scipio in 203 B.C.: II 27.4, III 10.3
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Tamyris (*Tomyris*), queen of the Massageti, successfully defended her kingdom against Cyrus in 545 b.c.: II 12.1
Taranto (*Tarentum*), Tarentines, town in Apulia: II 11.2, II 24.3
Tarquinius, Lucius, master of the horse, fought on foot under Cincinnatus in 460 b.c.: III 25
Tarquinius, Sextus, son of Tarquin the Proud, raped Lucretia in 509 b.c.: III 5
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Theodotus, Livy's name for NM's Theodorus, conspired against Hieronymous of Syracuse, captured (215 B.C.): III 6.6
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Tiberius, Roman emperor (14–37), survived conspiracy of Sejanus: III 6.3
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Tigranes, king of Armenia (c. 98–56 B.C.), his cavalry defeated by Lucullus's infantry in 69 B.C.: II 19.1
Timasitheus, prince of Lipari: III 29
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Tyre, city in Phoenicia, resisted Alexander the Great, but conquered in 332 B.C.: II 27.2, II 27.4

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Vailà (*Agnadello*), town in Lombardy, site of French victory over Venice in 1509: III 31.3
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Valerius Corvinus Publicola, *Marcus*, Roman consul six times between 348 and 299 B.C., defeated Samnites (343 B.C.): I 60, II 26, III 22 T, III 22.1, III 22.3–6, III 23, III 37.3, III 37.4, III 38.1
Valerius *Potitus, Lucius*, consul in 449 B.C., criticized decemvirs: I 40.4, I 44.1–2
Valerius *Publicola*, Publius (1), consul in 507 B.C.: I 28
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